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In April 1937

a

Dr.

Robert H. McNeal

Preliminary Commission of Inquiry in

Mexico City heard the defense of Leon Trotsky, the chief defendant in absentia in the Moscow purge trials.

In December

1937 the full Commission of Inquiry, known as the "Dewey

Commission" after its chairman, Professor John Dewey, an-

nounced its verdict in the Trotsky case— "Not Guilty."

The

"counter-trial" is the subject of this dissertation.

Based primarily on research in the Trotsky Archives
in the
(Harvard University), interviews with participants
of the time,
hearings, and readings in periodical literature

Trotsky's "defense."
this study focuses on the quality of
examined, along
However, the Soviet purge trials are also
forming the Commission
with the difficulties encountered in

public opinion.
and the effect of its verdict on
Commission, deThis study concludes that the Dewey
an "impartial" investispite certain deficiencies, conducted
gation.

misinterpreted the
It also concludes that Trotsky

reign.
effect of the purge trials on Stalin's

of "not guilty" contributed to

a

historical judgment:

of
stood accused as the perpetrator
IV

But the verdict

a

great "frame-up."

Stalin

«
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PREFACE
It was a "Time of Troubles" unmatched in the memory
of modern man.

The Soviet Purge of 1936-38 devoured liter-

•4

ally millions of victims in an attempt to liquidate an elu-

sive Fifth Column which allegedly threatened the very exis-

tence of the state.

"Trotskyites

,

"

"Rightists," Mensheviks

Social Revolutionaries, etcetera, etcetera

— they

were all

NKVD

purged in this "witches' sabbath of human reason."

agents, sweeping over the land in their Black Marias, like
a motorized oprichnina

,

brought fear to almost every house-

The great and not-so-great of the nation,

hold in the land.

alike in their fright, scurried for safe niches, waiting for
the storm to abate.

But the ubiquitous

"

seksots "

("secret

collaborators") had created such distrust in Soviet Russia
that many fearful citizens kept a small suitcase packed with

two changes of warm underwear; men talked only to their
wives, and then at night with the blanket pulled over their

heads.

Estimates vary, but the "Great Terror" resulted in

500,000 executions, 7-9 million arrests, and some

8

million

unfortunate souls being sent to "corrective" labor camps,
the catefrom which they rarely emerged alive, passing from

little difgory of "living" to that of "dead," which made

ference to them.

As Aleksander Tvardovsky once wrote,

vi

Who and what for and by whose willFigure it out, History.
The purge has been described as the "first full-

sized example of the hitherto inconceivable ravages which

modern despotism is capable of inflicting on the bodies and
souls of its subjects."

But such massive "ravages" needed

some kind of justification.

The three "show" trials of 1936-

38 were designed to dramatize the mortal danger to the nation

and legitimize the saturnalia of blood inflicted on the pop-

ulace.
1936.

First there was the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial of August

Then came the Py atakov-Radek case of January 1937.

And finally there was the greatest spectacular of all, the
March 1938 trial of Bukharin and Rykov.

In almost every

case the defendants astonished the world by "voluntarily"

confessing that they had conspired to overthrow the Soviet
regime, to liquidate the Party's leadership, and to prepare
the way for Russia's defeat in wartime.

"Old Bolsheviks,"

some of whom were Lenin's close colleagues and members of
his Politburo, heaped self-abuse on their heads and demanded

death for their heinous crimes

— arranging

"medical" murders,

contaminating troop trains with "biological" germs, even
throwing "nails" and "glass" into butter.

A horrified nation

insisted that "the running dogs" be liquidated.
cases the accused received "the supreme penalty,"

In most
a

pistol

shot in the back of the head.
But "enemy number one"

missing from the dock.

(

"vraq nomer pervyj ") was

Lev Davidovich Trotsky had been
vii

exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929, forced to live in one
unsafe haven after another until his assassination in 1940.

During the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial he was living in Norway,
but after January 1937 he resided in Mexico.

In newspapers

and over the airwaves Trotsky learned that he was the
"Judas" of Bolshevism, who had arranged the death of Sergei

Kirov, plotted to fell Stalin, and used terrorism and

wrecking to regain power.

He had even become an "appendage

of Fascism" by aligning himself with the Nazi government.

His goal was a "return to capitalism."

The multiple calum-

nies were like a "delirious" nightmare to Trotsky, something
out of the pages of Dostoevsky.

The chief defendant

iri

absentia

— Trotsky — was

deter-

mined to refute the accusations and turn the accusers into
the accused.

In order to explode the "greatest falsification"

in all of history, however, he needed a platform.

Despite

valiant efforts to arrange an "impartial commission of inquiry," however, there were few takers, until the "American

Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky" arranged to have
an international body hear Trotsky's case.

In April 1937 a

Preliminary Commission, chaired by Professor John Dewey,
opened hearings in
of Coyoacan.

a "Blue

House" in the Mexico City suburb

The "counter-trial" is the subject of this

paper.

******************
viii

Trotsky is the primary subject of this dissertation,
which attempts to assay his understanding of the purge phe-

nomenon and his success in turning Stalin into the accused.
But the history of the American Committee for the Defense of

Leon Trotsky

Inquiry

— or

— known

— and the Commission
Commission" — necessarily is

"Defense Committee"

as the

cluded in this tale.

"Dewey

of

in-

The record is not complete, however.

A book can, and should be devoted just to the efforts of the
American organizers of the investigation.
Moreover, Trotsky's "defense" necessarily omitted

response to the Bukharin-Rykov trial.

a

The Mexican hearings

occurred after the first two "show" trials, but before the
final trial in March 1938.

The last chapter of this study

briefly describes his reaction to the trial of Bukharin and
Company, but the bulk of the paper is devoted to Trotsky's

refutation of the charges in the first two court proceedings.
In truth, however, his views on the trials changed little

from April 1937 to March 1938.
In order to put the "counter-trial" in perspective,

history
the first chapter of this study is concerned with the
of the "Great Purge" until the middle of 1937.

The second

efforts to
chapter details Trotsky's life in exile and his

arrange a "fair" hearing.

The next chapter is devoted to the

of
Defense Committee and the formation of the Commission
the hearings
Inquiry. This is followed by two chapters on

themselves, and

a

final chapter on the aftermath of the

ix

investigation.

A concluding section, in addition, attempts

to evaluate the efforts of the Dewey Commission and Trotsky's

success in turning the tables on Stalin.

A note on transliteration and spelling is in order.
As E. H. Carr has noted,

"No system of transliteration is

satisfactory except to the philologist who has invented it."
The transliteration system used in the English-language ver-

sions of the Moscow court records and the Dewey Commission

reports differs significantly from the standard Library of

Congress system.

In order to avoid confusion, this study

follows the Soviet procedure.

Thus, throughout the paper

the name of a chief defendant is rendered "Pyatakov," not
the more acceptable "Piatakov."

In addition, instead of

writing "center," the Soviet and British spelling

— "centre"

has been followed, in order to avoid two spelling variations
of the same word.

*****************
Many people have assisted in this study.

The edito-

rial assistance of Professors Robert H. McNeal and Milton

Cantor has been of great value.

My

wife— Heidi— has provided

great spiritual support, as has my father.

During the

course of the preparation of this paper three daughters were

born— Alix, Melissa, Kim--who
special way.

also helped me in their own

Not least of all, there has been the consci-

Roberta
entous work of my typists, Mrs. Joan Taylor and Mrs.

Hunting.

I

would like to express gratitude to the various

professors and administrators at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, who provided financial support,
through the years, the sine qua non for the completion
this task.
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CHAPTER
SIGNS OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY:

I

PURGES AND TRIALS

The Great Soviet Purge of 1936-38 is something of an

historical Sphinx, with the answer to the riddle hidden in
the bowels of the Central Committee.

Since Soviet archives

are both distant and inaccessible, the student of The Great

Purge runs the risk of being either too assertive or too

irresolute.

An example of the categorical imperative is the

rather injudicious remark of Nathan Leites in 1954:

"It is

unlikely that we shall ever be able to know much more about
.
i
the Moscow trials than we are now in a position to learn.

.,1

An example of historical timidity carried to an extreme is
an editorial in The Nation in 1937:

"It is possible that it

will be another hundred years before all the actual facts

about the recent Soviet trials are known."

readers to "suspend judgment "

dred years

— on

Soviet charges.

— apparently

It then advised

for another hun-

some of the most important aspects, of the
2

bare
Actually the historical cupboard is not totally
the Moscow trials.
of scraps of information pertaining to

As a result of Nikita

S.

Khrushchev's revelations about

archive was
Joseph Stalin's "crimes," the door to the Party

opened

a crack,

emerge
allowing certain tantalizing clues to

from the dark past.

is
Now the historian of the Great Purge

in roughly the same position as the historian of the Middle

Ages of the Lower Empire who, Robert Conquest suggests,
"after having for many years covered his subject by means of
a

handful of inscriptions and two or three chronicles (one

of them falsified for reasons of state), finds half-a-dozen

new codices, including confidential official documents."

•a

Despite the mysterious circumstances of The Great
Purge, it is no more

table.

a

complete enigma than China is inscru-

Even in 1936-38 many clues to this disorder were

available to the diligent researcher.

There was, for ex-

ample, the Soviet system itself.

I.

The Purge Formula

The essential ingredients for a diabolical formula
of incredible potential were inherent from her earliest

years.

The three main prerequisites

terror, show trial

— were

1920s and early 1930s.

would be created.

— party

purge, mass

no strangers to Soviet life in the

Once they coalesced,

a

critical mass

Once the political decision permitted

such a merger, fusion was inevitable.

Stalin made the nec-

essary decision.
The Party Purge
The

"

"clean-up," or
life,

— variously translated as "purge,"
"combing-out — was a familiar facet of Party

chistka "

"

and indeed of Russian history.

4

During the years of

the
underground struggle, there was an obvious need for

infiltrators and agents
Bolshevik Party to weed out Tsarist

provocateurs.

But given V. I. Lenin's insistence on the

necessity of a disciplined and monolithic cadre of professional revolutionaries, there was a duty to purge all oppor-

tunists and half-hearted fellow-travellers from the Party's
ranks, not to mention those who dared question Lenin's om-

niscience.

With victory in 1917 the need for such "self-

cleansings" increased, if anything.

Hordes of self-seeking

careerists suddenly discovered the material and political

benefits that Bolshevik sanctif ication bestowed.

But only

the truly righteous were equal to the awesome tasks facing
the Party:

conclude a bitter Civil War; liquidate the

former ruling classes; and create the new society.

Few were

equal to the call.
Thus, there was a need for a reliable method to en-

sure the Party's purity, efficiency, and "democratic" nature
The chistka was designed to weed out the impure and ineffi-

cient, and subject the Party's leadership as well as its

rank-and-file to intensive scrutiny.

sirability

In practice, the de-

of "democratic controls" from the bottom gave

way to the superior wisdom

— demand

for loyalty tov the summit

As Zbigniew K. Brzezinski has written,

Despite their official celebration of the democratic aspect, they /the leaders/ conceived of
the role of the masses in the purge as being
like beaters flushing the foxes out in a foxhunt, whose goal is to assist in locating the
But it is the hunters on horseback
victims.
5
(or the secret police) who make the kill.
If not "democratic" in result, the Party purge was rela-

tively successful in eliminating the passive and the

unreliable, the self-seekers and the heretics.

Periodically,

every Party member had to run this "hazardous gauntlet" in
order '"to justify the lofty title of member of the Party.'" 6
In the same way that a democratic politician expects, from
time to time, to face the scrutiny of the voters, the Party

functionary expects to face the stern inquisition of

a

con-

trol commission.^

Mass Terror
The second essential ingredient in this diabolical

recipe was mass terror.

State-inspired violence has been

part-and-parcel of the Russian experience.

IV s

Certainly Ivan

"hooded order of vigilantes," the Oprichnina

,

and Peter

the Great's torture chamber, the Preobrazhenskii prikaz

were worthy models for the Soviet secret police.

,

Even

though the party purge and mass terror were closely inter-

twined—indeed, had

a

symbiotic relationship—they were not

identical in the early years of Bolshevik rule.

Whereas

the purge was basically a "non-violent," intra-Party affair,
foes.
the "Red Terror" was originally directed at external

underMuch terrorized by the Tsarist Okhrana during their
Party
ground years, the leaders of the triumphant Bolshevik

coming to power.
had few qualms about squaring matters after
the use of
Certainly Lenin and Trotsky did not shrink from

victory of their
"stern revolutionary justice" to ensure the

sacred cause.

Unlike those "sentimental" liberals, the

their "tough-minded"
Bolshevik leaders took perverse pride in

willingness to liquidate the class enemy, be it mighty Tsar
or lowly tramp.

But terror was not to be dispensed in an in-

discriminate manner.

It was to be applied in rational doses,

commensurate with the problem at hard.

Although the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection was not an
especially bloody affair, the Party was soon awash in rivers
The "traitorous" behavior of the Left Social-

of blood.

Revolutionaries and the "inhuman" cruelty of the "White
Terror" during the Civil War left the Bolsheviks no choice:

terror was to be applied mercilessly against the enemy.

It

was Trotsky, in particular, who later argued that the "Red

Terror" was only a logical and necessary response to the
And, indeed, the Ukraine endured a gory

"White Terror."

occupation at the hands of the White forces.

But the pro-

verbial problem of which came first, the chicken or the egg,

complicates the problem.

It can be argued that the Whites

the
were only following the lead of the Reds in terrorizing

land.

Adam

B.

Ulam, for one, has concluded that, "Far from

Bolshevik
being a regrettable necessity, the extent of the

terror was one of the factors that made victory
War more difficult."

i<n

the Civil

g

Certainly the Bolshevik Party institutionalized

violence at an early date.

In December 1917, the CHEKA, or

CounterThe Extraordinary Commission for Combating

Revolution and Sabotage, was established.
brave Chekists'

"

In charge of "'our

often
Lenin appointed Felix Dzerzhinsky,

or blemish,'" by
referred to as "'a knight without fear

Soviet admirers.

9

Dzerzhinsky may have had honorable in-

tentions, but hardly the same could be said for his subordinates,

all too often renowned for their sadism.

Even

Dzerzhinsky himself once lamented that, "'Only saints or
scoundrels can serve in the GPU /successor to the CHEKA/,
but now the saints are running away from me and

with the scoundrels.'"

1

I

am left

By September 1918, this police

organization was authorized to sentence and execute class
foes without referring the cases to revolutionary tribunals.

In the first full year of Bolshevik rule the CHEKA offi-

cially executed 6300 enemies of Bolshevik power, including
1173 in the ominous category of "miscellaneous."
was a staunch supporter of Dzerzhinsky

'

s

11

Lenin

cadres and even

used the threat of terror "administratively" to cut red tape
and improve bureaucratic efficiency.

Despite many examples of random cruelty, it can

hardly be said that the use of mass terror was countenanced
1921-28.
by the Party during the "tranquil" years of NEP,

early 1930s.
But this situation changed radically during the
in greatly
Forced collectivization of the peasantry resulted"

increased use of force.

Some of the kulaks and serednyaki

expropriation.
(middle peasants) took unkindly to their
In some cases peasant bands, armed
Fierce battles ensued.
engagements with GPU dewith pitchforks, fought desperate
and even planes and
rifles,
automatic
with
armed
tachments,
to five million
There was a great loss of life (three
tanks.
an even greater loss of
and
causes),
various
from
peasants,

I

7

livestock (some 42 million cattle, for instance).
open question which loss

— human

or animal

— was

It is an

the most

bothersome to the Party.
As a result of this violent clash in the countryside,
the Party was placed on a war footing.

Military measures

became the norm for achieving social reforms.
mass terror dosed out in modest amounts.

No longer was

If anything, the

use of violence became almost "banal," and opened the way for
the mass slaughter of other sections of the populace,

Once limitations on the

finally reaching the Party itself.

use of violence had been relaxed, not even the Party could

escape its ever-widening spasm.

The creators of the terror

As Bertram D. Wolfe has written,

became its victims.

...

if there is one thing that is certain
about the use of total terror to solve the complex problems of economics, politics and
thought the incalculable affairs of men in
society it is that one cannot have recourse
to terror on a scale sufficient to embrace all
the affairs of society without its spilling
over into the very group that uses it.
The universal cruelty of the early thirties
coarsened and brutalized the whole of life. It
inured men to the idea of using torture and
death to settle what was unsettled, to make
certain what was uncertain, to silence, uproot,

—
—

crush opposition, compel approval, remake men
All-encompassing torment and
and their lives.
death spread like a plague through the countryside, then into the cities, then into the
1
party.
.

.

.

The nation, then, had been bloodied.

fears were realized.
kind.

By 1935 Lenin's worst

The Party had begun to devour its own

8

The "Show" Trial
The so-called "show" trial completes this unholy

trinity.

But once again the Soviet dramatists unconsciously

borrowed from the late fifteenth-century.

At that time the

"Judaizer" heretics were forced to appear in public trial

before ecclesiastic judges in order to be read out of the
true church. 14

During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet de-

fenders of the one-and-only faith also turned to public
dramas as a means of exorcising heresy.

1

Rather amateurish

in conception, the early trials abounded in blunders. 16

they also served a useful purpose.

But

In Robert Conquest's

phrase, a "pilot model" for the successful trial was

developed.

"The Judge"

(V.

V. Ulrikh)

and "The Prosecutor"

(Andrei Vyshinsky) gained valuable experience.

Vyshinsky,

in particular, learned the technique of impressing an out-

landish story on browbeaten witnesses, and also became adept
at obscuring embarrassing discrepancies in the court

testimony.

In fact, he learned that discrepancies in detail
"'In totalitarian propaganda the details

were of small note.

do not matter,'" Arthur Koestler once observed.

important to d?^zzle the public with
more complicated the better.

a

17
*

But it was

complicated plot, the

Faced with a labyrinth of

underground conspiratorial contacts, the public would lose
sight of the lack of evidence.

only made Vyshinsky'

s

Material proof, in fact,

task more difficult.

In this regard

Robert Conquest quoted the Minister of War in Penguin Island,
exclaimed
who, in discussing charges against a Jewish officer,

"Proofs!
Of course it is good to have proofs
but perhaps it is better to have none at all
the Pyrot affair, as I arranged it, left no
room
for criticism; there was no spot at which it
could be touched.
it defied assault.
It was
invulnerable because it was invisible.
," 18
'

.

.

The stage should be as ill-lit as possible to ensure
the

success of the production.
The lack of material proof was also obscured, para-

doxically, by publishing "verbatim" transcripts of the
trials.

Following the completion of the Pyatakov-Radek

proceedings (1937), and also that of Bukharin-Rykov (1938),
the Soviet authorities issued 600-page tomes, so impressive
in their weight and wealth of detail that they graced many a

New York coffee table in the late 1930s.
largely unread.

They also remained

Stalin well understood that most critical

faculties become listless when confronted with such massive
documents.

Recently Nikita Khrushchev has written that
"never liked it when someone seemed to have

Stalin, himself,

...

less than absolute faith in statements that exposed and de-

nounced conspiracies."

19

If so, he shared this failing with

many western intellectuals of the Thirties who confused
words with facts

,

and a profusion of words with the gospel

truth.
The very complexity and incredibility of the well-

publicized trials served

a

special purpose:

purge itself from critical attention.

to shroud the

Even Trotsky, as we

shall observe, tended to ignore the vast dimensions of the

nation's purification, choosing, instead, to concentrate his

j

10

powerful mind on the trials' manifold absurdities.

recently

More

Brzezinski has attempted to redress the balance

Z.

of attention.

He has dismissed the trials out of hand as

mere "frosting on the cake," just the keynote to the purge
*
itself.
i

20

Without denying that the trials served to dramatize
the purge, it should also be noted that they tended to

legitimize

(

of ormlenye

)

the "self-cleansing" process.

Spectacular accounts of treason in Moscow justified the arrest of innumerable "enemies of the people" in every nook
As Robert Tucker has

and cranny of the far-flung nation.

explained this process, the purge trials served "a political
symbolic function, which was to provide

a

rationale for the

purge, to make publicly meaningful the campaign of arrests

that was going on night after night."

21

Besides providing ideological vindication for the

all-Union dragnet, the court proceedings made credible the
incredible.

Without such abject displays of self-debasement

the renowned revolutionary names of Bukharin, Rykov

Rakovsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al

.

,

might have become

Bolshevik martyrs at some point in the future.

It was cru-

and portray them
cial to destroy their reputations publicly

people and for
"in the blackest possible light for the

posterity

.

22

was part
This falsification of the Party's history
inside out and impress a
truth
turn
to
effort
broader
of a
To this purpose
gross untruth on the nation's memory.

Pravda and other organs of the Soviet press devoted immense
amounts of space as they reported the trials.

Day after day

their columns featured lengthy excerpts of the testimony,
revelations of new conspiracies unearthed in obscure places,
and indignant demands by such-and-such a factory that the

running dogs be shot.
heights.

Mass indoctrination had reached new

Stalin's productions made it all but impossible to

separate truth from legend.
Thus, the great show trials of 1936-38 cannot be

Deciphering these "hieroglyphs" allows the student

ignored.

of Stalin's Russia to peer dimly into a distant society, one

beset by an acute case of "social pathology," to paraphrase
Robert Tucker.

23

II.

The Curtain Rises

By the early 1930s conditions were ripe for the out-

break of a political tragedy of unprecedented proportions.
The party purge, mass terror, the show trial

advanced stage of readiness.

— all

were in an

But a political catalyst was

needed to fuse the three elements and trigger the expected
reaction.

On December 1, 1934, the missing catalyst was

supplied, when Sergei M. Kirov was assassinated in

Leningrad's historic Smolny palace.

With pardonable ex-

"the crime
aggeration Robert Conquest has called this murder

of the century."

Before the "Kirov affair" was settled, hun-

crime and
dreds were shot for direct complicity in the
^ 24
involved.
indirectly
literally millions perished for being
n

It was the signal for the opening act of the great tragedy.

The Kirov Affair

Sergei Mironovich Kirov, the Party's Viceroy for the

Northern Palmyra of Leningrad, was

a

rough-and-ready

Stalinist, of the type which loudly supported the "General

Line."

A veteran of Civil War intrigues in the Caucasus,

Kirov had subsequently been responsible for purging the
Zinoviev apparatus in Leningrad and constructing the blood-

stained White Sea-Baltic Canal project, two "credits" that
forever exempted him from the ranks of humanitarians.

But

despite his strong-armed tactics, there are several reports
that his solicitude for the Leningrad workers, his personal

courage and accessibility, and his considerable oratorical
ability had made him that rarity among genuine Stalinists,
a truly popular Party leader.

25

Certainly he was a man on

the rise.

Although Kirov was ostensibly Stalin's man, there
was some friction,

willed leaders.

apparently, between the two strong-

Trouble had surfaced in 1932 with the ap-

pearance of the so-called "Riutin Platform."

Bearing the

and
name of Mikhail N. Riutin, a veteran Party worker
in
"Rightist," this manifesto assayed the Party's situation

1932,

and concluded that,

'"The Right wing has proved cor-

criticism of
rect in the economic field, and Trotsky in his
the regime of the Party.'"

26

More to the point, the plat-

depicting him as
form devoted some fifty pages to Stalin,
who, motivated by
the "evil genius of the Russian Revolution

vindictiveness and lust for power, had brought the

Revolution to the verge of ruin." 27

terpreted as

a call

Shaken by what he in-

for his assassination, Stalin demanded

that the GPU summarily execute the impetuous Riutin; but
after the "buck" had been passed up several Party echelons,
the Politburo majority decided otherwise.

It is said that

Kirov "spoke with particular force against recourse to the

death penalty."

28

Stalin had suffered

a

rare rebuff, one

29
that would rankle for years to come.

Stalin's pique was also exacerbated by Kirov's

growing popularity within high Party ranks, especially for
his "reform program."

In some academic circles Kirov has

been credited with sponsoring

a

"'policy of reconciliation,'"

one that would have considerably lessened the nation's in-

ternal divisions.

It is said that he advocated offering re-

prieves to ex-oppositionists, ending terror within the
Party, easing the lot of the peasantry, and stressing

"proletarian humanism" in Party propaganda.

All of these

measures were predicated on the supposition that the regime's
external foe, Nazi Germany, was

a

much more dangerous ad-

versary than any internal malcontents.

If true, this thesis

directly clashed with Stalin's theory that as socialism ap-

proached complete victory, the enemy became increasingly
.

.

desperate, resulting in more violent class conflicts.

30

Whatever Kirov's program, he must have been doing

something right.

There are several reports that he was wel-

comed in January 1934

to the Party's XlVth Congress- "The

Congress of Victors "—with

a

spontaneous ovation approaching

the dimensions of the applause given to the "Beloved Leader.

1,31

And at this Congress, more aptly named the "Congress of the
Condemned," considering the high mortality rate of its delegates in coming years, Kirov was named one of the Party's
"co-equal" secretaries, along with Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich,
and Andrei A. Zhdanov. 32

Later in the year (November 25-28),

the Central Committee of the Party held one of its periodic

plenums, at which, according to Nicolaevsky, it

"

accepted

the whole of Kirov's grand plan ," but only published the

economic planks.

33

After the conclusion of this Plenum, Kirov hurried
back to Leningrad to report to the city's aktiv (most active
Party members) on the Central Committee's decisions, and

possibly to inform it of his imminent transferal to
post in Moscow.

new

a

But he never returned to the capital.

in the afternoon of December

1,

1934,

Late

as the shadows

lengthened in the long corridors of his Smolny headquarters,
a shot sounded.

Stunned Party officials ran out into one of

the hallways to find Kirov lying dead on the floor.

guard was in sight.

But alongside the dead leader lay a

Nagan revolver and one Leonid
,

,

.

No

V.

Nikolayev, apparently over-

.34

come by his act.

Despite close scrutiny, many of the elements of the
"crime of the century" have never been adequately explained.

For instance, the assassin still remains
A veteran Party worker, Nikolayev'

s

a

shadowy figure.

career had suffered some

setbacks in the early 1930s.

obscure post at
countryside,

a

a

At one point he was offered an

Machine Tractor Station (MTS) in the

position he refused on the grounds of "ill-

health," possibly epilepsy.

The "club-footed Lenka," as he

was called, was in the doldrums, having lost his wife, job,
and even, temporarily, his Party membership. 35
in his "diary," confiscated after the murder,

Certain pages
are said to

regret the loss of friendly relations within the Party, the

former "'blood brotherhood'" which Nikolayev missed dearly.
Perhaps this regrettable situation could be underlined with
a

terrorist act.

He had read deeply in the memoirs of the

Narodovoltsi and Social-Revolutionaries, and "regarded his
own act as the continuation of the terrorist activity of the

Russian revolutionaries of the past."

36

Whether he was a

"typical representative of that younger generation" which,

after experiencing much anguish in the early years of the
Party, emerged finally "with nerves shattered, health broken,
and soul deeply seared,"

37

he was certainly a misfit in

Stalin's Russia.

Another explanation of Nikolayev'

s

motives stressed

his burning hatred for the "'evil genius— Kirov

!,'

"

who not

only personally blocked his Party career, but had even se-

duced his lovely wife.

However, a source who claimed to have

personally known the "beauty" suggested that if Nikolayev
had found his wife in bed with Kirov "'he'd have been beside
himself with joy,'"

enchantress

38

since she was something less than an

16

However, the generally accepted version is that the
local NKVD was searching for just such a malcontent.

Ac-

cording to several reports, one of Nikolayev's "friends" (an
agent provocateur

)

betrayed his comrade to Ivan Zaporozhets,

deputy head of the Leningrad NKVD, and was directed, in turn,
to turn Nikolayev's generalized anger into a hatred for

Kirov.

39

Support for this view comes from the fact that

Nikolayev made at least one abortive attempt to reach Kirov.

Arrested near Smolny, he was discovered to be carrying
volver and certain incriminating evidence (either

a

a re-

"note-

book" or "chart"), that clearly indicated his intentions.

Yet Zaporozhets ordered him released!

Certainly this

"strange liberalism" on the part of the local NKVD was
40
1,-1
w
suspicious.
highly
.

.

Once the "tragic" news had been relayed to Moscow,

Stalin wasted no time in hurrying to Leningrad, accompanied

by several of his closest henchmen.

One report has Genrikh

Yagoda, overall chief of the NKVD, briefing Stalin on the

situation at the Leningrad train station, and being slapped
"'You nincompoop,'" supposedly shouted Stalin,

in turn.

"•Don't you know how to protect the leaders of the working

class?'"

41

Stalin took personal charge of the investigation,

and even interrogated the assassin, who was anything but

servile in the presence of the "Plowman," and boasted that
he had really directed the shot at the Party.

42

In addition,

loyal
he ordered the guestioning of one Borisov, Kirov's

unaccountably
factotum and erstwhile bodyguard, who had been

absent when the fatal shot was fired.

Without

a

doubt

Borisov could have shed much light on the mysterious circumstances of the murder but, "unfortunately," he died in
truck "accident" on the way to his interrogation.
A

a

(No one

O

else was injured.

Stalin's deep grief at the murder of one of his own
was so marked that he publicly kissed the cheek of the

corpse as it lay in state; nonetheless, he was able to control his sorrow and attend to matters of state. 44

Within

hours after the murder decisive action was authorized, the
.famous "Kirov

Decree/ one of those happy "contingency"
1

pi ans that governments prepare beforehand in case of just

such a "crisis."

As revealed by Khrushchev, this decree

ordered:

Investigative agencies are directed to
speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.
"2.
Judicial organs are directed not to
hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to
consider the possibility of pardon, because the
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the USSR does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.
"3.
The organs of the Commissariat of
Internal Affairs are directed to execute the
death sentences against criminals of the abovementioned category immediately after the passage
of sentences "45
"1

.

.

Soviet police authorities were ordered to complete such
cases in no more than ten days, and not to accept the repu-

diation of confessions, no matter how obtained.

Relatives

of the accused were also considered responsible for their

alleged actions.

46

In short, Yagoda had been given

a

free

18

hand.

Bloodshed was the order of the day.
Kirov's death was to be mercilessly avenged, but the

identity of Nikolayev's accomplices was under advisement.
Three different sects were officially blamed in the coming
weeks.

First it was the turn of the "White Guardists."

Soviet investigative agencies discovered that scores of

emigre terrorists had penetrated the border in order to aid
the murder conspiracy.

In addition,

a

Finnish consul, who

later became the "Latvian" consul in Leningrad, one
Bisseneks, had given the assassin some 5,000 rubles to

further the plot.

Although the consul was allowed to

quietly leave the country, the "White Guard" terrorists were
swiftly liquidated for their role in the crime, even though
they had been residing in Soviet prisons before the act.

47

Besides ordering the execution of hundreds of such "agents,"

Yagoda also directed that thousands of political suspects be
hastily arrested and sent to Siberia, the so-called "Kirov
flood."

48

As for Nikolayev, and his "group"

(now numbering

fourteen), a secret trial was held on December 28-29 before
a

specially appointed Military Collegium of the Supreme

Court.

The trial was brief.

The Soviet press announced

the execution of all the accused on December 30th.

49

With

the physical elimination of Nikolayev and his coterie the

Soviet leadership allowed this particular leitmotif to disappear quietly from stage center.

The "Latvian consul" and

"White Guard" terrorists were omitted from all subsequent

versions of the crime.

Even Nikolayev himself was permitted

19

to vanish into a historical limbo, mentioned only when abso-

lutely necessary.
The second official version of the murder complicated
the plot immeasurably.

At his trial in camera Nikolayev had

been identified as a member of the '"Leningrad center'" of
Zinoviev's followers.

In fact, G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, and

thirteen others had been arrested two weeks earlier, on
December 16.

50

It is quite probable that they were the orig-

inal quarry in this political hunt, triggered by the assassination, but Nikolayev' s intransigence under questioning forced

impromptu changes in the script. 51

At some point Stalin ap-

parently decided to implicate his former political allies no

matter how confusing the result;

a

Soviet source claims that

Stalin personally picked the members of the "Leningrad" and
"Moscow" centers and that this "roll," in his own hand-

writing, still existed in 1956.

52

On January 15-16, 1935,

this group was tried for stimulating the terrorist pro-

clivities of the Nikolayev band.

Although the accused

pleaded not guilty and denied many of the specific points in
the indictment, Zinoviev did accept "moral and political

responsibility" for the act.

He was quoted as declaring,

The task that I see confronting me at this
stage is to repent fully, frankly and sincerely,
before the court of the working class, of what I
understood to be a mistake and a crime, and to
say it in such a way that it should all end,
53
once and for all, with this group.'

".

.

.

For their efforts the accused received sentences ranging

from five to ten years.

More important, they had capitulated

20

once again and become logical candidates for a future trial,

much more deadly in nature.
On January 23, 1935, yet another group was tried in

connection with Kirov's murder.

The blame was extended to

the NKVD detachment in Leningrad.

Zaporozhets and eleven

other police functionaries were charged with nonfeasance:
'".

.

.

having received information about the preparations

for the attempt on

S.

M.

Kirov

.

.

.

they failed to take the

necessary measures to prevent the assassination

.

.

.

al-

though they had every possible means of arresting it.'" 54
Such failures to perform official duties in the Soviet Union

normally resulted in the forfeit of life.

Yet, incredibly,

the convicted NKVD officials received two-to-three years in
a

labor camp.

Suspicions were heightened when it was

learned that they were given special treatment in the camps,
and even allowed to receive expensive gifts.

their luck turned.

55

But in 1937

In his "Secret Speech" Khrushchev re-

vealed that,
After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of
the Leningrad NKVD were given very light senWe Can astences, but in 1937 they were shot.
sume that they were shot in order to cover the
traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing.
(Movement in the hall.) 5 ^

the
But Khrushchev refrained from naming the "organizers" of

crime
The mysterious involvement of the NKVD in Kirov's
Guardsdeath undermined the official fable that the White

cum-Zinovievites were responsible for the dastardly act.

I

It

21

seemed only logical that Zaporozhets would never have taken
such a cavalier attitude towards the life of a ranking Party

official unless he was following orders. 57

This suspicion

was confirmed in the March 1938 trial of Bukharin and Rykov.
It now appeared that G. Yagoda had ordered Zaporozhets to

ease Nikolayev's path.

The head of the NKVD, in turn, was

acting on orders given him by A. Yenukidze, who oversaw

Kremlin security. 58

Only in 1956 did the Soviet authorities

cast doubt on this version.

Khrushchev declared that he was

not satisfied with the earlier investigation:
It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide
many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination.
There are reasons for the suspicion that the
killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by
someone from among the people whose duty it
was to protect the person of Kirov. 59

At. the XXIInd Party Congress in October, 1961, Khrushchev

announced that

a

thorough investigation into the complicated

case was continuing, but the "'more deeply we study the mate-

rials connected with Kirov's death, the more guestions
arise.

.

.

.

'"

Apparently more guestions are still

arising, for a res judicata is still lacking in the case.

Did Stalin directly order Kirov's murder?

There

were "transparent hints" to that effect, as Svetlana

Alliluyeva wrote in 1963, but she could not believe that her
father would have Kirov eliminated:
asserted,

"He was one of us," she

"an old colleague and friend.

and was attached to him."

My father liked him

Stalin may have committed many

22

crimes, but "I'll never believe my father was involved in
this particular death," affirmed his dutiful daughter. 61

In

truth, the evidence against Stalin is highly speculative.

Kirov's death may have been "the keystone of the entire edifice of terror and suffering by which Stalin secured his

grip on the Soviet peoples/

1

62

being a consummate opportunist.

but this only convicts him of

More likely is the supposi-

tion Stalin desired to use an abortive attempt on Kirov's
life to justify new reprisals against the opposition

but,

"To Stalin's dismay, Nikolayev's attempt succeeded," suggests

John Armstrong.

In fact, this was Trotsky's view in 1934.

63

If the Kirov murder remains a political enigma of
the first magnitude, then the later show trials are also

shrouded in mystery, for this act, among all the alleged
poisonings, mine explosions, train wrecks, ad infinitum

,

was the "only proven crime" in this phantasmagoria of deadly
sins.

The

"
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The key to the trials continues to be Kirov.

Soviet Spring "

With the "final solution" of the Kirov problem in

January 1935, it appeared that the skies had cleared and
that the Soviet Union was about to enjoy some balmy political weather.

Outwardly the spring of 1935 seemed to con-

tinue beyond its natural limits, and become a "'Soviet
spring,

1

"

one that extended into the next year.

65

Optimism was inspired by several favorable omens.
Food rationing was discontinued by late 1935.

The inhuman

tempos of the collectivization and industrialization cam-

paigns were muted.
a

Peasants were even allowed to cultivate

hectare of their own land and own

a

few chickens and pigs.

Traditional Russian heroes like Alexander Nevsky and General
Suvorov were resurrected, while Pushkin once more became a

hallowed name.

Some gaiety even appeared.

Party functions

were likely to feature exhibitions of the foxtrot and the
tango.

Wives of high officials displayed their new jewels

and fashionable gowns; their husbands sported pressed

trousers.

The Soviet press even suggested that it was

highly proper to erect Christmas trees on New Year's Day,

concession to nostalgia.
Stalin declared in 1935.

a

"'Life is getting better, happier,'
66

The year 1935 was also marked by two much applauded

innovations
policy.

— "Stalin's

Constitution" and the "Popular Front"

During much of 1935 and 1936 the press avidly dis-

cussed the work of a constitutional commission, chaired by
Stalin himself, which was attempting to write the "most

democratic" of all constitutions, one that would authorize
the secret ballot and safeguard individual liberties,

other desirable reforms.

among

No matter that this document would

legitimize the Party's absolute authority within the Soviet
system,

its implied sanction of "democratic liberties" was

warmly welcomed, especially in the West, where Louis Fischer,
among others, wrote rapturous articles about this "model"

constitution.

67

Then the VII th (and last) Congress of the Comintern,

held in Moscow in August 1935, put the seal of approval
on
the "Popular Front" strategy.

would become

a

Henceforth the Soviet Union

defender of the Versailles settlement and

member of the League of Nations, and it would join with

a

all

"peace loving" peoples in opposing the overwhelming threat

posed by Hitlerite Germany.
it was necessary for all

In order to save civilization

"democratic" and "semi-democratic"

forces to forget past differences and unite their energies
in a crusade against the forces of darkness.

Front" was the slogan of the day.
vol to-

1

,icc

The "Popular

With this dramatic

the Soviet Union ended its role as the inter-

national outcast and earned

a

certain respectability as the

leader of the anti-fascist forces.
But this "lull" was deceptive.

As Arthur Koestler

observed, it was like the period of suspense in Daniel

Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year

,

"between the first ap-

pearance of the plague, and its full outbreak several months
later."
"Note;;
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The "halcyon days" of 1935-36 diverted attention

from other, more ominous departures.

"Alas, how naive were

all these hopes of ours!," lamented an "Old Bolshevik."

Ho

could not, in retrospect, understand how the "symptoms" of

impending havoc were ignored.

In actuality, the trend was

of
away from reconciliation and toward the intensification

terror within the Party, until it reached its
logical conclusion, the "physical extermination of all those
whose Party

past might make

power

t hem

opponents of Stalin or aspirants to his

69
.

Some of these "symptoms'
a new

involved personnel changes:

1

breed assumed leading positions of authority.

one hand, Valerian Kuibyshev,

a

On the

loyal Stalinist of rather

temperate nature suddenly died of "natural causes" in

January 1935. 70

On the other hand, Nikolai Yezhov, a "blood-

thirsty dwarf" destined to become

a

world-wide celebrity,

assumed Kirov's vacated post as secretary of the Central
Committee, and also became chief of the Central Control

Commission

the official purge apparatus

#

.

His assistant for

Party affairs was Georgi Malenkov, an ambitious young careerist, eager to fulfill almost any task, no matter how noxious.

Heading Stalin

1

s

personal secretariat was A. N. Poskrebyshev

his "faithful dog,

this company.

11

whose amorality was noteworthy even for

In addition, Nikita Khrushchev and Andrei

Zhdanov were pi aced in charge of the all-important Party

organizations in Moscow and Leningrad, respectively.

The

post of Attorney-General fell to Andrei Vyshinsky, whose re-

lationship to the Party has been described as that of

a

"gangland lawyer," but who managed to outlive his legion of
detractors.

7

A wrecking crew of impressive credentials had

been formed to implement Stalin's bidding.
There were other signs of subterranean activity,

other disquieting signs.

In April 1935 the regime issued a

26

draconian decree that made children over the age of
twelve
liable to all legal penalties, including capital

punishment.

This decree had a wonderous effect in encouraging
"voluntary

confessions," for many of the accused in later proceedings
could not bear to have their children arrested as accomplice

with all this entailed.

Also in May-June 1935

the Society

of Old Bolsheviks was disbanded, along with the Society of

Former Political Prisoners and Exiles.

Both societies were

dedicated to the revolutionary ideals of October, which
meant they were millstones around Stalin's neck, for he was
intent upon liquidating the revolutionary generation.
At this point in the scenario reality, in the form

o

an actual attempt on Stalin's life, may have insinuated it-

self into the story.

Details are few, but three puzzling

incidents of some importance occurred during May-July 1935:
a

number of Kremlin guards secretly stood trial; Abel

Yenukidze was suddenly relieved of his post as Secretary of
the Central Executive Committee;

and Lev Kamenev received

another five years on his prison sentence.

These events may

be interrelated.

Almost nothing is known of the Kremlin Guard affair,
except that in "the spring of 1935" some forty members of
Stalin's bodyguard were tried

ceived the death penalty.
of the Kremlin

— the

73

iri

camera

.

Two of them re-

At the same time the commandant

Latvian A. A. Petersen

his post and later eliminated.

— was

relieved of

A rather romantic figure,

Petersen had once commanded Trotsky's famous armored train

during the Civil War.

74

Apparently linked to this affair were two other
developments:

an attack on Stalin by a "princess in the

Kremlin library/' and Yenukidze's fall from favor.

Accounts

vary both in details and accuracy, but it has been suggested
that Yenukidze, a staunch supporter of the arts, was struck

by the beauty of a would-be artist and sometime librarian,
one Zoya Nikitina.

Eager to brighten his chief's life, he

arranged for this daughter of White Guard emigrees to arrange some books in the Kremlin library, while Stalin

scrutinized her from a secret peephole in an adjacent room.
But the hyper-suspicious Stalin was disturbed by the young

lady's peculiar cape, and ordered her searched.

To his con-

sternation it was discovered that she had concealed under
the cape "a small pistol loaded with poison bullets."

parently she met

a

Ap-

swift end, along with hundreds of her

acquaintances in the Komsomol

75

This tale seems highly suspect, but Yenukidze's dis-

missal occurred at the time.

76

A fellow Georgian and in-

timate friend of the Alliluyev family, Yenukidze had long

been Stalin's crony, and had overseen the management of the
Kremlin, including its security.
nature,

78

77

Well noted for his warm

it is possible that he attempted to ease the lot

of those sentenced in the January 1935 trial of the "Moscow

center."

In this connection he supposedly told his inter-

rogators that he once pleaded with Stalin to stop the repres
sion

:

28

"'Soso,'" I told him, "'there is no denying
they have wronged you, but they have already
suffered enough for that: you expelled them
from the party, you keep them in prison, their
children have nothing to eat.
" 'Soso,'"
I said, '"they are old Bolsheviks,
like you and me. You are not going to shed the'
blood of old Bolsheviks! Think what the world
will say about us!'
"He gave me a look as if I had murdered his
father and said,
'"Remember Abel, who is not with me is
7§
against me
!

'

In June 1935, Yenukidze was dismissed from his post at the

Central Executive Committee and accused of shielding enemies
of the Party, such as "'former princes, ministers, courtiers,

Trotskyites, etc.,'"

a real

"'counter-revolutionary nest.'" 80

For his efforts he was relegated to running "health resorts"
in the Northern Caucasus.

Eventually arrested but never

properly conditioned to appear in a public trial, he was
secretly executed in December, 1937.

8

Then Lev Kamenev was tried again in July 1935, by
most accounts

a

superfluous act of vengefulness

.

Yet the

"Old Bolshevik" confided to B. Nicolaevsky that this '"second

Kamenev trial'" was held "in connection with

a

terroristic

conspiracy against the life of Stalin," one which also in-

volved the Kremlin guard.

Although innocent of any wrong-

doing, Kamenev was once more attacked in

discredit the Opposition.

a

further effort to

"Apparently there was

truth in the case," added Nicol aevsky

'

s

a

grain of

highly placed in-

formant, involving at least talk about eliminating Stalin.

Also convinced that there was "a grain of truth in
the story," Robert Conquest has written that Kamenev was

82

implicated through his brother, one Rosenfeld, who was married to

doctor assigned to the Kremlin.

a

After Rosenfeld

testified against his brother in the secret trial, Kamenev
received

a

ten-year sentence, convicted under

a

statute ap-

plying to terrorist acts against Soviet officials. 83
If the "covert struggle over this case dominated the
ensuing period," 84 as Conquest has contended, then perhaps

the assassination "attempt" on Stalin's life figured in the

show trials.

Certainly the accused were credited with

myriad of efforts to liquidate Stalin, often of

a

a

bizarre

nature, as we shall observe.

It is impossible to go beyond

speculation here, but there is

a

highly tenuous link between

the "attempt" in the Kremlin library and Trotsky, through

Kamenev (Trotsky's brother-in-law) and Petersen, his former
companion-in-arms.

Indeed, various "grains of historical

truth" did find their way into the trials' records.

It is

not beyond the realm of possibility that an actual attempt
on Stalin's life, involving the opposition in some way, was
a

motivating factor in staging the trials and conducting

a

massive purge of the Party.
The Pace Quickens

All during the period of 1933-35

a

Party purge was

in process, one that cleansed its ranks of at least 315,000

"•rogues, kulaks, white-guards, counter-revolutionary

trotskyites, zinovievites

elements.'"

85

,

double-crossers and other hostile

But on December 25, 1935, the Central

30

Committee of the Party declared the purge

ordered its cessation.

success and

a

This was not the end of the purifi-

cation drive, however, for in January 1936

a

new purge began

under the guise of "exchanging" old membership cards for new
ones, which resulted in the expulsion of more undesirables

from the Party's ranks.

ft fi

As the "re-registration" campaign of early 1936 took
its toll, Stalin was personally directing preparations for
the first public trial.

A special NKVD team was charged with

obtaining confessions from some 300 oppositionists

complicity in

a

,

whose

massive plot against the regime had sud-

denly been uncovered.

The experienced interrogators followed

the tactic of obtaining confessions from minor figures-

Valentine Olberg (a secret NKVD agent), Isak Reingold (an
acquaintance of Kamenev), Richard Pickel (a former aide to
Zinoviev)

— and

then confronting the chief figures in the

alleged plot with this incriminating evidence.

Despite ill-

health, threats to their families, and oppressive prison

conditions, Zinoviev and Kamenev remained unyielding until

July 1936, when they agreed to stand public trial if Stalin

would guarantee their lives in the presence of the entire
Politburo.

According to defector sources, they did obtain

an interview with Stalin, who was seconded only by K.

Voroshilov and Yezhov.

After berating Stalin for dis-

crediting Lenin's Politburo, Zinoviev apparently broke down
and wept, a performance which left Stalin unmoved:

already late for tears,"' he correctly observed.

"'It's

When Kamenev

31

asked where was the guarantee that they would not be
shot,

Stalin asked if they wanted an official treaty certified
by
the League of Nations.

This was all too much for Voroshilov,

who advised them "'to fall on their knees before Comrade

Stalin and thank him for the life preserver that he is

throwing to them.
drown.

If they don't want to be saved, let them

The devil take them!'"

After Stalin assured his

former colleagues that the trial was actually aimed at
Trotsky, not them, Zinoviev and Kamenev agreed to stand
trial if none of the Old Bolsheviks were shot and if their

families were left unmolested.

"'That goes without saying,'"

confided the benevolent dictator of the Party. 8 7
By the end of July 1936 the main roles in the

pageant had been cast, although

I.

Smirnov and V. A. Ter-

Vaganyan still objected to their humiliating lines.

But

what would the Party's cadres think of this political bomb-

shell?

The "Old Bolshevik" assured Nicolaevsky that the

"trial came as a complete surprise not only for the rank and

file of Party workers, but also to members of the Central

Committee and some members of the Politburo."
statement is belied by

a

88

vBut this

Central Committee letter, dated

July 29, 1936, and marked "top secret."

Entitled, "On the

terroristic activity of the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-

revolutionary bloc," it informed the Party faithful at some
length about the forthcoming trial, and laid down

a "general

line" for combating any doubts about the guilt of the famous

defendants.

In particular, this letter featured copious

quotations from the preliminary examination (Protokol

doprosa

)

of the accused, many of which were entered in the

trial record itself.

oq

But the most sensational part of the letter was left

to the end.

refrain

The last few paragraphs began with the ominous

— "Only

the absence of Bolshevik vigilance can ex-

plain the fact, that

..."

(" Tol'ko

otsutstviem bol

shevistsko j bditel nosti mozhno ob' yasnit
'

followed each time by
90

noted."

a

'

tot f akt

,

1

chto"

)

"suitable sin," as Robert McNeal has

For instance, only the lack of "Bolshevik vigilance"

could explain how some of the arrested Party members in recent months "were passed in the check of Party documents and

were left in the ranks of the Party."

Even more alarming,

however, were the final lines of this extraordinary letter:
"The inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present

conditions should be the ability to recognize an enemy of
the Party, no matter how well he may be masked."
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Henceforth, the basic criterion for Party membership
was the willingness to "unmask"

Party workers.

— i.e.,

"squeal on"

— fellow

Only the most obtuse of apparatcliiki could

have expected the purge to end with the liquidation of
It was only the opening act.

Zinoviev and friends.
III.

The Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial

On August 15, 1936, the great news was finally

broadcast far and wide.

Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Ivan

for
Smirnov and thirteen others were to be publicly tried
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arranging Kirov's assassination, for planning numerous terrorist acts against Soviet leaders, including Stalin, and
for conspiring with Fascist agents to undermine the regime.

Writing from Paris, Walter Duranty, the doyen of Kremlin
observers, immediately declared that such a public spectacle
was "inconceivable" without the authorities having "full

proofs" of the defendants' guilt.

A "dark story of treason-

able intrigue" will emerge, Duranty confidently predicted,

though he was not sure of its details.

These were

furnished on August 18th, when the full indictment appeared
in the Soviet press.

The trial opened the following day.

The "dark story" was to be told at last.

Mis-en-Scene
The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court heard
the case in the little "October Hall" of the Trade Union

House, not as glamorous as the great "Hall of Columns,"

scene of earlier public trials, but not entirely without dis-

tinction.

A rather ornate chamber (formerly

the then Nobles Club)
and light-blue walls.

,

93

a

ballroom in

it featured white Corinthian columns
"In a frivolous ballroom of a van-

ished nobility, where dancing girls in the plastic frieze
smile down on sixteen doomed revolutionaries," the fantastic

drama was to unfold.

94

The accused sat behind a low wooden bar,

a

"railed-in

pen" sideways to the audience, alertly guarded by three

rather massive NKVD soldiers, standing rigidly at attention

34

with their bayoneted rifles. 95

In the "gallery" were seated

some thirty foreign journalists and diplomats, along with

150-odd "workers from numerous shops and factories," as the
special correspondent for the New Masses informed his
readers.

96

This particular factory was named the

"

Lubyanka "—

NKVD headquarters. 97
In the rear of the chamber, opposite the gallery,
sat the judges, led by Vassili V. Ulrikh, a man of many

chins, whose "enormous head" hung almost on a level with

his shoulders, and who looked like "a proper country land-

owner of Czarist times," observed an NKVD defector. 98

Re-

portedly a one-time officer in the Counter-intelligence Department of the CHEKA,

99

Ulrikh was presiding judge in most

of the political trials of the 1920s and 1930s

— from

that of

the terrorist, Boris Savinkov, in 1924, to the "Great Trial"
of Bukharin and Rykov in 1938.

This record was surely a

great testimonial to his reliability, if not integrity.

In

1936 Time magazine noted that he had the reputation of

"having handed out more Death sentences than any other
jurist in the world."

100

By 1938 this journal was referring
.

n

101

I.

I.

to him as the "'Shooting Judge'" of the Moscow trials.

The other two judges

Nikitchenko

— were

— I.

0.

Matulevich and

of so little consequence during the pro-

ceedings that they merely took up space.

Ten years later,

however, Nikitchenko was to grace the High Tribunal at the

Nuremburg war crimes trial.

(Not surprisingly, this Tribunal

talks with
refused to question Rudolph Hess on his alleged
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Leon Trotsky in the 1930s, a central issue in the
Pyatakov-

Radek trial of 1937. 102
As in so many other political trials, the prosecutor
was Andrei Vyshinsky.

Anything but disheveled, this veteran

inquisitor was something
a

King's counsel.

of a dandy,

and looked the part of

One observer at the trial, Joshua Kunitz,

depicted him in this fashion:
His straight blond hair brushed harshly to the
side, his closely cropped, bristling reddish
mustache; his steel-blue eyes, thin lips, decisive movements, and cold concentrated expression
suggest his fitness for the part he is to play
at this trial. 103
But in this trial Vyshinsky was somewhat "less light of step
and panther-like than usual," reported Time, 104 possibly be-

cause he occupied an exposed position.
1920

,

A Menshevik until

and once arrested for ant i- Soviet behavior

,

this

parvenu was charged with lending credibility to an implausible script, one prepared by NKVD veterans.

fector

,

A.

Orlov

,

The NKVD de-

described the situation as follows

The chiefs of the NKVD didn't dignify
Vyshinsky with their confidence and treated
him with the same humiliating condescension
with which Stalin's influential bureaucrats
treat non-party men. And even then, when
they were instructing Vyshinsky how cautious
he should be with the weak points of their
judicial forgeries, they never openly used
the word "falsification," but instead employed hypocritical phraseology for their

explanations
Vyshinsky had grounds to hate his haughty
He knew that he would have to cover
bosses.
up at the trial their clumsily concocted
forgeries and outdo himself in eloquence in
order to lend at least some plausibility to
their idiotic fabrications. He also knew
that if their falsifications came out during
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the court proceedings, the inquisitors would
make him responsible for the fiasco of the
trial and maybe even accuse him of "sabotage." 105

His vulnerability made him uncommonly obedient, and thus

particularly useful to Stalin.

In fact, he lived to see his

tormenters perish in Siberia's frozen dungeons, and gained
new prominence after World War

II

when he represented the

USSR at the United Nations, where once again he displayed
his gift for abuse.
But, of course, the real stars of the drama were the

distinguished defendants.

Grigori Zinoviev was a founder of

the Bolshevik Party, close associate of both Lenin and
and first chairman of the Communist International.

Stalin,

Famed for his oratorical gifts, Zinoviev had stood in the
first ranks of the Party, and shared the revolutionary limelight with Lenin and Trotsky.

But at this trial the former

"'Bomb Boy of Bolshevism'" was "unshaven, round-faced, wild-

haired" in appearance, reported Time

106
.

The New York Times

man in Moscow, Harold Denny, also noted that the once-

arrogant Zinoviev seemed "utterly beaten, chagrined and

apathetic," and his great voice had fallen to

whisper

a

"womanish

.

Lev Kamenev was almost as distinguished
as Zinoviev.

a

defendant

Once leader of the Bolshevik faction in the

Tsarist Duma, Kamenev had also served as leader of the

Moscow Party organization and Vice-Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars after Lenin's death.

Married to

Trotsky's sister, he had joined Stalin and Zinoviev in the

famed "Troika" of the mid-1920s.

At the trial Kamenev re-

tained some of his former dignity.

Denny found him still

"animated and distinguished-looking with his white
imperial
and snowy hair."

hair,

Even Kunitz noted that with "his gray

aristocratic whiskers, high stiff collar, sparkling

pince-nez, and well-fitting business suit around his generour waistline," Kamenev was the personification of academic
dignity. 109

Ivan N. Smirnov had once led the famous Fifth Army
in Siberia during the Civil War and become known as the

"•Lenin of Siberia.'"

Close to Trotsky, he had been an op-

positionist in the 1920s and served time in various correction camps.
since January

In fact, he had been continuously in prison
1,

struck Kunitz as

1933.
a

With his shirt open at the trial, he

typical labor leader, one who might have

come from a typographical union in the Middle West.

1

"''

0

The other five defendants of major st ature--Grigori
E.

Evdokimov, Vagarshak A. Ter-Vagany an

Ivan

P.

Bakayev, Yefim A. Dreitzer

,

— also

Sergei V. Mrachkovsky

had outstanding

Party records, if not quite as prominent as those^ of the
111
three chief defendants.

Corpus Delicti
The trial began with a bang.

After President Ulrikh

had ascertained that the defendants had no objection to the
court's membership, and that they declined to be represented
by "counsel," the court's secretary stepped forward and

38

rapidly read the sensational charges.

Supported by

a

pro-

fuse number of quotations culled from the
pre-trial examina-

tions, the indictment charged that Zinoviev
and Company not

only were aware of Nikolayev's terrorist inclinations
in
1934,

as was already known, but were

"the direct organizers

of the assassination of Comrade S. M. Kirov." 112

Kirov was

struck down, it was charged, because of his close association

with Stalin for, as Zinoviev once told Reingold, "'It is not

enough to fell the oak; all the young oaks growing around it
must be felled too.'" 11

This act was in line with

a

ter-

rorist policy adopted in late 1932, when the Zinovievites
and the Trotskyites formed a "united centre."

Their only

goal was to "seize power at all costs," as they lacked any

kind of

political program. 114

a

Concealing their true in-

tentions with "double-dealing" tactics that might have been
admired by an Azef or a Malinovsky, they made plans not only
to destroy Kirov, but also to assassinate Stalin, Voroshilov,

Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze

,

Zhdanov, Kossior, Postyshev, and

Stalin was the chief target of their efforts for,

others.

as Trotsky allegedly observed (quoted secondhand N by Reingold),

"'the whole matter is in the top, therefore the top must be

removed.

'

115
"

Several attempts were prepared against

Stalin's life, including one to shoot him during the Vllth

Congress of the Comintern (August, 1935), in line with

Trotsky's order that the act should be "'timed with some big
political event of international importance.'"

116

From

abroad Trotsky also wrote detailed instructions to his
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confederates, and personally dispatched Olberg, Berman-Yurin
and David on terrorist missions.

In addition, one of

Trotsky's gangs was "actually organized by the active German
fascist Franz Weitz

the representative of /Heinrich

,

7

Himmler, at that time the leader of the fascist SS detach-

ments and now the director of the German Secret Police
(Gestapo)."

117

At the conclusion of the indictment it was claimed,
not unexpectedly, that the formidable charges had already

been established.

More surprising was the assertion that

all of the accused, with the exception of Smirnov, had

"fully admitted their guilt of the charges preferred against

them."

118

This was staggering news.

As Kunitz later wrote,

The picture of plotting, villainy, treachery,
double-dealing, hypocrisy, cynicism, lust for
power, and murder uncovered by Vyshinsky as
the result of months of investigation is so
terrifying, so monstrous, seems so utterly
inapplicable to most of the scholarly-looking
men in the dock that the European bourgeois
correspondent at my side whispers to me:
the concoction of a dis"Incredible
eased mind!
.

.

.

In particular, this correspondent doubted the unanimity of
the alleged guilty pleas and their tenor:

"'Fantastic

.

.

.

They couldn't possibly have admitted all the crimes ascribed
to them, not in this spirit, not in these words.

119
.

.

.

But then fourteen of the accused corroborated the claim by

publicly pleading guilty to all the charges!
and Holtzman as well,

Only Smirnov,

attempted to dispute the indictment.

Although they admitted participation in the Trotskyite-

40

Zinovievite organization, and even confessed to transmitting

terrorist instructions, both of them denied personal parti-

cipation in the preparation of terroristic acts. 120
The Ritual of Confession
The deportment of Zinoviev and Company was even more

shocking than their formal confession of guilt.
attempting to undermine Vyshinsky'

s

Instead of

case or introduce seeds

of doubt, most of the accused cheerfully cooperated with the

Prosecutor in digging their own graves.

Nothing astonished

Western public opinion more than the tone of the confessions
remorseful, self-accusing, all-inclusive.

The enigma of the

confessions quickly became the major cause celebre of this
trial

and of the others that followed.

,

observe

,

As we shall soon

Trotsky devoted much attention to the "mechanics"

of confessions.

But at this point it is only necessary to

introduce several illustrations of the phenomenon.
ample

at one point Vyshinsky questioned Zinoviev about the

,

centre

For ex-

1

s

activities
Was it your centre that
Vyshinsky
organized the assassination of Comrade Ki^rov?
Was the assassination of Sergei Mironovich
Kirov organized by your centre, or by some
other organization?
Yes, by our centre.
Zinoviev
In that centre there were you,
Vyshinsky
Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky and Ter-Vaganyan?
Yes.
Zinoviev
So you all organized the assasVyshinsky
sination of Kirov?
Yes.
Zinoviev
So you all assassinated Comrade
Vyshinsky
Kirov?
Yes
Zinoviev:
121
Sit down.
Vyshinsky
:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

.

.

.
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It is notoriously difficult to unearth the human touch in

cold trial records, but no one could miss Zinoviev's moral

prostration or Vyshinsky's complete contempt in the above
exchange.

"Sit down," commanded the ex-Menshevik to the

ex-founder of the Bolshevik Party.
In another memorable exchange the two leading de-

fendants so helpfully subscribed to Vyshinsky's slurs on
their actions that a note of self-mockery, not to say burlesque, was reflected in the dialogue.

Vyshinsky began the

intercourse by questioning Kamenev about his "double-dealing"
tactics
Vysh nsky
What appraisal should be given
of the articles and statements you wrote in
1933, in which you expressed loyalty to the
Party? Deception?
No, worse than deception.
KMtenev
Pel
idy?
Vysh nsky
Kamenev
Worse.
Vysh nsky
Worse than deception worse
Treason?
than perfidy find the word.
ouml
You havo
Kamenev
Accused Zinovi ev do you
Vysh nsky
hi:;.
con
in
Yes.
Zi novi ov
Vyshi nsk"y
Tre ason perfidy doublc:

i

:

:

i

t

:

:

i

—

f

:

i

I

t

.

:

i

,

1

1

i

i

I

:

:

deal

i

7,

ih]
i

;

in >v

i

i

>v

:

,

,

|

Yes

y?
^

Such shameless deference to the Prosecutor's verbal assaults
eoul d on y dumb ound most

West o

I

1

t

n

jou rn a

1

i

s

t

s

Harold Denny was one of the first spectators to confess his inability to fathom this behavior.

There was an

"incomprehensible desire" on the defendants' part to convict
themselves, he wrote in

The_

death, they cried out:

"

'

Now York Times

.

Faced with

We who are about to die salute you.

i

ti
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Springing to their feet like "bright students," they seemed
eager to show how much they knew.

There was even "witty

repartee" in the court, with the defendants joining in the

general "merriment."

They were marching to their death

"amid gales of laughter."

This behavior was all so alien to

Denny that he could only blame it on the "traditional Slavic-

Oriental indifference to death."

But he noted that their

stories dovetailed nicely and admitted bewilderment:

"If

there is more here than meets the eye, not even the most

skeptical observer can guess what it is." 12 3
But there was much more here than met the eye.

As

Robert Conquest has correctly noted, the "impression of unanimous surrender was not, indeed, entirely a correct one."^^
If Denny and the other journalists present at the trial had

been more attuned to the swirling undercurrents in the courtroom, they would have detected a subtle and desperate effort

by some of the defendants to undermine Vyshinsky's case.
Since open defiance only invited swift retribution, the ac-

cused used various rhetorical devices and "veiled language"
to cast doubt on the charges.

The employment of v such

"'double-talk'" or "'Aesopian language'"

hallowed revolutionary tradition.

125

was an almost

Even Lenin in 1911

observed that Russians had gone through the school of serfdom:

"'they are able to read between the lines and to add

what the speaker did not say in so many words.'

A great variety of such techniques was utilized to

convey the intended double entendre

,

or hidden meaning.

The

43

defendant might plead

f orgetf ulness to

some allegation, deny

's

minor facts, admit to only "general orientation" to

crimi-

a

nal program, or even refuse to answer one of Vyshinsky'

charges.

In this connection Stalin commented in 1936:

may be said that silence is not criticism.
true.

1,1

It

But that is not

The method of keeping silence, as a special method of

ignoring things, is also

a

form of criticism.

addition, the accused might suddenly remark,

when the Prosecutor made

a

was to feign amazement and say,
.
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"of course,

in
11

particularly absurd allegation,

one that had been denied until that point.

some startling revel at ion

»

.

.

.

Another device

"that's news to me," after

For instance

,

Vyshinsky quoted

Kamenev as stating in the January 1935 trial

:

"

1

1

became

blind--I lived to the age of 50 and did not see this centre
in which, it turns out,

I

myself was active, in which

I

participated by action and by inaction, by speech and by
When Vyshinsky attempted to force Kamenev in

silence.'"

the August 1936 trial to admit that he was fighting against

socialism, the latter replied, "You are drawing the conclu-

sion of an historian and prosecutor," clearly contradicting
the conclusion.

And another favorite device was to sug-

gest a historical analogy that exposed the absurdity of the
charge.

Thus, M. Lurye testified to asking Zinoviev how it

was permissible for Marxists to practice individual terror
and maintain contact with fascist groups,

the case.

a

touchy point in

Zinoviev supposedly replied, "'You are an

historian, aren't you, Moissei Ilyich,'

and he drew the
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parallel of Bismarck and Lassalle, adding:

today utilize Himmler?'" 1 30

'why cannot we

Clearly the political coopera-

tion of Bismarck and Lassalle was of

a

different stripe than

the alleged relationship of the "centre" and Himmler.
In this trial it was Smirnov who most effectively

used "veiled language" in his defense, which Vyshinsky found
necessary to "decipher" for the edification of the gallery.

Although Smirnov steadfastly denied any participation in
terrorist activities, and frequently challenged the veracity
of his fellow defendants'

testimony, Vyshinsky finally forced

him to admit membership in the

"

bloc

,

"

to confirm a 1931

meeting with Lev Sedov (Trotsky's son) in Berlin, and to
acknowledge transmitting certain terrorist instructions from
Trotsky.

Yet not all the honors in this duel went to the

Prosecutor.

Smirnov managed to insert in the record that

"Sedov was not an authority for me,"

131

an important point,

since there was great difficulty in directly linking

Trotsky

— the

real authority

— to

the alleged conspiracy.

In

addition, when Mrachkovsky testified to meeting Smirnov in
his apartment for secret discussions, the

turned on him and demanded,
is my apartment?,"

a

1

atter v suddenly

Where

"Was it at my apartment?

question that Mrachkovsky was unable to

answer in detail, and which undermined his testimony.

132

_

.

At

another point Vyshinsky asked Smirnov about his alleged

resignation from the centre:

"I

did not intend to resign;

rethere was nothing to resign from," came back the telling

tort.

133

The balky defendant underlined this point by
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further testifying that,

"I

officially, but actually

I

did not resign from the bloc
was not a member of the bloc." 134

And on one occasion Smirnov turned to Ter-Vagany an
Mrachkovsky, and Dreitzer, and jeered, "'You want

a

leader?

Well, take me,'" which Vyshinsky considered "jocular,"
but
was surely meant to be derisive. 135

This line of defense was only a continuation of
Smirnov'

s

pre-trial tactics, as Vyshinsky revealed in his

closing argument.

According to the Prosecutor, at his exam-

ination on May 20, 1936, Smirnov merely said, "'I deny that,
again

I

deny,

I

deny.'"

On July 21 he admitted something,

but when confronted with Mrachkovsky

"Invention and slander,.

.

.'"

questions with such phrases as
"•evidently such

a

'

s

accusations, replied,

Smirnov also answered

— "'I

do not remember,'"

conversation may have taken place,'"

"•there was not, but there might have been,
to reply to that'"

cowardice."

— which

1

"

"'I have nothinc

Vyshinsky characterized as "animal

Finally he admitted "full responsibility," con-

tended the Prosecutor, on August 13, i.e., only six days
13
before the trial opened! ^

K

Only a Vyshinsky could argue that Smirnov made
full, open,

and voluntary confession.

a

In fact, he was the

demi-hero of the drama.
Circumstantial Evidence
The Prosecutor took great pains to discredit
Smirnov'

s

"elastic form of lies," as well he might, for this

46

was the fatal flaw in the proceedings, 137 missed by Denny
and most other observers.

If Vyshinsky could not make the

various confessions appear

a

model of consistency and

totally convincing, then the case would fall to pieces
around him.
hole

— his

The "voluntary" confessions were his ace in the

only ace.

To compound the difficulties, the trial

record was rife with flagrant contradictions of both time
and place.

Finally, there was "no evidence against them

/the accused/ except for their confessions and those of
I

"DO

others," as Conquest has correctly noted.
The so-called "material evidence" in the case was

nothing but

a

mirage.

True, Vyshinsky did cite four

clandestine letters that Trotsky allegedly sent to his confederates in the Soviet Union, but the State's attorney

could only produce one of them as an exhibit

—a

1932 "Open

Letter" that Trotsky addressed to the Central Executive

Committee of the USSR, and which had been widely disseminated
in several European languages

tion.

139

— hardly

a

secret communica-

The other "letters" had vanished, in one way or

For instance, in 1934 Trotsky supposedly wrote a

another.

letter in invisible ink to Dreitzer and Mrachkovsky, which
he signed,

"

Starik " ("Old Man").

140

This extraordinary com-

munication was smuggled into the Soviet Union concealed in
a "German

cinema magazine," but, alas, Mrachkovsky burnt it

for "reasons of secrecy."

Faced with an embarrassing lack of material evidence
Vyshinsky
to link Trotsky directly with the conspiracy,

,

then,

47

was forced to rely on the testimony of Trotsky's secret
agents. 142 it appeared that the "Great Exile" controlled
a

whole platoon of emissaries, including "Friedmann," A. Lunt
Y.
(I.

Gaven, N. Lurye

Kruglyansky

)

,

,

M

.

Lurye

,

K.

and V. Olberg.

Berman-Yurin

,

David

F.

All but Friedmann, Gaven,

and Lunt, never produced in court, testified that either

Trotsky or his son had personally directed their undercover
operations.

In addition, Berman-Yurin and David contended

that they had met Trotsky in Copenhagen in late 1932, when
the latter was giving a rare lecture to socialist students.

At this time Trotsky directed them to assassinate Stalin.

Holtzman also met Trotsky in the Danish capital.
to his testimony, Sedov suggested such

a

According

meeting, but they

agreed to make the trip from Berlin separately.

Then Holtzman

added a few details:

arranged with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within
two or three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol
I went to the hotel straight
and meet him there.
from the station and in the lounge met Sedov.

I

With these apparently innocent remarks Holtzman raised havoc
with the State's case, which will later be examined in some
detail
In addition, it was never fully determined when the

centre was formed and how long it functioned, important details that Vyshinsky was careful to leave muddled.

Zinoviev

testified that the united centre was organized in "the summer
of 1932," and functioned "up to 1936."

144

Kamenev also re-

ported that in "the summer of 1932" Zinoviev had told an
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organizing meeting of his group that the union with
the
Trotskyites was "an accomplished fact." 145 But another

wit-

ness, Professor Yakovlev, selected "the autumn of 1932"
for
the formation of the bloc, 146 as did Mrachkovsky and

Dreitzer.

1

^\

*7

And Ter-Vaganyan implied that it had been

functioning since the fall of 1931. 148

Vyshinsky choose

not to arbitrate this matter contending, with Zinoviev, that
it had been formed in the summer of 1932,

and also declaring

that it had been organized "in the autumn of 1932," leaving
the gallery to select its own date. 149 It did not matter if
"the white threads struck out all over the thing and the

finished product simply didn't hang together; important was
the fact that the defendants executed their commission," as

Max Shachtman once wrote on this discrepancy. 15 ^
The timing of the centre's formation becomes impor-

tant when it is remembered that in the fall of 1932 both

Zinoviev and Kamenev were once again expelled from the Party
and banished to the borderlands,

affair.

as a result of the Riutin

This development "somewhat held up the execution of

our terroristic plans," Kamenev admitted.

151

Reingold

agreed, testifying that the exile of the leaders caused "an

interruption in our terroristic activities between the
autumn of 1932 and the summer of 1933

..." 152

But Bakayev

contended that the interruption lasted from "the autumn of
1932" to the "autumn of 1934," when the centre became active
again.

153

Yet Vyshinsky, in referring to May, 1933, called

this period a time when "the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite

49

centre was intensifying its activites to the utmost, when
these terroristic activities reached their highest point of

development

,

"

surely a surprising contention. 154

Thus, the centre was formed in the autumn of 1932
and immediately ceased to function.

It reached its high

point in May, 1933 when the two leaders were in exile.

It

functioned up to 1936, even though Zinoviev and Kamenev were
once again arrested in December 1934, and jailed until the

August 1936 trial.

It was led, on the Trotskyite side, by

Smirnov, who was continuously incarcerated from January
1933, until his execution in August, 1936.

Smirnov, explained Vyshinsky, had used

cate with his companions outside

,

a

1,

But the wily

"code" to communi-

a "code"

that was never

produced in court. 155
Despite all of the above discrepancies

,

the

Prosecutor smugly declared in his closing statement that
the guilt of the accused had been "fully established" and,

therefore,

rr

I

can be relieved of the duty of enumerating the

many facts, and of analysing the material of the Court investigation, which exposes them to the fullest degree."
The trial of the missing tarts commenced:

"What do you know about this business?'
the King said to Alice.
said Alice.
"•Nothing,
"'Nothing whatever ? persisted the King.
"'Nothing whatever,' said Alice.
"'That's very important,' the King said,
turning to the jury." 157
'

'

156
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Doomsday
The crowning point in the trial was Vyshinsky

closing statement, the

"

s

summa summarum " of the State's case.

It was a masterpiece of malice aforethought,

and deservedly

earned for the Prosecutor fame as the poet laureate of
political invective
Vyshinsky began his lengthy speech by lavishly

passing out compliments.
ducted

a

The judges, he declared, had con-

model trial:

With the greatest possible care you have subjected to investigation and judicial scrutiny
every one of these proofs, every fact, every
event, every step taken by the accused, who
in the course of many years added crime to
crime in their struggle against the Soviet
state against the Soviet power against our
Party and against the whole of our Soviet
people ± JO
,

,

-

.

The chief victim in the case had been "one of the best sons
of the working class, one of the most devoted to the cause

of socialism, one of the most beloved disciples of the great

Stalin

,

the fiery tribune of the prolet ari an revolution

unforgettable Sergei Mironovich Kirov."

159

,

the

He was "most

dear to us," continued Vyshinsky, "that admirabla and wonder
ful man, bright and joyous,

joyous."

as our new life is bright and

But with his death the entire nation rose up in

support of the Party:
In this boundless love of millions of toilers
for our Party for its Central Committee and
for our Stalin and his glorious comrades-inarms, in this infinite love of the people lies
the strength of the defence and protection of
our leaders, the guides of our country and
l61
Party, against traitors, murderers and bandits.
,

,
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With "great and unsurpassed love," workers of the world
utter
the name of "the great teacher and leader of the peoples
of
the U.S.S.R.

— Joseph

Vissarionovich Stalin!"

Under his

leadership "socialism has finally and irrevocably triumphed
in our country.

11

Once this

"

Laudeamus Stalin " had been sung, Vyshinsky

turned to the enemy.
No!

Were they principled political foes?

The accused were but scum, terrorists lacking any

political program,

a

"contemptible

insignificant

,

group of traitors and murderers." 16 3

,

impotent

They were only "liars

and clowns, insignificant pigmies, little dogs snarling at
an elephant, this is what this gang represents!"

But they

knew how to kill, and when the order went out,
The underground machinery begins to work, knives
are sharpened, revolvers are loaded, bombs are
charged false documents are written and fabricated, secret connections are established with
the German political police people are sent to
their posts, they engage in revolver practice,
and finally they shoot and kill.
,

,

Their entire domestic program, declared Vyshinsky, could be
summed up in

a

single word

— "Murder." 165

The Prosecutor characterized their method's as double-

dealing, deception, and provocation.
on their faces,

These people put masks

"adopted the pose of repentant sinners who

had broken with the past, who had abandoned their old erring
ways and mistakes which grew into crime."

166

Zinoviev was

particularly adept at masking his true intentions.
even had the effrontery to write

entitled "The Beacon Man."

a

He had

eulogy for the dead Kirov,

Vyshinsky exercised his
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indignation that Zinoviev, his hands "stained with
Kirov's
blood!/' could write such "insolent sacrilege!," could
exceed
all bounds of cynicism:
Such is this man.
of him, and he killed
murderer, mourns over
like it ever occurred
What can one say,
to describe the utter
of this:
Sacrilege!
Cunning!

He loved him, he was proud
him!
The miscreant, the
his victim!
Has anything

before?
what words can one use fully
baseness and loathesomeness
Perfidy!
Duplicity!

Finally Vyshinsky admitted that he could not "find the word

with which to appraise this despicable trick!" 167

Turning to Kamenev, this hypocrite "'in an ass's
skin,

1

"

as Kamenev once described himself, Vyshinsky brought

to the court's attention a preface the defendent had written
in 1934 to Machi avelli

'

s

The Prince

cused on Machiavelli being

a

.

After quoting the ac-

"'master of political aphorism

and a brilliant dialectician,'" one who "'created a shell of

tremendous explosive force which disturbed the minds of
rulers for centuries,

1

"

Vyshinsky claimed that the 15th-

century Italian had been Kamenev 's "ideological source," as
well as Zinoviev' s:

Machiavelli was a puppy and a yokel compared
with them, nevertheless, he was their spiritual
"Machiavellism, " and Azefism served
preceptor.
you as the source of your activities and your
Now this has been exposed by Zinoviev
crimes.
murder, cunning, perand Kamenev themselves:
fidy and masquerade were the principal, decisive
methods in their criminal activities. 168
But Vyshinsky saved his best for the last.

words of the speech sent

a chill

The final

through the audience:
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The enemy is cunning.
A cunning enemv must
not be spared.
The whole people rose to its
feet as soon as these ghastly crimes became
known.
The whole people is quivering with indignation and I, as the representative of the
state prosecution, join my anger, the indignant
voice of the state prosecutor, to the rumbling
of the voices of millions!

After reminding— even instructing—the judges to apply
the
law to the full limits of its severity, Vyshinsky barked

out

the "demand that dogs gone mad should be shot— every one
of
them." 169 Hearing this cry for blood, "the prisoners slumped

back in their chairs and some buried their heads in their
hands and wept for the first time since the trial began,"

knowing in their hearts that all was lost. 170
But one last effort was made to save their lives

during the final pleas, when the accused attempted to placate the "beloved Leader" by reaching the "uttermost limits
of self-abasement."

If Vyshinsky'

s

closing speech was the

dramatic apex of the trial, then the last words of the defendants were its nadir.

As the NKVD defector, A.Orlov,

wrote in wonder, "The old Bolsheviks branded themselves as

unprincipled bandits and fascists and at the same time
praised Stalin, whom they regarded in their hearts
usurper and traitor to the revolution."

171

as

a

Like "camp-

meeting converts," they spared themselves no indignity in
order to reach the proper level of contrition and selfcondemnation.

In these final moments some of the accused

were "fainting at times," while others were "choked by sobs"
or stopped to wipe tears from their eyes;

"but upheld by the

Russian talent for the theatrical," they delivered their own
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funeral orations before a hushed audience of
their enemies. 172

Mrachkovsky began the sorry spectacle.

At first he

departed from the prepared script and stressed his
revolutionary background, but then he swung his arm and hit the

wooden bar, "with all his might," and returned to form. 173
He ended his last plea with this request:

traitor to my Party, as

a

I

be believed when

vestigation

I

spat out all this vomit." 174

I

appeal for mercy.

s

a

All

I

say that during the in-

The proper tone had been set.
'

depart as

traitor who should be shot.

ask is that

followed Mrachkovsky

"I

Most of the defendants

lead in specifically rejecting any

Thus,

Evdokimov declared that their col-

lective crimes were too great "to make it possible for us to

expect clemency." 175

Reingold agreed with this sentiment.

After stating that the organization had been exposed as "the
shock troop, as

a

white-guard, fascist shock troop, of the

international counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie," he con-

cluded that the trial would bury the "political corpses" of
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, and Smirnov under "a heavy tombstone."

my guilt.

Reingold was modest to the end:

"I

fully admitted

It is not for me to plead for mercy."

same vein, Pickel confessed,

176

In the

"the last eight years of my

life have been years of baseness, years of terrible, night-

marish deeds.

I

must bear my deserved punishment."

177

Berman-Yurin and Holtzman also joined the chorus, practically

pleading to be shot.

Only M. Lurye

,

Olberg,

and Ter-Vaganyan

asked for mercy, but the last named contritely added:

"I

bow

55

my head in guilt before the Court and say:

whatever your

decision may be, however stern your verdict,
deserved.

1

I

accept it as

no

The two chief defendants were almost as repentant as
the others.
a

Zinoviev began his final "graveside" speech in

restrained fashion, but finally warmed to his task and

used his great oratorical talents to condemn his many political sins.

formula:

His final plea was notable for the following
"My defective Bolshevism became transformed into

anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism

Trotskyism is

a

I

arrived at fascism.

variety of fascism, and Zinovievism is

variety of Trotskyism." 179

a

Only a true Stalinist could have

properly appreciated this inspired invention.
As for Kamenev, he retained

a

measure of dignity

while explaining how he found himself sitting in the dock
next to foreign agents.

It was no accident that their fates

had become linked together:

"Such was the path we took, and

such was the pit of contemptible treachery and all that is

loathsome into which we have fallen."

dressed

a

180

But then he ad-

personal appeal to his sons, and urged^them not to

look backward, but to go forward, with the Soviet people
"to follow Stalin."

After this plea he collapsed, and had

to be given assistance.

words,

The courtroom was shaken by these

and even the "faces of the judges lost the studied

expression of stony indifference."

181

Only Smirnov continued

to be balky and, tossing "his mane of white hair," insisted

that he was only partially guilty of the charges.

I 82

The court took almost seven hours to
consider its

verdict, a surprising development, since there
was little to
discuss.
It is possible that the time was used
to consult
Stalin on the sentences, surely approved beforehand.
In the

small hours of the morning of August 24 the court
re-convened
to hear the verdict.

Ulrikh took some thirty minutes to read

the decision, merely a banal rephrasing of the original
in-

dictment. 18 3

Then he named each defendant and announced the

collective sentence— "the supreme penalty— to be shot, and
all property personally belonging to them to be confiscated.

1

Some of the NKVD men present then expected to hear the famil-

iar words, that considering past services to the Party, etc.,
etc., the sentences had been commuted.

forting words were forthcoming. 185

But no such com-

One of the Luryes, either

Moissei or Nathan, managed, at the end, to interject
and ironic epitaph to the proceedings
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin!*"

1

11

:

'

a

fitting

Long live the cause

Q c.

According to one Soviet law, the accused had some 72
hours in which to submit

a

written appeal for clemency.

Barely 24 hours later, however, on the 25th of August, there
appeared

a

brief press announcement that the sentences had

already been executed.

Supposedly the accused met their end

in one of the cellars of the Lubyanka prison,

in the back of the head.

a

pistol shot

Once more Smirnov was in character.

He reportedly exclaimed, as he was being led away to execution:

"'We deserve this for our unworthy attitude at the

trial."'

187
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Was the trial a smash hit, or at least a succes

d'estime?

Orlov,

for one, later wrote that Stalin had only

succeeded in shooting Zinoviev et

al

.

and that in all other

,

respects the trial had been "a complete failure," which
foreign opinion regarded an "an act of Stalin's revenge upon
-I

his political opponents."

Qp

But one may question this

judgment, written with the aid of hindsight.

Zinoviev and Kamenev had been such

M

a

The trial of

terrible political

event" that many onlookers recoiled in confusion, unable or

unwilling to gaze deeply into the abyss.

Despite the lack

of material evidence, despite the many inconsistencies in

the testimony, despite Smirnov's valiant effort to undermine
the state's case, despite the inherent absurdity of the ac-

cusations

— despite

everything

—a

large body of opinion

tended to accept the trial's credibility*
in particular, carried the day.

The confessions,

To a considerable degree,

observed Conquest, "the confession method justified itself
politically."

189

In addition, there was the rather human

desire to avoid facing a cruel dilemma.

"There was little

choice between accepting the trial at its face v^lue and

branding Stalin as

a

vulgar murderer, and his regime as

tyranny founded on falsehood."

190

a

But this was the period

of the "Popular Front," when Stalin's regime posed as the

lone bulwark against the rampaging forces of Fascism.

not to delve too deeply into the quagmire was

a

Best

popular

response in both America and Europe to the questions raised
.

.

.

,

by the trial.

191
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True, not everyone was afraid to face the
searing

truth.

While the trial was still in process Friedrich
Adler

and the Socialist International, no strangers to
such political frame-ups, sent a telegram to Moscow questioning
the

lack of judicial safeguards in the proceedings, which the
Soviet press indignantly rejected as

Soviet internal affairs. 192

a

gross intervention in

From Great Britain came the sane

voice of the Manchester Guardian Weekly

,

which suggested that

this was the "familiar cry of the State in danger, the be-

loved leader's life hazarded,
sassination," and posed

a

foreign Power fomenting as-

question of great relevance:

a

"With what conviction can the democratic countries develop

a

common front with Soviet Russia against reaction if she

descends to the methods of barbarism of the Fascist world?"

And from exile in Switzerland came the anguished cry of
Ignazio Silone, himself a bitter foe of Fascism, who de-

nounced the "macabre caricatures of justice" in the Soviet

Union and declared:

"If

I

remained silent now

I

should not

have the courage to write another single line against the

Fascist dictatorships."

Without respect for human life

Hitler's foes would themselves become Fascists, he added,
and "I refuse to be a Fascist

— even

a Red

Fascist."

194

But more common was the desire to duck the issues

raised by the trial.
words of

D.

N.

In this connection the authoritative

Pritt were of great comfort.

A prominent

member of the British Parliament, distinguished barrister,
and leading defender of Georgi Dimitrov during the Reichstag

59

Fire "counter-trial," Pritt had been specifically
invited to
attend the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in Moscow. He
repaid this

kindness by writing
but one message:

series of articles and pamphlets with

a

the "case was properly conducted and the

accused fairly and judicially treated." 195
Stalin had been apparently correct when he disdainfully replied to the argument that Western public opinion

should be taken into consideration:

swallow it.

1

"'Never mind, they'll

96

'

Entr'acte

IV.

There was

a

widespread hope in the West that this

trial saw the end to such macabre proceedings in the Soviet
Union.

But the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial contained within it-

self a thread that could be spun out into a new tale, one of

treason to the State.
During the August 1936 proceedings the names of other

prominent "conspirators" figured in the testimony.
cluded, for the "Trotskyites

,

"

G.

They in-

Pyatakov, K. Radek, L

Serebryakov, and G. Sokolnikov, and for the "Rightists
N.

Bukharin, A. Rykov

M.

,

Tomsky

,

and N. Uglanov.

,

Their

names had been tossed into the conspiratorial pot by Zinoviev,
1

Reingold, and Kamenev.

an

The last named not only involved

the "Leftist" group (Lominadze and Shatsky),

and the "Workers

Opposition" group (Shlyapnikov and Medvedyev), but was most

explicit in his denunciation of the "Rightist" group:
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In 1932, 1933 and 1934 I personally
maintained
relations with Tomsky and Bukharin and sounded
their political sentiments. They sympathized
with us. When I asked Tomsky about Rykov
frame of mind, he replied:
"Rykov thinks the
same as I do." In reply to my question as to
what Bukharin thought, he s-iid:
"Bukharin
thinks the same as I do, but is pursuing somewhat different tactics:
he does not agree with
the line of the Party, but is pursuing tactics
of persistently enrooting himself in the Party
and winning the personal confidence of the
leadership. "198
•

As a result of this testimony, Vyshinsky found it necessary
to inform the court at the close of the evening session,

August 21, that,
.yesterday I gave orders to institute an
investigation of these statements of the accused in regard to Tomsky, Rykov, Bukharin,
Uglanov, Radek and Pyatakov, and that in accordance with the results of this investigation the
office of the State Attorney will institute
legal proceedings in this matter.
.

.

There was already enough material, added the Prosecutor, to

begin criminal actions against Sokolnikov and Serebryakov. 99
1

The Soviet press fell into line.
22,

reprinted Vyshinsky'

along with

a

Pravda

,

on August

statement on the new suspects,

s

demand of some workers from the "Dynamo" plant

that the links between Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov, Sokolnikov,
Radek, Pyatakov and the "counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-

Zinovievite gang" currently in the dock be investigated without del ay

.

The next day Pravda carried a similar demand

by the Moscow Party aktiv
Khrushchev, but Tomsky'

s

,

adopted after an address by N.

name was omitted from the list.

This was no oversight, for the same issue

second page--had a brief communication:

— at

the top of the
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The Central Committee of the VKP (B) reports
that Central Committee candidate-member Tomsky,
who had become entangled with the counterrevolutionary Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorists, has
committed suicide. 20 !

On the samo day that Pravda had published Vyshinsky's and

"Dynamo's" statements, Tomsky had taken his life.

This

"honorable" but "un-Bolshevik" act was almost the only way
to cheat Stalin of his revenge.

All signs, however, pointed to the imminent trial of

Bukharin and Rykov, as well as Pyatakov and Radek.
was not to be.

But it

On September 10, 1936, Pravda announced that

the charges against the two "Rightists" had been dropped:
".

.

.

The investigation has not established legal grounds

for an arraignment of N.

I.

Bukharin and A.

I.

Rykov, in

view of which further development of the case is termi^
nated.

1

"

202

Although Rykov soon lost his post

as People's

Commissar of Communications, Bukharin continued for some
time to be an editor of Izvestia

,

members of the Central Committee.

and both remained candidate
203

Obviously there had been a significant development
in late August-early September that served to take the pressure,

at least temporarily,

off the two "Rightists," but

exactly what kind of development is still unknown.

At the

time the "Old Bolshevik" told Nicolaevsky that there was
"some conflict with respect to the advisibility of additional

trials and the persons who were to be incriminated.

Under

pressure of some members of the Politburo, announcement was
made rehabilitating Bukharin and Rykov."

204

More recently,

an ex-Party official, Aleksander Uralov
(pseud,

Avtorkhanov)

of Abdurakhman

has flatly stated that in early September
a

,

formal meeting of the Central Committee was held.

At this

plenum Yezhov supposedly accused Bukharin and Rykov of being
part of a "'monstrous conspiracy directed against the Party
and the State,'" a charge Bukharin accepted, except that

Stalin and Yezhov headed the conspiracy:

"'It is the NKVD

and not the followers of Bukharin, which is preparing a

coup

d'

etat

.

•

"

The vote in the Central Committee went

against the motion to indict the two "Rightists," at which

time Stalin thanked the Committee for its "'healthy criticism
and self-criticism,'" and promised that he would '"take note
.

of its decision for future guidance.

205

'

It is almost certain that Uralov-Avtorkhanov

never took pi ace

.

In the first pi ace

,

1

s

plenum

there is no formal

record of such a plenum being held, or any mention of an official resolution emanating from it, contrary to Party custom.
In addition, such well-informed observers as Nicolaevsky,
Orlov,

and Krivitsky never mentioned the calling of such a

meeting.

More to the point, Khrushchev also failed to men-

tion this plenum in his 1956 "Secret Speech," even though
the existence of a moderate opposition to Stalin's policies

would have dovetailed nicely with his effort to exonerate
the Party of complicity in Stalin's crimes.

Finally, the

details Uralov-Avtorkhanov provides are strikingly similar
to the facts known about an actual plenum, that of February-

March 1937, and it is highly doubtful that Stalin had left
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his vacation retreat in Sochi in early September,
206
1936.

Yet is is quite possible that some Politburo
members
were deeply disturbed by the new indictments, George
Kennan
has suggested, 207 and held some kind of informal
meeting in

early September to discuss the situation.

Stalin may have

taken note of this discontent in high places

and decided,

characteristically, not to press the matter until conditions

had ripened.

But there seems to have been no decrease in

his personal power.

NKVD to prepare

a

In early September Stalin ordered the

list of some 5,000 of the more active op-

positionists in the camps, and have them summarily shot. 208
Shortly thereafter, with an imperious nod, Stalin dispensed

with Yagoda'

s

services.

In a telegram sent from Sochi,

dated September 25, and co-signed by Zhdanov, the Party's

dictator appeared unmoved by any kind of "moderate" opposition to

his policies

.

As revealed by Khrushchev

,

the tele-

gram read:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that
Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of
People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda
has definitely proved himself to be incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite blocr The
OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This
is noted by all party workers and by the majority
of the representatives of the NKVD."209

There is

a

report that Yagoda had incurred Stalin's dis-

pleasure by shielding some of the accused and had cast doubt
on the accusations made against Bukharin and Rykov.

would find himself

a

210

He

co-defendant with the two leading

"Rights" in the 1938 trial.

Now,

in any case, Yezhov was
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clearly in the saddle.

Henceforth, the nation's ever-

widening circle of torment was to be known as the
Yezhovshchina
or Yezhov's thing.
If Bukharin and Rykov were to enjoy a brief reprieve,

not so Grigori (Yuri) L. Pyatakov and Karl Radek, who were

arrested in September 1936.

Stalin's price for delaying the

"Rightist" trial may have been an expeditious dispatch of
the other cases.

During the fall great pressure was put on

Pyatakov to confess.

"Tall, lanky, with a reddish goatee,"

Pyatakov "looked like

a

Russian editor of Don Quixote." 211

One of the six Party members mentioned in Lenin's "Testament,"
he had deserted the opposition after 1927 and devoted his

"superhuman energies" to the industrialization drive, which
he oversaw as Vice-Commissar for Heavy Industry.

212

Only

when his nominal chief and protector, "Sergo" Ordzhonikidze

promised him that his wife and personal secretary would be
left unmolested, did Pyatakov agree to stand trial.

213

Radek also gave much grief to his interrogators.
This "ugly Puck" of Russian Communism had years earlier for-

saken his oppositionist views and devoted his considerable

journalistic talents to enhancing Stalin's public image.
a

As

result of his many services, Radek was beside himself with

resentment at being arrested:
Stalin,

I

"'After all that

did for

I

didn't expect such an injustice from him.'"

During the fall he resisted all blandishments and even used
his wicked humor to strike terror in the heart of

Molchanov, one of his NKVD interrogators.

G.

A.

At one point Radek

i

.
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reportedly agreed to sign anything, even that he wanted
to
crown Hitler in the Kremlin, but insisted on adding one

small

detail

— that

Molchanov was one of his accomplices.

Yes! Molchanov!'

screamed Radek hysterically,

"'Yes!

'If you believe

that it is necessary to sacrifice oneself for the good of the
party, then let us sacrifice ourselves together!'"

As the

NKVD chief turned white with fear, Radek pressed his advantage:

'"What does the fate of a Molchanov matter to Yezhov

when the interests of the party are at stake!

In order to

have at the trial one Radek, Yezhov will gladly throw into
the bargain a dozen like Molchanov.

.

.

.'" 214

According to a NKVD source, Radek refused to confess
until Stalin personally guaranteed his life.

In the presence

of Yezhov the Party's chief interviewed his victim in one of

Lubyanka'

s

chambers.

Whatever Stalin said to him was ob-

viously satisfactory, for Radek began to confess on December
4,

and became the most willing of prisoners.

"From that

moment Radek became personal consultant to Yezhov in the
task of improving the legend of the conspiracy and perfecting
its dramatic and literary quality."

even boasted that for two and

a
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At the trial Radek

half months he had "tormented

the examining officials and compelled them to perform

a lot

of useless work," but after he decided to confess he "unfolded
the whole picture" without a single correction from first to

last

Before Pyatakov and Radek were deemed ready for public exposure, a preliminary trial was held in Novosibirsk,
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November 19-22, which served to put added pressure on them.
Industrial sabotage was the charge.

In particular, the West

Siberian Group of Trotskyite saboteurs was charged

with ar-

ranging the great explosion in the Tsentralnaya Mine at
Kemerovo

(

Kuzbas "

which cost many lives.

)

With the eager

assistance of several NKVD agents turned defendants, it was
not difficult to place the ultimate blame for the "sabotage
act" on Pyatakov's doorstep.

Many of the charges and de-

fendants in this Novosibirsk trial were also included in the

Moscow spectacular of January 1937.

?1 7

The Pyatakov-Radek Trial

V.

The case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre" began on January

.23,

1937 and, like the last trial, was heard

in the October Hall of the Trade Union House.

deja vu sense to the proceedings.

There was

a

In the chilly courtroom

there were many tall glasses of "smoking hot tea" for the

ubiquitous Ulrikh, who once again played straight man for

Vyshinsky's sallies.
smoke" sat

a

Amid "a blue haze of Russian cigaret

myriad of spectators, including Alexei Tolstoy

("the Lesser") and Lion Feuchtwanger

ists.
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,

two prominent novel-

Also present in the courtroom was the newly arrived

American Ambassador, Joseph

E.

Davies, who avidly followed

the unfolding drama with the aid of translations provided by

Loy Henderson and George
oir, Mission to Moscow

had been by Vyshinsky:

,

F.

Kennan.

In his celebrated mem-

Davies was to write how impressed he
"calm, dispassionate, intellectual,
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and able and wise.

He conducted the treason trial in a man-

ner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer." 219

Another American observer was the veteran reporter, Walter
Duranty, who covered the show for The New York Times

Duranty was in

a

But

.

"delicate position," as he had been in and

out of the houses of many of the accused, especially

Radek's.
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And, once again, the NKVD had sent over scores

of selected "workers" to give the Prosecutor moral support.

As usual, mounting guard over the prisoners were

"apple-cheeked" soldiers, with rifles and fixed bayonets. 221

Their charges included Pyatakov, who testified in

a

voice as

"precise and unemotional" as that of an academician, which
he also resembled,

"with his scholar's stoop, high forehead,

black-rimmed glasses and short reddish beard and waved-black
,

222
hair, both flecked with gray," as Duranty observed.

Radek had an "ugly fleshless face," thought another spectator,

and often smiled at the audience or put his arm around

this or that prisoner.

When he spoke, "he would pose

a

little, laugh a little at the other prisoners, show his

superiority;

adroit, literary."

arrogant, sceptical,

Often

he struck the barrier with his newspaper, or stirred his

glass of tea, and,

"whilst he uttered the most atrocious

things, drank it in little sips."

Also in the dock was

G.

223

Y.

Sokolnikov, who had

signed the 1918 Brest-Litovsk treaty for the Soviets, and

had been Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as well

Ambassador to Great Britain.

Like Pyatakov, he delivered

as

his testimony in

a

dispassionate voice, but not so

L.

P.

Serebryakov, who had preceded Stalin
as secretary of the
Central Committee. According to Duranty,
Serebryakov spoke
as if '-half asleep,

and his voice sounded strangely
dreamy,"

though his tale was clear enough. 224
the defendants was N. I. Muralov,

a

The most impressive of

fabled soldier who was

revered for his great courage, and intensely
loyal to
Trotsky.
He had thwarted his interrogators

for some eight

months before agreeing to stand public trial.

Davies con-

sidered that Muralov "conducted himself with fine
dignity,
and appeared manly and straightforward." 225

The remainder

of the seventeen defendants consisted of various railroad,

chemical, and engineering officials, men of the second-rank,
but still of considerable importance in the Soviet industrial system. 226

"Wreckomani a"

Unlike the earlier Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, sabotage
was at the center of these proceedings.

Vyshinsky revealed

that the Trotskyites had engaged in such a widespread

wrecking campaign that it had reached the dimensions of
national epidemic.

a

According to the indictment, the accused

had carried on "wrecking, diversive, espionage and terrorist
activities for the purpose of disrupting the economic and

military power of our country, thus committing
the gravest crimes against the state."

227

sabotage charge appeared inherently absurd.

a

number of

Outwardly the
During wartime,

69

to be sure, large underground movements, working with
mass

support, could inflict serious harm on the enemy.

But in

peacetime random acts of sabotage committed by various malcontents normally had minor effect, and resulted in swift
exposure.

Above all, such acts did not lend themselves to

coherent political objectives.

Yet this theme was well

established in "Soviet mythology," i.e., the 1928 Shakhty
Trial.

2

28

And one close student of the Soviet scene has

suggested that Stalin personally interjected the issue into
the trial, based on his experience with

M

wrecking"during the

Civil War,
In this trial Pyatakov was the leading authority on

such acts

,

ably assisted by Drobnis

Rataichak, and others.

various methods used:

,

Shestov

,

Knyazev

He calmly lectured the court on the
pi acing a coke oven into operation

prematurely; delaying the construction of workers

1

housing;

revising blueprints much too frequently; supplying unsuitable coal for power plants;

for lengthy periods;

allowing trucks to stand idle

and other heinous sins.

A dispassionate

observer might be pardoned for thinking that this litany of
treasonable acts appeared to be the normal difficulties en-

countered by any underdeveloped country attempting to industrialize rapidly.

It has even been suggested that the

defendants were being used as "scapegoats" to mask managerial

deficiencies
Some of the charges, however, were more serious, or
at least more fanciful in nature.

Shestov, for instance,
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testified that labor conditions were made so arduous
that
when a "worker reached his place of work, he must be

made to

heap two hundred curses on the heads of the pit management/*
a not

unlikely possibility at the time. 230

a railroad ex-

pert, Knyazev, also confessed that without mass support he

was able to arrange 3,500 different train wrecks in the

period, 1935-36, or an average of five a day, as one ob-

server noted. 231

(For reasons of verisimilitude, Vyshinsky

entered into the record the names of Red Army men killed in
one wreck:

11

.

.

.

Kryuchkov, born 1910, collective farmer;

Sochilin, born 1913, collective farmer,

11

.

.

.

and so on.? 32

Knyazev, in addition, testified that the mysterious

Japanese secret agent, one "Mr. H

—

,

"

had instructed him,

in time of war, to contaminate troop trains with "bacteria.

11

233

Even incidents of heroism were portrayed as dia-

bolical acts.

When Rataichak reported on a rescue operation

he had organized,
cal works

,

after a serious fire broke out in a chemi-

Vyshinsky pointed out that some 17 workers had

been killed as

a

result of the rescue effort.

In his de-

fense Rataichak responded that the operation was ^necessary
in order to save the lives of hundreds of workers:

You directed it in such a way
Vyshinsky
that 17 workers were killed and 15 were wounded.
Is that so?
234
(Remains silent.
Rataichak
:

:

Good motives were of no consequence; only objective results
mattered.

i
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Molotov's Auto "Accident"
Terrorism once again played
trial.

a

prominent role in this

In the course of the proceedings some
fourteen groups

or individuals were listed as planning
terroristic acts

against leading Party figures.

Outside of Kirov's murder,

however, only one plot went beyond talk.

Molotov, so con-

spicuous by his absence in the August 1936 trial,
was now
elevated to the position of chief target extraordinaire
.

According to the indictment, while Molotov was on an inspection trip to Prokopyevsk (Siberia), his chauffeur, one

Valentine Arnold, deliberately tried to overturn the car
into a "deep ditch," but at the last moment "flunked" and

did not turn sharply enough, thereby allowing guards in

a

second car to catch the automobile before serious harm could
be done.

?35D

Vyshinsky's interrogation of Valentine Volf riodovich

Arnold provided

moment of hilarity in an otherwise de-

a

pressing trial.

A consummate actor and professional rogue,

Arnold was able to puncture the Prosecutor's poise, and make
him look foolish, something the more learned defendants were
unable to achieve.

A rather "thickset, swarthy, shock-headed

creature, with a sharp-pointed nose that indicates consummate impudence,"

2
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Arnold was

a

"

lumpenprolet ari at " adven-

turer, born illegitimate in Tsarist Russia.

In his early

years he had traveled from St. Petersburg to Finland, Germany,
Sweden, Norway, England, back to Sweden and then to Russia
again.

Along the way he used

a

variety of names ("Ivanov,"

"Vasilyev," "Efimov," "Rask," "Kulpenen"

found impossible to keep straight.

)

,

which Vyshinsky

When the Prosecutor ac-

cused him of changing the story he had told in the
preliminary examination, Arnold blandly replied, "I signed
it

/official statement/ thinking that you had the story
straight

And when Vyshinsky became hopelessly confused over the details of the accused's service in the Tsar's army, Arnold

advised him,

proper order.

"...

you had better take up everything in

You skip things and leave unfilled gaps." 237

But it was Arnold's American experience that had the

audience rocking with laughter at the Prosecutor's expense.

2

38

In 1917 he obtained

ship berth to the United

a

States and found himself in New York.

A night spent in the

Army and Navy home resulted in his enlistment in the American
Army.

Now an American citizen with another name

— Arnold — he

returned to form and found himself in jail (at least once)
for ste aling government property

.

At one point he reversed

his testimony again, and casually informed the court that he

had been wounded at Verdun by
a plane.

a

bomb fragment dropped from

Vyshinsky exploded:

*

Accused Arnold, you would try even the
greatest patience the patience of an ox. I
You may deny what
am not losing patience yet.
you said at the preliminary investigation on
January 9, and what you said at the preliminary investigation in September but you will
not get away from what you said only five
minutes ago. 239
,

,

But Arnold had the last word.

Despite belonging to the

Russian Orthodox Church, this accomplished opportunist became
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Lutheran in Los Angeles in order "to get into
higher
society," i.e., become a Free Mason!
In fact, he
a

was a

Master Mason of the Ancient Order of Free Masons,
Lodge No.
183.

But there was more.

a Mason,

Besides becoming a Lutheran and

at the same time he also joined the nascent

Communist Party of the United States!

This was too much for

the Prosecutor:

Vyshinsky
And what were you really by
conviction, a freemason or a Communist?
Arnold
I was just a man. 240
:

.

.

.

:

This was the most dignified response of the entire trial.

After this inspired bit of buffoonery, the rest of
Arnold's testimony was on the prosaic side.
Vyshinsky'

s

Under

prompting, he dutifully described his return to

the Soviet Union, his various work assignments in Siberia,

his involvement with the Trotskyites, and how "cowardice"

kept him from successfully wrecking Molotov's car.^ 4

"1
"

Later

in the trial Knyazev accurately declared that such types as

Arnold were "one in
masterpiece."
as this

242

a million,"

and that he was "a rare

Still at a loss, Vyshinsky referred to him

"hardened scoundrel,"

a

"rascal and an adventurer,"

an "international tramp, who has been,

I

think, in every

country in the world, and everywhere has left traces of his
fraudulent operations."

243

•

Despite the serious charges

lodged against him, Arnold only received ten years in prison
for his actions.

There is a report that Stalin was so amused

by his antics that he decided to show him mercy.

244
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"Trotskyite-Fascist Alliance"
Perhaps the most sensational charge in the trial con-

cerned the alleged link between the Trotskyite conspirators
and high-level Nazi officials.

According to the indictment,

the Trotskyite "parallel centre" on trial (Pyatakov, Radek,

Sokolnikov, Serebryakov) had a concrete political program
to "'retreat to capitalism.

1

"

245

Since this policy could

not attract internal support, external assistance was so-

licited.

In fact, Trotsky had personally negotiated an ac-

cord with Rudolph Hess, Hitler's deputy, and offered him the

following concessions:
the permission in the U.S.S.R. of the
development of private capital, the dissolution of the collective farms, the liquidation
of the state farms, the leasing of a number
of Soviet enterprises as concessions to foreign capitalists, and the granting to such
foreign states of other economic and political
advantages including the surrender of a part
of Soviet territory.

".

.

.

As Trotsky wrote Radek in December 1935,

"'We shall have to

yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to Japan, and
the Ukraine to Germany.'"

Furthermore, Trotsky allegedly

wrote that, "'We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin to

Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil in case of war

with America.,'"

and '"We shall have to agree to Germany's

demand not to oppose her seizure of the Danube countries and
the Balkans,
China.

.

.

.'

and not to hinder Japan in her seizure of
1,246

In return for these concessions, Hitler

and the Mikado promised to aid Trotsky's return to power and
the reintroduction of capitalism.

gram of formidable dimensions.

This was

a

defeatist pro-
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Since Trotsky was unavailable for questioning,

and

the incriminating letter not forthcoming, Vyshinsky was

forced to rely on the testimony of Radek--Trotsky

1

s

"Minister

of Foreign Affairs" 247 —to bolster these sensational charges.

"'That Monkey Radek'" was certainly the most brilliant per-

former in the dock. 248

In Orlov's opinion, the trial was

direct challenge to Radek

1

a

ego:

s

To prove the impossible, to clothe an obvious
absurdity in a logical formula and do it better
than anybody else, was a feat that contained a
direct challenge to the demagogical intellect
and vanity of Radek.

A true Thespian, he '"lived
his assigned tasks.

1

"

his part, even overfulfilling

"Radek whined before the court and

249
lashed himself unmercifully," wrote the NKVD defector.

With

certain el an

a

,

he painted a vivid picture of

Trotsky's depraved activities, and even quoted verbatim from
letters he allegedly received from his "Chief,
see in a later chapter.

"

as we shall

Perhaps his most valuable contri-

bution to the case, however, was the valuable detail he
added to the "German connection."

Radek testified to having

three different meetings with diplomatic and military repre-

sentatives of

a

"Central European country," where German was

the native tongue.

When a diplomatic representative of this

nation asked him in the fall, 1934, about Trotsky's program
of "rapprochement" with Germary Radek understood immediately
,

that he was not referring to any published articles, since
he knew that "Trotsky had never advocated the idea of

rapprochement with Germany in the press,"

a

completely

a
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accurate statement.

Radek advised him that an altercation

between two countries, "even if they represent
diametrically
opposite social systems, is

a

fruitless matter, but that sole

attention must not be paid to these newspaper altercations."

Continuing this theme, he added:
told him that realist politicians in the
U.S.S.R. understand the significance of a
German-Soviet rapprochement and are prepared
to make the necessary concessions to achieve
this rapprochement.
This representative
understood that since I was speaking about
realist politicians it meant that there were
realist politicians and unrealist politicians
in the U.S.S.R.:
the unrealist politicians
were the Soviet government, while the realist
politicians were the Trotsky-Zinovievite
.250
bloc
I

.

.

.

Later in the trial Vyshinsky
the same subject.

deliberately led him back to

Radek testified about

a

meeting in the

summer of 1935 that he and Bukharin had with
a

professor from Konigsberg, as well as

versation with

a

a

a

diplomat and

November 1935 con-

military attache who was also from Germany.

In the second conversation, lamenting the change in Russo-

German relations, the military official recalled the rapport

between the armies during Trotsky's time, and pressed Radek,
"as one who had formerly pursued the Rapallo line."

In

response, Radek supposedly repeated that "realist politicians"
were ready "to make the necessary concessions in order to

ensure this friendship."

In full agreement, the attache

suggested that "we ought at last to get together somehow and
jointly discuss the details, definitely, about ways of

reaching

a

rapprochement."

In ambiguous terms Radek evaluated

the dialogue:
I
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This second conversation revealed to me
that there was an attempt on the part of
military circles to take over the connections
which Trotsky had established with certain
circles in Germany, or that it was an attempt
to verify the real content of the negotiations
that were being conducted.
Perhaps, also, it
was an attempt to ascertain whether we knew
definitely what Trotsky had proposed. 251
.

.

.

At this point Vyshinsky changed the subject.

There will be no attempt at this point to analyze in
any great detail these delphic statements.

But if "Stalin,"

and not Trotsky is the "realist politician" in question, as

Nathan Leites

has suggested, then the above exchange was

a

fairly accurate account of Soviet intentions at the time. 252
In fact,

"negotiations" were being conducted in January 1937,

between Stalin and Hitler, not between Trotsky and Hess.
Radek testified about the "negotiations" on the evening of

January 27th; two days later, on the 29th, Stalin's personal
emissary, David Kandelaki, verbally suggested to Dr. Hjalmar

Schacht that direct negotiations be initiated between Germany
and the Soviet Union.

However, Hitler reportedly thought the

time premature to improve relations.
On the other hand,

253

at this precise moment, Stalin was

beginning his subterranean campaign to undermine, and
eventually destroy the High Command of the Red Army.
shall see,

a

As we

major component of this extraordinarily compli-

cated plot was the allegation that Marshall Tukhachevsky had
surreptitiously been holding talks with the German General
Staff, not known for its pro-Hitler sentiments.

When Radek

alluded to "military circles" attempting to take over the
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connections which -Trotsky had established with
certain
circles in Germany/' he may have been conveying

signal from

a

Stalin to Hitler.
At one time "intensely indignant at Stalin's gross

ingratitude" for his services, Radek had used his talents to

expand the charges.

According to

defector source, "There

a

is no doubt that Stalin had promised him special considera-

tion in return for his help in touching-up the picture which

Stalin wished him to present." 254

Perhaps Radek

1

s

true mis-

sion was to send messages in Hitler's direction.
"Tilt of Wits"

Any speculation about Radek'

s

services to the prose-

cution must take into consideration his sharp, and often

malicious clashes with Vyshinsky, from which he emerged
"with banners flying," as Duranty wrote of his old friend. 255

Although he must have realized that too much verbal by-play
would seal his doom, observed his biographer, Radek could not
resist making

a

strong impression:

martyred, let it be in style!"

256

"If he was finally to be

Whereas Arnold used low
v

humor to discomfort Vyshinsky, Radek employed his ironic in-

telligence in such a fashion that the Prosecutor sometimes
lost his poise completely.

Various sections of the record revealed intense
animus between Radek and Vyshinsky.

It is not unlikely that

this opportunity to badger the sharp-witted prisoner was

precious moment in the Prosecutor's career.

a

But Radek was a
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dangerous adversary.

At one point, for instance, Vyshinsky

attempted to put into Radek's mouth the notion that
treason
was permissible when socialism was crippled.

With ill-

disguised contempt the famous wag replied, "You are
a pro-

I

found reader of human hearts, but

I

on my thoughts in my own words."

In response the Prosecutor

must nevertheless comment

admitted that he was out of his depths:

"I

know that you

have a fairly good stock of words behind which to conceal

your thoughts, and it is very difficult for

a man,

even

a

good reader of human hearts, to understand you and induce
you to say what you are really thinking. 257

Then ensued an

acrimonious exchange over Radek's "treasonous" position in
1935-36, really an exercise in browbeating, until the de-

fendant taunted his tormenter, and dared him to ask why he

had remained silent for so many months.

Vyshinsky angrily

replied:
do not propose to engage in a shouting
match with accused Radek. I am interrogating
you, putting questions to you.
Answer the
questions, if you please, and do not make
speeches.
I would ask you not to try to shout
me down and not to speak on questions that
^ ft
s
have nothing to do with the case 9^ D<D
I

.

But then the Prosecutor turned to Radek's long period of re-

sistance, September 22 to December

4,

and asked if this be-

havior did not cast doubt on the defendant's claim that he
had many doubts about Trotsky's line:
Yes, if you ignore the fact that
Radek
you learned about the program and about
Trotsky's instructions only from me, of
course, it does cast doubt on what I have
said. 2^
:
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Vyshinsky had gone too far, and the cornered knave
repaid
him in kind, exposing the fatal weakness in the
case.

The

intrepid Radek, in fact, returned to this dangerous
theme in
his final plea. After asking, rhetorically, what
proofs
could be produced to show that the Trotskyite organization
was helping to foment

a

new world war, he answered:

In support of this fact there is the evidence
of two people the testimony of myself, who
received the directives and the letters from
Trotsky (which, unfortunately, I burned) and
the testimony of Pyatakov, who spoke to
Trotsky. All the testimony of the other accused rests on our testimony.
If you are
dealing with mere criminals and spies, on
what can you base your conviction that what
we have said is the truth, the firm truth? 260

—

,

The clear implication in Radek'

s

statement was that the

"truth" rested on quicksand.

The very ambiguity of Radek 's "veiled" utterances

makes it difficult to fathom his true intent.

On the one

hand, John Armstrong has written that in an effort to save
"a cunning orator,

his life, Radek,

seemed to be exercising

his talents almost enthusi as tic ally to destroy his reputa-

tion."

Orlov agreed that, on the whole, Radek "had car-

ried out Stalin'

s

instructions in full

.

"

Yet he Nalso noted,

But if we examine carefully what Radek was
saying at the trial, we shall see that he
managed to construct his self -incriminating
testimony in such a way as to stress the
absurdity of the accusations and convey to
the world that the judicial authorities did
not possess any concrete evidence against the
defendants 2 ° 2

As we shall see in

a

later chapter, Trotsky was almost totally

oblivious to the "dangerous contraband" that Radek had managed
to introduce in the trial.
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Lacunae and Denouement

Although many accounts of the trial
ignored the
glaring lack of corroborating evidence,
Vyshinsky

was well

aware of the serious deficiencies in his
case.

Where were

the documents, written program, rules,
minutes, seal, etc.,
he rhetorically asked, to support the existence
of such a

conspiracy?

With great aplomb he answered that in such

a

case one could not demand such evidence:

You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy, of
cou P d'etat be approached from the standpoint:
give us minutes, decisions, membership cards,
the numbers of your membership cards; you cannot demand that conspirators have their conspiratorial activities certified by a notary. 263
The Tsarist Okhrana

,

however, had no such problem in ob-

taining these kinds of records from Lenin and other experienced conspirators.

Although the Prosecutor asserted that

certain documents of great value had been presented to the
court, he candidly admitted that the problem in this case

was to distinguish in the confessions truth from falsehood.

Incredibly, he claimed,

"every judge, every procurator, and

every counsel for defence who has taken part in scores of
trials knows when an accused is speaking the truth and when
he departs from the truth for some purpose or other." 264

But in each of the trials the "experienced" Vyshinsky osten-

sibly accepted certain "lies" as facts, which were only dis-

covered in the subsequent trial.
In fact, the material evidence was embarrassingly

meager.

A few of Stroilov's notebooks were introduced in

court as exhibits, several German "agents" were identified
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from photographs presented to the accused,
and the Telephone
Address Directory of the German Reich, 7th
Edition, Volume
II, was exhibited, "proving" that an
address in
one of

Stroilov-S notebooks matched that of

a

German agent in

Berlin. 265

Even

a

display of extra-sensory perception found its

way into the record.

Before 1932 Radek was ostensibly di-

vorced from any Trotskyite activity.

But at one point Radek

was walking home from his offices at Izvestia and saw

Smirnov and his secretary on the street.

I.

N.

They immediately

turned away, he recalled and, conseguently

"I

,

immediately

realized that something was in preparation, that something
was brewing.

But they did not come to me,

to me openly."

and did not speak

Yet these two conspirators, "knowing of my

frame of mind" from this chance encounter, supposedly re-

quested Trotsky to get in contact with Radek for the purpose
of recruiting him into the conspiracy.

Trotsky dutifully wrote Radek.

9

ft

f->

Thus,

In February 1932,
an exceedingly im-

portant contact was generated by "vibrations" passing between
three men as they silently turned away from each other.

During the trial, it was alleged, many letters passed

between Trotsky and his confederates in the Soviet Union but,
once again, none were available for examination in the courtroom.

Trotsky and Radek, in particular, maintained

a

steady

correspondence, their letters being passed back and forth by

Vladimir Romm

,

a

liaison man and journalist.

In late July

1933, Romm personally had an interview with Trotsky in Paris
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in the Bois de Boulogne. 267

Trotsky -s direct involvement in

the plot was further demonstrated when
Pyatakov testified
that in December 1935 he flew from Berlin
to Oslo, for the

purpose of discussing Trotsky's current line.
an exile in Norway,

held
etc.

a

At that time

Trotsky allegedly received Pyatakov and

long conversation with him on wrecking activities,

268

The circumstances around these two personal

"meetings" with Trotsky will be examined in some detail
in

another chapter

for,

like the "Hotel Bristol" affair, they

provided Trotsky with an important opening— one that tended
to explode the entire case against him.

Vyshinsky's summation was another exercise in abuse,
even more repetitious than his earlier effort.

In recapit-

ulating the proceedings, the Prosecutor claimed that the
trial had been a "searchlight," illuminating "the most re-

mote recesses, the secret by-ways, the disgusting hidden

corners of the Trotskyite underground." 269

Like a "reversed

cinema reel," the historical evolution of Trotskyism had been
clarified until its final conversion into

a

"storm detachment

of fascism, into one of the departments of the fascist

police."

270

The whole history of this movement, from 1904

to the present, had been "an uninterrupted chain of betrayals
of the cause of the working class, of the cause of social
ism.

H

271

In support of this unrelieved picture of treachery

toward the revolutionary movement, Vyshinsky introduced many
distortions of historical fact which will be examined in connection with Trotsky

'

s

defense.
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In the vignettes of the major defendants,
Vyshinsky

highlighted their criminal activities.
stressed that this was

a

Once again he

gang of criminals, hardly to be

distinguished from "gangsters who use blackjacks
and daggers
on the high-road on a dark night." 272
Murderers,

incendiaries,

bandits— they resembled the medieval

"

camorra ," which had

united Italian nobility, vagabonds, and brigands. 273

But

they were hardly intelligent conspirators, for their unequal
alliance with foreign states was like a wretched little gnat

crawling into

a

wolf's mouth while "consoling oneself with

the idea that the wolf is not wicked and will not gobble one
274
up."
In addition, declared the Prosecutor, these

Trotskyites were true "Judases," who had sold their native
land for "30 pieces of silver," thus repeating

a

familiar

refrain often used by the seminary-trained Stalin. 275
But the climax of the speech came in the final para-

graphs, where Vyshinsky called on the murdered and maimed to

support his plea:
am not the only accuser
Comrade Judges
I feel that by my side here stand the victims of
the crimes and of these criminals
on crlitches
maimed half alive and perhaps legless like
Comrade Nagovitsina the switch- girl at
Chusovskaya Station who appealed to me through
Pravda, today, and who, at 20 years of age, lost
both her legs in averting a train disaster
organized by these people
I do not stand alone!
I feel that by my side here stand the murdered
and maimed victims of these frightful crimes, demanding of me, as the State Prosecutor, that I
press the charge on all points!
the victims may
I do not stand here alone!
be in their graves, but I feel that they are
standing here beside me, pointing at the dock,
I

!

:

,

,

,

,

,

,

I

I
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at you,

accused, with their mutilated arms
which have mouldered in the graves to which
you sent them!
I am not the only accuser!
I am joined in
my accusation by the whole of our people!
I
accuse these heinous criminals who deserve
only one punishment death by shooting! 276

—

After the dead had pointed their maimed and moldering
arms at the accused, Vyshinsky gave way to three defense at-

torneys.

Counsel I. D. Braude, speaking for Knyazev, was

hardly distinguishable from the Prosecutor in his approach:
"Comrade Judges,

I

will not conceal from you the exceptionally

difficult, the unprecedentedly difficult position which the

defense finds itself in this case," since the great indignation felt by the entire country toward the accused "cannot
but be shared by Counsel." 277

Once these "defense" speeches

had been given, the accused presented their final pleas,

generally self-abusive, but not quite as shameless
at the August 1936 trial.

as those

Perhaps the most pathetic words

were spoken by Pyatakov:
In a few hours you will pass your sentence.
And here I stand before you in filth, crushed
by my own crimes, bereft of everything through
my own fault, a man who has lost his Party, who
has no friends, who has lost his very sel f.278
v

Certainly this was

a

sad end to

a

distinguished career,

symbolizing the tragedy of an entire revolutionary generation.
At 7:15 on the evening of January 29 the court ad-

journed to consider its verdict, and reconvened at 3:00 the
next morning.

After Ulrikh had read the verdict, he an-

nounced the sentences.
death penalty.

Thirteen of the accused received the

Arnold, as mentioned before, was given ten
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years, and Stroilov received eight for his
efforts.

More

surprisingly, Sokolnikov and Radek escaped
with just ten
years apiece. 279 According to Orlov, when
Radek heard the
sentence, his "face lit up with joy," he shrugged
his

shoulders,

and "smiled a guilty smile." 280

That very day, a bitterly cold January 30,
1937,

a

mass demonstration of some 200,000 people was held in
Red
Square.

While the demonstrators waved horrid caricatures of

the accused,

and shouted for blood, Nikita Khrushchev ad-

dressed them.

The future critic of the personality cult

concluded his speech by declaring:
These assassins aimed at the heart and brain
of our party.
They raised their evil hand
against Comrade Stalin.
Raising their hand
against Stalin, they raised it against all of
us, against the laboring class, against the
workers!
Raising their hand against Comrade
Stalin, they raised it against the teaching of
Marx-Engel s-Lenin
Raising their hand against Comrade Stalin,
they raised it against all that is best, all
that is human, because Stalin is hope, aspiration, the beacon of all advanced and progressive
humanity.
Stalin is our banner!
Stalin is our
281
will!
Stalin is our victory
I

To the surprise of hardly anyone, the workers gained

their wish.

It was announced the very next day (February 1)

that all pleas had been rejected and the accused had already

been executed. 282
.

,

VI.

A Second Entr'acte

The liquidation of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite

Centre" removed from the political scene

a

number of

Stalin's erstwhile opponents, but the "prophylactic" action
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was far from complete.
Party,

army,

A number of potential foes in the

and government still served to restrict
Stalin's

absolute freedom of maneuverability.

Once again the broom

made an appearance, this time wielded with almost
unimaginable
intensity
"Sergo"

One of the few Party leaders with a measure of in-

dependent authority was

G.

K.

("Sergo") Ordzhonikidze

other of Stalin's Georgian cronies.

,

an-

A veteran Party worker,

Ordzhonikidze was known for his tempestuous nature as well as
his elementary sense of decency.

As Commissar of Heavy

Industry, he had been heavily dependent on the expertise of
his brilliant deputy

— Pyatakov — and

strenuous fight to save his life.

posedly called Yezhov

a

had apparently waged

a

In this effort he sup-

"'filthy lickspittle,

1

"

and even

threatened Stalin over the phone:
demand that this authoritarianism cease!
I am still a member of the Politburo
I am
going to raise hell, Koba if it's the last
thing I do before I die! "283
"I

I

Ordzhonikidze never got the opportunity "to raisevhell."
February 18th he suddenly died of

a "heart

On

attack," as certi-

fied by a panel of eminent physicians, who themselves were to

perish in short order. 284

Almost immediately rumors circu-

lated that he had been murdered or forced to commit suicide,
but it was left to Khrushchev in 1956 to reveal officially
that instead of a heart attack, he died frrom a self-

inflicted gunshot wound.

At the XXIInd Party Congress in

88

1961 he added that "Serge" could no longer work
with Stalin,
and "'in order to avoid clashing with Stalin
and sharing

responsibility for his abuse of power, he decided
to take
his life. "
Since a decisive meeting of the Central
1

Committee was about to convene, logic indicates that
political murder, not suicide, was the order of the day, as Robert

Conquest has suggested. 285
The February-March Plenum

A plenum of the Central Committee met between

February 23 and March
record.

5,

1937, the longest such assembly on

At this time the Stalinist "moderates" made

a

last

feeble effort to deflect their chief from his murderous
course.

As revealed by Khrushchev in his 1956 "Secret

Speech," Pavel Postyshev, the Party's loyal satrap in the

Ukraine, led the counter-attack.

censed that

He was particularly in-

member of the Ukrainian Central Committee

a

Karpov

— had

1934,

after so many years of loyal and arduous service:

been accused of joining the Trotskyite camp in

.1

personally do not believe that in 1934
an honest party member who had trod the long
road of unrelenting fight against enemies for
the party and for socialism would now be in the
I do not believe it.
camp of the enemies.
I cannot imagine how it would be possible to
travel with the party during the difficult
years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites.
."286
It is an odd thing.
".

.

.

.

Eikhe

,

G.

.

.

.

Supposedly such Party stalwarts as Y. Rudzutak,
R.

— one

V.

Chubar,

Kaminsky, and also some Army commanders, at-

tempted to support Postyshev, but Stalin and his gang were
able to shout down any such pleas.

,
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Also at this plenum Bukharin and Rykov
were brought
before the membership, in order to be expelled
from

the Party

Bukharin took the opportunity to assert that
there was, indeed, a conspiracy in the land— led by Stalin
and Yezhovl
Supposedly Stalin intervened and brutally stated,
'"if you
are innocent, you can prove it in a prison cell!'" 287

The

two "Rightists" were arrested on the spot, and led
away to

prison.

In addition, Stalin berated Yagoda's stewardship of

the NKVD.

At this point Yagoda turned on the

jeering mem-

bers of the Central Committee and snarled, '"What

didn't arrest all of you before, when

I

a

pity

I

had the power I'" 288

His arrest was delayed until April of that year.

Toward the end of the plenum, on March
livered

a

3,

Stalin de-

long speech, in which he defended his pet theory

that the class struggle intensified as socialism reached its

triumphant completion and took some

ill-disguised swipes at

Postyshev and the Ukrainian organization, portending
purge.

a

new

He charged that some leading comrades had been un-

able to see the real face of the "'wreckers, diversionists

spies, and murderers,

1

"

and even had

"
*

cooperated* in pro-

moting the agents of foreign states into this or that responsible position.'"

289

Even more ominously, he suggested

that Party leaders at all ranks select "'two Party workers

capable of being their real substitutes,'" hardly
_

,

.

piece of advice.

a

fraternal

290

Henceforth, Stalin would have his bloody way, without

significant opposition:
its monstrous climax.

The Great Purge was about to reach

"

.
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The Red Army Purge

Not even the honored military establishment would be

spared the humiliation of public disgrace, even though it
was revered for its Civil War exploits.

"The Red Army was

as well loved among the masses of the people as the G.P.U.

was hated/
1

observed

1

a

secret police victim, shocked by the

atest purge 291

The news of a vast "plot" within the Army High

Command to overthrow the regime became public knowledge in
June 1937, but Stalin had been preparing this stroke since

mid-1936.

At that time Divisional Commander Dmitri Shmidt

was arrested

,

and

1

ater named as a conspirator in the

Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. 292

(He had once had the audacity to

threaten to lop off Stalin's ears, apparently
gotten insult. \2
r
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a

never-for-

Also in this trial record appeared the

name of Corps Commander Vitovt Putna, once military attache
in London,

and close to the Army's leadership.

294

But Radek was the real harbinger of bad news for the

Army

.

Apparently following instructions

,

Radek casually

mentioned at one point in the January 1937 trial \hat Putna
had come "to see me with some request from Tukhachevsky

.

295

At a later point Vyshinsky led him back to this point, and

Radek protested that he had not meant to implicate the

Army's leader:
of Putna*

s

"Of course, Tukhachevsky had no idea either

role or of my criminal role.

..."

There was no

question of having counterrevolutionary dealings with
and
Tukhachevsky, since Radek knew his attitude to the Party

I

"
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Government "to be that of an absolutely devoted man. 296
1

'

But

there is one report that, as Radek "absolved" the Marshall
of
all criminal activities, he "grinned maliciously," 297
perhaps

because Tukhachevsky was not known as being overly fond of
Jews.

But this was the denial that affirmed.

While stationed

in Holland, Krivitsky read of this exchange, and immediately

informed his wife, "'Tukhachevsky is doomed!'"

When she pro-

tested that Radek had again and again absolved the Marshall
of any connection with the conspiracy, he said that was

exactly the point:
Radek?'

"'Does Tukhachevsky need absolution from

298

If the tale that a small band of demoralized and dis-

credited capitulators could seize the country was highly unlikely, it was at least plausible that the highly disciplined

Red Army could successfully undertake just such
d'

etat

a

coup

Newly modernized, the Army in the 1930s boasted an

.

officer corps that was well-trained, tightly knit, and
faintly contemptuous of the political commissars, who inter-

fered with their legitimate military duties.

However, the

Army explicitly acknowledged that Stalin was the>Party's
rightful leader, being Lenin's "heir."

Klementi Y.

Voroshilov was the nominal chief of the military cadres, but
Marshall M. N. Tukhachevsky was the actual director of the
Army.

Born into an aristocratic family, Tukhachevsky had

fought as

a

youth in the Tsar's army, but later joined the

fledgling Red Army during the Civil War and became one of its

leading commanders while still in his

twenties.

He had come

.
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close to capturing Warsaw in 1920, only to see
this opportunity dashed by the disobedient tactics of the
"Tsaritsyn"

unit on his left flank, led by Stalin.

Vain, brilliant,

and

ambitious, his prestige had steadily increased to the
point
that, if a "Bonaparte" were to appear on the Soviet
scene,

this ex-noble was the logical choice.

Whether or not

Tukhachevsky and his coterie of followers ever entertained
the thought of overthrowing the regime mattered little.

Stalin had decided that

a

"preventive" purge was desirable

in order to remove this possibility. 299
By the end of April 1937, it was "an open secret"

that Tukhachevsky and other ranking generals were marked men,

according to a defector source.

During the traditional re-

view of the Red Army on May Day, the Marshall and his fellow
commanders stood silent, not even talking to each other,

possessed of

a

sense of doom.

On May 4th Tukhachevsky

•

s

com-

mission to represent the Soviet government in London at the
coronation of George VI was canceled.

And six days later he

was demoted and transferred to the command of the Volga

Military District, hardly an auspicious assignment.

At the

same time the positions of a number of other leading com-

manders were also shifted.

It appeared that the Army purge

was to be a protracted and convoluted operation
But in mid-May Stalin received "documentary evidence"

that Tukhachevsky and his group had entered into treasonous

relations with the German High Command.

This Byzantine in-

trigue involved the Soviet NKVD, the Nazi SD, the White

93

Russian officer corps, and President Eduard
Czechoslovakia.

Benes of

In a plot as complex as any mystery
aficio-

nado could desire, the first move had apparently
been by the
NKVD.

Through General Nikolai

V.

Skoblin, a leading figure

in the Paris-based "Union of Tsarist Veterans," who also

worked for both the German and Soviet intelligence agencies,
the story was planted in Berlin that Tukhachevsky was en-

gaged in
ously

a

a

conspiracy with his German counterparts.

Obvi-

spurious tale, it was promptly fed back to its Moscow

creators in

a

new guise, designed to compromise the Red Army.

Towards the end of 1936 the Nazis leaked the story of GermanRed Army contacts to Moscow through the good offices of
President Benes.
first months of 1937.

"A dossier was forged in the

Of great artistic merit, it featured

an exchange of letters between Tukhachevsky and the German

General Staff, some thirty-two pages long, and also in-

cluding

a

photo of Trotsky with German officials.

1937, this "dossier" was in Stalin's hands.

By May

301

Whatever reluctance Stalin felt about proceeding with
this particular purge apparently evaporated.

Arrests of

leading commanders were commonplace in late May.
June 11, 1937, came the stunning news.

Almost the entire

leadership of the Red Army had been arrested.
came the announcement of their execution, after

trial."

30 9

Then on

The next day

"secret

a

Unlike the earlier "plots," some top Soviet ofA leading

ficials believed in the reality of this intrigue.

NKVD official, Colonel Mikihail Shpigelglas, told

A.

I

Orlov

.
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that there had been '"a real conspiracy,"' as indicated
by
the panic at the top, the changing of all passes to
the

Kremlin, and the alerting of the troops.

Frinovsky, another NKVD chief, as saying,
Soviet Government hung by a thread.""' 303

He quoted M.

The whole

Yet the voluminous

Nazi records captured after World War II lent no support to
the existence of such

a

plot.

And during the post-war "de-

Stalinization" campaign the executed generals were among the
first to be exonerated, convincing proof of their inno304
cence

Even if there had been

a

plot in the Army High

Command to overthrow Stalin, this hardly justified the vast
dimensions of the military purge.

reached such

a

Guilt by association

stage that lowly captains were being arrested

for active participation in the plot.

hundreds of officers at
eliminated.

a

"Nests" involving

time were discovered, and promptly

Although accurate figures on the military purge

are not available, it has been estimated that from 20,000 to

35,000 officers perished, or 35 to 50 per cent of the entire

officer corps.

With regard to specific posts, Stalin's mili-

tary victims included

3

out of

5

marshals, 13 out of 15 army

commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195

division commanders, 220 out of 406 brigade commanders
so it went.

— and

Such a widespread decimation of the Army's

most experienced cadres could not but affect its efficiency.
Certainly, the Red Army's sorry performance in the 1939-40

Finnish campaign, and also in the first phases of the war

.
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with Germany, can partially be blamed on its lack of knowledgeable officers in leading combat positions.

Even

Khrushchev admitted that, "Very grievous consequences,

especially in reference to the beginning of the war /i.e.,
19417, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military com-

manders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his

suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations." 306
A Nation Prostrated
The NKVD tornado swept across the USSR with demo-

cratic choice and thoroughness, battering the Party, the
government, the nation, as well as the NKVD itself.

As early

as March 1937, Yezhov had embarked on a widespread purge of

Yagoda's followers, substituting his own men from the Central
Committee secretariat.

A favorite technique was to send

senior police officials on inspection tours to the provinces,
only to have them removed from the train at the first staand returned to NKVD headquarters, this time as pris-

tion,

oners.

Eventually the purge of experienced police cadres

extended down to the obi ast
different institution.

'

level, resulting in a radically

Those purged had hardly been paragons

of virtue, but many were dedicated Communists in their own
way,

and avoided the use of brutality per se.

The new police

cadres had fewer such scruples, following the lead of Stalin,
who no doubt took great pleasure in arresting Yagoda in early
_

.,

April

307

,
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The purge also transformed the Party into

creature.

a

new

Many familiar faces were missing from the summit

by the end of 1937.

Arrested as spies or worse were

Bukharin, Rykov, Rudzutak, Chudov

,

Yagoda, Postyshev

Kossior, Eikhe, Chubar, Krylenko, Bubnov, etc.

In some

cases these high officials continued to carry out their

Party or government functions, even though their death sen-

tences had already been signed.

OAQ

°

A number of them were

never properly conditioned to stand public trial indicating,
as Robert Conquest has noted,

that they had a clearer sense
of values than many who confessed. 309

During 1937-38 Yezhov handed Stalin literally hundreds of lists of potential Party victims.

Part of his

daily routine must have been authorizing the execution of

thirty-to-forty Party workers. 310

Nor was the center alone

singled out for special attention.

Stalin loyalists were

sent to the provinces intent upon wrecking old-time Party

organizations.

Zhdanov (to Leningrad)

,

Mikoyan (to Armenia),

Khrushchev (to the Ukraine), and Kaganovich (everywhere) they
were among the most prominent

.

Local Party secretaries were

replaced by their younger colleagues, who were promptly

purged in turn,

a

process that seemed endless.

But those

who managed to survive had great careers opened to them.
For example, Leonid Brezhnev was

a

Ukraine and member of the "Class of

Khrushchev protege in the
1

38," those who climbed

to prominence over the fallen bodies of their comrades.

311

4
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To loyal Communists this decimation
of Party cadres
was -the most frightful act in the tragedy
of the thirties." 312
Khrushchev, though only in retrospect, was
incensed by the

liquidation of those "honest, loyal Leninists,
devoted to the
cause of Revolution— .. ./who? were the first to
go when

Stalin imposed his arbitrary rule on the Party." 313

But a

far greater tragedy was visited on the average
Soviet citizen.

For every Party member who fell, another eight to ten
ordi-

nary Russians were persecuted, perhaps a total of seven
million.

31

The Party's "tragedy" pales beside that of their

suffering.
As explained in the Preface, the nightmarish atmos-

phere of Soviet life in the late 1930s was

a

peculiar com-

pound of physical fear and psychological mistrust.
informers, or seksots

,

Secret

were so plentiful that expression of

honest feelings all but disappeared; and sons were even en-

couraged to betray their fathers.

This "atomization of

society" resulted in the erosion of trust and loyalty, except to the Leader.

An incautious word might result, at any

time, in a knock on the door in the small hours of the

morning
a

— that

is,

a

visit by the NKVD.

"Fear by night,

feverish effort by day to pretend enthusiasm for

a

and

system

of lies, was the permanent condition of the Soviet citizen."

"Guilt" or "innocence" had almost nothing to do with

the decision to arrest.

It was all a matter of belonging to

certain "objective" categories, which automatically made one
an "enemy of the people."

Local NKVD chiefs had to fill

315
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quotas sent from Moscow.

Thus, a defector reported seeing
a

cable that Yezhov sent to his man in Frunze,
in the Kirghiz
SSR:
'"You are charged with the task of exterminating
10,000
enemies of the people. Report results by
signal.'" 316

Fortunately for the local secret police satrap, he
already
had voluminous lists of "subversives" under such
headings as
"AS"

(anti-Soviet element),

Church),

"SI"

"Ts"

(active member of the

(anyone with contacts abroad), etc.

He could

quickly meet his quota, and cable Moscow satisfactory news. 317
But as new and more expansive quotas were assigned, not only

former kulaks were arrested, for instance, but anyone who

knew said "criminals"

— until

the ever-widening circles en-

compassed a significant percentage of the nation. 318

This

was a "chain letter" operation with murderous consequences.

Besides the obvious danger of actually being

"Trotskyite

,

Cross, to be

former

a

it was not healthy to have belonged to the Red

"

a

member of

national minority group, to have

a

run a hotel, or learned Esperanto, or collected foreign
stamps.

The list of perilous occupations and associations

was almost endless. 319

danced too long with
self in a camp.

a

For instance,

an opera singer who had

Japanese diplomat at

a

ball found her-

Even a veterinarian who had treated dogs

from a foreign consulate was swept up, since contact of any

kind with foreigners was especially hazardous.
intellectuals were particularly prone to arrest.

As a class,

For in-

stance, it was risky to be a biologist and question Lysenko's

agricultural policies, or

a

linguist and disagree with

N.
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Marr-s thesis that all language
derives from the four

sounds-rosh, sal

,

ber,

and ^on.

Nor were poets neglected in

the general roundup.

Among the many examples, there was
the
celebrated Osip Mandelshtam. Arrested in
1934, he received
three years in a camp, where he
attempted to commit suicide.
Allowed to return to Moscow, he was arrested
again
in 1938

and was sentenced to five years'

forced labor in the Far

East, where he was viciously beaten by
a criminal gang,

forced to beg scraps of food.
a

psychiatric ward.

and

Apparently he finally died in

But earlier he had written these verses:

But your spine has been smashed,
My beautiful, pitiful era,
And with an inane smile
You look back, cruel and weak,
Like a beast that has once been supple,
At the tracks of your own paws. 32 "

Since the charges were patently false, the NKVD in-

terrogators invited the prisoners to invent their own
legend,'" which would later be confirmed by other interrogations.

In this way did "imagination materialize and put
on flesh and blood." 321 As a result, some of the charges

and confessions were worthy of high burlesque, if the con-

sequences had not been so deadly.

For instance, the

Assistant Director of the Moscow Zoo was thought to be

a

spy, but he told his cell-mates that he was only a "'wrecker'

"

— some

16 per cent of his monkeys had died of TB,

smaller percentage than that of the London Zoo. 322
other case, an elderly lady from

being

a

"Trotskistka"

(

a

"Trotskyite "

a

In an-

kolkhoz was arrested for
)

,

which she confused with

100
"

Traktoristka " ("tractor driver"); obviously

a

false charge,

she declared, since old people in her
village were not allowed to drive tractors. 323 Another worker
from Kiev told
his interrogators how he planned to blow
up a kilometer-long

bridge with several kilograms of arsenic, but
was thwarted
w
by rainy weather. 324 And one prisoner admitted
developing
special bacteria cultures, which only struck at
NKVD cadres.

321

Such myths did not matter in the least, since the

main objective of the interrogation was to obtain the names
of other accomplices.

The prisoners were forced to accuse

those who had recruited them, and whom they had in turn recruited, thereby ensuring an ever-widening purge.

However,

there were various tactics for avoiding the filthy business
of denouncing one's friends and family members.

For in-

stance, one Armenian priest denounced every single Armenian
he had buried in the last three years.

In addition,

a

leading doctor in Kharkov incriminated every single doctor
in the city, several hundreds, which enraged his interrogator:

'"You're not going to tell me that all the doctors in

Kharkov are enemies of the people.'"
to his impl ausible t ale

326
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But the physician stuck

Another tactic was to implicate

all the NKVD personnel involved in one's case, but this was
a

chancy ploy at best.

No matter, the ever-widening search

continued for "the imaginary founders of our various organizations,'

1

wrote one ex-prisoner.

The accused usually re-

ferred to these legendary forefathers as
recruiters.

1

"

1

the arch-

.
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Some ten per cent of those arrested
were executed in
speedy fashion. But the vast majority
were sentenced by
"Special Boards- to five, eight, or ten
years in one of the
various "corrective" camps.
It has been estimated that by
the end of 1938 the camp population was
about eight million
persons.
These camps specialized in felling timber,
mining
gold, preparing various construction projects,
etc., each

its own special hell.

if a n inmate survived the frigid

weather, debilitating diseases, and close confinement
with

vicious criminals

(

urkas

)

,

he often succumbed to the lassi-

tude brought on by short rations.

As soon as

a

prisoner was

obviously weakening under the terrible regimen, his food

quota was reduced, which meant

a

quick end.

Most of the in-

mates, even the hardy ones, could only survive two years of

this living hell.

Of all the millions incarcerated in the

late 1930s, perhaps only a tenth ever drew
again.

a

free breath
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*******************
The Soviet Union's collective derangement was reaching
a

crisis point in mid-1937.

But yet to come were v some of the

Purge's bloodiest excesses, including the "Great Trial" of

Bukharin and Rykov (March, 1938), to be discussed in

a

later

chapter
Leon Trotsky did not wait, however, for the end of
the savage affair before mounting a strenuous defense against

the calumnies besmearing his political reputation.

The

"counter-trial" in Mexico City was staged in April 1937, and
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based primarily on the charges in
the first two Moscow
trials.
it is appropriate at this

point, therefore, to turn

to Trotsky's initial reactions
to the Purge and his feverish
efforts to arrange an "impartial
inquiry" into the Moscow
"show" trials.

I

*

CHAPTER II

"THE PLANET WITHOUT A VISA"

All places that the eye of heaven visits
Are to a wise man ports and happy havens.
Teach thy necessity to reason thus;
There is no virtue like necessity.
Think not the King did banish thee,
But thou the King.
King Richard II, 1:3
.

.

.

"The Century of the Homeless Man"

—a

fitting epithet

for an era that has witnessed the forcible dislocation of

human lives on an unprecedented scale.
God's own

— the

blessed Anglo-Saxons

Except for perhaps

— most

of the world's

tribes in recent decades have experienced the doubtful pleas
ure of forsaking home and starting life anew in an alien en-

vironment.

In fact, nothing is so banal as the picture of a

homeless refugee

bored world.

,

hands outstretched

,

begging alms from

a

Banishment has been the rule, not the excep-

tion, for the world's pilgrims during much of the twentieth-

century.
In exile, there is both "splendor and squalor," as

Joseph Wittlin has observed,"'' but for most of the world's
outcasts the sorrows have certainly outweighed the blessings

Lack of

a

valid passport has meant not only spiritual exile,

but often the inability to secure work or sink new roots.

2

Being "paperless," and therefore prey to the whims of gendarmes and concierges, these transients were condemned to
103

a

"
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travel-stained life of cold-water, walk-up flats, temporary
jobs demeaning to the spirit, and incessant fears of
yet an-

other trip across the frontier, these "border-bugs." 3
Dreams of the past and hopes for the future became

their consolation.

Fearing the irreversible step of accept-

ing a new culture, emigrees tended to recreate
past.

a

glorious

They held on to "stage properties of the past," while

at the same time endlessly debated the shape of the future.

The cafe became the surrogate for the homeland, a place

where the ferocious reality of the present receded in

a blue

haze of cigarette smoke and hot cups of tea, where talk was
a virtue in itself:

"Five men listened and did not under-

stand, and five others did not understand and talked."
(Herzen)

On "the road with one another" to an imaginary

destination, time disappeared and boredom intruded, spiced
from time to time with intrigues, scandals, and gossip

endemic to emigre life.

The result,

all too often,

t

all

was a

psyche deformed by "fear, debasements, destitution, and rejection.

Not all the "flotsam," of course, was prey to these
tribul at ions

.

The creative ones

profited from the experience.

,

in particul ar

,

even

Despite the deprivation of

emotional reaction, of the native soil, of language, there
was the liberation from the tyranny of current concerns.

Voltaire, Hugo, Schiller, Herzen

— all

have benefited from

the opportunity to ignore the transitory in life in favor of

deathless issues, to make "shoes" for feet which will tread

,
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the earth a hundred years hence.

But at some point even

making shoes for imaginary feet loses its charm.

5

Only the

hardy can sustain the necessary faith.
At best, exile has been a mixed blessing for even
the strongest of the exiles.

the problem succinctly.

Sursis

Jean-Paul Sartre once expressed

Ke has Matthieu Delarue say in Le

:

La liberte
etre libre

c

1

est

1

1

exile et je suis condamne

a.

For the final decade of his life Leon Trotsky was also "con-

demned to be free.'

1

*******************
No stranger to exile and emigration was Lev Davidovich

Bronstein, known to the world as Leon Trotsky.

Arrested in

1898 by the Tsarist police for youthful political indiscre-

tions

,

Bronstein spent more than eighteen months in jail

before being exiled to the Lake Baikal region of Eastern
Siberia.

In 1902 he escaped his captors and finally made

After

his way to London and a first meeting with Lenin.

several years spent as a political emigre in France,

Switzerland, and Belgium, he returned to Russia in 1905 to

help lead the 1905 revolution.

Arrested again, the young

revolutionary, having assumed the name Trotsky, was ordered

deported in 1907 to lifetime exile in Northern Siberia, to
penal colony on the Polar Circle.

But the intrepid Trotsky

never reached his God-forsaken destination.

On the way he

i

a
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eluded his guards and made good his escape, traveling

week

a

across the frozen tundra on a sleigh drawn by reindeer
and

driven by a drunken native.

After coming upon

railroad

a

line, he made his way to St. Petersburg, and from there
to

Western Europe.

The years 1907-14 were spent mostly in Vienna,

with sidetrips to the Balkans.

The outbreak of World War

I

forced him to take up residence in France, which allowed ex-

cusions to neutral Switzerland.
to Spain.

But in 1916 he was deported

From there he succeeded in finding passage to New

York, arriving in early 1917.

Finally, in May 1917, he re-

appeared once again in the Russian capital, this time to

spend ten fateful years in the thick of revolutionary activity.

On February 12, 1929, the Soviet vessel "Ilyich"

entered the Bosphorus

,

and disembarked its meager cargo--

Trotsky, his wife and eldest son, and GPU escorts.

A year

had already been spent in exile in distant Alma-Ata.

But

Stalin desired that his arch-nemesis be banished to an even
more remote realm, to the Turkish "backwater" of Kemal
Ataturk.

And so began Trotsky's "third" and last emigration.
This period of banishment was to be far different

than the first two, which Trotsky remembered as "blissful
times," when he could freely cross frontiers on

passport and appear in open political meetings.

traveled on

a

a
7

doubtful

Now he

passport in the name of "Leon Sedov," no more

acceptable to European authorities than the former one.
This time exile was involuntary, and instead of finding

8

a

H
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circle of kindred spirits, Trotsky found himself set adrift
in hostile Constantinople, where, to be sure,

a

Russian

colony flourished, but one consisting of White emigr4es,
from whom he was separated by "the blood of the civil war." 9
He was now an outcast par excellence

,

unwelcome in the West

as well as the East.

But he shared with the other "Lost Tribes of Russia"

the usual vexations of emigre life

manence, uncertainty.

— impoverishment,

imper-

Few, however, could share with him

the extreme vicissitudes of fortune.

The former "Ogre of

Europe," who had shaken thrones and defied presidents, was
just another "Wandering Jew."

No matter how he conducted

himself, the last years of his life could only be an anti-

climax to the great years of triumph.

And the revolutionary

flow did not pledge another triumph in the coming years.

Yet

he remained the eternal optimist, with great faith in the

future, no matter what "filthy outrages" history allowed her-

self in the present.

At the dawn of the century he had

pledged his faith:
As long as I breathe, I shall fight
for the future, that radiant future in which
man, strong, and beautiful, will become master
of the drifting stream of his history and will
direct it towards the boundless horizon of
beauty, joy and happiness ll°
.

.

.

In the last year of his life he reaffirmed this optimism:
But whatever may be the circumstances
of my death I shall die with unshaken faith in
This faith in man and in
the communist future.
his future gives me even now such power of resistance as cannot be given by any religion.
.

•

.

i
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Yet these brave words could not disguise the
melancholy

truth of his situation.

He was turning fifty as he began

his final period of exile, and the "communist future"
was

becoming increasingly remote under Stalin's stewardship.
Trotsky had reached this age just at the point when the

Revolution no longer required his services.
But the "Old Man" contemptuously rejected the notion
of personal tragedy or the thought that he, like the

Mensheviks, had been tossed into the "ashcan of history."

Only a philistine, he wrote in his autobiography, My Life

,

could accept a relationship between the "power of reasoning
and a government post, between mental balance and the present

situation."

Proudly he declared,

tragedy." 12

Like the poet who had carried eight volumes of

"I

know no personal

Pushkin with him into exile, thus packing "Russia in my
bag,"

13

October.

Trotsky had also packed his "Russia"
It was his solitary duty,

— the

ideals of

as he conceived it,

to

preserve the legacy of Lenin from Stalin's disfigurement and,
at the same time,
a

to fashion "shoes" for the future.

It was

demanding assignment, excluding personal concerns.

And it

was a task that he alone could discharge.

mains," he lamented in 1935.

carrying on

a

"Now nobody re-

As a result, he was reduced to

dialogue with the newspapers, hardly an ade-

quate substitute for his earlier exchange of ideas with Lenin,
Rakovsky, Bukharin, et al

.

Still, Trotsky considered that

his work in those years was "the most important work" of his
life, even more important than his heroic activities in the

,
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period 1917-21.

Then his work could not be considered

"indispensable," not with Ilyich there to guide
the ship of
state.
The decade of the 1930s was another affair
altogether
In an oft-quoted passage, he wrote in 1935
that "now my work
is 'indispensable'

in the full sense of the word."

it was a

simple fact of political life:

There is no arrogance in this claim at all. The
collapse of the two Internationals has posed a
problem which none of the leaders of these
Internationals is at all equipped to solve. The
vicissitudes of my personal fate have confronted
me with this problem and armed me with important
experience in dealing with it. There is now no
one except me to carry out the mission of armina
a new generation with the revolutionary method
over the heads of the leaders of the Second and
14
Third International.
.

.

,

Hardly any other Russian emigre at the time was faced with
such a mission, self-imposed or otherwise.

Trotsky's state of splendid isolation was exacerbated
by Stalin's machinations.

As one after another of the voices

of October lost his willingness, or ability to make plain
the reality of Stalin's Russia, Trotsky stood alone in the

historical limelight, the only authentic alternative to "The

Leader of All Progressive Humanity."
was middle-aged

,

No matter that Trotsky

frequently beset by enervating illnesses

and forced to depend on a handful of loyal secretaries to

transcribe his philippics, his mythical figure grew in direct

proportion to the virulence of the attacks emanating from the
Kremlin.

Ironically, as Isaac Deutscher has observed, the

more loudly Stalin "denounced his adversary as the chief or
sole prompter of every heresy and opposition, the more

8
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strongly did he turn all the mute anti-Stalinist
feelings,
with which Bolshevik Russia was overflowing, towards
the

outcast's remote yet towering figure." 15

The two Titans

stood alone on facing peaks, issuing their epistles
and

clashing over the rightful possession of Lenin's legacy,
while their disciples, far below, debated the proper slope
to scale.

Much of Trotsky's energy was devoted to creating
Fourth International.

a

Whether this was an heroic or quixotic

undertaking, it was a central concern of his in the 1930s.

Yet this International basically was stillborn:
more than a tiny boat overweighted by
one observer of the Trotskyite band.

1

a

it was never

huge sail, to quote

c

Much of the trouble

lay in Trotsky's inability to direct personally the activities
of his followers.

Often forced to live incognito, his free-

dom to travel severely limited, police scrutiny

a

constant

vexation, Trotsky was "cut off from political action,'

himself wrote.

1

as he

He even had to turn to "such ersatz journal-

ism" as a private diary:
But one has to take the situation as it
is.
For the very reason that it fell to my lot
to take part in great events, my past now cuts
I am reduced
me off from chances for action.
to interpreting events, and trying to foresee
their future course. At least this occupation
is more satisfying than mere passive reading. 17
•

.

.

Yet this was no mean task, as Isaac Deutscher has noted:

"To

restore Marxism and to reimbue the mass of communists with
its critical spirit was the essential preliminary to effec-

tive revolutionary action, and the task that he set himself."

1

Ill

The prosaic present, however, kept bidding for his
attention.

Money, passports, police spies— these mundane

matters drew him away from "what ought to be" to "what was."

And then came the nightmare of the purge.

Trotsky suddenly

found himself publicly branded as the arch-fiend of the revo-

lutionary movement.

What could he do?

In 1937 he wrote

Angelica Balabanoff that, "'History has to be taken
is;

as she

and when she allows herself such extraordinary and filthy

outrages, one must fight her back with one's fists.'" 19

And

so he accepted the challenge issued by Clio or, more ac-

curately, by Stalin.

I.

Castaway, A La Turque

When Trotsky's party disembarked in Constantinople
(February, 1929), it was initially housed in the Soviet
With

Consulate, an awkward arrangement for all concerned.

the solicitous aid of his GPU escorts, Trotsky finally found
a

villa on one of the Prinkipo Islands, or Princes

in the Sea of Marmara.

1

Isles,

Once a place of exile for royal pre-

tenders to the Byzantine throne, the "bright red-cliffed
island" lay down beside the sea "like a prehistoric animal
on

The summer brought hordes of vacationers from

drinking."

the city, but for the balance of the year Trotsky shared the

island with

a

few fishermen and shepherds, with "only the

braying of an ass" to break the serenity of the isle.

21

Near the main village of Buyuk Ada was the villa,
rented from an impoverished Turkish effendi.

The '"dingy

:
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marbles, sad bronze peacock, and humiliated gilt
betraying
the social pretensions as well as the failure
of the Turkish

owner,'" wrote an English visitor, was to be the scene
of

ceaseless bustle. 22

wife— Nat alya Sedov a— immediately

His

set about removing the many signs of senescence in
the large
abode, but comfort was not her main concern.

vast rooms lacked

a

Many of the

single stick of furniture, wrote Max

Eastman
The lack of comfort or beauty in Trotsky's
house, the absence of any least attempt to
cultivate the art of life in its perceptual
aspect, seems sadly regrettable to me. A man
and woman must be almost dead aesthetically to
live in that bare barrack, which a very few
dollars would convert into a charming home.

The garden surrounding the villa was allowed to run to seed.
"To save money, Natalia Ivanovna explains.

indifference to beauty,

I

should say." 2

3

Through sheer
Isaac Deutscher

agreed with the "hedonistically minded American visitor"
that the place lacked the coziness of an American middle-

class home, but this was but a "waiting-room" for them:
"Effort and money had to be saved for a desperate struggle
in which the Biiyuk Ada house was

a

temporary headquarters.

Its clean and bare austerity suited its purpose."

24

Eager to remove himself from this Turkish cul-de-sac,

Trotsky and his friends waged
a

visa to

a

a

more civilized land.

strenuous campaign to secure
But the governments of

Europe were loathe to offer hospitality to such
guest.

a

notorious

The German Social Democratic leadership and the Labor

government of Great Britain turned their hypocritical backs

—

"
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on the plight of their "socialist brother," despite the
re-

peated efforts— in the case of the British— of Lloyd George,
H.

G.

Wells,

and George Bernard Shaw,

among others. 25

French, Dutch and Czechs followed suit.

Luxemburg turned

deaf ear to his pleas.

a

The

Even the Duchy of
As for the United

States, Trotsky believed it would be futile to attempt to

obtain a visa from not only "the strongest, but also the most

terrified country."

Since Europe and America controlled the

other continents, "This means

The pi anet without

a.

visa.

1,26

When the Soviet regime deprived him of citizenship in 1932,
he was not only without a visa, he was a "man without a

country.

27

In actual fact, many relished the spectacle of

Trotsky's fall from grace,
Churchill.

none more so than Winston

Ironically, considering his war-time relations

with Stalin, Churchill wrote in Great Contemporaries that
"the dull,

squalid figures of the Russian Bolsheviks" were

not redeemed in interest even by the magnitude of their

crimes.

"All form and emphasis is lost in a vast process of

Asiatic liquefaction," he declared, and not even the slaughter
of millions will "attract future generations to their uncouth

lineaments and outlandish names."

Churchill was especially

pleased that Trotsky had been "marooned by the very mutineers
he had led so hardily to seize the ship."

Lacking any trace

of compassion or sense of human kinship, Trotsky was like the

cancer bacillus:

"

.

.

.he

grew, he fed, he tortured, he

slew in fulfillment of his nature."

But the "once triumphant
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Trotsky," chortled Churchill, "whose frown meted
death to
thousands, sits disconsolate— a skin of malice stranded

for

a time on the shores of the Black Sea

1,28
.

.

.

For more than four years Trotsky was to be "stranded"
on Pnnkipo. 29
-

Amidst secretaries, bodyguards, and family,

he once more established his familiar regimen

and more work.

— work,

The results were impressive.

the Bulletin of the Opposition

work,

Besides editing

he issued numerous statements

,

and articles on the Soviet scene, especially on Stalin's col-

lectivization drive and on the Comintern's suicidal policy
towards the rise of German fascism.

Even more important,

Trotsky found time during these "tranquil" years to write
his autobiography,

Russi an Revolution

My_

Life

,

and the epic History of the

30
.

This prodigious labor was accomplished despite the

coming and going of numerous visitors.

Besides the Eastmans,

other fair-weather friends consulted him on the lonely isle,
such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, the British Fabians.

Fol-

lowers also made the long journey, including one SeninSobolevitzius

(

ali as Jack Soble),

the GPU dispatched him to keep
sis.

Another prominent Chekist

visited the "Old Man."
his life.

a

who later testified that

wary eye on Stalin's neme-

— Jacob

Blumkin

— secretly

For this indiscretion he was to lose

31

For relaxation, Trotsky went on long fishing trips

with two Turkish friends, relishing the exertion of dragging
heavy nets and loads of fish.

On one occasion, they ran
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afoul of a great storm at night, and were forced to
seek

refuge on a deserted island. 32
to his spirit.

Such adventures were balms

"When the- fishing had been good, that is,

very fatiguing," wrote one of his secretaries, "he began
work on his return with redoubled enthusiasm." 33
While preparing to leave Turkey, once and for all,
in July, 1933, Trotsky wrote that "'on this island of quiet
and oblivion echoes from the great world reached us delayed

and muffled.'"

In a melancholy vein, he added,

"'I feel

as

if my feet had got somewhat rooted in the soil of Prinkipo.'"
In truth,

as Isaac Deutscher has noted,

this was "the calmest,

the most creative, and the least unhappy time of his exile." 34
II.

French Hospitality

Somewhat to Trotsky's surprise, and much to his relief

,

the Radical government of £douard Daladier offered him

asylum in July, 1933.

Not since 1916 had Trotsky lived in

France; then he had been expelled at the behest of the

This time the offer of a visa included

Tsarist government.
stringent conditions

outcast

,

.

Corsica, home of another notorious

was to be his residence

,

until the state of

Trotsky's health caused Paris to relent.

The authorities

agreed that he could live in one of the southern departements
as long as he maintained a strict incognito and stayed away

from Paris.
The voyage on the Italian vessel, Bulgaria

,

was slow

attack of
and painful, Trotsky being stricken with a severe

,

116

"lumbago."

Near the port of Marseilles, various subterfuges

were taken to land him undetected on mainland
France.
a

After

lengthy automobile trip, he arrived in the small
village

of St. Palais, near Roy an and the Atlantic coast.
25 to October 1,

From July

1933, he lived in a rented villa, receiving

scores of visitors and re-acquainting himself with European

political conditions.

But his health was so poor, and his

physical stamina so low, that Trotsky was unable to establish
a

work schedule.

At the beginning of October, Trotsky and

his wife journeyed to Bagneres de Bigorre, in the Pyrenees,
for a complete rest.

Barbizon,

a small

Finally on November

1

he moved to

town near Paris, his residence for the next

six months. 36
The peaceful conditions of Barbizon allowed him to

return to his political and historical labors.
he researched his proposed biography of Lenin,

task.

At this time
a

congenial

Loyal followers protected his identity and carried

messages back and forth to Paris.

But in April, 1934, the

local gendarmes stopped one of his messengers for

a

minor

traffic offense, and, subsequently, discovered the true identity of the mysterious recluse living on the outskirts of
town.

Since the national Surete had not found it prudent to

inform the local police of Trotsky's whereabouts, the news of
the great discovery was given to the press.
the far left to the far right,

giving asylum to such

a

Newspapers, from

attacked the government for

dangerous fugitive.

As a result of

this "'catastrophe,'" Trotsky was forced to take to the road,

once again.

37
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Accompanied by two secretaries, and followed by

a

detective, the beardless Trotsky drove southwards, having

become a true nomad.
almost immediately.

At Chamonix his identity was discovered
He and his wife moved into a pension,

registering as French citizens of foreign extraction, while
his followers searched for

a

more permanent abode.

Pre-

tending to be in deep mourning, in order to avoid dining with
the other residents, they lived in fear of new difficulties;

they had inadvertently settled in "a royalist pension," the

landlady being the leader of the local monarchists.
followed another move to

a

"leak" to the local press.

There

summer house, and still another

After three months of such vaga-

bond living, Trotsky and his wife finally found refuge in
small Alpine village

— Domene — near

a

There they

Grenoble.

lived for eleven months in the house of the schoolmaster,

without secretaries, bodyguards, or visitors.
Life in Domene was bleak.

38

The depressing conditions

of this period are reflected in a personal diary that Trotsky

kept at this time.

In May,

1935, he confided,

Life goes on, as before, in a modified
prison style: between four walls, without
Once a day a walk along a path, with
people.
back yards and gardens on one side, and the
The
ascent into the mountains on the other.
path leads to villages at either end, so that
the walk is a short one, about 30 minutes long;
to stretch it out to an hour you have to walk
there and back twice. That too resembles
prison walks ... 39

For companionship husband and wife listened to concerts over
the radio,

"an instrument perfectly suited to a prison.

I

,,40

.
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For relaxation Trotsky sampled a wide variety of
Russian,
French, English, and American literature, most of which

failed to stir his admiration.

For example, he picked up an

unnamed book of Edgar Wallace, and could not fathom why his
stories were read so voraciously:

"It is hard to imagine

anything more mediocre, contemptible, and crude." 41

But the

autobiography of "Mother Jones" was another matter.

"It has

been a long time since

I

terest and excitment.

An epic book!"

have read anything with such inHe wondered if this

memoir by the veteran American radical had been translated
into foreign languages. 42

Most of his reading, however, was

as exciting as prison fare

To compound his woes, the weather in the Alps was

often raw and chilly, reflected in the state of his health
and his spirits.

Intermingled with reflections on the sorry

climate, Trotsky wrote in his Diary a running commentary on
Thus, for May 23,

his various ailments for this period.
1935, he penned:

"It has been quite a few days already that

N. /Nataly^a/ and I have been ill.

Prolonged grippe

in bed either by turns or together.

dreary.

..."

.

We stay

May has been cold and

Often he complained of ill health, which

interfered with his work:
health began for me.

"Yesterday another period of ill

Weakness, slightly feverish condition,

an extraordinary humming in my ears."

44

For June 26, 1935,

he wrote an extended comment on the perplexing problem:
It is amazing how much
go on being sick.
difference there is in me between health and
I am like two different people, even
sickness.
I
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in external appearance, and sometimes this happens within twenty-four hours. Hence there is
a natural supposition that the cause is my
nerves.
But the physicians diagnosed an infection a long time ago, in 1923. It is possible
that it is my "nerves" that give such a wide
range to the external manifestations of the illness 4 5
.

This mysterious "fievre cryptogene

,

"

with him since the early

1920s, struck at odd times, often coinciding with political

crises or personal setbacks; hence the hypothesis that it was

psychosomatic in origin. 46

Certainly Trotsky's "nerves" were

exacerbated by political matters, at least in part.

Imme-

diately after the above passage Trotsky confided to his
Diary that he had dreamt about

a

shipboard conversation with

Worried over Trotsky's illness, Lenin stated:

Lenin.

"'You

seem to have accumulated nervous fatigue, you must rest

.

.

Yes, agreed the sick one, this time "the trouble seemed to
lie in some deeper processes," which caused his mentor to

declare:

"'Then you should seriously (he emphasized the

word) consult the doctors (several names)

.

.

.'"

At this

point in the dream Trotsky realized that Lenin was already
dead,

and so hurried to close the conversation, recounting

his trip to Berlin in 1926 for medical consultation.

47

Without attempting any kind of "analysis" of this dream, one

may still state that Trotsky's "nervous fatigue," or fever,
was associated with the sorely missed Ilyich.

Now Trotsky

was the "Old Man," with all that entailed for the movement.

In fact, his age had begun to depress him.

remembered that Lenin had once quoted

I.

Trotsky

Turgenev, and asked

.'"

.
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a colleague,

"'Do you know what is the greatest vice?
To be more than 55 years old.- 48 Lenin did not
live long

enough to develop this "vice/ but Trotsky was just
55-years1

of-age in 1935.

In his Diary he attempted to defend the

necessity of old age saying, with Engels

#

that without it

there would be no youth, but it was still a shock:

"Old age

is the most unexpected of all the things that happen to a

man.

,,49
M

Old age, of course, implied death.

And Trotsky

worried that the "organism-destroying microbes" would consume
him before the world revolution went forward again.

He ex-

pected an early end in 1935:
My condition is not encouraging. The attacks of illness have become more frequent the
symptoms are more acute, my resistance is
obviously getting weaker. Of course, the curve
may yet take a temporary turn upward. But in
general I have a feeling that liquidation is
approaching. 50
,

His "liquidation

,

"

of course

,

was not to come for another

five years.
But it was not only his own life that was at stake

Many members of Trotsky's family still lived in the Soviet
All during 1935 Trotsky and his wife worried that

Union.

Stalin would strike "police blows against people close to
me."

51

And he remembered

a

remark by Pyatakov, after

Trotsky had charged Stalin with being the "gravedigger " of
the Revolution:
this:

dren."

"'He /stalinZ will never forgive you for

neither you, nor your children, nor your grandchil52

During this terrible year, starved for information
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about their kin still in Stalin's power, Trotsky
and Natalya
feared the worse.
Finally a postcard brought the news that

Trotsky's first wife— Alexandra Sokolovskaya— had been
arrested and exiled. Later they learned that their
youngest
son, the apolitical Seryozha, had also been arrested.

this point Trotsky wrote in his Pi ary
my poor, poor Natasha

.

.

,

"Poor boy

.

.

At
.

And

," 53

Under the weight of so many blows, Trotsky recalled
the sad plight of the 17th-century Old Believer, Avvakum,

forced to wander through the Siberian wasteland for his
heresies.

He reminded Natalya of the archpriest and his

wife, the latter sunk in snowdrifts:

"•And I /Avvakum/ came up, and she, poor soul,
began to reproach me, saying: 'How long, archpriest, is this suffering to be?'
And I said,
Markovna, unto our very death.'
And she, with
a sigh, answered:
'So be it, Petrovich, let us
be getting on our way. "54
'

•

And so the modern-day "archpriest" of Bolshevism and his wife
went on their way.
It was during this year in Domene

,

certainly the

nadir of Trotsky's period of exile, that Stalin's incipient
Purge became to embroil him.
III.

Kirov and Trotsky

For several years Trotsky had been warning his fol-

lowers to expect more outrages of the lethal variety from
the Kremlin.

As early as March 4, 1929, he wrote:

"There remains only one thing for Stalin: to
try to draw a line of blood between the offiHe absolutely
cial party and the Opposition.

"

122

must connect the Opposition with terrorist
crimes preparation of armed insur rection
~
etc ..."
,

'

.

If Stalin could not provoke some such "adventure,"
and thus

discredit his foes, then his clique would be forced to
"fabricate or plant on the Opposition 'a terrorist act' or

'a

military plot.'" 55

Trotsky had no doubt that the "terrorist

act" of December 1,

1934, was just such a provocation.

The

"line of blood" had been drawn at last.

Isolated in his Alpine retreat, Trotsky was forced
to rely on his "prison radio" for much of the details about

the Kirov affair.

Energized by this political challenge to

his analytical talents, Trotsky responded with a series of

penetrating articles and pamphlets.

In each case he at-

tempted to place Kirov's death within the context of growing
internal contradictions,
Stalin's regime.

a

basic tenet of his approach to

His understanding of the purge phenomenon

in the ensuing years was to grow in depth, but would not

radically alter from the initial response to this "colossal
sensation.

Trotsky wasted no tears on Kirov's fate.

In his

view, the Party's leader in Leningrad was just another ad-

ministrative cipher, of no more political importance than
Postyshev or

a

Kossior.

a

Deserving little attention, Kirov

hardly figured in Trotsky's first comments on the affair.

Never did he suggest that Kirov was the leader of
opposition to Stalin's policies.
a

a

"moderate"

Scorned as a "rude satrap,"

"third-rate bureaucratic figure," an "administrative man
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of only average talent," Kirov, prior to his death,
received

from Trotsky no more attention than he gave "to some general

somewhere in China."

Only death gave him stature.

"Who in

the world had heard of Kirov before he was assassinated?,"

asked Trotsky before the Dewey Commission. 57
In the same vein, Trotsky disparaged the importance

of Leonid Nikolayev, Kirov's killer.

The assassin's name

"reveals nothing to anyone," wrote Trotsky in his first re-

sponse to the murder. 58

Too much time had passed since Kirov

purged the Leningrad apparatus in 1926.

There must have been

"much more recent circumstances" that drove Nikolayev on the

road of terrorism than these old grievances. 59
"subjective motivations" of Nikolayev'
"a matter of indifference" to Trotsky.

legation that

a

Whatever the

band, they remained

s

60

But the Soviet al-

terrorist organization existed within the

Party was of "great symptomatic significance," indicating

political atmosphere favorable to such acts.^

Trotsky knew, however, this was just
YCLers."

a

a

As far as

band of "unknown

62

Neither Trotsky nor Stalin considered the murderous
act "an isolated and accidental phenomenon," or a tragic

In fact, the bureaucratic leaders invested it with

episode.

"a political importance so exceptional," wrote Trotsky, op-

position and terrorism were eguated:
of Nikolaev

the party

,

1,63
.

"To the terrorist act

Stalin replied by doubling the terror against
Such "disproportionately great consequences"

"
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suggested that they were already lodged in the system,
awaiting a signal "to break out into the open." 64
The bureaucratic degeneration of the workers' state
gave rise to such mischief.

But not all was amiss.

In

Trotsky's opinion, it would be "criminal" to deny the progressive work of the bureaucracy, such as the program of in-

dustrialization and collectivization, adopted by the
of its own interests ." 65

justification," in

a

Certainly it had

"

logic

"historical

a

transitional stage, to protect the

nationalized economy against individual appropriation.

In

the village, especially, there was "the need of guarding by
the severest methods of repression the property of the col-

lectives against the peasants themselves."

According to

Trotsky, the regime was the instrument for "preventing

a

new

class struggle that is looming from out of the fierce com-

petition between the interests involved in the sphere of
consumption, on the basis of

economy

a

still lagging and unharmonious

.

But the "dual" role of the bureaucracy also contained
a

Externally, in the international working-

negative side.

class movement,

organizing
end."

,

"

The Stalinist bureaucracy pi ays

_a

dis -

demoralizing and fatal role from beginning to

In the past eleven years the Comintern, despite nu-

merous revolutionary opportunities, had known nothing save
"shameful defeats, political disgrace and the atomization of
its organization."

Internally, the bureaucracy had ex-

cluded the active participation of the entire toiling
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population in planning the economy, resulting in
contradictions and crises, with the overwhelming majority

of the popu-

lation leading

a

poverty-stricken existence.

There was,

argued Trotsky, "an increasingly more profound and
irrecon-

cilable contradiction with the fundamental needs of Soviet

economy and culture.

"

As a result, there had developed a

"permanent political crisis," with the ground slipping from

under the feet of the Stalinists. 68
Communist youth were caught in the middle.

Listening

to the grumbling of their bureaucratic fathers, the "sons"

had no outlet for expression and, if "spurned, oppressed and

deprived of the chance for independent development," then
terrorism appealed to their senses. 69

Trotsky was unsparing

in his condemnation of Kirov's murder, showing how counter-

productive were its consequences.

But he also charged that

such acts were the logical result of bureaucratic decay:
"

Individu al terrorism is in its very essence bureaucratism

turned inside out.

"

Both the terrorists and bureaucrats

have no confidence in the masses.

"The Stalinist bureaucracy

has created a vile leader-cult, attributing to leaders divine

qualities.

'Hero'

worship is also the religion of terrorism,

only with a minus sign."

change history.

70

But this was an attempt to short-

The glorification of the "'Great Leader,'

the 'Beloved Chief,'" has led to a tissue of contradictions
and the emerging "communist" terror.

71

Stalin incarnated "in the most complete fashion the

positive and negative traits of the bureaucratic stratum,"
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believed Trotsky, 72 and he was using the Kirov incident
to
"discipline the bureaucratic ranks, which are disintegrating
and which have lost their internal cohesion.

1,73

in particu-

lar, Stalin castigated the "compromised groups," i.e.,

Zinoviev and Company, who had become infected by the pre-

vailing spirit of the bureaucracy, even telling stories about
Stalin's ignorance.

"Could Stalin have chosen a better vic-

tim than this group when the shots at Smolny impelled him to

teach the vacillating and decomposing bureaucracy

a

lesson?,"

Trotsky charitably asked. 74
Yet Trotsky also claimed that linking Zinoviev and

Kamenev to the bloody deed at Smolny reached the depths of
"infamous stupidity," hardly

a

sympathetic comment.

75

Once

it was announced that Nikolayev actually represented an

intra-Party opposition, then the White-Guard version of the
affair collapsed, revealing "a colossal lie."

76

It was in-

conceivable, charged Trotsky, that Zinoviev and Kamenev

would actually have encouraged such

a

terrorist attempt.

Disclaiming any need to defend the reputations of his erstwhile enemies, Trotsky recalled their unprincipled struggle
against Marxism-Leninism and their many capitulations, for
*

which they were cruelly punished:
defend them I"

"It is not our task to

77

But the Stalinist bureaucracy was not judging them

for their "real crimes" against the Revolution; not at all.
Instead, the bureaucracy was making Zinoviev and Kamenev into

"scapegoats for its own transgressions."

Certainly they

1

127

lacked character, wrote Trotsky, but no one considered them
"fools or ignorant buffoons."

Bolsheviks for many years,

they could not suddenly believe that individual terror would

overthrow the regime, let alone aspire to "'reestablish the
capitalist regime,'" as charged. 78

Only

a

"savage counter-

revolutionary coup d'etat" could reinstitute capitalism in
the Soviet Union, resulting in countless victims.

A destruc-

tive Russian fascism would ensue, so ferocious that the

savagery of Mussolini and Hitler would appear "like philanthropic institutions."

The liquidation of Zinoviev and

Kamenev would be an inevitable result.

Thus, the accusation

lodged against the Zinoviev group was "fraudulent from top
to bottom, both as regards the go al specified, restoration
of capitalism,

and as regards the means

terrorist acts."

,

At the same time this clique was accused of advocating

a

79

more

revolutionary policy against the bourgeoisie and the
restoration of
gone?,'

1

a

bourgeois regime.

asked Trotsky:

"Where has common sense

"It is completely buried under a

monstrous defecation of infamy.

11
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But with the trial of the Leningrad NKVD cadres,

Trotsky perceived another reason for involving the deposed
Bolsheviks:

"The Zinoviev affair is a gigantic smoke screen

over the St alin-Yagoda affair."

8

When the original "amalgam"

t

went awry, Zinoviev and Kamenev were used as protective

coloration to obscure the true situation.

As early as

December 30, 1934, weeks before the NKVD trial, Trotsky wrote
of a police link to the assassination.

Although he did not

—

"
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charge that the Leningrad Chekists premeditated the
murder
of

Kirov— "we have

no facts for such a supposition"— he did

accuse them of knowing the terrorist act was in preparation
and making contact with Nikolayev, all with the purpose of

"attempting to compromise the political opponents of Stalin
by means of a complex amalgam."

When he learned, some

weeks later, that Philip Medved and Ivan Zaporozhets, the

Leningrad police chieftains, had been charged with
"negligence" in the affair, Trotsky thought otherwise:
"

Excessive zeal

,

taking

a.

chance with Kirov

1

s

life

that is

,

the explanation that fits better the basis of the affair."

But the assassin would not wait until all the pieces were in
place, until all the implicating "notes" had been prepared.
"The difference in rhythms between Medved

Nikolaev's finished up in

a

1

s

work and

bloody outcome, precisely!"

There was no doubt in Trotsky's mind that Medved would never
have taken this gamble at his own risk.

"For an affair of

such extraordinary importance, Medved could not but refer

daily by telephone to Yagoda, and Yagoda to Stalin."

Thus,

charged Trotsky, the responsibility for the "amalgam" should
be laid at Stalin's doorstep:
of Stalin

— more

"

Without the direct agreement

precisely, without his initiative

Yagoda nor Medved would have decided to mount such
enterprise

neither
_a

risky

83
.

The missing "link" in the entire amalgam was the

mysterious Latvian consul, M. Bisseneks.

His role was to

opposition
connect the terrorist act and the opposition, all

—
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The indictment in the secret Nikolayev trial
convinced

Trotsky that "the GPU itself
or fake consul

link him

u_p_

,

,

through the medium of an actual

was financing Nikolaev and was attempting to

with Trotsky

1,84
.

Sequestered in his Alpine

prison, Trotsky quickly discerned a tentative effort to make

himself responsible for the murder, an effort repeated ad

infinitum in the coming years.
emerges suddenly

Trotsky."

— suddenly

From the indictment "there

for naive people

— the

name of

According to the official charges, Nikolayev had

confessed to having various contacts with a "consul," who
gave him 5,000 rubles for expenses.
added:

The assassin further

"'He /the consul_7 told me that he can establish con-

tact with Trotsky, if
the group.'"

I

give him a letter to Trotsky from

After reading this singular statement, Trotsky

quickly pointed to its bizarre implication.

Neither Trotsky

nor Nikolayev was attempting to make contact; the consul

himself assumed the initiative.
The 'consul' is at his post:

"The 'consul'

The 'consul'

is wide-awake!

requires

a

tiny

document, a letter from the terrorists financed by him to

Trotsky."

But the letter was never mentioned again, as a

"curtain of silence" was drawn to avoid any indiscretion.

85

And the "re-called" consul himself kept quiet, in line with
the proverb,

"'Revelations are silver, silence is golden.'"

Trotsky surmised that he could return home "as

a

86

distin-

guished hero who suffered in the service of his passionately
loved fatherland," along with

a

"certain supplementary sum

to his modest salary" tucked away in his pocket.

87

"

"

.
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The "idiocy of the Nikol aev- consul -Trotsky
•

'

amalgam,"

88

future.

"Using the Zinovievist group as a footstool

is_

warned the exile, promised new lunacies in the

aiming to strike at Trotskyism

89

According to its

.

namesake, "Trotskyism," or better yet

Stalin

,

,

"international

Leninism," was acutely feared by the Kremlin rulers, and
"daily prods on their malevolent will," leading to more blows

New amalgams were in preparation, the leader assured his followers, which could only be forestalled in one way:
the scheme in advance

"

"

expose

The "Leninists" must prepare the

international proletariat for new expulsions, extraditions,
and arrests.

capitulators

90
,

"

And they must break "irreconcilably with
thus making it more difficult for the GPU "to

cook up" new cases.

But it would be "criminal light-

mindedness" to believe that Stalin would stop at this stage.
All too accurately, Trotsky concluded that the Zinoviev case

had the importance of being

"warning."

a

91

From his mountain

retreat he judged that "the corpse of Kirov has not brought
Stalin any great laurels."
retreat:

"

For this very reason he cannot

Stalin is forced to cover up the unsuccessful

amalgams with new

,

broader

.

.

.

and more successful ones

.

In this armed struggle honest proletarian revolutionaries

could not remain silent.

"Of all political figures, the

most despicable is Pontius Pilate," declared Trotsky and,
above all, he was no Pilate.

92

This initial analysis of the Kirov affair is worth

examining, because it foreshadows Trotsky's personal and
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political response to the subsequent "show" trials.

As we

have seen, Trotsky was hardly taken unaware by the "bloody

blow."

He had expected some such act for many years.

also anticipated more such deeds in the future.
set a course that was unalterable.

He

Stalin had

Although Trotsky re-

frained from accusing Stalin of direct complicity in the
assassination, he was convinced that his old nemesis had been
aware of the developing provocation.

The only way to thwart

new "amalgams" was to expose them in advance.

No "Pontius

Pilate" himself, Trotsky almost relished the opportunity to

bring his great powers of mental discipline to bear on the
"colossal lie."

In response to the plot woven around Kirov's

corpse, he published detailed analyses of the entire affair,

featuring trenchant reasoning, mixed with liberal doses of
irony and sarcasm.

At one point he even suggested that "an

international commission of authoritative and conscientious
people" be formed to investigate the repressions associated

with Kirov's murder;
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and in this proposal was the genesis

of the later Dewey Commission.

Implicit in this approach

was the belief that Stalin's provocations were unable to

withstand searching inquiry, would thereby be checkmated.
But Trotsky's analysis of Kirov's death suffered from
an inability to isolate the ruling motive behind the act.

Was the plot primarily directed at the "vacillating and de-

composing bureaucracy," at the "compromised groups," i.e.,
Zinoviev's faction, or at "international Leninists?"

In the

was
first case, Trotsky appeared to favor the "lesson" Stalin
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dishing out to some sections of the bureaucracy.

In a simi-

lar vein, he was hardly dejected at the picture of the
capit-

ulators being punished for their "real crimes" against the

revolutionary movement.

But a "monstrous defecation of in-

famy" was the smearing of Zinoviev and Company, one which ex-

tended to the Trotskyites.

This extension of the frame-up

to his own followers convinced Trotsky that the bureaucracy

was in its death throes, and thus needed to invent such

"amalgams" to deceive the masses, and at the same time needed
to compromise "international Leninism," the only alternative

to the ruling clique.
Thus, there existed in the Soviet Union a "permanent

political crisis," between the bureaucracy and the masses,
and between different factions of the bureaucracy itself.
But what of Stalin's role?

Implicit in the theory that

Stalin was administering a blow to the weakened bureaucracy
was Stalin's ascendency over his bureaucratic colleagues.
In fact, the aftermath of the Kirov affair found Stalin to

be a much more powerful figure than previously.

nation served as

a

The assassi-

pretext for liquidating hostile elements,

potential or otherwise, within the Party and bureaucracy and,
incidentally, greatly strengthened Stalin's personal power.

Almost mesmerized by the plight of the bureaucracy, Trotsky
failed to foresee the coup that Stalin was preparing.

Kirov's

corpse may not have brought Stalin any "great laurels," but
it paved the way for a totalitarian state, in which the

bureaucracy served the leader.

The administrative apparatus,

"
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as an independent creature, was doomed,
but not so the

"ruling clique," i.e., Stalin.

Whatever the motivation,

Kirovs death signaled Stalin's strength
lessness.

and Trotsky's power

Henceforth, Stalin would act— with bloody deeds;

and Trotsky would

react— with indignant words.
IV.

In the Land of Ibsen

In his monk's cell high in the mountains, Trotsky

had an excessive amount of time on his hands.

Doubts about

the Kirov affair began to appear in his private diary in the

first months of 1935.

When Pravda published an article on

the '"stinking dregs of Trotskyists, Zinovievists

,

former

princes, counts, gendarmes, all this trash, acting as one,'"

Trotsky commented that there was something fatal in such
stupidity:

"Only a historically doomed clique could become

so degenerate and moronic!"

But, he also concluded, this

was evidence of some "'disorder'" deep within the bureauc-

racy itself; the amalgam of dregs and trash was probably

directed at

a

third party, "most likely against liberal

tendencies within the ranks of the ruling bureaucracy."

In

addition, he wrote that new steps against the "Trotskyists"

were in preparation, in order to lay the groundwork for a

blow at more intimate enemies of "Stalin's Bonapartism.
Even

a

"new coup

d'

etat " might be arranged to provide jurid-

ical sanction for Stalin's personal power.

doubted that Stalin would take

a

But Trotsky

crown or the title of

"'leader'" for life, since it smacked too much of the
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"Fuhrer!"

In any event, he worried that some "new
stage is

being prepared, by comparison with which Kirov's
murder was
only an ominous portent." 94
The "lone eagle" also mused over his personal
fate.

Convinced that the struggle for the Fourth International
was
"ricocheting" back against the Soviet bureaucracy, he be-

lieved that Stalin "would now give

a

to retract the decision to deport me:

be to stage a 'show' trial!"

must look to other methods.

great deal to be able

how tempting it would

However, the Soviet dictator
"Stalin will unguestionably re-

sort to a terroristic act in two cases," wrote Trotsky,

"if

there is a threat of war, or if his own position deteriorates

gravely."

Then, of course, there could be a third case and

a fourth.

"We shall see.

And if we don't, then others

will." 95

There was a more immediate threat to his security.

French "hospitality" had long since lost its charm.

Local

Stalinists and home-bred Fascists were united in making overt
threats against his personal safety.

With the "Popular

Front" initiative in March, 1935, and French ministers being

wooed in the Kremlin, Trotsky could no longer depend on official protection.
In March 1935, the possibility of

a

new haven arose.

A Labor government had been formed in Norway.

Trotsky's in-

termediaries guickly petitioned the new government on his
behalf.

As negotiations proceded, the famous outcast had

misgivings about Norway, knowing little of it except from

"
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the pages of Ibsen; but he had even more misgivings
about re-

maining in France, with the threat of being deported
to some
remote colony:
"Norway is not France, of course:
an
un-

familiar language,

layed mail, etc.

a

small country, off the main track, de-

But still it is much better than

Madagascar. 96
Then, in early June, 1935, assured that a visa was

forthcoming, Trotsky and his wife left for Paris, but at the
last moment the Norwegian authorities reneged on the agreement, having second thoughts about granting asylum to such
a

desperado.

Surete

,

Stranded in Paris, beset by the suspicious

which feared some kind of

a

ruse, Trotsky sent a

telegram (June 12, 1935) to the Norwegian Prime Minister:
The French government believes that I have deceived it, and demands that I leave France
within twenty-four hours. I am sick and my
wife is sick.
Situation is desperate. I
Q7
solicit immediate favourable decision.^'

Finally news was telephoned from Oslo.

The visa had been

granted, but only for six months, as a "precautionary meas-

ure."

98

That was enough.

Trotsky and his wife packed their

bags once again.
With two secretaries, Trotsky and Natalya journeyed
to Antwerp, where they boarded a small Norwegian vessel.

officer in charge of tickets listed the party as
a

a

The

"Frenchman,

Czechoslovak, and two Turks," since the two Russians

traveled on emigre passports issued by the Turkish govern-

ment."

Finally on June 18, 1935, Trotsky was thankful to

disembark on Norwegian soil.

Not all were overjoyed by his

,
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presence in Norway, however.

The Opposition raised questions

in Parliament (Storting), and hostile noises emanated from
the camps of the local Fascists and Communists.

But the

Labor party stood firm, and its official organ even declared
that,

"'The Norwegian people feel

presence in their country.

1

,,10 °

.

.

.

honoured by Trotsky's

in short order Martin

Tranmael, founder of the party, and Trygve Lie, Minister of
Justice, paid their respects to their famous guest.

After

securing Trotsky's promise to refrain from political activity
(which the exile understood allowed political writings), the

Labor officials happily interviewed him for their paper,
Arbeiderbl adet

Among other political comments, Trotsky

.

complimented his hosts on Norway's beauty:
"In the short time

have been in Norway, I
have been completely captivated by the 1 andI don 1
scape nature s beauty and the people
know if the so-called Aryan race is directly
descended from Norway, but I must say that the
tall, strong figures and faces in which one
reads such dignity make the best impression
upon a person. Nature--at least in the small
part of the country I have so far gotten to
know appears fascinating and soothing. To
anyone who is looking for rest and recreation
who wants to engage in either intensive mental
work or sports, I would warmly recommend
Norway. 101
I

1

1

.

,

1

1

—

11

Trotsky's opinion of the land never changed.

A year-and-a-

half later, as he sailed away under less auspicious circumstances, he warmly remembered "the marvelous land of forests
and fiords, of the snow beneath the January sun, skis and

sleighs, children with china-blue eyes, corn-colored hair,
and of the slightly morose, and slow-moving but serious and

honest people.

,,,102
^ v.
Norway, good-bye!
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There was the usual difficulty in securing
abode for the Trotsky entourage.

a safe

Finally Konrad Knudsen, a

Social Democratic editor and later deputy in the Storting,

offered living accommodations in his home in the village of
Wexhall, some thirty miles north of Oslo.

Trotsky and his

wife became close to the family of his warm-hearted and

courageous host.

There was an amicable agreement between

the two men not to press their political differences, which

surely contributed to the serenity of the household.

Natalya later noted that in 1935-36 they found "'the illusion
of true security, in the home of these upright people,'" who

quickly became their friends.

104

Sometimes the two families

went to a cabin in the mountains, where they resided, wrote
Mme. Sedova,

"in the harsh enchantment of the cold."

105

Life with the Knudsens was "completely peaceful and well-

ordered

— one

might even say petty-bourgeois," judged Trotsky

as he was being expelled from the country.

106

Trotsky worked assiduously, sometimes arising at
5:30 in the morning, while the rest of the household slept.

From time to time the inevitable visitors called him from
his labors.
Muste,

Among the Americans were Max Shachtman, A.

and Harold Isaacs.

107

J.

But his literary work was most

impeded by the recurrence of illness.

Shortly after arriving

in Norway he wrote in his diary that the trip had not been

too strenuous:

But now everything has come back at once; weakness, temperature, perspiration, inner physical
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emptiness
If s an affliction
no other word for it.l° 8
.

.

there's

.

In September, 1935, he entered an Oslo hospital
for some inconclusive medical tests. Due to his '"financial
catastro-

phe,"' he had difficulty in paying these bills.

And he was

forced to spend most of December in bed, which he
described
as '"the worst month of my life.'" 109

V.

"Enemy of the People"

This "Norwegian idyll" came to an end in early
August, 1936.

Despite his enervating illness, Trotsky had

just completed the manuscript for The Revolution Betrayed

perhaps his last great theoretical opus.

,

In the form of a

respite, Trotsky and Knudsen went camping on an isolated

island in one of Norway's many fjords.
of a bizarre happening.

There they learned

On the evening of August 5-6, 1936,

some fascist followers of Major Quisling, later to gain

certain international notoriety, attempted to make
search'" of Knudsen 's home.
Knudsen'

s

a

a

"'house

Despite their police badges,

daughter found the whole affair suspicious, and

"stood with arms outspread in front of the door to my room,

declaring that she would let no one enter," wrote Trotsky
with admiration for her courage.

Meanwhile, her younger

brother gave the alarm, neighbors appeared in their nightclothes, the frightened invaders fled, taking

with them.

a

few papers

The ostensible objective of the raid was to ob-

tain documents proving that Trotsky had violated the terms
of his asylum; they were to be used by the Fascists and

,

Opposition to embarrass the government in upcoming
parliamentary elections.

Trotsky was confident that no such compro-

mising material had been obtained, but on August 13, the
chief of the Oslo criminal police arrived by light plane to

interrogate Trotsky on the incident.

On this occasion

Trotsky managed to convince the police official that he had
done nothing to harm the best interests of Norway.

"incident was closed,

1

"

The

or so believed Trotsky at the time.

1

Trotsky's peaceful sojourn in the solitary fisherman'
cottage on the rocks of the tiny island was completely

shattered on the night of August 14-15, 1936.

listening to

weak radio signal on his portable wireless set

a

when he heard some excerpts from

something about
ary activity.

1

Knudsen was

"

1

a

Trotskyist groups

Tass communique; there was
•

11

and

"

'

counterrevolution

"

"What does

he asked me.
I replied
Some very nasty piece of work
'but exactly what, I don't know.'"
"

it mean?'

,

1

'

In the early morning a journalist friend from the nearby village of Christiansand arrived at their cottage, with fuller

particulars on the charges.

Although prepared for most any-

thing, Trotsky could not believe his eyes,

"so outrageously

unbelievable did the mixture of villainy, impudence and
stupidity in this document" seem to him:
Terrorism, well and good, I repeated,
stupefied, 'that is still within the realm of
But the Gestapo! Are you quite
comprehension.
sure that it said "Gestapo"?'
" Yes.
'"So, right after the fascist attack, the
Stalinists accuse me of being an ally of the
fascists?
"

1

1

1

'

1
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"•There is no doubt about it.'
•"All the same, there are limits to everything]
A communique/ like this can only be the
work of a drunken agent provocateur and an
illiterate one, to boot "ill

—

"

!

'

Then and there Trotsky dictated to the journalist his first
statement on the announced trial.
of the report, he branded it as

Though lacking the text

" one

fications in the history of politics

of the greatest falsi .

"

The charge that he

directed a terrorist plot from Norway against the Soviet
rulers

"

does not contain an iota of truth

,r
,

and

"

stands in

sharpest contradiction to my ideas and to the whole of my

activities

,

which at the present time are devoted exclu -

sively to writing

.

Denying that he had had any communica-

"

tions recently with the Soviet Union, Trotsky referred to

himself as "a man without

a

country" and suggested that

a

competent Norwegian commission investigate the charges.

An-

other possibility was the formation of "an impartial international commission by the labor organizations of the entire
world, or better still of its international leaders, to in-

vestigate the charges made in the Soviet Union."

In this

matter, he concluded, "I have nothing to fear and nothing
to hide.

As for myself,

lishing the truth."

112

I

am only concerned with estab-

Speaking extempore, Trotsky had

established on this small island the main lines of his defense effort.

Shortly thereafter, the small party broke camp and

returned to Wexhall.

"Dictionary in hand," Trotsky followed

the course of the trial in the Oslo newspapers.

One
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incredible charge followed another.

"I

felt as if

were

I

in a madhouse," he later wrote. 113

Trotsky:

The Arch-Murderer

During the Zinoviev-Kamenev "show" trial there was
a concerted effort to present a stark contrast:

a

united,

triumphant Soviet nation, led by Stalin, and an unprincipled
gang of political adventurers, led by
derer.

a

power-crazed mur-

On the positive side, Vyshinsky described a nation

united in "infinite love" around the Party's leadership,
which had produced

a

veritable paradise.

kolkhozes were rich with

a

Fields in the

"golden harvest," Stakhanovite

factories were "pulsating with life," Krivonoss trains were

speeding over "glittering ribbons of steel."

In fact,

claimed the Prosecutor, "socialism has finally and irrevocably triumphed in our country," resulting in
human, socialist culture."

a

"new,

really

These victories had brought "our

whole country, every factory worker and collective farmer,

every office worker and intellectual,
do life."

a

happy and

a

well-to-

All of this occurred under the leadership of

Comrade Stalin, who had "developed and undeviatingly carried
out Lenin's teachings on the building of socialism in our

country, having armed the vast millions of workers and col114
lective farmers with these teachings."
If this picture of unrelieved prosperity was un-

believable, no less so was the portrait of its archenemy.
bloc," led
With no expectation of mass support, the "united

s
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by Trotsky, directed their "hatred and rage
against socialism" on the Party leadership.
There was only one
aim,

gain power.

Trotsky planned to take

this endeavor.

personal hand in

a

As Kamenev testified,

to

'"Trotsky's appear-

ance and his active participation in the struggle
for power
were taken as a matter of course.'" 115

Trotsky, it was further charged, was motivated by
his extreme loathing for Stalin.

In fact, he only agreed

to the formation of the bloc if Stalin were to be removed

by violence.

According to Berman-Yurin

,

and down the room during their interview,

Stalin with exceptional hatred."

Trotsky paced up
and "talked of

He told Fritz David that,

"'Now there is no other way out except the removal by violence of Stalin and his adherents.
that is the revolutionary task.
his hand will not tremble.'"

Terror against Stalin--

Whoever is

a

revolutionary-

In furtherance of his mur-

derous program, Trotsky personally directed a number of his
agents to strike a blow at Stalin, preferably in some large
assembly, in order to have a "tremendous repercussion," one
far beyond Soviet borders.

Berman-Yurin testified that

Trotsky believed this public act would be "an historical
political event of world significance."

If arrested, how-

ever, it was the duty of the agents "'to conceal by every

possible means Trotsky

'

role in the organization of a ter-

roristic act against Stalin,'" or so said Leon Sedov to
Olberg.

V.

This policy of deception was analogous to the posi-

tion taken by the Central Committee of the Social-

:
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Revolutionaries, which denied responsibility for
Dora
Kaplan's attack on Lenin. 116
If the whole domestic "program" of the Trotskyites
was murder (including blows against Kirov, Voroshilov,

Kaganovich, etc.), their foreign policy was defeatist.
"Here," charged Vyshinsky,

here the old

'

"the shades of the dead arise,

Clemenceau theses' are revived, here the

cloven hoof of Trotsky again becomes visible."

Not even

disdaining aid from the Gestapo, Trotsky, according to
Fritz David, confided in event of war with Japan, "'our
task will be to unite and take the lead of these discon-

tented masses, to arm them and lead them against the ruling
bureaucrats.'"
power.

Every wartime setback would be used to seize

As Trotsky told Berman-Yurin

,

"'We will defend the

Soviet Union provided the Stalin leadership is overthrown.

1

1 1
" ±JL

7

In their final pleas before the court

,

many of the

accused blamed their fall from grace on Trotsky's evil influence
I

.

Fritz David, for instance

curse Trotsky.

I

,

assured the court "that

curse that man who ruined my life and

pushed me into heinous crime."

And Evdokimov had some ad-

vice for the absent satyr
"Trotsky is not with us here in the dock because
He has two perspectives before
he is abroad.
either to disappear immediately and withhim:
as Azef did, not only from the
out a trace
political arena, but from the arena of life in
general and go into oblivion, hide behind some
false name as Azef did or else, at some time,
face a proletarian court." 118
,

—
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In its final verdict the court adopted
Evdokimov's suggestion.
Trotsky and his son were declared "convicted"
of

having directed various terrorist acts against
the Soviet
leadership. As a result, they were "subject, in the

event

of their being discovered on the territory of the
U.S.S.R.,
to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium
of
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R." 119 Another trial would

seem to be superfluous.

But this formula was just "an

esoterically phrased death sentence," as Robert Tucker has
suggested. 120

There was now

a

"contract" on Trotsky's head.

To be sure, this portrait was a travesty of the

authentic Trotsky, but presumably it accurately reflected
the Kremlin's understanding of "Trotskyism," or at least
the caricature it wanted broadcast far and wide.

According

to this two-dimensional image, the Trotsky of the October

Revolution and the Civil War had passed into

a

"memory

hole," his part in these epic events wiped clean.

In the

same vein, the Trotsky of formidable intellectual preten-

sions, the author of "permanent revolution," and other

formulations, ceased to exist.

Instead, there was the pic-

ture of the exile, wallowing in self-pity, consumed by his
own bile, plotting to regain power

power

— at

any cost.

— for

the sheer sake of

Frustrated by the success of "socialism

in one country," Trotsky turned to terrorism as the only

means to overthrow the regime.

Above all, he lusted for the

death of Stalin, his hated rival.

He was even willing to

accept the aid of the Gestapo, and utilize wartime setbacks,

—

.
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to achieve his nefarious ends.

"Trotskyism" then, was com-

posed in this first trial of two main ingredients:
ism and defeatism.

terror-

Based on the assumption that these

charges reflected Stalin's real concerns, the Party's chief
must have feared, above all, assassination and the loss of
power, as a result of war.

Throughout the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Trotsky's name
ran like

a

"red thread."

He emerged as the "real defendant,"

with Stalin assuming the role of prosecutor. 121

To a great

extent, the great clash of ideologies had been reduced to

a

personal quarrel, more Stalin's modus operandi than

Trotsky

'

s

Trotsky's Counterblast
As the "muddy tide of lies" flooded over the airwaves, Trotsky struggled to understand the gross misrepre-

sentations attributed to him and his "co-conspirators."

He

was "stunned by the cold-blooded premeditation of the frameup, by the moral gangsterism of the clique in power, by this

attempt to deceive world opinion on such a massive scale

over the entire earth, in our generation and for generations to come."

wildered him.

The sheer magnitude of the campaign beNo longer did the political lie retain an

element of dilettantism and timidity.

"We are far from that

stage today in our era of the absolute lie," he observed in

wonderment, "the complete and totalitarian lie spread by the

monopolies of press and radio to imprison social consciousness."

122

As the "assemblyline liar" on the radio paraded

.
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forth his various falsehoods, Trotsky frequently
asked himself:
"Can the human race possibly be so stupid?"
Trotsky
and his wife fought to have faith in the good
instincts of
mankind, but had to admit that Stalin had "assimilated
in
full the psychological techniques of fascism,
which consist
in smothering criticism under a massive blanket
of repeated
lies." 123

While making notes with which to refute the lies,

Trotsky wondered, "'But isn't it shameful to answer such infamous charges?

1

"

He understood that to answer the accusa-

tions, was to become tainted; to stare long and hard at the

author of the crimes was to reflect some of his depravity.
Murder, double-dealing, treachery, conspiracy, falsifica-

tion

— it

was all a "delirious dream."

As he wrote during

the third trial,
It is with almost _a physical effort that I
tear my own thoughts away from the nightmarish
combinations of the OGPU and direct them upon
" How
the question
and why could all this be
made possible ?"124
,

But to submit passively to such abominable accusations would
be to aid the conspiracy, Trotsky thought, tarnish his revo-

lutionary honor and that of October, and acquiesce in the

liquidation of hallowed revolutionaries
Consequently, Trotsky marshaled his arguments,

checked his facts, prepared his documents.
power of thought, merciless consistency,
solidity of line

— all

a

The physical

lucidity and

that he considered the fundamental

traits of the October Revolution

— were

applied to Stalin's

"
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calumnies.

Once again

pen, into the fray.

"

Pero " thrust his chief weapon, his

As he later wrote,

to reason, to logic, to criticism.

documents.

I

demand

a

I

make an appeal

"I

present facts and

verification!" 125

But this task was

far different from exposing contradictions in theoretical
formulas.

In writing on the trials he observed over and

over again "how limited is our vocabulary and the range of
our feelings in the face of the enormity of the crimes

being committed today in Moscow!"
After reading the verbatim record of the second
trial, he told the Dewey Commission for the "hundredth and

first time,

I

have the impression of reading Dostoyevsky

And it would take the vocabulary of

a

.

Dostoevsky to depict

adequately the masochistic self-degradation that was the
trials' chief claim to fame.

Dostoevsky in Trotsky.

But there was nothing of

The underground world of tormented

psyches, of self-inflicted suffering, of
of this was congenial to Trotsky's mind.

held no fascination for him.

1

'

ame Russe

— none

The irrational

He preferred the scholastic

theorems of Marx to the mystical mutterings of Prince
Myshkin.

Although Trotsky shared with Ivan Karamazov the

intellectual sin of excessive faith in unadorned reason, he
was alien to the entire Karamazov mise-en-scene

Vyshinsky, Yagoda

— even

Stalin

— had

.

Yet Ulrikh,

much more in common with

Smerdyakov than Plekhanov.
In short, Trotsky was out of his depths, using reason

to subdue the frenzied witches in

a

Walpurgis Night of

.
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iniquity.

During the second trial he compared the phenome-

non to medieval times, when witches were thought
to spread

epidemics and Jews drink- the blood of Christians:

"is it

really so long ago that Jews were accused of using
Christian
blood?" 128 Trotsky, in a sense, was just another "wandering
Jew," another Mendel Beilis, only this time accused of

drinking "Bolshevik blood."

Against this charge, "clarity

of thought," etc., etc., was not enough.
To remain silent, however, would be even more shameful,

and also obstruct the "march of truth."

In addition,

it was of paramount importance to answer the charges as they

appeared.

"He had to refute Stalin's accusations before the

world's amazed and shocked sensitivity was blunted.

All

that he needed was the freedom to defend himself," observed

Isaac Deutsche r

129

At Wexhall journalists of all kinds "besieged" him.

With the aid of two secretaries
Hei jenoort

— Trotsky

— Erwin

Wolf and Jean van

prepared almost daily press releases

during the trial's run, which were eagerly picked up by
American, British, and French news agencies.

130

In an open

letter to Mr. Swen, the police chief, he defended his right
to engage in "literary" activities in other countries,

and

also offered to appear before "any impartial commission of

inquiry" to answer the new charges:

".

.

.1

undertake to

prove that my accusers are the real criminals."

131

On the

20th of August he gave a press interview which received wide

coverage in the Oslo papers.

After an extended criticism of
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the trial's early sensations, which began on August
19,

Trotsky concluded:
The whole thing is a crude frame-up.
it's
a lie, an infamous lie that is directed at me.
But there is no possibility of raising the
voice of criticism in the Soviet Union.
Criticism is strangled there and these senseless accusations will remain unassailed there
for the time being.
But here we do have the
possibility of criticizing. And as for me,
gentlemen, I criticize 132
.

There was no letup in "criticism" in the following
days.

To a British journalist, Trotsky expressed his irri-

tation at being associated with Berman-Yurin

,

a name

unknown

to him previously, and "banges /sic/ fist in the desk and

almost shouted."

Intervention was necessary to expose "the

greatest falsification in political history," which only an
impartial investigation could achieve. 133

In a statement

written in German on the 23rd of August, he again called for
an impartial inquiry:

"A free and open trial would be of

historical importance, not only for myself but for the whole
affair."

134

On learning of Tomsky's suicide, he praised his

former adversary for being the "greatest figure the Russian

proletariat had produced out of its own ranks in the course
of 30 years," and contended that his suicide was "an irref135
utable denial of the accusations and the whole trial."

And so it went, statement after statement,

a

strenu-

ous effort to refute the charges before they gained credi-

bility.

In one case he was vexed by a counter-suggestion.

A certain "Herr Johann Scharf fenberg,

"

a

Norwegian Labor

appear
party official, had proposed that Trotsky voluntarily

.
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in Moscow:

'"You belong to the barricade, and the
barricade today is the Court in Moscow.'" 136 Trotsky
found this

proposal "more pathetic than realistic," but also

embarrassing.

trifle

a

Bound hand and foot, he would have little

chance back in Moscow to expose the truth.

Did Herr

Scharffenberg really believe that in Russia he could
"subpoena these witnesses and make my documents public?"

Under the conditions existing in the Moscow court how could
he "contribute one iota to the clarification of the case?"

To expect "the truth to be victorious in Moscow is

absolutely impossible."

.

.

.

Instead, he invited Herr

Scharffenberg and others to help him unmask the amalgam in
a friendlier environment,

i.e., Norway.

13 7

But the suggested

analogy to Georgi Dmitrov and the Reichstag Fire case, how-

ever unfair, cast some doubt on Trotsky's revolutionary

courage

When the death sentences were announced, Trotsky de-

clared they were inevitable, as only in this way could "the
seriousness of the indictment against me be shown to the
world,"

1 38

but when he learned of the actual executions, he

could scarcely believe his ears:

"'Cain Dzhugashvili

/Stalin/ has reached the very peak of his destiny,'" he said
to his wife when "the first minutes of stupefaction had

passed."

139

More than ever he demanded his day in court,

since he was the only one not silenced:

"'In submitting

myself to the impartial courts of these countries,

I

fulfill

my duty to unmask and avenge one of the most horrible crimes

in world history.'" 140

But he also warned that more "mock

trials" were just down the road:

"There is no calling a
halt once started on this road." 141

Quid Pro Quo:

Herring for Detention

Instead of granting him his day in open court, the

Norwegian government provided Trotsky with
four months in strict confinement.
the socialist regime,

a free

vacation-

After August 27, 1936,

"dripping with democratic hypocrisy,"

silenced its disconcerting visitor. 142
As early as July, before the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial,

Trotsky had fretted over the too-cozy relationship between
Oslo and Moscow.

Affairs

,

When Halvdan Koht

Minister of Foreign

,

was received in the Kremlin

,

Trotsky asked Konrad

Knudsen if he knew why the Norwegian official was being
feted:
"

1

Why?'

"'They are bargaining over my head.
'How do you know that?
"'Moscow is hinting to Mr. Koht or saying
we will
outright
"We will charter your ships
buy your herrings, but on one condition, that
you sell us Trotsky."
"Devoted to his party, Knudsen was annoyed
'So you think that
to hear me talk this way.
our principles are for sale?
"'My deal Knudsen,' I replied, 'I am not
saying that the Norwegian government is getting
I am only saying that the
ready to sell me.
Kremlin would like to make such a deal.' "143
1

11

1

—

—

,

1

1

Then came the charges of "murder," "conspiracy," "treachery
etc., which placed the government's guest in a new light.

Certainly the Socialist ministers sensed

a

"'practical aim'

of the trial, as Friedrich Adler phrased it:

"'.

.

.

of
question of depriving Trotsky of asylum in Norway,

a
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organizing a veritable manhunt against him, of
making it impossible for him to exist any place on earth."' 144
For the better part of

a

fortnight the "sulphureous

fumes" from Moscow got into "Norway's eyes and nostrils
and
set them tingling," commented a New York Times reporter. 145

For instance, Izvestia

charged that Norwegian labor offi-

cials were dispersing "'lethal gases of hypocritical lies'"
to cover for Trotsky's activities. 146

Then on August 29

Soviet Ambassador Yakubovich delivered to the Oslo government a formal diplomatic note demanding Trotsky's expulsion
but not his extradition

.

,

After recounting the "proven"

charges in the just-concluded trial, and asserting that

Trotsky was using Norway as a base for conspiratorial
activities, the note warned,
"In informing the Norwegian Government of the
above the Soviet Government believes the continued granting of refuge to Trotsky, the
organizer of terroristic activities, may harm
existing friendly relations between the U.S.S.R.
and Norway and would be contrary to modern ideas
of procedure in international relations."

Soviet authorities were confident, the note added, that Oslo

would take the "'necessary measures to prevent further
granting of refuge to Trotsky on Norwegian soil.'"

147

Although fearful of an open break with Moscow, the
Labor government could not openly accede to such
threat.

Minister Koht made all the right noises:

a

flagrant
"'The

principle of asylum will be maintained by the present govern
ment of Norway.

We will not let ourselves be subdued in

such matters by anyone."'

148

At another time, Koht bravely

153

declared that, '"Norway does not intend to dance to another government's pipes.'" 149

Despite these words, the government was buffeted by

strong pressures, especially from Norwegian financial
circles, to sacrifice Trotsky in return for Soviet trade.
The Socialist ministers were afraid of economic reprisals,

whether the Kremlin actually threatened them or not. 150
For his part, convinced that the shipowners made policy, no

matter who occupied the seat of government, Trotsky believed
that Norwegian commercial interests and Soviet diplomats
were combining to silence him.

As for the government it-

self, worried by its balance of payments and a coming election, it justified its capitulation, sneered Trotsky, with
the rationale,

"'All the same, we can't sacrifice the coun-

151
try's vital interests to Trotsky!'"

With Trotsky's head being weighed against herring
and freight bottoms, the government looked for some "transi-

tory compromise" in order to extricate itself from the in-

creasingly awkward situation.

The answer was internment.

Minister Lie handed to Ambassador Yakubovich

a

reply, noting

that Trotsky had arrived in Norway some six months after

Kirov's assassination, thus it had nothing to do with Oslo.
But it was also stressed that Trotsky had been interned

"'before'" reception of the Soviet note.

152

Technically

this claim was correct, but it was also highly probable that

Yakubovich made an oral demarche during the trial, thus
...

.

.

prompting subsequent actions by Norwegian officials.

153

,

154

The first steps inhibiting Trotsky's freedom
of

action were taken on August 26, 1936.

Several ranking

functionaries, accompanied by eight plainclothes
policemen,

visited Wexhall and demanded that Trotsky sign
agreeing to new conditions in exile.

a

document

He was not to write

on political conditions in other countries or grant
press

interviews.

In addition, he was asked to allow censorship

of his mail.

This demand, felt Trotsky, was a self-willed

invitation "to ask for chains and handcuffs.
cally refused."
stricted.

1

categori-

I

Then and there his freedom was severely re-

S4

The "following morning" he was called once again as
a "witness" in the affair of the fascist intruders into his

lodgings.

After the judge suggested that Trotsky had vio-

lated the terms of his asylum, he was taken under police escort to confront the Minister of Justice. 155

Again he was

asked to sign the document restricting his freedom of action

Leon Trotsky, declared that I, my wife,
and my secretaries shall not engage while in
Norway, in any political activity directed
against any state friendly to Norway.
I declare that I will reside at such place as the
government may select or approve
that I
my wife, and my secretaries, will in no way
involve ourselves in political questions current
that my activeither in Norway or abroad
ities as author shall be limited to historically
that Any/
works, biographies, and memoirs
writings of a theoretical nature
shall not be directed against any government of
I further agree that all
any foreign state.
mail, telegrams, telephone calls, sent or received by myself, my wife, and my secretaries
"156
be censored.
"I,

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

"
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In response Trotsky heaped scorn on the head
of Trygve Lie
for these outrageous demands.
He also declared that this
was the first act of surrender to Nazism, and
prophesied

that the government would pay dearly:

near— remember this!— the day

"'But the day is

is near when the Nazis will

drive you from your country, all of you together with
your

Pantof fel-Minister- President.

1,157
•

Trotsky also challenged

Lie to act on his own:
"•If you want to arrest me,' I demanded,
•why do you want me to authorize you to do it?'
"'But,' the minister replied, with an air
of profundity, 'between arrest and complete
liberty there is an intermediate situation.
"'That can only be an equivocation or a
trap; I prefer to be arrested!
•

—

'

The Minister obliged him on the spot.
aside,

Erwin Wolf was shoved

and Trotsky forcibly returned to Wexhall. 158

According to the Norwegian Constitution, it was illegal to incarcerate someone not convicted of a crime.

Minister Lie was not deterred by such legal niceties.

But

Three

days later (August 31, 1936) he obtained King Haakon's signature on a special "royal decree" that gave him the authority
to intern "'undesirable'" aliens.

159

On September

police moved Trotsky and his wife to Sundby,

overlooking

a

2

a small

the

village

fjord some twenty-two miles south of Oslo.

This "bourgeois prison" was home for more than three-and-aillhalf

months.

The couple occupied the second floor, while

downstairs lived more than

a

dozen "slow-moving, heavy police

men who smoked pipes, played cards, and at noon brought us

newspapers" when they were in the mood.

160

To cause Trotsky

156

more inconvenience, his secretaries-Wolf

and van Heijenoort

were deported, and he was forbidden
visitors, except for an
occasional call by his Norwegian attorney.
Even physical exercise in the courtyard was forbidden.
"it was worse th an
the Tsarist prison," commented Trotsky,
"because in the

Tsarist prisons we had visits from friends
and from my relatives." 1 6 X At first even a radio was forbidden
to them,

since it was considered incompatible with the
proper regimen
for internees.
In charge of this northern "St. Helena"
were

three senior officials, with fascist proclivities.

One,

Jonas Lie, later served the Quisling government as chief
of
police.

The irony of this impossible situation did not

escape Trotsky.

As he observed in wonderment, first the

fascists raid his home, then Stalin accused him of an alliance with the fascists and obtainedhis imprisonment, and

finally he was locked up under the supervision of three
fascist functionaries:

"No chess player, in his wildest

fantasy, could dream up a better deployment of the pieces." 162
At the beginning, internment was
spirit.

a

balm to Trotsky's

It was like "a rest cure," after the "nervous ten-

sion of the Moscow trial week."

Without news, without tele-

grams, without mail, without telephone calls

Trotskys to recover their strength.

— it

allowed the

"But from the day we re-

ceived the first newspapers, internment became torture," he
later wrote. 163

Unable to answer the lies coming from

Moscow, he "raged like a caged tiger," sadly observed his
wife:

"To defend himself against slander, to fight it

— after

157
all, this was his native element,
the organic passion of his
being; he found refuge in furious
labor and in the struggle

against all his contemptible enemies.he fell ill.

But doomed to silence

The Norwegian government had
subjected him

to a kind of "political paralysis,"
where one could see,
hear, and understand everything, but
was "unable to move a
finger to ward off mortal danger." in
these conditions, the
appearance of his son's book, Livre Rouge sur
le proces de

Moscou, was an "inestimable gift"; he now had

a

defender. 165

Unbowed, Trotsky continued his "literary" labors,

writing several pamphlets and articles on the trials,
in addition to letters to his son and to various attorneys.

After

submitting them to censorship, he impatiently awaited replies, unaware that most of these letters were simply con-

fiscated.

If he had known their fate, he would have "laid

down my arms ^and read Hegel
shelf."

— there

he sat, right on the

But the government prohibited nothing in clear and

distinct terms.

1 fir:

With the noose tightening every day, Trotsky tried
other means to escape this infuriating cul-de-sac.

In an at-

tempt to have the Moscow charges aired in court, he sued two

Norwegian papers

— one

dorsed the calumnies.

Stalinist, one Fascist

— which

had en-

But on October 29, 1936, there appeared

another "Provisional Royal Decree" which authorized Lie to
deny legal recourse to any alien interned under the August
act which, coincident ally

,

only applied to Trotsky.

31

Then he

instructed his French attorney to sue Stalinist papers in

158

Prance, Czechoslovakia, and
other countries, again
with the
intention of stating his case in
court, even through intermediaries.
But the Minister of Justice
(„ho years later
headed the United Nations) was
equal to the challenge.
On
November 11 he informed Trotsky in
a "rude letter" that legal
action in foreign courts, and even
communication with lawyers
abroad was prohibited.
In retrospect, Trotsky rued that
he had never been
persecuted with "as much miserable cynicism"
as during these
four months. 168 From the beginning of
his stay, after meeting
the Labor Party leaders, he "got a strong
whiff of the stale
odor of the musty conservatism denounced
with such vigor in
Ibsen's plays." 169
fact, he reread Ibsen, his "literary
love" of some thirty-five years earlier, while
vegetating in

m

a

Norwegian lockup.

"Ibsen's hatred of Protestant bigotry,

provincial sottishness, and stiff-laced hypocrisy," he
wrote,
"became more comprehensive and closer to me after my
acquain-

tance with the first socialist government in the poet's
native
land." At one point he even engaged Minister Lie in
a dis-

cussion of Ibsen's play, "Enemy of the People."

The socialist

official was bothered by Trotsky's comparison of his activities and those of Burgomaster Stockmann in the drama. 170

Trotsky would not let him off easily:
case for you, Mr. Minister:

"'To make out the best

Your government has all the

vices but none of the virtues of

a

bourgeois government.'"

This exchange prompted Lie to declare that the government

had committed "'a stupidity'" in granting Trotsky

a

visa.

159

'"And,

are you preparing to rectify this
stupidity by means

of a crime?,

-

Trotsky quickly retorted, mindful
of the fate
of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht
in "socialist"
Germany.

1

71x

During the months of internment Trotsky
remained
calm and self-controlled, always insisting upon
his "rights"
but not offending his captors in the process. 172
However,

he continually fretted over the unanswered lies
that poisoned

the airways and the press.

Trotsky's imprisonment and

forced silence implicitly tended to support the charges. 173
But on December 11, 1936, he had one last chance to set the

record straight on Norwegian soil.

Called once again as

a

"witness" in the prolonged trial of Quisling's men, Trotsky

testified for some four hours in German, denying that he had

violated the conditions of asylum, and also analyzing the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial at some length,

a first

his statements before the Dewey Commiss on. 174

had complete freedom of expression
room.

— before

"sketch" of

This time he

an empty court-

(Minister Lie had the court cleared of spectators and

the press.)

dows."

No matter; he intended "to open doors and win-

At several points in his testimony Trotsky explicitly

censured Lie for the "trap" he had made of political asylum.
He also pointed out that in this case the Communists and

Nazis had cooperated in muting his critical comments:

"The

fascists steal my papers in Norway, the GPU steals them in
Paris,

and this unity of action engenders

terest."

In fact,

a

solidarity of in-

"Stalin and Mr. Quisling have collaborated

160

to have me interned," not without some official aid. 175

Trotsky informed the court of his concern for his
papers, which could be used to arrange a new trial or prove

his innocence.

In a telling metaphor, he asked the court to

imagine a pious man who had always lived by the Bible, but
was then accused of spreading anti-religious propaganda, on

the basis of false documents and false testimony.

What would

this maligned man say?
"Here is my family, here are my friends, here is
my library, my correspondence over many years,
Read all my letters,
here is my entire life.
written to the most diverse people on the most
varied subjects; question the hundreds of people
with whom I have had connection for many years,
and you will be convinced that I could not have
engaged in an activity contrary to my entire
personality, contrary to my entire moral code."

To signs of assent from the President of the Court, Trotsky

concluded that this argument would convince any honest and
reasonable man:
just described."

"My situation is analogous to the one

I

have

176

VI.

"Deliverance"

Such compelling testimony had no effect on the
its
Norwegian government, which was now anxious to be rid of

unwelcome guest.

While Trotsky wondered if his "socialist

tender mercies
comrades" would actually hand him over to the
a transfer to
of the NKVD, the ministers were considering

some inaccessible place in the far north.

I 77

to exMeanwhile, Trotsky's Norwegian visa was due

pire on December 18, 1936,

and his friends abroad once again

161

searched for

a

nation willing to grant him sanctuary.

At

one point Trotsky apparently requested the Catalan government
to allow him to settle in Barcelona, which would surely have

complicated the Spanish Civil War, already beset by Byzantine
complexities. 178

In Mexico, American followers of Trotsky

approached Diego Rivera for assistance.

The flamboyant

muralist went to President Lazaro Cardenas, who unexpectedly
I

agreed to provide

a

haven for Trotsky.
•I

TO

The happy news was

OQ

quickly relayed to Oslo.
Trotsky had been kept informed of Mexican efforts on
his behalf, but his enthusiasm for such

move was tempered

a

by the violent nature of Mexican politics.
his enemies might be behind the invitation.
was something of a "mystery" to him.

181

He feared that

The whole affair

With the possibility

of a Mexican visa looming, Trotsky requested permission to

consult friends, arrange for a safe voyage, and secure the
safety of his archives.

But when Minister Lie visited him

at Sundby in the second week of December, he was "obviously

staggered by the extremism of my requests."

Trotsky reminded

him that even in Tsarist jails exiles were allowed to see
friends and arrange their personal affairs.

"'Yes, yes,'

replied the Minister of Justice philosophically,
have changed

'but times

,„1 82
.

.

.

On the 18th of December Lie returned to inform

Trotsky that the visa had been granted, and that he had already chartered the "Ruth,"

a

Norwegian oil tanker, which

would leave for Mexico the following day.

Once again Lie

"

refused Trotsky leave to arrange his personal affairs.

unseemly haste disturbed Trotsky:

"'And what

•if Stalin knows about your tanker?

1

,

This

he asked,

We may be torpedoed on
I

the high seas and never reach the English Channel.'"

the Minister was not swayed by such considerations:
and his wife were given a few hours to pack.

QO

But

Trotsky

"Not one of

our numerous migrations ever took place in such an atmosphere
of feverish haste, such feeling of utter isolation, uncer-

tainty, and suppressed indignation."

Natalya asked, "'Mightn't it be
government?'"

a

Amid the helter-skelter,

trap on the part of the

Trotsky replied, "'I hardly think so,'" but

with no great assurance.

184

As he prepared to leave the known dangers of the Old

World for the unknown ones of the New, Trotsky finished an
article on the sycophantic defenders of the frame-up, en-

titled "Shame I"

Intended for his son in France, he fear-

do not know if my letter will reach you.
185
He
sea."
the
to
bottle
this
consigning
In any case, I am

fully concluded:

"I

also took the precaution to name his sons, Lvov and Sergei,
as his literary heirs.

The struggle would be continued in

Mexico, and his accusers finally answered, "if ever

there

I

arrive

186
.

The "Ruth" sailed on December 19th.

On the initia-

his comfortable
tive of the shipowner, they were assigned
which had been Lie's
cabin, not the "semi-dark infirmary"

suggestion.

187

passengers,
Trotsky and his wife were the only

police agent, Jonas
ever-suspicious
the
of
exception
with the

"

163

Lie.

As the tanker steamed through the Atlantic, Trotsky

"avidly" read books on Mexico and worked on his diary, parts
of which were later incorporated in his book on the trials,

Les Crimes de Staline

.

Despite the security precautions,

journalists quickly learned of the voyage.

Several American

newspapers wanted to interview Trotsky, via the ship's transmitter, but this was forbidden:

"'The Norwegians believed it

was necessary to protect the United States against my ideas,
and deprived me of the right to use the ship's radio.'" 188

On the morning of January

1,

the ship's sirens greeted the

new year, but there was no echo, except for the salutations
Jonas Lie brought from his Minister.

"The world seemed en-

gulfed in absurdity," commented Isaac Deutscher.

189

As the

sea became extraordinarily calm, the lonely passenger mused,

"Behind are four months of captivity.
the unknown

.

Ahead

— the

ocean and

..190

After

a

long journey, which included much tacking

from one course to another, the "Ruth" finally sailed into

Tampico Bay on January

9,

1937,

a hot,

tropical morning.

Trotsky had no intention of disembarking unless met by
friends:

"We had not the slightest grounds for trusting the

the
Norwegian vassals of the GPU, alike in the tropics as in

Oslo parallel."

But a government cutter approached the

journalists, and
tanker, bringing a Mexican general, various
husband,
"friends"— Frida Kahlo (substituting for her ailing

co-thinker"), and
Diego Rivera), Max Shachtman (his "close

American Committee for the
George Novack (Secretary of the

164
x

Defense of Leon Trotsky).

Later Natalya Sedova recalled

how their anxiety dissipated as they saw all the friendly
'"We breathed our deliverance.'" 192

and affectionate faces:

Trotsky and his wife stepped, "not without excitement," onto the New World.

There was an immediate physical

and spiritual contrast with their former hermitage.

"Torn

free from the atmosphere of revolting selfwill and ener-

vating uncertainty, we encountered hospitality and attentiveness at every step."

193

According to Frank Kluckhohn,

the New York Times reporter at Tampico, Trotsky appeared

"tanned and healthier than for some time," as
the sea voyage,

along with

a

a

result of

and sported a tan golf suit with knickers,

red tie.

Peering tranquilly from behind hornrather pedagogical

rimmed glasses, which he tapped in

a

manner, Trotsky immediately made

short statement in

a

Russian, which he orally translated into French for the
He commended Mexico

benefit of the assembled journalists.

for its kindness in granting the visa, promised not to in-

terfere in local politics, pledged "complete abstention"
from any actions that might hamper Mexico's relations with

other nations, and supported with all his "strength" the

proposed international commission to investigate the

Zinoviev-Kamenev trial.

Then Trotsky expressed the desire

much-deferred
to learn more about Mexico and to finish his
book on Lenin.

194

As he later wrote,

life was opening very favorably.
its subsequent development?"

195

But

"A new chapter for our
.

.

.

What would be

165

That evening the party left for Mexico City in
special presidential car.

a

As the train climbed higher and

higher into the mountains, the air became cooler and, he
recalled, "we soon rid ourselves of the northerner's fear
of the tropics which had seized us in the steamy atmosphere
of the Gulf of Mexico."

196

During the trip Shachtman and

Novack briefed Trotsky on plans for

commission of inquiry.

a

The conversation also turned to the theoretical backwardness of American radicalism, especially Max Eastman's tirades against dialectical materialism.

197

On the morning of January 11th, they alighted at

Lecheria,

a

tiny station on the outskirts of the capital.

The "agile" Trotsky descended from the "magnificent rail-

road car," to be met by Antonio Hildago,

a

Mexican radical,

Fritz Bach, the former Swiss Communist, and Rivera, who had
just been released from the hospital.

Even though Rivera

"not
and his friends "loaded their revolvers," Trotsky was

even noticed, much less molested" at the station.

moment security precautions broke down, as

known well-wishers surrounded them.

a

198

_

For a

throng of un-

Asked to get in

a car

Natalya Sedova
with some policemen and other strange faces,
weren't
"'A fear crossed our minds:
suddenly felt anxious:
199
captivity?'"
of
place
we being taken, as before, to a new
Coyoacan, once
But the destination was the suburb of
"Blue House" on Avenida
the residence of Cortes, and the
the house immediately imof
ambience
exotic
The
Londres.
In the words of Natalya,
refugees.
northern
two
the
pressed

.

166
it was,

"A low blue house, a patio filled with plants,
airy rooms, collections of pre-Columbian art,'
a profusion of pictures
We were on a new
planet, the home of Frida Kahlo and Diego
Rivera. "200

...

More Frida'

s

home than Diego's, it had been designed by Juan

O'Gorman, with flat planes and metal finishings.

The nat-

ural concrete had been poured in cobalt-blue and rose, with

lemon-colored floors and natural plaster walls.
in deep-blue and red spotted the spacious rooms.

Furniture
'I',

ill

eucalyptus trees soared above walls draped with purple
bougainvillea.

There was an orange tree, along with rose

Completing the decor

bushes and geraniums in the patio.

were a spider monkey and green parrot.

201

In this improb-

able setting Trotsky and his wife lived and worked for two

years.

The "Blue House" was also the setting for the ses-

sions of the Dewey Commission.
"The Lion" and "The Frog"

At the beginning of his stay in Mexico, Trotsky wrote
"It was to him above all that we were indebted
202
Thus befor our emancipation from captivity in Norway.

of Rivera:

gan a tempetuous friendship between the two giants.
were men vastly dissimilar in nature and appearance.

They

Rivera

was of immense size, with an attractively ugly face,
profeaturing good-natured, frog-face features and dark

truding eyes.
or "Panzas"

(

To his wife he was

"Fatbelly "

203
)

"

Carasapo " ("Frog-Face")

He had joined the Mexican

167

Communist Party in 1922, and directed its stormy affairs
for some years, along with his fellow artists, David Alfaro

Siqueiros and Jose Clemente Orozco.

In 1927 he attended

the Xth- anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution

and was invited to sketch Stalin, not one of his best efforts.

He left Moscow in a huff, upset that some artists

had been silenced, and that popular and religious traditions
were not incorporated in Soviet art. 204
the '"undertaker

1

"

Later he wrote that

/Stalin/ had a '"peanut-shaped head'" and

liked to pose a la Napoleon, with one hand behind his back,
before his worshipers.

205

In 1929 the Mexican Communist

Party expelled Rivera on the false charge of "Trotskyism."

Nonetheless, as Bertram Wolfe has suggested, his poetic

world of pre-Columbian heroes had little in common with the
prosaic celebration of Soviet tractors.

206

In 1937 the Riveras were probably the Trotskys'

"closest" friends.

lonely struggle.

20 7

The artist sympathized with Trotsky's

In 1933 he

included the "Lion's" portrait

in several of his celebrated murals, notably a "Communist
O AO
The artist in Trotsky also appealed to
Unity" panel.
him, observed Rivera's biographer:

His mind /Trotsky's/ operated like that of an
artist, in terms of sudden insights, theoretical
formulations possessed of a certain literary
elegance, constructs based on a mixture of
reality and imagination. Analogy— the building
block of the logic of the artist mind plays a
major role in his thinking: the prominence of
the "Thermidor Theory" in his programmatic
system gives evidence of that. 209

—

"

168

For his part, Trotsky was strongly attracted to Rivera, "to
the imagination, charm, transparency,

great artist." 210

and geniality of the

In particular, Trotsky admired the com-

bination of artistic and political themes in Rivera's
murals, believing that the craftsman should be just another
worker, one not alienated from his surroundings, and that
211
great art combined politics and poetry.

was Rivera

1

s

"elemental temperament

,

And then there

somnabulism

,

and

'Gargantuan size and appetites'," so foreign to the Russian,
"which made of him a riotous and roaring prodigy like any
of the chimerical figures appearing in his paintings."

212

Frida Kahlo, Rivera's wife, also caught Trotsky's eye.
A "concealed devil"

(

un demonio oculto "), she was

of melancholy and fantastic compositions.

a

painter

Fantastic in her

own right, she concealed her "maimed body" (the result of
a car accident)

in long-flowing Mexican garments of ex-

quisite grace and riotous color.

Indeed, as Bertram Wolfe

wrote, she looked like some pre-Conquest Indian princess.

213

Until the end of 1938 the two couples were convivials,

though there is some doubt how much they actually saw of
each other.

214

Shortly after Trotsky called Rivera "'the

revolutiongreatest artist of our epoch and an indomitable
of the Fourth
ary, '" implying that he was the Gorky

international,
lationship.

215 severe strains developed in their re-

One cause,

the two women.

apparently, was a quarrel between

Increasingly irritable and aggressive,

the household, and sometimes
in
flare-ups
provoked
Natalya

169

insulted the dignity of the women comrades.

After harsh

words were exchanged, Natalya would feel deeply remorseful,
but the harm had been done.

When Frida became the target of

this attack, she felt hurt and outraged. 216

Possibly, we

may speculate, Natalya was expressing her displeasure at

Trotsky's rather old-fashioned "flirtation" with this exotic Mexican woman. 217
But a more important reason for the strained re-

lations was political in nature.
"

pintor

a

pistola ," almost

a

Rivera, the proverbial

Mexican landmark, had attacked

Cardenas toward the end of 1938 as "'an accomplice of the
Stalinists,'" and publicly backed his conservative foe in
the presidential election.

Since the Stalinists could

easily make it appear that Trotsky, Rivera's "mentor," was

behind the move, the Russian refugee was forced to make

a

public disavowal in order to protect his delicate position
in Mexico.

Above all, Trotsky had to avoid even the sem-

blance of interference in local politics.

As a result,

Trotsky stated in early January, 1939, that he no longer

enjoyed "'moral solidarity'" with Rivera, and soon left his
house, despite the great financial inconvenience this en-

tailed.

Unlike many other such ruptures in Trotsky's long
career, he retained great personal affection for Rivera,

while regretting the artist's political naivete.

Shortly

Rivera against
after this political quarrel, Trotsky defended

undiminished
certain political attacks, and expressed

170

admiration for the "'genius whose political blunderings

could cast no shadow either on his art or on his personal
integrity.'" 219
"Noxious Influence"
The volatile political situation in Cardenas' Mexico

forced Trotsky to be highly circumspect in his conduct.

As

was the case in Norway, both extremes of Mexican politics

awaited only the slightest miscue on Trotsky's part before

attacking him.

The offer of asylum was not universally

popular, even within Cardenas' government.

True, such

organizations as the General Labor Confederation of Mexico

welcomed him as an "'upright and sincere revolutionary,'"
whose presence in Mexico "'surely will provide orientation
to the proletariat in view of the enormous social experience
he had.'"

And the managing editor of the government's

mouthpiece, Nacional

,

declared that "'ethical reasons con-

sonant with the clean conditions of our country'" had led to
the issuance of a visa.
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But the left-wing of Mexican politics saw the offer

somewhat differently.

Hernan Laborde, Secretary-General of

the Mexican Communist Party, branded Trotsky as

a

"'noxious

influence,'" one who would surely encourage reaction both
home and abroad.
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Prior to Trotsky's arrival in Mexico,

entry of
the local Party's chief also proclaimed that "'the

Trotsky into Mexico must be prevented.
effort to keep Trotsky out of Mexico.

We will make every

Trotskyism is the

171

same as Divisionism.

22 3

'

"

The Mexican Confederation of

School Teachers, echoing such sentiments, lamented that

Trotsky's presence would '"encourage the assassins of labor
and work woe to Mexico l'" 224

More important, Vicente

Lombardo Toledano and the powerful Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM)

,

one of the bulwarks of the government,

launched a violent campaign in the press to force Cardenas
to reconsider his decision.

Lombardo Toledano'

s

behavior

was so unprincipled, wrote Trotsky, that the "Russian

Mensheviks were genuine knight-errants of the revolution,"
compared to him.
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On the right, conservative opponents of Cardenas'

agrarian revolution charged that he never made

a move with-

out first consulting the "'Red Demon of Coyoacan.

'

226
"

When

American oil properties were nationalized, it was freely attributed to Trotsky's influence, the eminence grise behind
the President.

The New York Daily News repeated this

slander, much to Trotsky's irritation.
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And The New York

Times weighed in with a solemn editorial, assuring its

readers that Cardenas was no "Trotskist," and that it was
not expected that Trotsky would advise on foreign or domestic

policies.

Regarding relations with the United States,

Mexico's "celebrated guest will almost certainly be in-

structed to keep hands off."
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From the moment the visa was granted, the Mexican
political atmosphere turned ugly, with
the air.

a

hint of violence in

kidnapped
Reportedly Diego Rivera's caretaker was

and beaten by four armed men, who eventually pitched him

out of an automobile,

'"for refusing to talk.'" 229

Another

story had two armed assailants attacking Rivera himself in
a

Mexico City restaurant; when Frida attempted to intervene,

she was felled by a blow in the stomach. 230

In the opinion

of Max Shachtman, the Mexican Communist Party would stop at

nothing to eliminate its hated nemesis, and Rivera had
doubts that Trotsky would be allowed to leave the tanker in

good health.

2 31

Mexican political circles were alive with

the rumor that the Stalinists had orders '"to shoot Mr.

Trotsky on sight.'" 232
President Cardenas successfully faced down this tide
of opposition, and even expressed confidence in Trotsky's

discretion.
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He had little to fear.

aware of his delicate position.

Trotsky was well-

Fresh from his bitter ex-

perience in Norway, he had no intention of violating the
On his first day in the New World, Trotsky

terms of asylum.

sent a telegram to Cardenas pledging non-interference in

Mexican politics.
pressed
prive

a

2

34

And to some Mexican journalists he ex-

desire to drop out of sight and become

1,235
.

"u_n

homme

It was with "great gratitude" that he had ac-

cepted the visa, and he lost no opportunity to applaud the
"magnanimous hospitality" of this "magnificent country,"
whose President had acted out of
in granting asylum.

"

fidelity to his own ideas "
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Yet Trotsky reserved the "right" to answer publicly
any slander,

a

"right" which the Norwegians abhorred, but

173

the Mexicans allowed.

Trotsky had little doubt that GPU

agents would penetrate Mexico and assist the "friends" of
the Soviet Union in making his continued stay a difficult
237
one.
Fully expecting Moscow to invent new falsehoods

about his career, Trotsky expressed the hope that Mexican

public opinion would accord him

a

"certain moral hospital-

ity," i.e., permit him the opportunity to refute the forth-

coming accusations before passing judgment. 2 38

However, as

Frank Kluckhohn wrote at the time, Mexico, for Trotsky, was
"a place to live in but the wide world remains his chosen

field."
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Scarcely two weeks after his arrival in Mexico,

the "wide world" once more beckoned to Trotsky, this time
in the form of the Pyat akov-Radek trial.

VII.

"Enemy of the People"

— Anew

News of the impending trial first reached Trotsky on

January 19, 1937.

With its actual opening four days later,

Trotsky and his wife once more lived through "a week of
nightmare."

Even though the procedures were clear and the

decision foreordained, wrote Trotsky, "the impression of
moral horror increased rather than decreased.
from Moscow seemed like insane ravings.

The dispatches

It was necessary to

re-read each line several times to force oneself to believe
that behind these ravings were living men."
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Natalya

later recalled that period of anguish:
we opened the mail and
absurdity,
the Moscow newspapers, and the insanity,
blood were flooding around us as
"We listened to the radio,

outrage, fraud,
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in Norway,

as over the whole world

.

.

."241

Again. Trotsky asked himself if mankind was really so stupid
as to believe such charges.

"Of course not," he assured

himself, but "the frame-ups of Stalin are so monstrous that

they likewise seem impossible crimes."
"For The Sake of Trotsky's Beautiful Eyes "

These "insane ravings" directly involved Trotsky's

honor as a revolutionary and human being.

Even more than in

the first "show" trial, he was the center of attention, re-

ceiving due credit as the mastermind of the many "impossible
crimes."

The portrait of the "Prince of Darkness" was more

diabolical than ever.

The surreptitious aims of "rotten

putrid Trotskyism" were revealed for all to understand.

His

betrayal of Lenin and Lenin's Party was fully exposed, ex-

tending back to the year 190 3:

"The whole history of the

political activities of the Trotskyites represents an un-

interrupted chain of betrayals of the cause of the working
class, of the cause of socialism."
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During the trial the various defendants vied with
each other in tossing dung at their absent colleague, the
"Judas" of the revolutionary movement, Knyazev, for instance,

called him

a

"scoundrel," and Rataichak implicated every

member of the "centre," in order that none would be left
"even in the slightest degree contaminated with the rottenness of this Trotskyite morass."

944

.

,

,

Repeating this theme,
.

,

in the "stuffy,
Drobnis regretted the many years he had lived

I

"

stinking, foul, evil-smelling Trotskyite underworld," but
was quick to assure the court that he had "washed rotten

putrid Trotskyism from every recess of my mind,
dealt with it ruthlessly." 245

I

have

Boguslavsky also spoke of

the "absolutely intolerable and incredible rottenness within
the Trotskyite organization," and warned that Trotsky's

"venomous fangs have not yet been extracted,"

a

necessary

task, for his system of deceit might have some success

"...

abroad:

the inspirer and organizer of all this

criminal activity of ours was Trotsky, and the task of his
exposure, complete and final, is the basic task besides the

task of finding the specific criminals, his accomplices
here in our country."
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And Norkin, in case his final

plea was the last act of his life, wanted "to take advantage
of it to convey my seething contempt and hatred for

Trotsky.
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On a somewhat more elevated level, Pyatakov stressed

Trotsky's impatience to get on with the dirty deeds.
was short, and talk was cheap.

Time

In 1932 Leon Sedov conveyed

Trotsky's acute dissatisfaction to him:

"'You know the sort

of man Lev Davidovich is, he is roaring and raving, burning

with impatience to have his instructions carried out as
from
quickly as possible, and nothing concrete is visible

your report.'"
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When Pyatakov allegedly made his furtive

journey to Norway in December 1935

to protest certain in-

little time left.
structions, Trotsky stressed that they had
short period," Trotsky
-It was a matter of a relatively

—
supposedly stated, and used "expressions of utter dis-

satisfaction and nasty and sarcastic remarks" to express
his displeasure at the failures to date.

Ostensibly, Pyatakov and Radek were dragging their
feet because of a lack of enthusiasm for Trotsky's new program.

As Radek phrased it,

"For nothing at all,

just for

the sake of Trotsky's beautiful eyes--the country was to

return to capitalism.
a madhouse."
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When

read this

I

felt as if it were

This was the new element in Trotskyism

"a retreat to capitalism"

cations.

I

— which

had many profound impli-

According to the internal logic of Trotskyism, as

seen from the Kremlin, there must necessarily be
cal program:

a

politi-

"There can be no struggle for power without

some kind of program,

a

program that formulates the aims,

tasks, strivings and methods of struggle."

Six months

earlier the only program Vyshinsky was willing to ascribe
to the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre" was a simple lust

for power, but in January, 1937, he revealed that both cen-

tres had the same basic aim

— "an

open assertion of the need

for capitalist restoration in the U.S.S.R."

251

By December, 1935, Trotsky had supposedly concluded
as
that the collapse of the Soviet state was inevitable,

socialism could not be built in one nation alone.

In the

the "Old Manfamous Norwegian "interview" with Pyatakov,

delivered

a

"veritable phillipic," it was claimed.

"'Y ou

cord," he allegedly
can't break away from Stalin's navel
for socialist
declared, "you take Stalin's construction

s

177

construction."

Not only the Trotskyites, their mentor

1

allegedly charged, but also the masses were "under the

hypnotic influence of the huge constructive work that was
going on in the country, constructive work which they took
to be socialist construction." 252

As a result, the only

feasible method for seizing power was through

a

coup d'etat

,

with the aid of imperialist states.
Fortunately, from the Trotskyite point of view, war

with the imperialist states was imminent, perhaps in 1937.
As Pyatakov reported, Trotsky believed that capitalism was

beginning to grow stronger, and clearly could not tolerate
the defensive power of the Soviet state much longer:

"A

military clash was inevitable, and if we remained passive,
all the Trotskyite cadres as well would perish in the ruins

of the Stalin state."

253

Sokolnikov further explained that

the most organized form of capitalism was fascism, which

was seizing Europe:

"'Therefore, it would be better for us

to come to an agreement with it, better to arrive at some

compromise in the sense of retreating from socialism to

capitalism.'"

254

.

i

Furthermore, in the forthcoming war with
.

the fascist powers it was necessary to "deliver a stab in

the back" to the Soviet regime.
'"He, Trotsky

,

According to Pyatakov,

considers it absolutely necessary to adopt

distinctly defeatist attitude in this war.
that the bloc

'

a

He considers

coming into power can certainly be hastened

by the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war."

255

Vyshinsky, just the old Clemenceau thesis:

This was, charged

"'Hasten the

178

collision
U.S.S.R.

1

— provoke

— this

war, prepare for the defeat of the

was the program of the Trotskyite 'centre' in

the sphere of, so to speak,

'foreign policy.'" 256

But could an agreement be made with the fascist

powers?

Repeating his favorite figure of speech, Radek

pointed out that if such an agreement was arranged, it "would
not be made purely for the sake of Trotsky's beautiful
257
eyes."
Sharing this view, Trotsky allegedly entered into

negotiations with Rudolph Hess, Vice-Chairman of the National
Socialist Party, and made important territorial and economic
concessions.

These concessions were specified in a letter

Trotsky sent allegedly to Radek in December of 1935:
"'.

.We

shall inevitably have to make territorial concessions. ... We shall have to
yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to
Japan, and the Ukraine to Germany.
"'Germany needs raw materials, foodstuffs
We shall have to permit her to
and markets.
take part in the exploitation of ore, manganese,
gold, oil, apatites, and to undertake to supply
her for a definite period with foodstuffs and
fats at less than world prices.
"'We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin
to Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil
We shall also have
in case of war with America.
We shall
to permit her to exploit goldfields.
have to agree to Germany's demand not to oppose
her seizure of the Danube countries and the
Balkans, and not to hinder Japan in her seizure
1,258
.
of China.
.

.

.

'

Pyatakov concluded, "What was new, if you like, was formulated distinctly enough:

in essence, the Trotskyite organi-

,,259
fascism."
of
appendage
an
into
transformed
zation was being

to this
Certain practical steps were inevitably linked

program.

the final
In the event of coming to power, charged
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verdict, Trotsky undertook to "liquidate the state farms,
to dissolve the collective farms, to renounce the policy of

industrialization of the country and to restore on the territory of the Soviet Union social relations of capitalist
society."

In the meanwhile, "at the behest of the enemy of

the people Trotsky," and with the direct participation of

German and Japanese agents, diversive and wrecking work in
defense industry and on railways was performed, consisting
of "disrupting plans of production, lowering the quality of

the product, organizing fires and explosions at factories
or factory departments and mines, organizing train wrecks
In organizing

and damaging rolling stock and railway track."

these activities, the accused were guided by Trotsky's dictum,

"'to strike palpable blows at the most sensitive

places,'" supplemented by instructions from Pyatakov and
others not to shrink before loss of human life, because
'"the more victims, the better, since this will rouse the
260
anger of the workers.'"

Terrorism was also of "prime importance" to the
Trotskyite centre.

261

"At the direct behest of the enemy

of the people L. Trotsky," the centre formed terrorist groups
and
in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Novosibirsk, Sochi,

other cities.

They prepared terrorist acts against Stalin,

Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze
Zhdanov, Kossior, Eiche

,

Postyshev and Beria.

,
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Yezhov,

According

published docuto the Prosecutor, Trotsky at least twice
which their author
ments giving terrorist lines, "documents

?

.

180
1,263

has proclaimed urbi et orbi.

wrecking, terrorism
struggle.

— they

Ties to fascist states,

were all necessary tools of the

In a conversation with Pyatakov, Sedov quoted his

father to the effect, that whoever attempted to brush aside
the questions of terrorism and wrecking signs his own

"'testimonium paupert atis

1

"
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Retreat to capitalism!
in the back!

Appendage of fascisml

Surely these charges taxed credulity.

could believe such flummery about Trotsky,

a

Stab
Who

veteran of more

than thirty- five years service in the revolutionary trenches

Vyshinsky, himself, recognized the problem and asked rhetorically,

How can these people who fought for socialism
for so many years, people who blasphemously
called themselves Bolshevik Leninists, be accused of these monstrous crimes? Does it not
prove that the accusation is unfounded, that
these people are being accused of crimes they
cannot possibly be accused of because of the
very nature of their past socialist, revolutionary, Bolshevik activities?
But he had a ready answer.

For decades Trotsky and his Com-

pany had sung the praises of capitalism and damned socialism.

Trotskyism had always been

a foe,

,f

this old enemy of the

workers and peasants, this old enemy of socialism, loyal
servant of capitalism."

In fact, for more than thirty years

Trotskyism had been preparing for its "final conversion into
a storm

detachment of fascism, into one of the departments

of the fascist police."

In fact, claimed the Prosecutor,

represented an
the entire history of the Trotskyites

"uninterrupted chain of betrayals" of socialism.

265
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In support of this "historical" perfidy Vyshinsky

dragged up some old chestnuts.

His first exhibit was

Trotsky's "despicable" pamphlet, Our Political Tasks (1904),

packed full of "filthy insinuations" against Lenin:

"In

this pamphlet Trotsky squirts venomous saliva at the great
ideas of Marxism-Leninism."

He even slandered Lenin,

Vyshinsky asserted, by calling him "'Maximilian,'" after
Robespierre.

Then in 1911-12 this "Judas-Trotsky" knocked

together the so-called "August bloc " which, in Lenin's
opinion, was built on hypocrisy and empty phrases.

In re-

ply, Trotsky and his co-ad jutors "retaliated with a stream

of filthy slander; they hurled abuse at Lenin and the

Bolsheviks, and called them 'barbarous,'

Asiatics."

'fiercely sectarian'

But in this struggle against Lenin and his Party

worse was to come:

"In 1915 Trotsky came out in opposition

to Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the victory of

socialism in one country.

Thus, he completely capitulated

to capitalism over twenty years ago!"

Trotsky, in fact,

served "Economism, Menshevism, Liquidationalism, Kautskyism,

Social-Democracy and national-chauvinism, just as he is now
serving imperialism and fascism in the fight against the
U.S.S.R.

1,266

And after the October Revolution and Civil War (conveniently ignored in this recital of historical sins),
Trotsky continued his treacherous ways.

In 1922 he advocated

property
allowing Soviet industrial enterprises to mortgage
credits.
to private capitalists in order to obtain

This

t

"

182

"capitalist control" meant political control, as Stalin ex-

posed at the time.

"Is it an accident that," asked Vyshinsky,

"having started with capitalist control
a frank

,

these people sank to

platform of capitalist restoration

,

to open struggle

for the purpose of carrying out this platform in alliance

with the capitalists against the dictatorship of the proletariat?"

Then, in 1926-27, the "New Opposition" took their

struggle into the streets, took the path of "open anti-Soviet
crime," and used "their pseudo- Lef

1

'

"

proposals on "super-

industrialization" to break the bond between town and country.
"Strictly speaking, these proposals and demands were on

a

line with the present acts of diversion and wrecking.

Strictly speaking, there is only

a

difference in form between

the wrecking and diversive acts of 1926-27 and those of the

present time

.

§

Vyshinsky triumphantly concluded his historical indictment with the boast, "Organic connection is proved.

Historic connection is proved."
mented.

The charge was fully docu-

"This accusation," he continued,

"condemns the

criminals in this dock to eternal disgrace and to the external

execration of all honest toilers, of all the honest people in
our country, and throughout the world."

From anti-Soviet

street demonstrations in 1927 to terrorism and treason in

1932-36 was "only one step.

And this step they took!"
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Unfortunately, for Moscow, "the brain of the crime"
was not in the dock with the other degenerates.

plea Pyatakov had but one lament:

"I

In his final

only deeply regret that

1

M

\

he, the main criminal,

the unregenerate and hardened offender,
Trotsky, is not sitting beside us in the dock." 269 But the

final verdict once more held out hope for such an occasion:

Enemies of the people, Lev Davidovich Trotsky,
and his son Lev Lvovich Sedov,
having been
convicted by the testimony of the accused
as well as by the materials in the present case
of personally directing the treacherous activi-'
ties of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre, in
the event of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R., are liable to immediate
arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 270
.

.

.

.

.

.

Apparently the court had some reason for believing that
Trotsky and his son might suddenly reappear on Soviet soil,

either voluntarily or involuntarily.

Trotskyism Revisited
The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial had shed little light on

Trotsky's background or underlying motives.

Trotsky's non-

existence, before the Party expelled him, was implicit in this
Almost no judicial attention was given to his

earlier trial.
earlier career.

Before 1927, he was an "un-person" as far as

this court was concerned.

But in the 1930s, devoid of politi-

cal principles his only aim was to seize power.
,

In pursuit

of this obsession Trotsky, according to the Prosecutor, was

willing to accept fascist assistance and take advantage of
wartime setbacks,

a

form of defeatism.

But he relied chiefly

on terrorism, pure and simple, to achieve his objective.

Trotsky, consequently, was portrayed in the earlier trials as
a

power-mad has-been, consumed with hatred for Stalin, willing

regain power.
to countenance criminal methods in order to
I
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But in the Pyatakov-Radek trial Trotsky and

"Trotskyism" received much more serious attention.

Trotsky

was still the criminal captain of a murderous and traitorous
band.

But it was "proven" that his betrayal of Lenin and

Lenin's movement was of long duration, extending "uninterruptedly" back to the year 1903 and the beginning of
Bolshevism.

According to Vyshinsky, Trotsky's capitulation

to capitalism had surfaced in 1915, when he came out in op-

position to "Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country."

At this point the seeds

of treason were sown.

Implied throughout the trial was the impossibility
of "permanent revolution" versus the possibility of "socialism"
in one country."

Although Vyshinsky was careful not to dis-

cuss Trotsky's formulation of "permanent revolution," he

equated this "black program" with

a

retreat to capitalism,

and then contrasted it to Stalin's program of liquidating all

remnants of capitalism and building the "socialist motherland."
This was "a life and death struggle between two programs," ex-

claimed the Prosecutor, "two opposite sets of principles, two

mutually hostile trends and views which reflect the respective
sets of principles."
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In Vyshinsky 's Manichean view of the

struggle, two diametrically opposing political programs

clashed— Trotsky and capitalism, Stalin and socialism.
During the trial Vyshinsky took great pains to demontreason.
strate that "Trotskyism" inevitably led to

"Is it

that Trotskyism had become
an accident," he continually asked,

—
185
an appendage of fascism?

Certainly not!

The "logic of the

struggle" determined Trotsky's historical path, and

"strictly speaking," it was only "one step" from questioning
the Party's line to conspiring with fascists for its downfall.

In other words, when Trotsky asserted "A" (the impossibility
of socialism in one country), he also implied "Z" (retreat to

capitalism)

,

the path he subsequently followed.

intermediate position in this conception.

Either

There was no
a

Party

member wholeheartedly supported the Party line, or inevitably
sunk into the "Trotskyite morass" and the fascist camp. 272

Even the faintest taint of the dread disease could
have serious consequences.

At the trial Pyatakov testified

he had attempted to rid himself of his old ideas, after his

capitulation in 1927, but there remained "a poisoned splinter
of the remnants of Trotskyite ideas," around which grew "that

festering sore which brought me to the path of crime, treachery and treason."
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Serebryakov also confessed that his

original political error

— i.e.,

adherence to Trotsky's views

"by the inevitable logic of fate, developed into most grievous

crimes."
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And Radek made the warning explicit:

"whoever

has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realize that

tomorrow he may be

a

diversionist

,

tomorrow he may be

a

traitor if he does not thoroughly heal that rift by complete
and utter frankness to the Party."
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Thus, the internal logic of "Trotskyism" led its

author to

a

progression of criminal acts.

Not only did the

assistance, but
"roaring and raving" Trotsky accept fascist

186

he became an appendage of fascism.

Not only was he willing

to take advantage of wartime setbacks, but he urged
in the back" during the military struggle.

a

"stab

Not only was he

eager to undermine the regime, but he advocated striking
"palpable blows at the most sensitive places" of the Soviet
system.

In the space of six months, from one trial to the

"Trotskyism" had become

next,

a

malignant disorder of extreme

depravity, highly infectious and immune to treatment.

ventive innoculation was the only answer.

Pre-

But its creator

was beyond assistance, except for the mercy of the "icepick.

"

VIII.

"Bitter Work"

At the end of the trial Pyatakov predicted that the

chief culprit would not

— "for

I

know him full well"--find any

other course than to dissociate himself from "what we have
done together with him and under his leadership, to slander
else he
us, to lie, to accuse us of cowardice, and anything
276
Far from frigid Moscow in sunny Mexico City,
may please."

Trotsky did as predicted by Pyatakov and the other accused.
He went about dissociating himself from them.

work," Natalya Sedova later wrote.

It was

"bitter

The "Blue House" in

former colCoyoacan was "haunted" by the faces of Trotsky's
those who would unleagues who had already disappeared and

doubtedly follow them.
experience, however,
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After the frustrating Norwegian

the
"enemy number one" felt grateful for

the most recent Moscow
opportunity to refute the charges in

"

,
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tragicomedy.

"'What good luck it is," Trotsky wrote his son,

Lyova, in Paris, "'that we have managed to come to Mexico
just before the start of a new trial in Moscow.

'
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De-

spite the incredible charges designed "to paralyse every

critical thought and to render every argument grotesquely

inadequate," observed Isaac Deutscher, 279 Trotsky valiantly

struggled to pierce the veil of mystery and puncture the
trial

1

s

credibility.
Pencil in hand, "over-tense and overworked, often in

fever, yet tireless

11

Trotsky listed the forgeries

documents, checked dates,

280

,

searched

but the work was despairing and

the contest unequal, as he well knew:

The struggle is being waged with unequal weapons.
On the one side the GPU, the court, the press,
the diplomats, the hired agentry, journalists of
the Duranty type, attorneys of the Pritt type.
On the other--an isolated "accused" who has
hardly torn himself free from a socialist jail,
in an alien, distant land, without a press or
resources of his own. 281

—

No matter!

This "David" entered the fray, hoping to wound

Stalin's "Goliath" with the sting of his irrepressible pen.
Le Vieux Journaliste

On the eve of the trial Trotsky declared that the

back-stage managers of the new production wanted "to catch
public opinion unawares and commit rape upon it."
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The

"precipitate procedure" in announcing the trial only four
prevent me
days before it opened was aimed, above all, "to

—

frame-up in time."
the main defendant— from exposing the new
in Trotsky's opinion,

"the G.P.U.

is calculating upon

188

gullibility, ignorance, short memories."

But these calcu-

lations would prove faulty, since there was no question of

internment this time:
challenge the organizers of the frameup! I
do not doubt that the Mexican government, which
has been so hospitable to me, will not prevent
me from presenting to world public opinion the
whole truth about the monstrous frameups of the
G.P.U. and its inspirers.
I

This

"

vieux journaliste

,

"

as he once called himself,

remained

during the trial "at the disposition of the honest and impartial press.",,283
If anything, he was too lavish in gratifying the

press's insatiable need for fresh copy.

For eleven days

after January 20, 1937, Trotsky prepared and issued over

forty articles and statements relating to the Py atakov-Radek
trial.

In many cases there were

two or more original

Russian versions of each statement, plus authorized transHis feverish cam-

lations into Spanish, French, and English.

paign to refute the accusations before they gained
of respectability bore some fruit.

a

patina

In The New York Times

,

for instance, daily dispatches from Moscow on the trial's

progress were juxtaposed with daily disclaimers issued from
m

Mexico City.

This time his voice was heard.

284

The trial's chief aim, declared Trotsky, was "to
285

opinion."
cover me with shame in the eyes of world public
to cover each
in response, his tactic was similar; namely,
to assist his
charge with shame and ridicule, in order
political crime of our
readers in analyzing "the greatest

189

epoch and, perhaps, of all epochs," aimed at maintaining the

Bonapartist clique in power. 286

Like a drama critic, he re-

viewed the various performances, doing so with
sonal relish.

a

certain per-

Vyshinsky, for Trotsky, was nothing but

a

former Menshevik who was now attempting to save the October

Revolution from all those who had been its creators.

2

fl

7

Pyatakov's role in the trial was no surprise, especially
after his unseemly capitulation in 1927; and just before it,

Trotsky recalled, he had predicted, "'if
Pyatakov will accept
the office.'"

288

a

289

Bonaparte appears,

portfolio, and quietly set out for

And no one could have any illusions about

Radek, whom Trotsky considered

simple.

a

a

"'traitor,'" pure and

As for the "loyal" Muralov, Trotsky quietly ob-

served that "it was already many years since he had been com-

pletely separated from politics."

290

Only Rakovsky's name

elicited any sentiment on Trotsky's part.

when Drobnis im-

plicated the veteran revolutionary, thus hinting at

new

a

trial and new accusations, Trotsky wrote that his old

friend's destiny was "deeply tragic,"

and sorrowfully pre-

dicted that "this old fighter, crushed by life, will not outrun his fate

11

291

.

In other comments, Trotsky castigated the "infernal

conveyor" system, which forced new confessions, leading to

new trials.
process.

Not even Stalin could stop this self-perpetuating

Indeed, Stalin "resembles

solution to quench his thirst."

292

a

man who drinks

a

salt

Trotsky had nothing but

Russian "soul"
scorn for the theory that the so-called

.
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explained the debasing self-accusations.

The defendants were

not personalities, but "empty vessels," the stooges of the
GPU, which staged an enlightened spectacle on the theme,
"

'Trotskyism is the source of all evil.'"

Before the eyes of

the whole world, the accused threw themselves "under the

chariot of the terrible divinity Mahabharata.
the pious Hindus, they did so

"

But, unlike

not out of blind fanaticism,

"not in religious ecstasy, but cold-bloodedly, hopelessly,

under the club which drove them into the impasse." 29 3

These

confessions, produced under instructions, only reflected the

Stalinist principle:

"'The State

— it

is I!

Socialism

— it

From his lofty position Stalin feared assassination,

is I.'"

which he imputed to the opposition:

"Stalin imposed his own

interests and psychology on the accused with the aid of
political terror."
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On other matters, Trotsky was eager to disprove that
he had ever met Vladimir Romm

"courier"

— in

— an

the alleys of the Bois de Boulogne.

easy since he was at the time in
from Paris.

izvestia correspondent and

295

a

It was

sickbed hundreds of miles

Moreover, he quickly perceived the many in-

consistencies in Pyatakov's story that he had flown to Oslo
in December 1935, in order to interview Trotsky;

telegraphed

a

and Trotsky

number of specific questions to be asked

once
Pyatakov in Moscow, all designed to explode the story

and for all.

Trotsky was convinced that the grandiose frame-

airplane and has been
up had crashed with "the non-existent

smashed to bits

,,296

"
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Once more Trotsky contended that the trial was

a

fiasco, that it only exposed the weakness of Stalin's regime.

The "moral fiasco" of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial led to the

Pyatakov-Radek trial:

"In order to cover up the fatal story

of Pyatakov's plane, Stalin now has to have a new trial."
But who would be the new victims?

Perhaps they would come

from the ranks of the bureaucracy:

A new period has opened! Using the bureaucracy,
Stalin crushed the people; now he is terrorizing
the bureaucracy itself.
The bureaucracy fears
its own isolation from the people and therefore
supports Stalin.
Stalin is afraid of his isolation from the bureaucracy and is trying to play
the people along; hence the "democratic" constitution and the demagogic trials.

As was his habit after each trial, Trotsky solemnly stated:
"The political system of the USSR has entered an epoch of

deep and severe crisis.
this.

Only the blind can fail to see

297

Before the verdicts were proclaimed, Trotsky wrote

that perhaps two or three of the accused might be spared, but
to pardon the others would only signify that the trial was
298
He was genuinely surnothing but "a miserable comedy."

prised, however, that Radek and Sokolnikov were among those
saved:

"One cannot avoid seeing here a partial retreat on
..299

the part of Stalin before international public opinion."

Trotsky, to be sure, was not sure who was worse off

executed or those who were spared.

— the

The "saved ones" could

revealing the truth
be a "sort of explosive bomb" in prison,
about the trial.

All the world, charged Trotsky, knew that

!
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Radek could not keep

a secret;

"and each imprudent word from

Radek represents an enormous danger for Stalin." 300

But

Stalin was unwilling to take that chance with Pyatakov, who

could testify about the "mythical" plane flight before some
future commission.

Furthermore, he had to execute the others

in order to strengthen his right to execute Pyatakov.

OA

"I

Despite all the vicious charges made by the accused
against their former "mentor," Trotsky still defended their

"...

innocence:

before all humanity

I

exclaim from the

These men are innocent of all the crimes

depths of my soul

:

which the

forced them to take upon themselves

G. P.U.

.

"

They

were but the victims of the horrible political system
302
—
Cain-Stalm.
organized by „
,

.

.

Counter-trial
In his many statements on the Pyat akov-Radek trial,

Trotsky repeatedly stressed the need for
Returning to

a

a

"counter-trial."

theme first developed during the Zinoviev-

Kamenev proceedings, he demanded that world opinion accord

him his day in court.

At various times he entertained the

idea of an "international commission of inquiry," an appearance before a Mexican extradition court, and even an appeal
to the League of Nations.

Despite the unsettled nature of

determination
such an inquiry, Trotsky was steadfast in his
of public
to clear himself and indict Stalin before the bar

opinion and, eventually, before the bar of history.

i
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He reiterated the need for an "impartial inquiry" at

every chance.

Even before the Py at akov-Radek trial commenced,

Trotsky proudly declared:am ready before any free and impartial
court before any independent commission of inquiry to prove, with the aid of irrefutable
facts letters documents evidence that the
Moscow trials of "Trotskyites represent the
most horrifying falsification, and that the
real criminals are not the accused but the
accusers 303
.

.

I

.

,

,

,

,

,

11

,

.

Such an inquiry was simply a matter of "elementary political
Even if the GPU

hygiene," he argued in another statement.

was unwilling to present charges before an international com-

mission of outstanding personalities,

"I,

for my part, prom-

ise to demonstrate before such a commission that Stalin is

the organizer of the greatest political crimes in world his-

tory."
trial

304

,"

This commission should result "in a great counter-

he told a Mexican audience, one that would rid the

atmosphere of "the germs of deceit, calumny, falsification
on
and frame-ups," and confirm that there was "not a stain

my honor, both personal and political."

30 5

The question of

caprice,
an international commission was not a personal

a

opposifamily affair, or even just a concern for imprisoned

tionists

:

It deeply
No this is an international question.
involves the political consciousness and moral
standards of all countries. In the most diffimeans
cult conditions there is no more vivifying organiThat is why all workers'
than the truth
all
zations, all progressive social groups,
for
honest citizens must support the initiative
investigation
the setting up of an international
commission 306
!

!

l
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If the terms of such an inquiry were vague, not so Trotsky's

impassioned plea that somewhere, somehow, men of good will
would come together to hear the truth.

A variation of this stratagem was to present his
case before an authoritative Mexican court.

If only Moscow

would formally demand his extradition, then Trotsky could
use a legitimate judicial setting to answer the charges.
the world would listen.

All

At one point during the Moscow trial

he commented on a rumor that extradition might be demanded:
"I welcome this idea warmly.

What is more, for my part,

demand that the Russian Government present such
Recalling his frustrating appearance in

a

a "closed"

I

request."

Norwegian

court, he boasted:
am now ready to repeat the action with very
much more detail, with the doors wide open, beI cannot imagine
fore a Mexican court of law.
307
a better solution of the whole matter.
I

Not only was Moscow unwilling to provide Trotsky with

a

platform, but the entire idea was something of a sham.

legal

There

were no formal diplomatic relations between Mexico and the
Soviet Union; as a result, no extradition treaty governed
308
In effect, Trotsky's challenge was
Trotsky's situation.
a

public relations device.

Even more fanciful was an appeal to the League of
Nations.

After Balkan terrorists had assassinated King

Barthou in
Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Minister
international outMarseilles (in October 1934), there was an
a tribunal on
establish
to
League
the
for
demand
a
cry and

195

terrorism (not unlike the international reaction to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics).

Heading

the effort to have lawyers establish judicial foundations for

such a tribunal was Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign

Minister, and the "new boy" in the League.

As part of the

proposed agreement, nation-states would transfer terrorists
to the interested party, not unlike the exchange of Michael

Bakunin between allied monarchs in the nineteenth century.

Could Litvinov'

s

309

enthusiasm for this plan have anyNot only did

thing to do with Russia's most famous outcast?

Trotsky believe he was the "target" of this Soviet initiative,
but that it was part and parcel of the "first amalgam," or

counterfeit conspiracy, around the Kirov affair.
nately, Nikolyaev fired the fatal shot before

a

Unfortulink was

established between Trotsky and the terrorists, and before
the international tribunal had been established.

of the effort.

Little came

"The scandalous speech of a Soviet diplomat

trying hard to unite the world's police forces against
•Trotskyism'

grand
is presently the only thing left from the

Nations.
design of reaching me through the League of

,,310

turn the
However, Trotsky perceived an opportunity to
On
own game.
tables on Stalin and embarrass him at his
in Sundby, Trotsky
October 22, 1936, while still interned
a letter to the apdirected his Norwegian lawyer to address
doubted that Stalin
propriate League officials. Trotsky
the proposed tribunal, but as
before
case
a
press
ever
would
the case to its attention;
bring
could
he
/Tic7
. "claimanet"

196
and, if the Soviet government did not respond, then "the

accusation with all its international consequences must be

recognized as anihilated /sic/.

"

The only reply Trotsky re-

ceived was acknowledgment of its receipt, No.
15058.

3

A/15105/

Trotsky, persevering, made the same threat in

January 1937.

If the tribunal were ever established, "I

will undertake all the necessary legal steps in order that
all the accusations against me can be judged in their en-

tirety." 311

Twice disdained, Trotsky returned to this

frivolous enterprise fourteen months later, in

a

letter ad-

dressed "To the Juridical Section Secretariat of the League
of National /sic/.

"

He still claimed the right to refute

charges of terrorism by ill-intentioned governments.

He was

League tri-

ready at any time, he stated, to appear before

a

bunal and "convert my accusers into accused."

Citing a long

list of murdered associates, Trotsky contended that there

was ample basis for the interference of an international tri-

bunal against "a centralized Mafia of terrorists" led by

Joseph Stalin.

Since Litvinov had declared that governments

must extradite terrorists, the Foreign Minister, "we can
hope, will not refuse to employ his influence to place the

above-mentioned Joseph Stalin, as head of the international
terrorist band, at the disposal of the tribunal under the

League of Nations."

312
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IX.

"Be It Even Over Our Bleaching Bones,

The Truth Will Triumph!"
If an appearance before a Mexican court was impracti-

cable, an appeal to the League of Nations implausible, and

even a law suit of dubious worth, then Trotsky's options
were severely circumscribed.
choices:

In effect, he had only three

to be silent, to wage a polemical campaign, to

stage a "show" trial.

But each possibility was not without

its inherent defects.

Trotsky, as already observed, rejected out of hand
the path of silence.

Not only would inaction tend to rein-

force the appearance of personal guilt, it would betray the
The "unsoiled banner of

ideals of the October Revolution.

socialism," he argued, must be handed to future generations,

cleansed of monstrous falsifications.

urged

affirmed

to his listeners,

313

As he repeatedly

"'Fealty to the October

revolution demands merciless exposure, and, if need be,
cauterize its sores.'"
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He had nothing but scorn for those

"'radical bigots,*" who avoided any criticism of the Soviet
Union, and who tended to believe the danger lay "'in the

medical diagnosis,"' and not "'in the disease which gnaws

cunningly at the organism!'"

315

Only those revolutionary

of
hypocrites masquerading under the cheap title, "'friends
to aid fascism:
the USSR,'" could keep silent in order not

afraid to name
"This is like superstitious people who are
in word magic.
their illness aloud because they believe
protect the revolution
These so-called radicals sought to

,

s
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like "a fragile hot-house plant," but only revealed their

lack of historical understanding and their undersupply of

political courage.

For, Trotsky declared, the "road to

human emancipation is the road of truth and

f orthrightness

not puerility and falsehood." 317

One such hypocritical "friend," in Trotsky's opinion,

was Andre Malraux.

The famed French writer had been one of

his many visitors at St. Palais in the summer of 1933.

If he

so desired, Malraux could have corroborated Trotsky's state-

ment that it would have been next to impossible for him to
have met Romm in Paris at the time.

Despite Trotsky's ap-

peal, however, Malraux chose to remain silent.
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Then in

February 1937, this experienced observer of revolutions made
a

trip to New York to rally support for the Loyalist cause

in the Spanish Civil War.

At

banquet in his honor,

a

tendered by the editorial staff of The Nation

quoted as saying, "'Trotsky is

a

,

Malraux was

great moral force in the

world, but Stalin has lent dignity to mankind;

and just as

the Inquisition did not detract from the fundamental dignity
of Christianity, so the Moscow trials do not detract from the

—

—

fundamental dignity /of communism/.'"

319

This sophistry was too much for Trotsky.

had once

written

The Conquerors

,

a

a

Although he

generally favorable review of Malraux'

novel dealing with the Chinese revolution,

edition
and had urged Simon and Shuster to issue an American
of Man's Fate

,

calling it

a

'"true work of art,'" Trotsky

declared that,
turned on his former friend, and publicly

199

"In 1926 Malraux was in China in the service of the Comintern-

Kuomintang

and is one of those who carry the responsibility

,

for the strangulation of the Chinese revolution."

Unlike

Andre Gide, Malraux "is organically incapable of moral in-

dependence," and "is officious by birth."

This New York trip,

Trotsky asserted, was all part of the Stalinist campaign to
prevent

review of the Moscow trials.

a

Malraux left Spain,

charged Trotsky, for the purpose of conducting in the United
States "a campaign in defense of the judicial work of Stalin-

Vyshmsky

"

321

.

In response to this intemperate attack, Malraux re-

minded Trotsky that he had protested both the Russian's expulsion from France and Georgi Dimitrov's trial for the
Reichstag Fire incident:

"Apparently to Mr. Trotsky moral

independence consists not only in defending Mr. Trotsky but
also in not defending Dimitrov."

More tellingly, the

Frenchman observed, Trotsky was "so obsessed with whatever
concerns his personal fate" that he could not accept first
priority for the Spanish cause.

He deplored "the incredible

levity with which Mr. Trotsky is ready to hurl any accusation
in order to dramatize his personal conflicts."
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This minor contretemps reflected little glory on

either man.

To some degree Malraux was correct in implying

the Moscow trials
that Trotsky's obsession with the charges in
his mental equiwas clouding his perspective, and upsetting

librium.

conflict.
But this was hardly just a "personal"

that was attempting "to
Trotsky placed Malraux in the group

"

200

turn public opinion

,

with the aid of pathct

i

c

invoc ations

,

from the enormous frame-ups and ass ass in at ons to other
i

tasks

.

"

Either Moscow's accusations were true, which would

mean that almost the entire old generation of Bolsheviks had

taken the road to Fascism, or they were false, indicating
that the bureaucratic apparatus was completely rotten.

"Tn

both cases, thus, the Soviet state finds itself gravely sick."
But before prescribing

illness,

plained.

a

a

cure for this political, not personal,

diagnosis must be made:

"The truth must be ex-

323

If a policy of silence was unimaginable, then Trotsky

had the option of continuing his vigorous campaign to impeach
In refusing to join any kind

Stalin in the world press.
a
I

counter-trial, George Bernard Shaw advocated just such

o!

a

ine:

hope Trotsky will not allow himself to be
brought before any narrower tribunal than his
reading public, whore his accusers are at his
His present position gives him every
mercy.
advantage; and If he is personally com <>i .ii<
in Mexico (quite a pleasant place) I shall certainly do nothing to change it. His pen is a
terrific weapon." 324
"I

•

i

i

But Trotsky was surely at

a

i

<

disadvantage in relying only on

his pen in tho confrontation with the Kremlin.

Not all of his

statements were well received by the world press.

Moreover,

Union had many
the "friends" and "attorneys" of the Soviet
Tn addiTrotsky.
more platforms for their polemics than did
theatrical drama and intion, he was hard-put to match the

herent fascination of the Moscow trials.

And the charges and

201

counter-charges were so complex, not even

a

could do justice to their tangled skein.

Above all, written

statements gave little sense of the man

massive volume

— proud,

indignant,

horrified by the monstrosity of the calumnies, but serenely
confident in the Tightness of his cause.
In a very real sense, Trotsky had no alternative.

Only

a

"counter-trial" could hope to counter the original

dramas in fascination and effectiveness.

Besides, the public

Trotsky relished highly theatrical stagings.

In 1906, when

the Tsarist government put him on trial, the youthful

Trotsky utilized incisive logic and scathing wit to place
s

the regime on the defensive.
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After the October

Revolution he entertained the idea of doing Tsar Nicholas II
a

similar favor, proposing before the Politburo

(a few weeks

before the Romanov execution) that they hold "an open court
trial" for the Tsar, in order to expose the government's

policies and reign:

"The proceedings of the trial would be

broadcast throughout the country by radio

.

.

.

,

accounts

of the proceedings would be read and commented upon every

day."
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Nothing came of this proposal, but

a

"show trial"

was staged in 1922, featuring the Central Committee of the

Social-Revolutionary Party, with Trotsky's vocal approval.
would
If Trotsky could confront Vyshinsky in open court, he

savagely dismember the government's case point by point, dis-

crediting its authors before the bar of public opinion.
a fantasy may have

appealed to this veteran of

a

Such

thousand

illusions that Stalin
verbal clashes, but he could have had no

202

would permit it.

No

He had to stage his own "show trial,"

1

this time with Stalin the chief defendant in absentia

.

As Isaac Deutscher has written, Trotsky wanted

a

counter-trial set on "a scale appropriate to the provocation,"
and conducted in such a way as "to shake the conscience of
the international labour movement."

*3

97

But only a tribunal

that was authoritative, impartial, and somehow "legitimate"

could achieve this lofty aim.

A court composed of leading

figures in the international workers' movement might meet
these requirements.

cooperate.

But his socialist "colleagues" would not

Under pressure from Leon Blum, the "conscience-

stricken" leaders of the Second International, as well as the

so-called Amsterdam International of the Trade Unions, de-

clined to participate in any endeavor that might embarrass
Moscow.
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Next came appeals to leading intellectuals of the

left, for whom Trotsky had always expressed a certain con-

tempt, since they tended to issue grandiloquent statements
of moral indignation instead of uniting in effective mass

organizations.

But such international figures as Berthold

Brecht, Andre Gide

Feuchtwanger

,

,

H.

G.

Wells, Romain Rolland, Lion

Henri Barbusse, and Louis Aragon either en-

dorsed the Moscow charges, or refused to participate in
counter-trial.

329

a

Trotsky's followers, however, did manage

to form British, French,

and Czech defense committees, among

others, but they lacked the necessary authority to "shake"
the world's conscience.

Only the American Committee for the

energy,
Defense of Leon Trotsky showed the requisite

.

203

initiative, and gravity to form an effective commission of
330

inquiry

Despite the uncertainty about the formation of
mission, Trotsky proceeded to build his alibi,

a

com-

"foolproof

a

and indestructible alibi," one that would endure for all ages,
as Isaac Deutscher has noted.
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s

His villa in Coyoacan began

to resemble a "sweat shop" in early 1937, as Trotsky, his

wife, and loyal secretaries translated documents, copied af-

fidavits, typed endless statements.

In the manner of a

pedantic scholar, Trotsky left nothing to chance, and re-

traced his activities through the years of exile.

Affidavits

and depositions were solicited from a myriad of friends and
foes, including inn-keepers and police agents.

most

surfeit of documentation.

a

No matter!

There was al-

Trotsky drove

himself unmercifully, as he did Lyova, his son, expressing
anger when dates were not checked, signatures not validated,

place names not indicated.
slovenliness'

son's

"

At one point he wrote that his

bordered on "'treachery.'"

Even more

cruelly, he reproached over-worked Lyova for sending apologies,
not affidavits, in one letter:

"'It is difficult to say which

Moscow or those from
are the worst blows, those that come from
Paris.

'

"
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her
The "Moscow Themis" had not only blindfolded

eyes, but also "put cotton in her ears."

Nonetheless,

set the right course:
Trotsky remained confident that he had

providing a
The immediate task consisted in
thought of the
factual point of support for the
provoke criticism,
most penetrating minds, and to

.
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or at least doubts, among the next layer.
Having conquered the minds of the select,
truth would unfold further and further. In
the long run, the spiral of truth would prove
333
stronger than the spiral of frame-up.
.

Firmly on the side of "truth
about his cause.

before

a

"
,

.

.

Trotsky expressed no doubts

Even when L. Kaganovich called for his head

crowd in Moscow, he denied that

successful assas-

a

sination attempt would alter the situation

.

"Be

our bleaching bones, the truth will triumph!"
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it even over

It was to

the Dewey Commission that he assigned this historic task, the

pursuit of truth

CHAPTER

III

"THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE

DEFENSE OF LEON TROTSKY"
The year was 1936.

The place was New York City.

Yet

another group of civil libertarians had created yet another
"defense" committee.
its aims

— to

But the endeavor was unprecedented in

assure the physical safety and political honor

of a Bolshevik revolutionary.

"The American Committee for

the Defense of Leon Trotsky" had more than its share of de-

tractors, for it was bucking a historical tide of great
force.

The conjunction of the depression with the rise of

Hitler's Germany prompted many Americans

— especially

intel-

lectuals

— to

faith.

The Soviet Union appeared to be just such a power.

look abroad for an ally strong in both arms and

Thus, the "defense" of Stalin's arch nemesis

— Trotsky — was

hardly the most popular of causes in the mid-1930s.

The

stage was set for a battle, an exceptionally bitter battle.

'***************
The Great Depression

vast numbers of Americans.

— an

unmitigated disaster for

The "smashup" of 1929 was almost

the Day of
"like a rending of the earth in preparation for

Judgment," wrote Edmund Wilson.

There was no lack of evi-

United States.
dence that the furies had descended on the
205

"
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In the cities long lines of once-proud men stood many
hours
to obtain a bowl of mush from one of the innumerable soup

kitchens.
gone wild.

On the streets were apple peddlers and young boys

Empty lots were dotted with "Hoover-villes

,

drafty shacks made from tarpaper, old packing cases, and

wrecked car bodies.
pitchforks in

a

In the country irate farmers wielded

futile effort to stop foreclosures.

the Anacosta Flats in Washington, D.C.

,

And on

an army of unemployed

veterans set up their tents, waiting for much-needed bonuses,
until the night of July 28, 1932, when Douglas MacArthur,

Dwight

D.

Eisenhower, and George

S.

Patton, Jr. led a de-

tachment of cavalry, infantry, and tanks against the dis-

organized "red rabble," gassing their children, burning
their

shacks.''"

Much of America shuddered, fearing

a

Revolution, or perhaps the Apocalypse.
But the gathering darkness also had some compen-

sating virtues.

A segment of the American "intelligentsia"

took some comfort from the disaster.

As Edmund Wilson ob-

served, times were terrible,
Yet, to the writers and artists cf my generation who had grown up in the Big Business era
and had always resented its barbarism, its
crowding-out of everything they cared about,
these years were not depressing but stimulating.
One couldn't help being exhilarated at the sudden unexpected collapse of that stupid gigantic
It gave us a new sense of freedom.
fraud.
.

.

2

.

To Wilson and his brethren the multiple shocks of the early
1930s also brought a measure of hope, the promise that
and better world would be created on the ashes of the

burned-out business civilization.

a

new
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The self-appointed legislators and creators
of this

Elysium were the former outcasts of Babylon— the
intellectuals.

No longer paralyzed by a sense of alienation,
eager

to grasp the reins of power, they prepared to refashion

America along new lines.
was needed.

But first an internal revolution

The traditional dichotomies of "art and life,"

"intellectual and Philistine," "contemplation and action,"
"literature and propaganda"

— these

must be smashed.

Only by

a deep commitment to the untutored and dispossessed, wrote

Malcolm Cowley, could an end be put to '"the desperate
feeling of solitude and uniqueness that has been oppressing
artists for the last two centuries.'" 3
a need for an external revolution,

new social vision.

But there was also

one which called for a

Almost by default the quest for a new

faith turned eastward, toward the "Red Phoenix."
A belief in Moscow as the New Jerusalem was hardly
new.

Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the future

appeared to lie with the "'greasy muzhiks'" and their
4
leaders in the Soviet Union.

There was a veritable deifi-

cation of the Bolsheviki in the early years of the Soviet
experiment.

For instance, a poet on the Liberator wrote an

ode to Lenin on his birthday in 1920:
"Your teachers enlighten the people without any
rest or stint,
And they give them one good rifle with every
good book they print;
And the workers now own everything, even their
right to be born,
And the peasants have taken in the full flax
and the wheat and the corn,

!

,
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And in Moscow it is high noon, and in Europe
it is the morn,
And the Soviets are everywhere!" 5

In the same vein Rose Pastor Stokes, who had worked in a

cigar factory before making an opportune match with

a

wealthy industrialist, saluted her fellow comrades:
Russian Proletariat, my Comrades!
I long to share your meager bowl of Kasha,
For the sweet touch to my lips of a wooden
spoon
Whittled with Liberty's new pocket knife.
"0,

"O, Mass

0,

!

laughing, starving, challenging

Mass
What would I not give to laugh and starve
with you,
And with you to fling my challenge in the
face of the fore-doomed enemy;
To hear your Red Standard laughing in the
wind!

.

.

.

Flaming kisses would I kiss you, 0 wind that
bore its laughter
Though your breath should be as icy as the
frozen Steppe. "°
During the 1920s any number of the curious
artists

,

educators

— made

the pilgrimage to the Promised Land

to share the "meager bowl of Kasha."

disquieting news.
Soviet corpus:

— writers,

7

But many returned with

Certain carbuncles had appeared on the

Kronstadt, Chekist outrages, political

factionalism, intellectual repression, economic disparities.
But these blemishes were largely forgotten in the early
1930s.

Even the politically non-committed were impressed

by the drift and despair at home, in comparison with the
high hope and bustling activity exhibited by the Soviets
abroad.

In the opinion of Arthur Koestler,

209

"The contrast between the downward trend of
capitalism and the simultaneous steep rise of
the planned Soviet economy was so striking
and obvious that it led to the equally obvious
conclusion:
They are the future we, the past." 8

—

In order to participate in "the future," a broad spectrum of

American liberals turned towards economic planning as the
panacea for domestic infirmities. 9

Admiration for the

Soviet Five-Year plan was almost epidemic.
Warren, III, has written,

As Frank A.

"It was the confrontation of the

Five-Year Plan with the depression that served as the catalyst," and greatly increased Russian prestige among liberal

Stuart Chase, for one, was eager to fashion an

circles.

"'Why should Russians have all the fun in

American plan:
remaking

a

world?'"

And Edmund Wilson urged his readers

to '"take Communism away from the Communists.'"

12

The rise of Hitlerite Germany also deepened the

emotional investment in the Soviet Union.

As a new dark age

appeared to descend on Europe, with reports of atrocities,
pogroms, and concentration camps, the search began for

strong force to counter the fascist threat.

a

This quest be-

came frenetic with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in

July 1936.

The lines appeared drawn between two systems of

life— democracy

and fascism.

trial for men of good will.
an act of generosity;

Norman Thomas.
tance.

13

Spain became the decisive
"'To aid Loyalist Spain is not

it is a debt of honor,'" intoned

Diverse factions sprang to Spain's assis-

left colAid came from Harvard undergraduates, who

Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
lege to become cannon fodder in the
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Aid came from Gypsy Rose Lee, who told

a

Hollywood rally,

"•I have not come to lift my skirts, but to
lift the embargo
on Spain!"- 14 But most of all aid, in the form of arms
and

men, came from the Soviet Union.

Profoundly grateful for

this assistance, many Americans shut their ears to reports
of minor Soviet peccadilloes in Spain, such as the liquida-

tion of anarchists and labor leaders.

This was a time of

uncritical loyalty to the sacred cause, in accordance with
Mike Gold's dictum, "'Every anti-fascist is needed in this

united front.

There must be no base factional quarrels.'" 15

This united front of anti-fascists in America was

immeasurably aided by a significant shift in Soviet foreign
policy.

At the Vllth Congress of the Comintern (July-August,

1935) Chairman Dimitrov officially announced that the "third

period" of revolutionary militancy had been abandoned in

favor of a broad alliance of progressives who abhorred
Fascism.

Henceforth "popular fronts" were to be organized

among disparate elements--liberals

radicals, socialists,

,

communists, but not Trotskyites, of course.

Earl Browder

hurried home from Moscow to oversee the shift in tactics.

Under the slogan, "Communism is the Americanism of the
Twentieth Century," the Party took

a

leading role in pro-

moting a whole host of "Fronts," or "Innocents' Clubs."
Among the myriad organizations either controlled or influenced by the Party were International Labor Defense,

Jewish People's Committee, Jimmy Collins Flying Club, League
Daughters
against War and Fascism, League of Women Shoppers,

8
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of the American Depression, Foster Parents Plan for
Spanish

Children, ad infinitum 16
.

monopolized.

Honest anti-fascist sentiment was

In the words of Eugene Lyons,

"Niagaras of in-

dignation against the bestialities of the Nazi regime, all
the geysers of fear and hatred and panic started by the ag-

gressions and duplicities of the Hitler Axis, were channeled
off into communist-controlled reservoirs."
Front, or "Trojan Horse"

1

7

The Popular

strategy was well-launched.

In historical shorthand, this period in America be-

came known as the "Red Decade," after Eugene Lyons' polemical outburst of the same name.

Himself a lapsed believer

and self-proclaimed "red-baiter," Lyons surveyed the

"intellectual slumming" of the "totalitarian liberals," and

asserted that the united front mentality "tinctured every

department of American life while it lasted and has left its
color indelibly on the mind and moral attitudes of the
Without

country."

a

doubt Lyons was also guilty of coloring

the truth, for on every major issue of the day

— economic

planning, collective security, Spanish Civil War, Popular
Front

— the

American Left was rent by serious conflicts and

fierce disagreements.

1

But the siren song of the Party's troubadours was

highly seductive, especially since the "rudimentary ideology"
of the Popular Front demanded a minimum of critical thought

or courageous action.

After the new line of 1935 it was

"•the sweetest bandwagon in all history,'" wrote Joseph

Freeman,

a

cultural commissar for the Party:
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"For now you could be for every kind of social
reform here, for the Soviet Union, for the
Communist Party, for Proletarian literature-for everything and anything that was at one
time radical, rebellious, subversive, revolutionary and downright quixotic and in doing
so you were on the side of all the political
angels of the day; you were on the side of the
Roosevelt administration, on the side of Labor,
the Negroes, the middle class; on the side of
Hitler's victims, on the side of all the oppressed colonial peoples in the world. In
short, this is the only period in all the
world's history when you could be at one and
the same time an ardent revolutionary and an
arch-conservative backed by the governments of
the United States and the Soviet Union. "19

—

This slumming was particularly sweet during Hollywood's
"Celluloid Uprising."

With characteristic hyperbole Lyons

wrote that, "Marx and martinis, bridge and dialectics, social

consciousness and social climbing were all mixed up on the
banks of luxurious private swimming pools."

20

It was a little too easy, however, to be engage at

the time.

The simple catchwords of the movement

"unity," "anti-Fascism"

— tended

of considerable perplexity.

— "democracy,"

to obscure a moral dilemma

One could agree with Max Lerner

that the problem of sheer survival demanded a "'peace pact'"

among radicals, liberals, and labor stalwarts.

And one

could echo the bleat of The Nation that "'the revolutionary
lions and liberal lambs'" should cautiously join against the

common enemy of Fascism, based on the logic of selfpreservation.

21

But this argument implied that the Soviet

Union was a staunch member of the "democratic" camp of peaceloving nations.

Certain awkward facts of Soviet life, how-

ever, were difficult to ignore.

The artificial famine of

I
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1932-33, the herding of millions into "corrective" labor
camps, the murderous aftermath of the Kirov affair

all of

this stuck in the gorge of liberals with an uneasy con-

science

.

Yet others managed to swallow their doubts.
allowances were made for Soviet defects.

Certain

By accepting a

Manichean division of the world into the "democracies"
(including the USSR)

,

and the fascist powers, it was neces-

sary to use a "double standard" when justifying Soviet

aberrations.

What was "understandable" in Russia, e.g., the

suppression of civil liberties due to historical causes, was
completely anathema in the United States. 22

In the laudable

effort to thwart the fascist threat it was considered the

height of bad manners

— and

bad politics

— to

criticize the

This was moral relativism

leader of the anti-fascist camp.

with a vengeance.
"The strategy of the lesser evil is the mind's

education in opportunism," once observed Philip Rahv.

23

This opportunism was severely tested when John Dewey demanded
an impartial inquiry into Soviet accusations against Leon

Here the "strategy of the lesser evil" ran head-

Trotsky.

long into the traditional credo of American liberals.
I.

Echoes of the Purge Reach American Shores

In 1937 James T. Farrell

convince

a

,

the novelist, attempted to

mid-western journalist that the Moscow trials had

immense historical significance for America.

In response,

his fellow writer asked, "'What do the Moscow Trials
mean in
Kokomo, Indiana?'" 24

Perhaps Kokomo, Indiana, was not convulsed by the

specter of Old Bolsheviks humiliating themselves in public
court, but this was not true in New York and other market-

places of intellectual America.

The trials rent in twain

the entire American left and split it into "fiercely opposed

camps," wrote one close observer of the convulsion. 25

At a

time when "unity" was the hallowed goal of the anti-fascist
forces, the Moscow spectaculars undermined the basis of the

Popular Front.

In addition, American "progressives" were

forced to honor or ignore such traditional liberal principles as political asylum and the right of any accused to
his day in court.

Above all, an agonizing dilemma had to be

faced, one that bedeviled many intellectuals.

As Waldo

Frank, the writer and sometime fellow-traveler, told Trotsky,
"'It is difficult for me to believe that you entered into an

alliance with fascism; but it is egually difficult for me to

believe that Stalin carried out such horrible frame-ups
In the apt phrase of Philip Rahv

mind and of the human spirit."

,

.
I

..26
II

these were "trials of the

27

The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial occurred during the

initial uproar over the insurrection in Spain.

The American

Communists had labored mightily to exploit this indignation
and draw

a

distinct line between the peaceful aims of the

Soviet Union and the militaristic goals of Hitlerite Germany
bath,
But the first "show trial," and subsequent blood

"

tended to obscure this moral demarcation line.

American

liberals had expressed great anger at the summary
executions
atrocities, concentration camps, and public trials
that had

become

way of life in The Third Reich.

a

But now these

sorry episodes were also occurring in The Promised
Land.
The growing similarity of the communist and fascist
regimes
was expressed in a familiar epithet,

resented by the Party faithful.

"Red Fascism," deeply

But if a moral distinction

was impossible to maintain, then the Soviet Union was an un-

likely candidate to lead the "'democratic' anti-Fascist
28

front.

The solidarity of the American left was shaken by
the trials, in fact, but hardly shattered.

Legions of

sympathizers flocked to the Soviet-led Popular Front even

during the years of turmoil, 1936-38, but at

a cost.

As

Edmund Wilson commented, "One of the worst drawbacks of

being

a

Stalinist at the present time is that you have to

29
defend so many falsehoods."

Trotsky and Amorir.i

Trotsky's reputation in America exacerbated the
moral and political dilemma posed by the trials.

During his

brief sojourn in New York City (January-March, 1917) he had
become acquainted with many radicals, but his enthusiasm for
the American movement was restrained.

"'A Babbitt of

Babbitts is /Morris/ Hillquit, the ideal Socialist leader fo
successful dentists,'" was his sally at the expense of one

i

216

prominent figure of the American left. 30

This disdain was

reciprocated over the years when the practical and "businesslike" Stalin triumphed with ease over his "fanatical foe."

As the modern Ishmaelite was forced to scurry from one tem-

porary haven to another during the 1930s, there was

a

smug satisfaction, not only among the Party faithful.

certain
And

there was concern that he would torpedo the fragile anti-

fascist alliance with his revolutionary calls to action.
The New Republic

,

for instance, solemnly warned that Trotsky,

"as is well known, has always demanded communist revolutions

in all parts of the world at the earliest possible moment." 31

Frederick L. Schuman forcefully presented the anti-

Trotsky view in an influential article entitled, "Leon
Trotsky:

Martyr or Renegade?"

In this "objective" analysis

Trotsky was portrayed as a failed fanatic.

According to

Schuman, the trials brought the Russian exile new fame, "for
he again plays the role he loves best

— that

of a lean and

grizzled revolutionary figure around whom, even in exile,
the tempests of controversay rage with cyclonic fury."

32

The conflict between Trotsky and Stalin offered a political

choice, if not a moral one:

Whatever it was yesterday or may be tomorrow,
Trotskyism today is a program of uncompromising
class war, of repudiation of liberal 'bourgeois'
democracy, of universal revolution, of the conversion of the Soviet state into a center of
Stalinism toworld-wide revolt and conflict.
day stands for appeasement, for collaboration
with liberalism, for order and peace in a
world society threatened with destruction by
war between classes and war between nations.

However, to side with Trotsky was to side with "the
most im-

pressive political failure of the age," the "renegade
who
failed."

Assuring his readers that political blunders were

worse than crimes, Schuman contended that Trotsky had been

mistaken in almost every political position he had maintained, a case of "too early or too late.

political blunderer."

Always he is

a

The death of his followers in the

Soviet Union "will haunt" him, for he risks nothing save

their fate:

"Neither the cheers of sympathetic multitudes

nor his own words of spiteful protest will silence the

inner voice which tells him that he had erred and failed
and betrayed himself.

In a red haze of anger he passes into

history, always self-defeated by his own follies."

Schuman

concluded that in times of peace Stalin's Russia was the
ally of democracies and bulwark of world order:

"Because

of this the democratic West must, for its own security, dry

its tears for fallen heroes and accept Moscow's hand."

33

But not all American progressives viewed Trotsky as
the "renegade who failed," a mortal threat to world peace.

At one time he had excited the admiration of John Reed,

Raymond Robins, and Max Eastman.
Portrait of a Youth (1925)

Bolshevik leader:

,

:

The

Eastman had extolled the

"'Trotsky's voice is so powerful that

you rest when he talks.

And his thought is so powerful that

you rest when he is thinking.

leader of men.

In Leon Trotsky

He is a born and inevitable

There is mature restraint and wisdom in his

speech, and yet there is young and overflowing boldness.'"

.
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And Mike Gold,

a

master of invective in the service of the

Party, had written in 1926 that Trotsky was the
symbol of

the artist-leader, one who could speak six languages
and

discourse on Freud and Einstein, "•almost as universal as

Leonardo da Vinci.'"

Even in 1930 Gold conceded that

Trotsky was "'an immortal part'" of the Revolution, and
surely was "'one of the permanent legends of humanity, like

Savonarola or Danton.

'

11

In the mid-1930s such leading American intellectuals
as Louis Hacker, John Dos Passos, Lionel Trilling, Sidney

Hook, and John Chamberlain, among others, were attracted to

his brilliance, cosmopolitan attitude toward culture, and

obliteration of the romantic dichotomy between thinker and
activist.

36

Here was the scintillating intellect who could

also lead victorious armies

hopes

,

a

.

He was the symbol of their

living reproach to those paralyzed by the nagging

problem of alienation and the divorce of mental and physical
labors

There was

a

sharp disagreement, therefore, in ap-

praising Trotsky's talents.

In a review of the transcript

of the second trial, Malcolm Cowley confessed that he had no

love for Trotsky:

My opposition is partly a question of temperaI have never liked the big-city intelment:
lectuals of his type, with their reduction of
every human question to a bald syllogism in
which they are always right at every point,
miraculously right, and their opponents always
37
stupid and beneath contempt.
.

.

.

For the opposition camp, Dwight MacDonald noted
Cowley's

personal prejudice against Trotsky, and admitted his
own

deep-seated prejudice in Trotsky's favor:
necessary to give my reasons.

"It's hardly

They are about the same as

Mr. Cowley's." 38

Thus, Trotsky himself was an issue in the intellec-

tual vineyards of America, one intertwined with the greater

problem of how to approach the Moscow trials.

As Carleton

Beals, no admirer, shrewdly observed, it was possible that

"Trotsky shakes the New York intelligentsia far more than he
does the Soviet Union."

30

American Reaction to the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial
This discomfort over the fate of the Popular Front
and Trotsky's "fanaticism" influenced the first reactions to
the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial.

For the "true believers," how-

ever, there was no problem in issuing definitive judgments;
it was merely a matter of correctly echoing the approved

line.

The fellow-travelling New Masses

,

for instance, ap-

proved the verdict in an editorial entitled, "The Trotsky
Cesspool."

Only "a complete idiot or an out-and-out counter

revolutionary" could believe that the accused chanced
firing squad merely to malign Trotsky unfairly.

a

Besides,

the crimes were a logical result of Trotsky's counter-

revolutionary activities; his "bitter and malicious struggle
against communism and against the Soviet Union has had its

logical outcome."

40
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On the other side of the political divide,
the

Trotskyite organ, Socialist Appeal

,

approvingly quoted its

leader on the trial being the "'most colossal fabrication
in
the history of world politics,'" and echoed his contention

that the Soviet Union was beset by an internal political
crisis.

To these Trotskyite editors there was no veil of

mystery obscuring the proceedings:

"All correspondents

agree that the trial had only one purpose:

to discredit

Trotsky and the revolutionary ideas for which he stands.
Not only to discredit Trotsky but actually to incite fanatical Stalinists to make an attempt on his life." 41

But it was not on the extremes of the political

spectrum that the real controversy raged.

The partisans on

both sides fought for the allegiance of the progressive
middle

— "the

swamp"

— which

often took its lead from the

liberal journals, The Nation and The New Republic

.

But

editorials in these magazines revealed considerable anguish
and immense confusion over the issues.

While the trial was

still in progress, The Nation took a stab at deciphering the
enigma.

On the one hand, it was "unthinkable" that the

Soviet government would stage an open trial unless it had

proof of guilt; on the other hand, it was "equally unthinkable" that Trotsky would have conspired with fascist agents

to overthrow the regime.

The editors of The Nation were

willing to hazard a guess that some foreign plots had
occurred, and that some "Trotskyites " had indulged in terror:

"Beyond that one transcends the limits of even reasonable

"

conjecture."

As a partial explanation for the trial,
the

editorial went on to state that the atmosphere in
the Soviet
Union was filled with both counter-revolutionary
fears and

democratic hopes.

Their "conspiratorial blues" would prob-

ably continue, since the Soviet leaders lived in

a

"wilder-

ness psychology," beset by fears of foreign and domestic
wolves.

No matter, The Nation wanted to believe, with

Louis Fischer, that the new constitution inaugurated
of law:

a

reign

"The best test of this claim will lie in the fair-

ness with which the present trial is conducted." 42

With the precipitate executions of the accused, this
hope appeared to have been dashed.

A week later The Nation

protested that death by shooting "does not smell any the
sweeter" for being described by Ulrikh as "'the highest form
of social def ense--shooting.

1

"

But the editors qualified

this censure by reminding its readers that the trial was
part of the "world's iron age, and must be approached in an
iron mood."

And it was peculiarly Russian, the confessions

in their "hysteria and their masochism" reminiscent of the

Brothers Karamazov

,

the yielding to discipline a product of

the revolutionary era.

In any event, Russia must gird her-

self for "the most crucial struggle" in her life, in which
she "must be unified, with every opposition stamped out and

every national energy whipped up.

43

If The Nation was rather aimless in its analysis,
The New Republic had many fewer doubts about the trial's

essential integrity.

After briefly reviewing several

—
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negative views of the trial, it stated:

"We see no reason

to accept any of these labored hypotheses, or to take
the
trial at other than its face value."

After all, the various

confessions dovetailed nicely and the defendants, "who spoke

volubly and extemporaneously for several days, gave no evidence of having been coached, parroting confessions painfully memoraized in advance, or of being under any sort of

duress."

Surely the followers of Trotsky remembered their

days in power:

"The hatred American tories feel for

Roosevelt is probably no more violent than the similar

feeling the Russian Trotskyites had for Stalin."

Although

the evidence pointed to the "genuineness" of the plot, The

New Republic admitted that it did not seem "conclusive" in
regard to Trotsky's personal participation.

Taking issue

with the theory that the Soviet Union had serious internal
problems, the editors assured its readers that the opposi-

tion movement lacked vitality.

But the dissidents seemed

unable to change their views or nature:

"Over and over

again history teaches us that most men are incapable of

abandoning the fixed set of ideas with which they equip
themselves during their early, more impressionable period.
They will die before they will alter, as these sixteen men
and how many others!

— have

died."

44

If it is indeed true that "most men" are incapable

of abandoning a "fixed set of ideas," then the editors of
the liberal journals, especially those of The New Republic

must be included in this general category.

,

The shock of the

.

Zinoviev-Kamenev trial produced much hand-wringing,
but
little desire to examine closely the charges
or search for
an underlying explanation.
Above all, they avoided

a fresh

look at the validity of including the Soviet
Union in the

anti-Fascist front.

As we shall see, the reaction of The

Nation and Ihe New Republic to the purge trials evolved
over
the coming years, but these "oracles of 'democratic

1

half-

truth/' to quote Trotsky, never went beyond the "golden

mean," dividing the guilt equally. 45

And they undermined

the efforts of John Dewey and others, searchers for "the

whole truth," a difficult quest at best.

Trotsky Finds Defenders

II.

An improbable source took the lead in providing

Trotsky with
States.

a

forum

— The

Socialist Party of The United

On August 28, 1936, the Socialist Party's Executive

Secretary, Clarence Senior, sent

a

cable to the fraternal

Norwegian Labor Party:
"Today, with world reaction organizing armed
attacks upon workers and engaged in such attacks
upon Spanish labor, we deplore disunifying action
of Soviet Government in conduct of recent tri al
and in rejecting request of Labor and Socialist
International and International Federation of
Trade Unions for representation at trial
"Because of Leon Trotsky's long and worthy
services to labor, impossible to believe that he
We supis implicated with Fascist terrorists.
port demand for hearing by an international
labor commission and call upon labor to defend
his right of asylum. "46

This cable echoed the initial reaction of Norman Thomas to
the Moscow proceedings.

Writing in the Socialist Call

,
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Thomas clung to the hope that the cause of "liberty
and
humanity, the whole hope of a working class solidarity,
shall not be set back by fanatical persecution of the

Trotskyites."

In any event,

"Trotsky is right in asking a

special commission to take his own testimony." 47

With the

conclusion of the "amazing, fantastic, incredible affair,"
he charged that the defendants had proven themselves "com-

plete cowards and weaklings," even if they were innocent,
still an open question in Thomas' mind.

Like The Nation

,

he

wanted to "suspend judgment" on the matter of Trotsky's
guilt, but once again called for an inquiry:

"The best

thing that could happen would be if an international working
class inquiry into Trotsky's acts could be arranged." 48
This was a ticklish time to call for an inquiry.

Like most socialists the world over, the American variety
owed a certain loyalty to the Soviet Union, especially in
its struggles with fascist machinations, even though their

loyalty was more "critical" than most.

In addition, Thomas

was the Party's standard-bearer in the upcoming presidential

election and depended on the support of all progressives,
even "Friends of the Soviet Union," if he were to make

a

respectable showing.
But at just this point in time the American

Socialists had made
native Trotskyites.

a

marriage of convenience with the
Even though Trotsky had once remarked

that Thomas called himself a socialist as

understanding,

49

a

result of

he advised his followers to join the

l

a

mis-

Socialist Party in the spring of 1936.
Thomas'

Convinced that

Party was on its deathbed, James Cannon and other

Trotskyites negotiated an agreement with the left-wing
"rabble" of the Socialist Party, despite many difficulties:
"A Trotskyist will do anything for the party, even if he

has to crawl on his belly in the mud." 50

As a sign of good

faith, the newly formed Workers Party of The United States
(an alliance of Trotskyites and Musteites) was disbanded,

along with several journals.
a "manipulative faction,"

But the Trotskyites joined as

and continued the tactics of

"boring from within," seizing one Socialist Party stronghold
after another.

Within a year open warfare broke out, and

Thomas moved to expel his boorish guests, the Trotskyites

leaving to form the Socialist Workers Party.

This folly

was almost the coup de grace to a faltering denomination.

As David A. Shannon has written, "Their /Trotskyites inva-

sion was like a slight cerebral stroke for one already dying
of malnutrition."

^

But this tactical ruse gained for the

Trotskyites many new followers, and severely weakened
rival party,

a

a

result that pleased the exile in Mexico.

Cannon later told

a

reporter his leader relished the

Socialist collapse, "'Comrade Trotsky said that that alone

would have justified our entry into the organization even if
we hadn't gained a single member.'"

52

This morganatic marriage with the Socialists during
the time of the purge trials provided the Trotskyites with

priceless asset.

It served as "protective coloration" for

a

"
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their efforts to clear Trotsky and discredit the trials.
With a certain smugness, James Cannon later wrote about
this

favorable conjunction of circumstances:
It was required for us historically, at
that crucial moment, to be members of the
Socialist Party and by that to have closer
access to elements liberals, intellectuals
and half-radical political people who were
necessary for the great political task of the
Trotsky Defense Committee. I don't think
Stalin could have arranged those trials as
well at any other time to insure their complete discreditment as in the summer of 1936.
We were then in the most favorable situation
as members of the Socialist Party
and,
therefore, surrounded to a certain extent
with the protective coloration of a half-way
respectable party and we couldn't be isolated
as a small group of Trotskyists, mobbed and
lynched, as they planned to do.
We conducted
a terrific campaign to expose the trials and
.
defend Trotsky.
.

—

—

—

—

.

To an unkind critic, this boasting might suggest that Cannon
and his group used the Socialist Party as a "front" organi-

zation to lure unwary "innocents" into

a

Trotskyite snare.

However, he was undoubtedly correct in stating that

months or years later

a

a

few

majority of these "petty-bourgeois

elements" would have been "physically and morally incapable"
of participating in such an endeavor.

54

Despite certain misgivings, Thomas felt honor-bound
to support the creation of a commission of inquiry.

His

original desire that a "working class commission" undertake
the inquiry died stillborn, partly because international

socialists were wary of offending Moscow, and partly because
local labor leaders were consumed with the effort to organize
the CIO, an endeavor that enjoyed considerable communist

support.

But in October 1936, Thomas and Devere Allen, of

the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party,

joined John Dewey, Horace Kallen, Freda Kirchwey, and Joseph

Wood Krutch to form the "Provisional American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky."

In an appeal dated October 22,

1936, they cited two main goals

— to

obtain for Trotsky "the

normal rights of asylum and to aid in the formation of an

International Commission of Inquiry, which shall examine all
the available evidence and make public its findings."

To

support this appeal was not identical with endorsing

Trotsky's political views.
this entreaty,

But no great figure, continued

"should be subjected to accusations coupled

with a virtual incarceration //internment in Norway_/ which
denies him the right to answer before a neutral body the

charges made against him."

The Provisional Committee in-

vited avowed friends of democratic rights to join the under"Will you let us know your answer as soon as pos-

taking:

sible?"
a

56

Within a month the "original six" were joined by

mixed-bag of academic types

(E.

A.

Ross, Louis Hacker,

Paul F. Brissenden, William H. Kilpatrick)

,

journalists

(Suzanne La Follette, John Chamberlain, Ben Stolberg, James
Rorty)

,

writers (Edmund Wilson, James

trade union leader (Vincent

R.

Dunne).

T.

Farrell), and a

Hereafter the

Committee dropped "Provisional" from its trademark.

Along with the appeal was circulated

a

57

copy of an

Nation.
editorial appearing in Freda Kirchwey's journal, The
about
The high-water mark in this magazine's misgivings

i
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Soviet justice, the editorial noted that the
transcript was

incomplete, documentary evidence was sparse, the
confessions
were "voluble and often melodramatic," and that Smirnov
was

"recalcitrant" throughout the trial, a point usually ignored

by press reports on the trial.

Contending that the pro-

ceedings were conducted "in a manner foreign to democratic
ideals of justice," with an overwhelming presumption of
guilt, The Nation questioned whether this could be con-

sidered "in any true sense a trial."

The most serious and

"least credible" charge involved Trotsky's alleged links to
the Gestapo, but here the proof was "most thin," amounting

to Olberg's word against Trotsky's.

Noting that Olberg had

had his day in court, The Nation editorialized:
is entitled to no less,

"Trotsky

and he has asked that his case be

submitted to an international proletarian commission." 58
If this appeal-cum-editorial was allowed to go un-

challenged, the many misgivings about the Zinoviev-Kamenev
trial promised to be reinforced, resulting in

threat to the Popular Front mentality.

a

mortal

But the Communist

Party, U.S.A., was sharpening its long knives.

An editorial

in the fellow-traveling New Masses analyzed this "curious

document" (appeal), and suggested that if the Defense

Committee truly desired an impartial inquiry, then it should
have called itself the "Provisional American Committee for
the Neutral Investigation of Trotsky."

But with "unconscious

frankness," the American Trotskyites had described it as
"defense" committee.

a

The sponsors, in addition, were hardly

s

neutral.

Norman Thomas was the "liberal front for

a

Socialist Party now rotting with the Trotskyite cancer,"
and

had "white-washed Trotsky and his accomplices."

As for

Joseph Wood Krutch, he was "notoriously anti-Communist" and

had exhibited "persistent prejudice" in allowing Trotskyites
to review books by Communists in The Nation'
tion.

But John Dewey was a special case.

literary sec-

The New Masses

piously regretted finding Dewey's name attached to this appeal.

His "sincerity" could not be doubted.

"It is a pity

he has been misled by some of his disciples who peddle

diluted versions of pragmatism under a Marxist label," an
allusion to Sidney Hook's supposed influence. 59
But the immediate threat to the Party's position

came from The Nation
in liberal circles.

,

which enjoyed considerable prestige

After answering point by point

Kirchwey's doubts about the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, the New

Masses demanded to know if the Trotskyites were circulating
the editorial (October 10) with the permission of the lib-

eral journal.

The Nation should either protest or explain

its position:
If the Nation wants to support Trotsky's
criminal activities, let it no longer pose as
Let it openly
an organ of liberal opinion.
and frankly declare itself a Trotskyite mouthLet the public know that it is the
piece.
organ of a band of counter-revolutionary conspirators and assassins.

Arguing that the editorial had been
prejudice," and its circulation

a

a

"foolish expression of

"serious political act,"

the Party's literary magazine posed the question:

"Ladies

l
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and Gentlemen of the Nation

,

where do you stand?" 60

In truth, the ladies and gentlemen of The
Nation

stood as firm as jello.

Replying to this attack, The Nation

compared its position to that of the Light Brigade:

"Cannon

to left of us, of short range but great explosive
capacity,

have trained a barrage on our recent editorial on the

methods used in the Moscow trial."
rages from the New Leader

CIO struggle.

,

To the right came bar-

critical of a report on the AFL-

Their critics could not have it both ways:

...

we can't possibly be Trotskyite assassins,
enemies of the Soviet Union, and Communists all'
at once.
The cross-fire from left and right,
however, fails to daunt or confuse us.
We
shall proceed as usual through the Valley of
Death, firm in the knowledge that although our
adversaries cannot both be right, both can
be and are wrong. 61

—

—

But a nervous tremor was revealed in these dauntless words.

Early in 1937 Freda Kirchwey resigned from the Defense
She adopted a policy of benign neutrality in the

Committee.

columns of her magazine, but not without
against the Trotsky cause.

What's in

a

certain bias

Score one for the opposition

Name ?

a

The editorial in the New Masses had also exposed

something of
founders.

Trotsky"

a

malapropism on the part of the Committee's

"American Committee for the Defense of Leon

— its

very title had

a

curious ring.

Was not "to

defend" Trotsky also to side with his political position
against that of Stalin?

I

62
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The writer, Louis Adamic, for one, felt that the

Committee's name was an ill-advised choice.

"I

seriously

objected to the defense part of the name of the Trotsky
Committee.

instance?

Why did he need anybody's defense?

Mine, for

Possessor of great literary ability he was fully

capable of writing

a

defense of himself ," argued Adamic.

His friend, Ben Stolberg, suggested that Alfred Dreyfus had

benefited from

a

similar defense committee, but Adamic re-

jected the analogy.

The Frenchman had been a helpless,

little man, while the Russian was "an historical figure,

a

great revolutionary, a formidable political oppositionist,
who, as such, had to expect all manner of dirty work.
'defend' him when one was not his partisan?"

Why

63

To a large extent the choice of this name was merely
a reminder of earlier defense committees,

e.g., the Sacco-

Vanzetti Defense Committee, the Tom Mooney Defense Committee,
etc.

Many of those associated with Dewey on his commission

had also participated in these earlier defense efforts, and

considered their "defense" of Trotsky

hallowed liberal tradition.

a

continuation of

a

At the beginning of the Mexican

hearings, Dewey took note of the problem and declared:
In the United States, it has long been customary
for public-spirited citizens to organize committees for the purpose of securing fair trials
in cases where there was suspicion concerning
the impartiality of the courts.

Such committees, continued Dewey, were "traditionally known
as

'defense committees,'

of the defendant."

and include in their title the name

But membership on such committees

M

.
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implied nothing more "than the belief that the accused
is

entitled to

a

fair trial." 64

Perhaps Shakespeare was correct in asking, "What's
in a name?

That which we call a rose / By any other name

would smell as sweet."

But another name might have smelled

sweeter, and avoided a partisan ring.

Surely the choice of

this particular name was a public relations faux pas

what later Dewey's group called itself

Some-

.

the "Commission of

Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the

Moscow Trials,"

much more judicious choice.

a

First Conclave
The most pressing worry for the Defense Committee

was Trotsky's physical safety.

Reports from Norway detailed

the sorry conditions of his internment

.

And there were

strong indications that his visa would not be renewed.

In

that case Norwegian authorities might hand him over to the

tender mercies of the GPU minions.

From offices at 22 East

17th Street, adjacent to Union Square in New York City, the

Committee issued

a

statement in late November protesting

"•this outrageous violation of democratic rights by the

Norwegian Government and demands that the full rights of
asylum be restored to Trot sky

charged that the

1,1

1

In addition, the statement

most elementary notions of justice

1

"

dictated that this world-famous revolutionist should be
"

given
case

1

.

"

1

the fullest and freest opportunity to state his

66

—
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Although "rotting with the Trotskyite cancer," the
Socialist Party continued the struggle to secure him

haven in an increasingly hostile world.
Executive Committee passed

a

a safe

Its National

resolution endorsing the work

of the Defense Committee and also established a sub-committee

to co-operate in making representations to the Norwegian

authorities.

The aim was to secure for Trotsky "'the full

rights of asylum,

'

"

mission of inquiry. 6

as well
7

as assist any responsible com-

And in early December the Socialist

Call wrote that soon Trotsky would be "a man without a country, welcome only in the Soviet Union where the hangman

holds a rope in readiness for him."

Accordingly, "The

working class demands asylum for Trotsky.

And an inter-

national working class commission to investigate the circumIt also suggested

stances surrounding the Moscow trials!"

that if Stalin wanted friendly allies, he should stop per-

secuting Trotsky, or "let him /Stalin/ meet Trotsky face to
face in open court before an international workers'
so that we may hear and judge the truth!"

68

jury

Sometimes the

Call had uncommon ideas.

Above all, there was a need to drum up popular sup-

port for asylum and an impartial hearing.

Plans were made,

therefore, to hold a mass meeting on December 18, 1936, the
day Trotsky's Norwegian visa expired.

By almost any stan-

dards the gathering in the Center Hotel (the former Hotel

Delano on West 43rd Street in New York City) was
success.

a

great

According to various estimates, the "giant" meeting
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attracted two to three thousand people, with another
thousand
or so turned away from the doors. 69

The organizers col-

lected the grand total of $1,284.20 from the audience,
against expenses of $569.32. 70

part of the proceedings

,

Radio station WQXR carried

and The New York Times reported on

the affair.

Suzanne La Follette chaired the meeting, with many

listeners standing three hours to hear the lengthy speeches.
In a principal address, Norman Thomas questioned that

Trotsky was actually an assassin, especially when the documentary evidence was so sparse.

Still, the Moscow charges

had immense importance for Liberals and Socialists:

"'In a

world like ours justice to the individual always matters.'"
Against a former Bolshevik leader the Kremlin was using
tactics "'as ruthless and unscrupulous as any which this

world of hate and intolerance now reveal,'" he charged:
"'Not on such basis can we ever build that fellowship of

free men which is our ultimate hope.'"

Other speakers included James

71
T.

Farrell who, "being

an Irishman, likes a good fight," reported the Socialist

Call

.

In his remarks Farrell branded the behavior of the

Communist press as "'Red Journalism Gone Yellow!,'"
catchy phrase he was to use on other occasions.

a

For his

part, Max Shachtman chided the Soviet regime for not de-

manding extradition hearings in Norway:

"'They want him

/Trotsky/ in the Soviet Union where the executioner's bullet
is held in readiness for him.

But they do not dare to say

!
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so."'

An "extraordinary impression" was made when Herbert

Solow read about Stalin's earlier frame-ups from the writings
of Carl von Ossietzky, a Nobel Laureate at the time a guest
in one of Hitler's concentration camps.

Only Max Eastman

upset the cheerful unanimity of the meeting when he identified bureaucratic excesses with the Soviet state, and then

lumped it together with Hitler and Mussolini in the same

dastardly category. 72
Call

,

This was too much for the Socialist

still professing a certain loyalty to the Soviet Union.

It was sad, wrote the Socialist organ, to see the results of

Soviet splitting tactics, but it was "sadder to see a Max

Eastman lose his balance, as he has done!"

The Call sug-

gested that Eastman had placed himself outside the working
class movement.

73

Asylum
At the Hotel Center meeting the Defense Committee

was able to announce the glad tidings:
sail to Mexico and safety.

Trotsky would soon

This had been the most pressing

task facing the Committee in the fall of 1936, considering
the Oslo diktat that Trotsky's visa would become invalid

after December 18.

"The Committee was instrumental in ob-

taining his /Trotsky's/ visa for Mexico," claimed its final
report, a just claim even though details are sketchy.

Without

a

doubt, it was the intercession of Diego

Rivera that persuaded Lazaro Cardenas to grant the visa.
remains unclear, however, who first approached the great

It
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Mexican muralist.

Rivera, himself, contended that he inter-

ceded with Cardenas at the request of the "New York Committee
for the Rights of Men." 75

The secretary of the Committee,

George Novack, gave credit to Anita Brenner, a journalist
and friend of Rivera, for making the contact. 76

But Miss

Brenner wrote that Cardenas acted on an appeal from John
Dewey, Suzanne La Follette, John Dos Passos, and Rivera.

No matter, when the happy news reached New York, Novack and

Max Shachtman relayed the information to Oslo.

Both of

them later journeyed to Mexico to ensure Trotsky's safe arrival.

The whole affair cost the Committee the grand sum of

$752.07, certainly a bargain price for obtaining a safe

refuge for "the man without a country."

78

The Committee, and its variegated supporters, had
just reason for congratulating itself on this stroke, which

not only materially aided Trotsky's health, but vindicated
At the Hotel Center

the ancient right of political asylum.

meeting on December 18, amidst
crowd adopted

a

a

few nays, the assembled

resolution praising Cardenas' action, and

solemnly declared, "'In defending Trotsky's right of asylum
we are not merely aiding one individual

,

but we are defending

democratic rights for every one everywhere,'" for "'world
reaction everywhere threatens these precious democratic
rights.'"

79

The Committee later claimed, quoting Professor

of all
Horace M. Kallen, that Trotsky had become "'the symbol

contemporary political refugees.'"

To deprive Trotsky of

in the
asylum would be to attack a noble tradition and,

I
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words of Norman Thomas, would '"turn the world into

prison

a

house in which the best militants of the labor movement
could
be confined.'"

With a certain ill-disguised pride, the

Defense Committee reported that its achievement in obtaining
a safe haven for Trotsky was "applauded by many political

exiles of many nationalities and political beliefs who saw

their own fates bound up in greater or lesser degree with
the results of our struggle."

But this quick success weakened the Defense

Committee's basic allure.

In the general applause over this

triumph lay seeds of dissension.

It was one thing for di-

verse liberals, at little personal sacrifice, to support
pious statements about the hallowed right of asylum, and

harken back to the situations of such refugees as Louis

Kossuth and Carl Schurz.

But it was an entirely different

matter to proceed to the second task, to inquire into the

Moscow charges against Trotsky.

The second aim of the

Defense Committee was a much riskier proposition.

Implicit

in an investigation of the charges against Trotsky was a

questioning of Soviet justice, and thus the entire Soviet
system.

Many liberals, friends or not of the Soviet Union,

had no desire to become involved in the labyrinth of Kremlin
politics, especially at a time when faith in the Soviet

Union was practically a prescribed article of belief.
Louis Adamic told Ben Stolberg,

"I

As

had been in favor of

Trotsky's finding asylum in Mexico, or in any other country

willing to receive him.

That was a simple issue.

I

could

—

"
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easily decide upon it.

These Moscow Trials and Trotsky, how-

ever, were another matter." 81

To support such an inquiry,

most assuredly, would result in being branded
a

feared stigma in the mid-1930s.

a

"Trotskyite

,

Somewhat the better part

of valor was to sing the praises of asylum, and leave the

other, more noisome business to the partisans.

At first the American Communist Party launched a
H

veritable lynch campaign'" against granting asylum to

Trotsky.

82

"'We are against asylum anywhere in the world

for those who make assassination their weapon of political

struggle, no matter who they may be,'" proclaimed Earl
Browder.

83

But in questioning the right of asylum, the

Party was casting doubt on a sacred American cow.

With the

granting of a visa to Trotsky, however, its line of action
was vastly simplified.

"All honest liberals are wondering

why the Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky should con-

tinue to exist, now that there is no longer any issue of
right of asylum," asked Soviet Russia Today

84
.

And in

a

letter of resignation to the Committee, Mauritz A. Hallgren
explained,

believed when

"I

I

joined your committee, and

I

still believe, in the right of asylum for persons exiled be-

cause of their political or other beliefs.

Trotsky has been

granted asylum in Mexico and this part of the committee's
task would seem, therefore, to have been brought to

close."

85

a

For liberals to continue with the second task

formation of

a

commission of inquiry

— was

"consciously or

unconsciously, serving the cause of fascism, reaction and
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war," argued Soviet Russia Today

:

Union at this time is to strike

a

"For to attack the Soviet

blow at the strongest

force for peace in the world today." 86
Thus, the very success of obtaining a visa had cer-

tain untoward effects, stripping the Committee of the pro-

tective coloration that such an unassailable cause afforded.
Henceforth, anyone supporting the call for an impartial com-

mission of inquiry was engaged in anti-Soviet activities at
the behest of the Trotskyite assassins.
j

III.

The Committee's Core

Early in January 1937 the Trotskyite organ,
Socialist Appe al

,

proudly claimed that the Defense Committee

had "secured the adherence of perhaps the

1

argest and most

distinguished group of intellectuals and publicists ever
joined together for a defense issue.*

1

87

But the depth of

commitment varied greatly among the "distinguished" figures
who supported the Committee's aims.

A small donation or

casual approval of a petition could result in one's name ap-

pearing on the Committee's scroll of signers.

88

In at least

one case, the name of a well-known writer appeared on the

list through the good offices of

a

friend, even though this

author had not been consulted, and vigorously opposed any
"defense" of Trotsky's good name.

89

Thus,

"membership" on

the Committee meant different things to different people.

But by April 1937 the Committee's letterhead boasted
the names of 82 adherents ("and others").

Among the recent

.

,
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additions were such academic luminaries as Lionel Trilling,
Franz Boas, and Alexander Golderweiser

sociate editors of The Nation

Margaret Marshall.

,

,

joined by two as-

Dorothy Van Doren and

The young Dwight MacDonald had enlisted

his waspish pen in the cause, along with the prestigious

Gaetano Salvemini, a noted anti-Fascist refugee from Italy.
Also gracing the Committee's letterhead was

a

playwright

(Sidney Howard), a theologian (Reinhold Niebuhr)

and an of-

,

ficial of the Jewish Daily Forward (B. Charney Vladeck)

But it was the nature of this kind of enterprise that under

cover of the illustrious names existed a small circle of

dedicated workers

— the

committee within the committee-which

along with the original founders, set the strategy.
"The Founding Fathers"

The American Communist Party, not adverse to accusing

others of its own devices, repeatedly charged that

a

Trotskyite cabal was the real master of the Defense Committee.
With regard to "the founding six" (two dons, two leaders of
the Socialist Party, two editors of The Nation

)

,

they were

hardly "Trotskyites " but, with one exception, were highly
critical of the Soviet system.

At least five of the six

founders had little in common with professed "Friends of the
USSR," even if they could not be classed in 1936 as outright

enemies of the noble "experiment."
The acknowledged leader of the academic cluster was

John Dewey (1859-1952).

Since this doyen of American
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intellectuals was to become the guiding spirit of the
entire
enterprise, this is not the place to examine in any
great

detail his thoughts on the Soviet Union. 91

But the elderly

professor at Columbia (and contributing editor to The New
Republic)

,

had forsaken his earlier sympathy for the Soviet

venture, and had taken a clearly hostile line by the time of
the Committee's formation.

The suppression of civil liber-

ties, the stress on class warfare, the use of character as-

sassination against opponents

— these

were some of the Soviet

traits that profoundly bothered this champion of "fair play.
He was convinced that even the threat of class war would

only result in Fascists coming to power:

opponent of Fascism in every form,

I

"As an unalterable

cannot be a Communist."

This tendency to identify Fascism and Communism was shared

by his close friend, Horace M. Kallen (1882-1974), the
eminent, German-born philosopher.

Active in Zionist affairs

Kallen was associated with the National Committee for the
Defense of Political Prisoners until his resignation in 1935
from this communist-led group.

He was in the forefront of

efforts to bring refugees from Nazi Germany to this country,
and he deplored the tendency to subordinate the individual t

the state in both Germany and the Soviet Union, castigating

their "tyrannical apotheosis of Unity."

93

A friend of

political exiles, he was no friend of the Kremlin.
Devere Allen (1891-1955) and Norman Thomas (18841968) had been close associates since they worked together

on The World Tomorrow,

an organ of The Fellowship of
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Reconciliation.

Long active in pacifist and defense groups,

Allen had written the militant Declaration of Principles
(1934)

for the Socialist Party, and in 1936 was a member of

its National Executive Committee.

With his pacific leanings,

Allen had little inclination to join any "Popular Front" alliance that advocated collective security for a threatened
Soviet Union.

94

Thomas, more a Christian than an orthodox

Marxist, also shared these pacifist principles.

A veteran

of many bitter struggles with the local Communists, Thomas

was on the road to becoming an outright enemy of the Soviet

system.

But in 1936 he advocated limited cooperation with

the Communist Party, if not "organic unity":
"The differences between us preclude organic
We do not accept control from Moscow,
unity.
the old Communist accent on inevitable violence and party dictatorship, or the new accent on the possible war against Fascism, and
We
the new Communist political opportunism.
assert genuine civil liberty in opposition to
communist theory and practice in Russia." 95

Thus, Thomas was willing to cooperate with the comrades on
Spain, but not on the campaign for collective security.

He

offered "critical loyalty," with the accent on "critical."
The brace of editors from The Nation on the

Provisional Committee were Joseph Wood Krutch (1893-1970)
and Freda Kirchwey (1893-

).

In 1936 Krutch was one of

associated
the chief editors of the liberal journal; he was
as drama
with it continuously from 1924 to 1952, principally

critic and literary editor.

A many-sided humanist, author

of works on Samuel Johnson,

Edgar Allen Poe

,

and Henry

,
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Thoreau, as well as on herbs, birds and deserts, Krutch was
a

wistful man, with a pessimistic streak that was balanced

by a deep devotion to the values of urbanity and detachment.

A visitor to Russia in 1928, he feared that Communism was
the retrogressive future, for its "'drama and its poetry

celebrate the machine exactly as the literature of

a

primi-

tive people celebrates the processes of hunting or of

agriculture,'" but this return to primitive materialism was
at the cost of civilized man:

"'We should rather die as

men than live as animals.'" 97

In May 1933 Krutch wrote an

editorial for The Nation on the Metro-Vickers trial in
Russian.

Entitled "Class Justice," it questioned how

American liberals who had protested against the effect of
class prejudice in other cases could "'logically acquiesce
in the methods of Russia just because they happen to sympa-

thize somewhat with the basic aspirations of the Russian

people."

As was the case with Sacco-Vanzetti and Tom Mooney

the Russian engineers were apparently convicted because they

were enemies of the social system, whether or not the

specific charges could be proven.

Krutch reminded his fel-

low liberals that they had insisted on the individual's
right to abstract justice, and could not logically change

their attitude for Russia without changing it for America
also:

The historical position of The Nation is
We
It has not changed.
the liberal one.
We
still advocate a classless impartiality.
refuse to be satisfied merely to have prejudice change sides, and to forget all the
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dangers of a medieval method of trial just
because that method happens for the moment
to be working in the interests of a revolutionary government whose basic aim is to
secure greater economic liberty. "98
This belief in classless justice led Krutch to give his sup-

port to the Trotsky Defense Committee.
But the historical position of The Nation was

changing, notwithstanding Krutch'

s

lecture.

In 1933 Oswald

Garrison Villard forsook active direction of the journal,

with Freda Kirchwey taking charge.

Finally, in 1937 she be-

came editor and publisher of The Nation

,

while Krutch de-

voted most of his energies to more congenial tasks at
Columbia University. 99

Miss Kirchwey had an even longer as-

sociation with the magazine, joining it in 1918, retiring

Although she was critical of Marxist revolutionary

in 1955.

strictures and Soviet repressive practices, Freda Kirchwey
was basically sympathetic to Soviet aims, especially economic

planning, collective security, and the "Popular Front"
policy.

Above all, she decried sectarianism on the left,

and called for an era of "'good will and decency'" in the
face of fascist aggression,

ment.'"

100

'"a little factional disarma-

When the Trotsky issue threatened to split

solidarity on the left, she quickly withdrew from the
Defense Committee, and advocated in the pages of The Nation
a

position of "suspended judgment" on the issues.
With the exception of Miss Kirchwey, five of the

"founders" of the Committee were hardly sympathetic to Soviet
aims and practices by the year 1936.

In defending the right
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of asylum and an impartial investigation, they were upholding

hallowed liberal principles, but an ingrained bias against
the Soviet Union may have also motivated their activities.
Dewey, Kallen, Allen, Thomas, Krutch

— none

were

"Trotskyites," but the Trotsky issue gave them an opportunity
to reaffirm liberal values while bringing into question the

basic premises of the "Popular Front."
Committee Cadre
Not only the "kumrads" questioned the Committee's

basic probity.

Even Waldo Frank and Louis Adamic detected

strong whiff of "Trotskyism" in its leading circles.

a

Chair-

man of the first Writers Congress (1935), Frank incurred
Party displeasure by raising some doubts about the integrity
of Soviet justice.

But he also doubted the worth of the

proposed Mexican hearings, because the Defense Committee,
"although it contains the names of men of integrity, is in-

dubitably controlled by Trotskyists:

that is, by men whose

entire political life has become involved in the premise
that Trotsky and all the defendants are innocent and that
the Soviet Union is guilty."

1

1

The popular Adamic shared

the same concern:
The Committee was run by a few deeply interested and intensely motivated persons who
were obviously Trotskyites, that is, who be-

lieved in Trotsky's conspirational-revolutionary
The idea to clear Trotsky as a matter of
ideas.
principle of justice was probably clear and paramount only in John Dewey's mind; I admired him
A few people of the Committee's inner
for it.
group, as well as most of the Dewey Commission,
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were more or less pro-Trotsky personally.
They admired some part of his mind or past,
without agreeing entirely with his basic
philosophy and future aims.
Politically
they were "anti-Stalinist" without being
Trotskyite. They were outraged by the
Trials and executions.
I think that Ben
Stolberg, Suzanne La Follette, and John
Chamberlain were of this group. Otherwise
the idea among the Committee leaders was,
for the most part, politically pro-Trotsky
(i.e., pro-conspiracy, pro-Revolution) in
.10 2
purpose.
.

.

George Novack, a prime figure in the Committee's fortunes, partially confirmed this analysis.

He wrote that a

"hard core of the anti-Stalinist intellectuals" constituted
the "backbone" of its membership.

Originally drawn toward

the Communist Party, they labored for various defense efforts
in the early 1930s, especially the National Committee for the

Defense of Political Prisoners.

But the refusal of this com-

munist-led group to defend '"agents of the class enemy,'"
e.g., IWW organizers, forced the resignation of Novack and

Many became Trotskyites or Musteites, before the

his ilk.

fusion of the two factions.

In 1936-37 they joined forces

to "defend" the beleagured exile.
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The "inner group" of the Trotsky Defense Committee

was composed of a mixed bag of journalists, academics,

writers, and political activists, but was noticeably short
of working-class representatives.

On the Executive Committee

(or "Ex Com") were Suzanne La Follette, Ben Stolberg,

and

Hook
James Rorty (journalists), James Burnham and Sidney
Farrell
(academics), assisted by the peripatetic James T.
(writer).

104

The national secretary of the Committee was

George Novack; his chief assistant was Felix Morrow.

Much

of the office work was performed by Pearl Kluger and Viola

Robinson Isaacs.

Also active in the day-to-day operations

of the Committee were Herbert Solow, Harold
Elliot Cohen. 105

R.

Isaacs, and

Was a Trotskyite "cell" in actual control of the

Committee's operations?

The answer must be a gualified "no,"

but there was strong Trotskyite representation within the

Committee, especially in the Secretariat.

George Novack,

for instance, was an open partisan of the Russian exile.

Even now he is a leading figure in the Socialist Workers
Party.

A product of Harvard, Novack originally came to New

York for a career in publishing, but the 1929 crash con-

verted him "from

a

his first- -and last

Nation - New Republic devotee, who cast

— vote

for a Democratic president in 1928,

into a Marxian revolutionary."

In the early 1930s he moved

from the Communist orbit to the Trotskyite fringe, and has

made a career of "revolutionary politics" to this day.
His assistant-Felix Morrow

— was

106

also "a hardened party

functionary," to use his own words.

At one time the Execu-

tive Secretary of the Non-Partisan Labor Defense (NPLD)

,

an

alliance of Trotskyites and liberals, he had overseen the

liquidation of this organization in 1935-36, as

a

peace of-

fering to the Socialists, who had their own defense committee.

107

This act, however, caused some resentment in liberal

the
ranks, and Morrow was subsequently blocked from becoming

overall director of the Trotsky Defense Committee.

"But
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while the Trotskyists were eager to mollify the liberals in

every reasonable way," Morrow has written, "the reality of
the situation was that the party had placed me in charge of

this work, and

I

remained in charge until the end of the

work of the Commission." 1 OR

Although close to the Trotskyists, Herbert Solow
was a counter-weight to the Novack-Morrow duumvirate on the

Committee staff.

A veteran journalist and one-time assis-

tant editor of the Menorah Journal

,

Solow (1903-1964) joined

the Communist League in 1933, but James Cannon considered
09
him only "a sort of sympathizer" of the Trotskyite movement.
1

At various times Solow actively worked for the National

Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners and the

Non-Partisan Labor Def ense

11<"
;

>

he was "resentful" of

111
Morrow's role in liquidating the latter group.

It was

Solow who handled many of the logistical details arising
from the Mexican hearings.

In the final years of his career

(1945-64), he was an editor of Fortune magazine, far removed

from factional intrigues.

112

The Executive Committee was much more "liberal" than
the Secretariat, .but one member, James Burnham (1905-

was an unabashed Trotskyite.

),

A professor at New York

University, Burnham helped unite the Trotskyites and Musteites
in 1934-35, and later became co-editor of New International
113
But in 1939-40 he
the Trotskyite theoretical journal.

provoked

a

bitter split in the Socialist Workers Party over

the nature of the first "workers" state.

His theoretical

,

»

,
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views were reflected in the 1941 study, The Managerial
Revolution.

In the post-war years Burnham joined the anti-

communist crusade and became

a "man in

a

freely predicting a third world war. 115

permanent apocalypsis

Considered one of

the "ancestral voices" of political conservatism in the

United States, he is currently

a

leading editor of The

National Review.
Burnham'

colleague in the Philosophy Department of

s

New York University, Sidney Hook (1902stalwart on the Executive Committee.

was another

),

A favorite student of

John Dewey, this "'ebullient, scrappy'" philosopher was be-

coming well-known for his Marxist treatises, which featured
But in 1934 Hook ad-

incisive, almost brutal logic.

vocated

a

"communism without dogmas," led by

new international.

117

a

new party and

For this doctrinal mischief the old

Party cast him into "'outer darkness.'"
the two "doughty professors"

118

Hook was one of

(the other being Burnham)

who

then negotiated the Trotskyite-Musteite alliance, and later
he was instrumental in arranging the Trotskyite-Soci alist
119
In
misalliance, the "last progressive act" of his life.

1936 he admired the "clarity" of Trotsky's vision, and the

"brilliance of his political forecasting," although they had
But always "out of step,"

sharp doctrinal differences.
first a premature Marxist, then

premature anti-Communist*
•

a

he was a prime mover in forming the 1939 Committee for

Cultural Freedom,

122

and the 1950 Congress for Cultural

the
Freedom, an organization enjoying fraternal ties with

121

,
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Central Intelligence Agency. 12 3

In subsequent years his

numerous articles on the abuse of the Fifth Amendment, the

danger of communist teachers in colleges, and the threat of
campus violence have made him anathema to much of the left,

both new and old. 124
Two other journalists, much less radical than the

Washington Square duo, had

a

material effect on the

Friend and foe alike found them kin-

Committee's fortunes.

Not only Louis Adamic believed they were "pro-

dred spirits.

Trotsky personally," but Selden Rodman, James

T.

Farrell, and

The Nation agreed that they were "admirers" of the Russian

exile.
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La Follette and Stolberg, confided the New Masses

were "well-known New York Trotskyites

journalist "strongly under Stolberg

1

s

,

"

,

with the lady

influence," having

written a number of articles critical of the Soviet Union.
To be under Stolberg

1

s

influence was particularly disgrace-

ful, for Stolberg was well-known in labor circles, claimed

the New Masses

,

as a "'stool-pigeon

1

"

who had spread "anti-

Communist, anti-Soviet propaganda of the lowest order."

126

In defense against one of the bias charges, Stolberg
"just
wrote that Miss La Follette, as far as he knew, was

another progressive LaFollette, only more so."

127

Daughter

La Follette,
of former Washington Congressman, William L.

and

Follette, this
cousin to Wisconsin's Senator Robert M. La
with The
free lance journalist had been closely associated

Freeman and The New Freeman

.

Although not

a

Marxist, she

until her resignation in
had supported the work of the NDCPP

1935.

1 28

Author of the book, Art in America

,

she became in-

creasingly critical of all matters Soviet, and supplied
information (along with Stolberg) to Eugene Lyons' The Red
Decade.

In recent years she has been listed as a "contrib-

utor" to The National Review 129
.

A much more interesting character was Ben Stolberg
(1893-1951).

German-born, educated at Harvard, Stolberg had

a career as a sociologist and social worker, before becoming
a

fulltime journalist.

At one time he considered himself a

Marxist, and believed Trotsky was "a great man," wrote his

close friend and sometime disputant, Louis Adamic.

cording to the author of

My_

America

,

Ac-

Stolberg was a curious

mixture of Voltaire, Mencken and Marx, "both Karl and
Groucho, the two about evenly divided," an impulsive, ill-

disciplined, friendly child who would never grow older.

At

one point Stolberg gleefully told Adamic that the Moscow

trials had put the local Reds on the defensive, and that by

giving Trotsky

a

hearing the memory of the executions could

be kept alive as long as possible.

In February 1937 Adamic

wrote in his diary about the initial reason for Stolberg

being "neck-deep" in this Committee.
there is in him a compelling personal need
to get into action every once in a while, into
something big and important, and feel himself
He is the scholar, the student, the
function.
intellectual who every now and then must do
something, preferably something "important";
for way down in him he knows that as a mere
writing and talking intellectual he is not very
effectual, but does not know yet that that is
so in great part because he still is not a wellrounded-out Benjamin Stolberg, but a messed-up
.

.

.

,
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"Marxian," cluttered up with big, fascinating
ideas not intimately his own.
.131
.

.

Soon he found his own voice, and published The Story of
the

CI .0.

(1938)

,

in which he chronicled communist penetration

of the labor organization.

Stolberg became

a

As a result of this study,

prime subject for Party invective.

instance, the Daily Worker called him an

For

ordinary low-

priced street-walker ready to peddle himself in parks,
alleys or hallways to any chance customer.

1

in sub-

sequent years Stolberg returned the compliments in

a

number

of barbed articles.

Another old soldier in various radical campaigns,
James Rorty, was also drawn into the activities of the

Executive Committee.

A former copywriter for B.B.D.& 0.,

Rorty had helped prepare in 1926 the first issue of the New

Masses

133
.

Along with Hook and

F.

Morrow, he had supported

the slate of William Z. Foster and James W. Ford for the

presidency in 1932.

And he had been proposed as an ac-

ceptable contributor in 1932-33 to Granville Hick's abortive
"Marxist Study of American Culture."
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But his non-

communist interests queered his relations with the Party,
and he threw his lot with the Musteites.

Along the way

this early forerunner of Ralph Nader wrote a number of

articles on consumer issues.

A 1936 series in The Nation

eventually resulted in his book, Medical Politicians vs the
People

.

Rorty was also one of the "renegades" who actively

protested communist-direction of the Second Writers Congress

i

"

(June, 1937). 137

For this example of lese-majeste the New
Masses branded him a "Trotskyite 138 By early 1938 he was
.

writing about the "Stalinist Judas goats," who had formed

a

"solar system" of "'innocent clubs,'" a la Eugene Lyons. 139

And in 1939 he was one of the signers of

a

statement for the

"Committee for Cultural Freedom," which denounced all versions of the totalitarian fraud, including the Soviet

variety.
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Although in later years Rorty clearly was

staunch anti-Communist, he forsook the path of

a

a

James

Burnham, and wrote against some of the worst excesses of the

"cold-war warriors." 141

And then there was James

T.

Farrell (1904-

),

by

all odds the most original character on the Executive

Committee.

This feisty Irishman from the slums of Chicago

had published his Studs Lonigan trilogy by 1935, to considerable critical acclaim.

Critics on the left especially

enjoyed his naturalistic descriptions of the Irish subculture, where social conditions turned futile dreamers into

depressing slobs.
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Certainly young Jim was

But,

a comer.

like a Norman Mailer, Farrell had a zest for public combat;
Un-

his polemical outbursts often infuriated sedate types.

like most writers, Farrell had actually read Marx, with

particular attention to the problem of committed literature.
His 1936 study, A Note on Literary Criticism

"'revolutionary sentiment alism'

"

and

"
'

,

castigated the

Marxmanship

1

"

of

Michael Gold, while also taking swipes at the "'mechanically'

determined criticism of Granville Hicks.

In reply, Gold

s
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scolded those pious sectarians (read Farrell),
who '"carry
their Marxian scholarship as though it were
a heavy

cross.'" 143

Undaunted, Farrell kept an unfriendly eye on the
efforts of
"proletarian" writers for the reborn Partisan Review
,

and

concluded that the left wing cultural movement was
"bankrupt,"
its aggressive boasts forgotten "'like a bad dream.'" 144

Once expelled from the ranks of approved writers,

Farrell was a natural for the Trotsky Defense Committee.

Somewhat on the raffish side, Farrell lacked the necessary

gravity to be a spokesman for the Committee, but he busied
himself collecting signatures for various petitions, and ac-

companied John Dewey to the Mexican hearings.
of the voyage,

In his account

"Dewey in Mexico," Farrell lavished many ad-

miring words on the Columbia University philosopher, and
also asserted that Trotsky was "a man of genius, of will and
of ideas," perhaps the "archtype of the civilized, highly

cultivated and thoroughly Europeanized Western European,"
certainly a "great man."
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Partly as a result of his political stance, Farrell'

critical reputation took

a

precipitate decline.

A

"whispering campaign" in the literary underground took on
the character of a "lynching."

The New Republic saw fit to

print a letter from twenty-five good citizens of East St.
Louis, Illinois, who took to task this "pretentious wind-

bag," this "palpable fraud whose literary talents are so
slender, whose faults are so many and obvious," including
-

,

"heinous faults of grammar, construction and logic.

146

_

in

the words of H. L. Mencken, they '"ganged him,'" the
outcast
147
from Chicago.

Never one to capitulate in the face of hostility,
Farrell became the self-appointed chairman of the "gloaters

committee" after the 1939 German-Soviet pact.

Many fellow-

travelers left the red express at the time, but he turned

back their apologies with easy contempt.

I

AO

After the war

he joined Sidney Hook in organizing the American Committee
149
for Cultural Freedom.
Currently Farrell is enjoying a

revival of critical attention, though on the restrained side
But he has not forgotten or forgiven the many intellectual

wars of the 1930s, and proudly bears their scars, even

though they personally cost him not

a

little in book sales,

friendships, and reputation.
IV.

Thunder on the Left:

Defamation

and Defections

From active support of communist candidates and defense efforts in 1932 to condemnation of "Red Fascism" in

1939

— this

protracted journey in the political wilderness

resulted in many radicals becoming '"pre-mature antiCommunists,'" in the words of John Chamberlain.
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Victims

of the intellectual and moral "Red Terror," disillusioned

supporters of the left found temporary havens in the resthomes offered by the Musteites, Trotskyites, and Socialists.

With the onset of World War II or soon thereafter, George
anti-Stalinism
Novack has observed, they "transmuted their

into anti-Communism and anti-Marxism, readjusted their ideas
and lives to the established order, and contributed their

quotas to the ideological virulence of the cold war."

But

before this final transformation, the likes of Hook,
Burnham, Rorty, and so on formed "the backbone of the

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky," and received a final schooling in factional politics. 151
L Affair Trotsky
'

— this

was an often traumatic ex-

perience for supporters of the Defense Committee.

The

American Communist Party applied immense pressure to split
the Committee and force defections.

This campaign resulted

in the resignations of a few Committee adherents, the

silencing of others.

In some cases, however, the intimida-

tion was counter-productive.

Take the cases of Mary

McCarthy and Louis Adamic, for instance.
Accidental Anti-Communists

Fresh from Vassar in 1933, Mary McCarthy joined The

New Republic

as

a

book reviewer.

At the same time she

flirted with the Communists, to whom she felt vastly superior:

"The superiority

I

felt to the Communists

I

knew had,

for me at any rate, good grounding; it was based on their

lack of humor, their fanaticism, and the slow drip of cant
that thickened their utterance like a nasal catarrh."

Willing to support

a

waiters'

strike at the Waldorf in

evening clothes, she also realized that her class snobbery

barred her from joining the Party.

Still, this would-be
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novelist admired the political activists, especially
the

underground types, for they had "a daily ugliness in their
life that made my pretty life tawdry."
summit.

They dwelled on the

"For me, the Communist Party was the party," she

later admitted, and even though

"I

did not join it,

I

prided myself on knowing that it was the pinnacle." 152
In the fall of 1936 Mary McCarthy was reading about
the brave Spanish Loyalists "with tears of exaltation" in

her eyes, and her heart was "tense and swollen with popularfront solidarity."

Kamenev trial.

But she knew little about the Zinoviev-

In November of that year she attended a

publisher's party for Art Young, the cartoonist for the old
Masses

.

The occasion was solemn, the atmosphere tense.

At

one point during the party an acguaintance asked her about

the Trotsky case.

"It was a novelist friend of mine,

dimple-faced, shaggy-headed, earnest, with
people, like a deputation, behind him."

153

a

whole train of

Confessing her

ignorance of the issues, she was quickly given

a short

course in the history of the controversy, while others

waited for her reaction.

Dazed by the enormity of the

charges, she was reluctant to express an opinion until asked
if Trotsky had a right to political asylum.
she answered,

"Why, of course,"

and quickly forgot the whole affair.
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Several days later she received a communication
from the "Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky."

Her

name was listed among those demanding asylum and a hearing
for the Russian exile.

"How dared they help themselves to

.
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my signature?," indignantly asked the youthful book
reviewer.
But then Mary McCarthy realized that many of the signers
had

attended the party for Art Young, where her novelist friend
had been methodically polling the guests.

Almost immediately

she decided to withdraw her name and write a note of protest.

But before she wrote the letter the telephone calls began.

Slight acquaintances gave her impersonal warnings:
the Committee.

get off

It was all very peculiar:

Behind these phone calls there was a sense
of the Party wheeling its forces into would-be
disciplined formations, like a fleet or an army
maneuvering.
This, I later found, was true:
a systematic telephone campaign was going on to
dislodge members from the Committee. The phone
calls generally came after dark and sometimes
(especially when the recipient was elderly) in
the small hours of the morning.
The more
prominent signers got anonymous messages and
threats
And in the morning papers and the columns
of the liberal magazines I saw the results.
During the first week name after name fell off
Prominent liberals
the Committee s letterhead.
and literary figures issued statements deploring
their mistake. And a number of people protested that their names had been used without
.1^5
permission.
,

1

.

.

It was for her a "providential escape."

The Party's pressure

tactics had taken the decision out of her hands.

Like a

simple reflex which makes one side with the weak, she

"rebounded to the defense of the Committee without

a single

hesitation," examined the trial's record, and became "a
little bit hipped on the subject of Trotsky," which gained

her a certain notoriety.
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Like a number of others, Miss McCarthy became an

"anti-Communist" at the times of the trials "by accident and

"
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almost unwillingly."

And she was branded

Trotskyite.

a

But

this was a different kind of conversion than that experienced

by the experts or the bruised souls who felt deceived by the

Nazi-Soviet pact:
We were luckier.
Our anti-Communism came to
us neither as the fruit of a special wisdom nor
as a humiliating awakening from a prolonged deception, but as a natural event, the product of
chance and propinguity.
.

.

.

It was too late for her to become a Marxist.

For Marxism

was "something you had to take up young, like ballet

dancing.
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Louis Adamic underwent

a not

dissimilar experience.

An immigrant from Yugoslavia, this free-lance writer on

ethnic groups in America was something of

a

mid-December, 1936, he left for Guatemala.

"drifter."

In

But when he at-

tempted to renew his visa in mid-February of the next year,
his reguest was denied.

As a result, he returned to the

United States, "puzzled, upset, chagrined," only to discover
list
that his name appeared at the top of the alphabetical

on the Defense Committee's letterhead.

Inundated with tele-

that
phone calls about his "membership," he was informed

few weeks earlier Pravda had printed
was not a Committee member:

portant whether

I

was or not?

"I
.

a

dispatch stating he

wondered:
.

."
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a

why was it so im-

Adamic discovered

Committee's
that Ben Stolberg had added his name to the
also sent
roster on his own initiative; Stolberg had
"Trotskyite"
Committee mail to Guatemala. Apparently this
from nervous Guatemala
material had resulted in his expulsion
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The two writers had heated words over the affair, and their

relationship became strained:

was

"I

Without delay Adamic wrote

a

— naturally — angry."

1

59

letter to the Defense

Committee requesting that his name be removed from its
roster.

But before he could mail it, diverse Stalinists,

anti-Trotskyites

,

and "professional, neurotically loyal, and

well-meaning friends of the Soviet Union pounced on me.
Resign

I

Resign!"

If he did not quit, he would never get a

visa to the USSR, and his books would not be translated into
Russian.

Finally one "Kenneth Durante," member of

a

wealthy

Philadelphia family who had gone "'proletarian'" and worked
for Tass, called and demanded to know if Adamic was or was

not a member of the Defense Committee:

This was a little too much. Was this U.S.A. or
wasn't it? One thing I have never been able to
The conversation
stand is pressure_t actics
with Durante /sic/ ended abruptly. Next day I
received a letter from him, which in tone and
obvious purpose was offensive to me.
.

refused to
As a result of this "near-intimidation," Adamic

withdraw and became briefly interested in the Defense
reservaCommittee, even though he continued to have deep

tions about its purposes.
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were
People like Mary McCarthy and Louis Adamic

least
"challenging the best-organized, most articulate,

wrote Eugene
squeamish pressure group in American life,"
total prestige and
Lyons, "a pressure group backed by the
the Soviet Union
resources of a great foreign nation," i.e.,
there were
Besides the organized telephone campaign,
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barrages of telegrams and letters, and threats that their

livelihood and friendships would be adversely affected by
this folly.

In his exaggerated manner, Lyons wrote that

this campaign was part of the "Red Terror," an organized effort by the "mud gunners, character assassins and poison-gas

brigades" to discredit renegades and deserters, and transform them as rapidly as possible "into hideous moral lepers,

intellectual perverts and germ carriers of fascism,
Trotskyism, etc."
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Despite Lyons' hyperbole, there is no doubt that the
Party used bribes (trips to the Soviet Union) and threats
(damaged book sales) to destroy the Defense Committee.
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It was open season on the "Trotskyite traitors."

Resignations
The "lynching" campaign was a partial success.

few members were terrorized into withdrawing.

A

Others may

have resigned from honest doubts about the effect of an impartial inquiry on Soviet prestige.

And some may have

originally joined the ranks in order to "resign publicly and
smear the committee in the role of ex-members."
the reason,

Whatever

at least nine members withdrew from the

Committee's roster.
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came
Perhaps the most strident letter of resignation

editor on the
from the pen of Mauritz A. Hallgren, an
In a fourteen-page
Baltimore Sun, and no foe of the Party.
received
epistle, dated January 27, 1937, and which

a

wide
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dissemination, Hallgren used convoluted logic to justify his
resignation.

Originally he had joined the Committee in

order to obtain political asylum for Trotsky and provide

him a fair hearing.

There was no desire to be "'just' or

in the meaningless sense that those terms are

'liberal'

usually employed by American liberals."

But it was possible

Stalin had perverted Soviet justice; Zinoviev and Kamenev

might have confessed in return for
sentences.

a

mitigation of their

The possibility of a double-cross, however, had

been erased by the subsequent confessions of Pyatakov and
Radek, who surely knew their fate.

There was no reason to

seek in mysticism or in dark magic the reasons for their

confessions, argued Hallgren:

"Why not accept the plain

fact that the men are guilty?

And this fact, if accepted

with regard to the men now on trial, must also be accepted
first
with regard to the men who were executed after the

trial."
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evidence
Hallgren went on to contend that the Soviet

convincing,"
against the accused was both "substantial and
framed was "backed
while the counter-charge that they were
or otherwise."
up by no evidence of any kind, convincing

If

clear the men on
Trotsky was withholding evidence that might
a commission of inquiry,
before
it
present
to
planning
trial,
cynicism," charged
this was simply an attitude of "astounding
not perfect,
Although the case against Trotsky was
him is very strong inagainst
evidence
"circumstantial
the
court with "his hands clean"
deed." Until Trotsky came into

Hallgren.

s;

(i.e., ceased his efforts to destroy the Soviet government),

Hallgren would remain convinced that "the present liberal
movement to win justice for him is nothing more than

a

Trotskyite maneuver against the Soviet Union and against
socialism."

The Defense Committee had become a Trotskyite

"instrument " for political intervention in Soviet affairs

nothing less was implied by an
the Moscow trials.'"
that,

"I

"•

impartial investigation of

In conclusion Hallgren proudly declared

do not intend under any circumstances to allow my-

self to become a party to any arrangement that has for its

objective purpose (whatever might be its subjective justification) the impairment or destruction of the socialist system

now being built in Soviet Russia."
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And so, with these

words, Mister Hallgren withdrew from the fray.

The Party rejoiced.

ment it had its point

d'

appui

With Hallgren'
.

s

ponderous state-

After publishing the letter,

members.
the New Masses solicited reactions from Committee
the happy
In its issue for February 16, 1937, it announced

Clothing
news that Jacob Billikopf, of the Amalgamated
editor of The
Workers of America, and Paul Ward, Washington

Nation

,

had resigned.

The literary journal of the Party also

Jaffe, and
published communications from Lewis Gannett, Sam
Gannett, literary critic of the New York
Le Roy Bowman.
a member of
Herald Tribune claimed that he had never been
,

after a protest his
the Trotsky Defense Committee, but even

name continued to be used in its publicity.

In Gannett'

organ for "the propagation
an
become
had
Committee
the
opinion

,
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of Trotskyism, an organ of apparently indiscriminate attack

upon the Soviet Union."

He was unsure of the facts about

the Moscow trials but, on the other hand,
in Mr. Trotsky

1

s

"I

have no faith

virginal innocence of the art of conspiracy

and no sympathy with the dogmatic fulminations of this mis-

named committee."
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'

The well-known actor, Sam Jaffe, wrote

that his initial concern had been for political asylum.

With this task accomplished, his connection with the Defense
Committee had automatically been brought to

a

close.

He

assured the New Masses that his name was no longer listed on
the Committee roster and added:

friend of Soviet Russia."
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"I

feel myself a genuine

As for Le Roy Bowman, of

Columbia University and the League for Industrial Democracy,
he felt that the members of the Defense Committee were too

sympathetic to Trotsky's political philosophy, and informed
them in

a

letter of resignation that his sympathies were

Russia
much more "with the present Communist government in

than with the opposition."
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"Stinkers' Committee"
faintThe climax of this early effort to browbeat
in February
hearted liberals on the Defense Committee came
one which de1937 with the issuance of an "Open Letter,"
of the Red
serves "a place of honor among the curios a
169 Authored by Corliss Lament, the "generalissimo"
Decade."
it boasted the
of the campaign to split the Committee,
writers, teachers,
signature of a remarkable collection of
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social workers, artists, and clergymen.

This group was

known as the "'stinkers' committee'" to those who resisted
its blandishments.
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Corliss Lamont was the second son of Thomas Lamont,

board chairman of

J.

P.

Morgan & Co.

Wealthy in his own

right, he used a considerable fortune to underwrite a host
of causes dear to the left, and abhorrent to his family.

The Party was delighted to use its in-house millionaire (and

Professor of Philosophy at Columbia) as
like bigoted atheists exhibiting

Eugene Lyons:

a

"rather

a front,

renegade bishop," claimed

"In time a patina of eccentricity came to

cover poor Lamont 's identity from head to toe."
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Chairman

of the "Friends of the Soviet Union," Lamont suffered for

his enthusiasm in the 1950s, when he was forced to fight

a

contempt citation from Congress, as well as an effort by the
State Department to deny him a passport.

At the beginning

this
of the 1960s he joined in issuing another statement,

one deploring the Vietnam War.

Currently he is

ideologue of the American Humanist movement,

a

leading

a way of

life

and sets up
"that rejects belief in any form of supernatural

man's chief
the happiness and welfare of all mankind as

science and
ethnical /sic7 aims, using methods of reason and
This faith
democracy as solutions for all human problems."
172
Ceremony.
Wedding
led him recently to author A Humanist

charged that
In this 1937 appeal to liberals Lamont

featured "bitter denuncia
Defense Committee publications had
and its speakers had even
government,
Soviet
the
of
tions"
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advocated "armed uprising."

There was simply no need for an

"impartial investigation'" of the trials, contended Lamont:
they had been fairly conducted and the Committee had "offered
no shred of evidence to the contrary."

The proposed inquiry,

therefore, could only be considered "political intervention
in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union with hostile intent.

"

Not content with this appeal, Lamont addressed four

specific questions to his liberal targets.

If "you" were

intent on defending the rights of asylum and free speech,

did not the alignment with Trotskyite enemies of the USSR
"only result in confusion and the distortion of true

liberalism?"

with

a

Again, were "you" willing to become allied

movement that had opposed the "progressive movement

undertaken by the Soviet Union under the five-year plan and
the Soviet foreign policy of peace and international under-

standing?" He also inquired whether "you" had considered the

effect of the Committee's activities "in lending support to
the fascist forces which are attacking democracy in Spain

and throughout the world?" The last question, however, was

the piece de resistance of the inspired appeal:

Should not a country recognized as engaged
in improving conditions for all its people,
whether or not one agrees with all the means
whereby this is brought about, be permitted to
decide for itself what measures of protection
are necessary against treasonable plots to assassinate and overthrow its leadership'-3 and in1
volve it in war with foreign powers?
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This deftly worded petition played on the liberal
fear of being considered a "reactionary," let alone a

"Trotskyite

ments/

1

.

"

It reminded its readers of Soviet "achieve-

at the same time it raised the specter of fascist

aggression.

The communique, in addition, discouraged any

questioning of Soviet motives, means, or ends.

In other

words, it solicited a faith of the heart, not the head, in
all matters Russian.

The "Open Letter," moreover, completely

ignored debatable questions of fact in the Moscow trials,
and failed to explain how an "impartial investigation" could

damage Soviet prestige assuming that justice had truly been
served.

This plea was addressed to the emotions, not critical
faculties, and yet a distinguished number of "intellectuals"

found its message so convincing that they joined in endorsing
the basic statement.

Among the signers were the hardy per-

ennials whose names appeared under almost every such petition
in the 1930s.

It was no surprise to see the likes of Heywood

Broun, Malcolm Cowley, Louis Fischer, Granville Hicks,

Rockwell Kent, Robert Morss Lovett, Donald Ogden Steward,
and Anna Louise Strong ratifying the document.

Also listed

Dreiser,
were some politically inclined writers— Theodore

Henry
Lillian Hellman, Ring Lardner, Jr., Dorothy Parker,
Roth, Nathaniel West.

Joining them were academics from such

institutions as Smith, Bryn Mawr, Hunter, CCNY, Sarah
Lawrence, and Harvard.
tures of Robert

S.

But more surprising were the signa-

Lynd, Paul M. Sweezy, and Lillian

I

D.

Wald,
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all people of independence and considerable mental acuity.

There is no need at this late date to compile yet
another scroll of the "simple-minded."

The eighty-eight

signers probably had eighty-eight different reasons for en-

dorsing the appeal, good and sufficient at the time.
name must be singled out

— Colonel

Raymond Robins.

But one

In 1917-18

Robins had direct dealings with Trotsky in Petrograd.

Through him certain Bolshevik appeals were transmitted to

Woodrow Wilson and the figures at the Versailles Peace
Conference.

In a sense, Trotsky first brought Robins into

Even if Robins later

the limelight and made his reputation.

preferred Stalin's "socialism in one country" to Trotsky's
"permanent revolution," his personal relations with Trotsky

should have convinced him that the Old Bolshevik was hardly
a "fascist agent"

befuddled.

at this late date.

Dreiser may have been

Robins should have known better.
V.
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The Battle is Joined

By early 1937 the sides were clearly drawn.

On one

the
side were the "Trotskyite renegades," on the other were

"stinkers."
day.

Rhetorical barrages became the order of the

For instance, Earl Browder at a mass meeting in

Madison Square Garden placed Trotsky in

a

class with Aaron

an enemy of
Burr and Benedict Arnold, since the Russian was

Communism.
"Twentieth Century Americanism," i.e., American

Browder charged that
At another gathering of the faithful
running through a
Trotsky was an "'egomaniac firebrand' "
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world full of explosives.
he desired,

He was applying his torch wherever

'"hoping for nothing so much as a new world war,

from which alone he sees his hopes of glory and power.

1

1,175

For its part, the Defense Committee responded with press releases that disparaged Soviet justice.

Just before the

opening of the Pyat akov-Radek trial, it publicly called on
the Soviet government to delay the proceedings until Committee

representatives could reach Moscow.

Modest were the demands:

"'We ask the right of the commission to move freely through

the U.S.S.R., to be present at the forthcoming trials with

stenographers, to interview the prisoners privately.'"

These

were just the "'normal'" rights allowed in political trials
in democratic countries.
It was a battle of mimeograph machines and mass

meetings, the advantage clearly lying with the defenders of
Soviet justice.

No matter, a steady stream of newsletters,

press releases, and pamphlets were sent out from Committee

headquarters on East 17th Street in New York City.

Local

branches were organized in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago,
Minneapolis, San Francisco and Cleveland.

Meetings were

held incessantly to spread the message and raise desperately

needed funds.

177

Max Shachtman, James Rorty, and Gus Tyler

of the Socialist Call

,

for instance, spoke in Boston at the

Old South Meeting House.

Shachtman was particularly active.

He embarked on a

only
speaking junket that took him to Hollywood, where

showed up, mostly
score or so of the local celebrities

a
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Europeans of some distinction and political sophistication:
"The native luminaries did not respond.

play the smallest interest or concern."

They did not dis178

It was all a bit

discouraging.
"Cut Wire"

The Committee saved its greatest organizing efforts
for a mass meeting on February

9

in the old Hippodrome

It was designed to institute "the public drive of

theater.

the Committee to create the Commission of Inquiry."
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Among

those scheduled to speak were the ubiquitous Shachtman,

George Novack, Roy Burt of the Socialist Party, and Angelica

Balabanoff
fairs.

,

once close to Lenin and active in Comintern af-

But the main attraction was the great man himself, or

at least his disembodied voice, speaking directly from

Mexico City via

a

telephonic connection.

Trotsky promised

fifteen
to speak forty-five minutes in English, and another
180 This was to be a little like the old days,
in Russian.

multitudes in
when the dynamic orator thrilled the assembled

Petrograd's Cirque Moderne.
was
In the opinion of Max Shachtman the gathering
in
"the most dramatic labor defense meeting

a

generation,

,,181

curious came to hear
in truth, an impressive number of the
policemen.
Trotsky, estimated at 6500-6600, including 500
preliminary addresses,
The audience patiently listened to the

while waiting for the main event.

waited some more.

It waited,

and then

conThere was something wrong with the

nection to Mexico City.

Few audiences have ever presented

U

:

,
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such a picture of "strained attentiveness

later wrote Shachtman:

,

of anxiety,"

"At the slightest sound from the

amplifying apparatus, which seemed to indicate that

a

good

telephone connection had at last been established, an impressive silence immediately gripped the assembled thousands." 182

But it was not to be.

from Mexico City were Trotsky

s
'

The only words that came

'"heartiest fraternal

greetings,'" spoken alone to Shachtman.
went dead again.

Then the connection
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Deeply disappointed, but also "deeply-stirred," the
audience remained until after midnight to hear Shachtman

read from an advance text flown to New York.

In this care-

fully prepared address, Trotsky apologized ahead of time for
his "impossible English," made an impassioned plea for the

formation of

a

commission of inquiry, and analyzed the

"glaring" contradictions in the first two trials.

On the

subject of Pyatakov's phantom flight to Oslo, for instance,

Trotsky declared that Pyatakov had been forced to fly in
"an imaginary airplane,

just as the Holy Inquisition forced

witches to go to their rendezvous with the devil on

a

broom-

But the most dramatic moment of the meeting came

stick."

when Trotsky announced (through Shachtman) that he had

nothing to hide and was ready to appear before an impartial
commission
if this commission decides that I_
declare:
am guilty in the slightest degree of the crimes
which Stalin imputes to me I_ pledge in advance
to place myself voluntarily in the hands o_f the
executioners of the G. P.
I

.

If the commission finds the trials to be frame-ups, a bullet

would not be necessary for the falsifiers:

"No, the eternal

disgrace in the memory of human generations will be sufficient for them!

Do the accusers of the Kremlin hear me?

throw my defiance in their faces.
reply!"
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And

I

await their

This address was published under the title,

Stake My Life

!

,

I

I_

and widely disseminated.

What happened to the telephone connection?

The

Defense Committee strongly suspected sabotage, but could not
prove it.
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The telephone authorities blamed it on "mechan-

ical interferences,'" the kind that could happen at any
I

time.

OC

Trotsky himself was not ready to charge deliberate

interference, but had strong doubts, especially since the

technicians involved belonged to Lombardo Toledano's union
in Mexico, hardly a friendly organization.

The would-be

speaker had been sitting in Rivera's house in front of

a

microphone, when the technicians suddenly announced that
there was too much resonance in this room.

Then followed

a

taxi ride through a dangerous section of the capital to an-

other location, but nothing was ready; indifferent workers

watched as Trotsky himself scurried about looking for the
proper chairs and table.

Then the amplifier refused to work,

followed by the suggestion to use
tus, which also proved impossible.

a

simple telephone apparaAll this time at least

negligence,
two of the workers showed an "attitude not only of

but also of hostility."

In the absence of the necessary

that the
technical knowledge, Trotsky could not affirm
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workers were at fault, "but the least that can be said is
that the complete absence of good will certainly aggravated
the technical difficulties and made the transmission of the
discourse impossible." 187 According to a dispatch to The

New York Times from Mexico, Trotsky dropped all work the
next day to "'find himself,'" as he was "'furiously angry'"
at the whole episode.

Much of the city, however, was still

"'laughing'" over the Trotsky affair.

1

88

Liberal Weeklies Wobble
In the meanwhile, the war of words escalated in New

York's various journals.
took a hard line.

trials.

a

,

naturally,

There was no "mystery" about the trials

that needed explanation.

reprinted

Soviet Russia Today

In support of this position, it

whole series of "expert" commentaries on the

The British Labor M.P., D. N. Pritt, was given much

space for his laudatory comments on Soviet justice; he was

'"indeed impressed'" that the Soviet Union could build the
White Sea Canal, among other feats, and also build a "'fine
judicial system and a fine tradition.'"

The eminent British

historian, Bernard Pares, after studying the first trial's
record, praised Vyshinsky's examination of the accused as
the
"•a close work of dispassionate reasoning,'" in which

guilt of the 16 defendants was '"completely brought home,'"
a

rather incredible statement.

189

After the second trial,

was
Dudley Collard, another British barrister, wrote that he

complimented
convinced of the defendants' guilt, and also

i

.

,
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Vyshinsky on treating the accused "with remarkable restraint
and courtesy."

Lion Feuchtwanger

the German novelist, con-

,

tributed the remark that the Pyat akov-Radek trial had been

a

"beacon" to anti-fascist forces, and had built "a new barrier
against war." 190 Soviet Russia Today even printed some com-

ments by Newton D. Baker, Woodrow Wilson's anti-Soviet
Secretary of War, in which he assayed Trotsky as probably
"

1

the greatest realist now living,

parently attempted to form

a

1

"

because he had ap-

"'new triumvirate of Hitler,

Trotsky and Japan,'" an unbeatable combination.
own part

,
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For their

the editors of the fellow-traveling journal re-

minded such liberals as John Dewey, Sidney Howard, and John
Dos Passos of Stalin's words in 1931:

Trotskyism

,

even when the

1

"'Liberalism towards

atter is shattered and concealed

is stupidity bordering on crime, bordering on treason against
i

the working class.'"

go

The uncovering of fascist plots in

the Soviet Union should occasion no surprise, as they had

been uncovered in other nations as well:
The difference between the forms these plots
take in the Soviet Union and elsewhere is that
in the Soviet Union there are no elements
either among officers or men in the army, and
no dissatisfied elements among the masses of
the population to serve as grist for the
fascist mill.
Five months after these reassuring words were published, the

high command of the Red Army was decimated in

a

search for

fascist agents
But the editorial comments of The New Republic and
those
The Nation counted much more in liberal circles than

.
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of self-proclaimed "friends" of the Soviet Union.

Both

liberal journals had an opportunity, nay, obligation to assay

fairly the Russian enigma, but both chose the path of "agnosticism."

In the face of serious questions about the Russian

trials, they advocated a "know-nothing" toleration of the

incredible
With the resignation of Freda Kirchwey from the

Trotsky Defense Committee, it was no surprise that The Nation
avoided making

a

choice between the "intolerable alternatives"

that the two trials had presented.

After all, it might well

be "another hundred years before all the actual facts about

the recent Soviet trials are known."

In trying to separate

"legal procedures from political realities and both from

matters of faith," The Nation tended to trust the confessions of guilt in the second trial because of the stature of
the defendants and the "relentless piling up of the testi-

mony."

One could believe the tales of domestic power strug-

gle, but more difficult was the charge of conspiracy with

fascist powers.

"Here one can only suspend judgment."

The

charges of foreign conspiracy attempts may have been dethe
signed to discredit "Trotskyism" and unite the nation in

face of war, continued the editorial.

But these conspira-

Union;
cies raised doubts about placing trust in the Soviet
by
the regime had actually sowed the seeds of conspiracy

making opposition illegal.

Until stability allowed the

"sympathetic
establishment of democratic safeguards, the
Soviet government
outside observer" could merely offer to the
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"a measure of just criticism," while refusing to use the

trials as a curtain to draw down upon Russia's many "positive

achievements in building a collective economy and

a

1 94
culture. "L

Its sister publication, The New Republic

,

found the

Pyatakov-Radek trial even "more unbelievable and yet more
authentic" than the Zinoviev-Kamenev drama.

"It is of

course impossible for anyone sitting in New York to pass

a

judgment that is worth anything on these Russian trials,"

wrote the editors.

It was equally impossible that any in-

vestigation, as demanded by Trotsky, would have "any value,"
since Trotsky would be the sole witness.

Even if he were

guilty, his correspondence would not reveal this fact:
"when you conspire to overthrow the government of the

largest country in the world, you do not put your plans on

paper and keep

a

carbon copy."

Still, although The New

Republic editors believed that the "weight of the evidence"

supported Walter Duranty's confidence in the confessions'
integrity, the whole episode was a "disaster," exposing many

hostile internal enemies of the regime.

More important,

just at a time when it seemed true that the world was

divided into two camps, "fascist and democratic," the trials
gave comfort to the fascist forces in Italy, Germany, and
Japan.

This was more than a Russian tragedy, the editorial

concluded, it was "a tragedy for the whole world."
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America,"
In another editorial on "Russian Politics in
The New Republic regretted that

a

substantial number of

f

"

liberals had rushed into the "hot controversy" over the
trials, and thus disrupted the necessary "unity" for ensuring

domestic reforms.

Of course, everyone with an intelligent

interest in world affairs should pay attention to this
"remarkable and puzzling event," but it was not necessary
for them to "let their emotions so run away with their common

sense as to fight a sham battle about the trial on this side
of the Atlantic."

Around the few known facts an "elaborate

embroidery of speculation" had arisen, but in the editors'
opinion, "fair-minded persons" should avoid drawing final

conclusions until more was known.

Minds should be held open

for further evidence; liberals should not join one side or

another of the quarrel.

"It remains for us, who have a

larger degree of political freedom, to defend it by fighting
for it at home

.

It was all so reasonable.

Avoid controversy, keep

the faith, and concentrate on nurturing one's own garden.

However, the readers' columns in the two liberal weeklies
soon featured a number of dissenting views.

Suzanne La

Follette wrote The Nation that its editorial stand was really
a

"rationalization" about different concepts of justice.

Be-

cause the trial happened in Russia, not in Germany, the
and
journal adopted an attitude of Olympian impartiality,
the
proceeded by implication "to indorse or at least condone

whole questionable procedure."

With a certain prescience,

"left-handed indorseshe suggested that in ten years this

October Revolution is
ment of Stalin's liquidation of the
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something that its editors would prefer to forget."

This

superficial examination, wrote Ms. La Follette, was really
just "a protective show of pseudo-liberal hocus-pocus." 197

In another letter, Franz Hoellering, a refugee from

Hitlerite Germany and a former editor of the Berliner

Zeitung

,

reminded The Nation

1

s

editors that if they sus-

pended judgment on the decisive issue of fascist plots, how
could they judge at all:

"The really objective observer

will suspend all judgment, and demand evidence again and
again."

In a telling remark, he suggested that behind the

editorial was at best "the fear and horror which certain
liberal idealists feel when brought face to face with cruel

expressions of moving history."
a Friend," James Rorty,
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a freguent

And in "Harsh Words from

contributor to The Nation

wrote that for twenty years he had trusted that in

a

situa-

tion involving moral and intellectual integrity The Nation

would "deal with it honestly and courageously."
test of the Moscow trials it had failed

disgracefully."

But on the

— "patently,

There was no reason to wait

a

grossly,

hundred years

to judge, as Trotsky had already exposed many contradictions
in the testimony.

Must we depend on the conservative press,

asked Rorty, to fit these exposures together and draw the
right conclusions?

another magazine?"

Must we now think of The Nation as "just
199

The New Republic also received its share of dis-

gruntled letters.

Weldon Burke accused the journal of

of
"illiberalism," and charged that it took "a good deal

,

training in partisan analysis to hold that because additional
investigation might not conclusively determine some question,
such investigation should not be held." 200

James T. Farrell

and John Chamberlain wrote that the precious rights of political asylum and a fair hearing "cannot be consistently de-

fended if we remain silent concerning the Moscow trials."

Another disappointed liberal, Martha Gruening, contended
that one need not be a Trotskyite "to demand more conclusive

proof than this of guilt in

steadfastly denies it."

202

a

defendant who consistently and

Finally a letter appeared, signed

by ten contributors to The New Republic (and all members of
the Trotsky Defense Committee), protesting the editorial

stand of the magazine and urging an impartial counter-trial
of the type that followed the Reichstag Fire case

203
.

And so

the battle raged.

To wait until the year 2037 before bringing in

verdict, in line with the slogan,

bolder,'"
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a

"'the older, the

was to accept the basic integrity of the trials,

if not all their parts.

To urge suspended judgment and

unity at home was tantamount to giving Stalin an absolute
free hand and forgiving "the minor peccadilloes of a hard205 And to plead for neutrality was to
working dictator!"

counter
deny Trotsky an effective forum from which he could

Stalin's calumnies.

In effect, both liberal journals

from
heartedly desired that the disagreeable Trotsky fade
threaten the solidarity of the left, something

sight, and not

of a dream at best.

On the grounds of political expediency,
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Trotsky's reputation was to be sacrificed; alone he could
hardly hope to match the legions of Moscow sycophants eager
to damn his memory for time immemorial.

In all fairness,

The Nation and The New Republic hardly whitewashed the

trials.

As Frank Warren has written, they did question some

charges and worried over the weaknesses revealed in the
Soviet system, but the "final effect was to prevent

questioning of the verdicts.
was discouraged.

"

a

basic

Even discussion of the trials

"With partisanship quelled, all that re-

mained was the official version or an agnosticism which
doubted the parts but accepted the whole.
they 'apologized'

for the trials."

In this sense
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Declaration of Principles
Under the pressure of incessant leers and sneers
from Party loyalists, the Trotskyite "renegades" felt
to define their aims

a

need

in such a way as to attract the sup-

port of the "silent majority," liberal style.

It was all

to hide
very well to declare that "those who have something

need fear the truth,"

207

but it was also necessary to answer

and apsome of the many objections to the proposed inquiry,

peal to traditional liberal sentiments.
School for
A membership meeting was held in the New

Social Research on March

1,

1937.
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Herbert Solow addressed the meeting.

Both George Novack and
But it was John Dewey

After
aims.
who insisted on some statement of Committee
Committee,
complimenting the "great work" of the Executive

:
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Dewey endorsed Novack's contention that the issues raised in
the Trotsky case ranked with "the historic issues in the

cases of Dreyfuss and Sacco and Vanzetti."

In calling for a

declaration of principles, Dewey argued that it would help
the Committee with those who had raised questions about the

Committee's objectives, and also with the larger group of

confused and responsible people who say, "'a plague on both
your houses.'"

If the Committee were to mean anything,

charged Dewey, it must form a Commission of Inquiry, but
this required public support.

Therefore the Committee must

convince prospective commissions "of our sincerity of purpose and of the honesty and integrity of the plans of pro-

cedure suggested to the Commission, so that it may effec-

tively accomplish its task."

209

On the motion of Professor Dewey the membership

meeting adopted a Declaration of Principles, which read in
part
"The American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky holds that social advance, the very
possibility of human progress, is inseparable
from the establishment and dissemination of
social truths; to let the truth be known is all
the more essential when it is obscure and conWe hold, also, despite our diverse
tested.
political opinions, that the immemorial right
of asylum for political refugees of all shades
of opinion should be universally maintained.
We hold, also, that no man accused of crime
shall be condemned as a pariah on the face of
the earth who has not been given a full and fair
opportunity to present his answer to his accusers and to argue his innocence.
have
"We, who today affirm these principles,
than
in the past actively defended them more
politonce, aiding the fight on behalf of the
The
ically persecuted of many viewpoints.
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charge that we were the tools of political
movements with which we disagreed, the charge
that we were obstructing merited punishment,
did not stop us from defending Sacco and
Vanzetti, do not stop us from calling for the
freedom of Tom Mooney or the political prisoners of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy,
"This Committee as such is indifferent to
the political program of Trotsky; the overwhelming majority of our members are not
Trotskyites.
But that tradition which we have
in the past made our own would, even if
Trotsky were not known to us as one who for
four decades has opposed the very tendencies
whose agent he is now charged with being, require today that we intervene between him and
all who would, in advance of any clear verdict
against him, convict him, punish him and
abandon him to the contempt of history. "210
These "principles" had a noble ring, dear to the heart of any

libertarian, but in a sense they were an evasion of the

practical problems facing the Committee.
One could easily agree with Dewey in the abstract

that "no man accused of crime shall be condemned as a pariah
on the face of the earth who has not been given a full and

fair opportunity to present his answer to his accusers," but
In the first

what constituted a full and fair opportunity?

place, "what agency is competent to hold an impartial in-

quiry and mete out justice?"

211

Lacking even

a

tenuous link

with the
to a quasi- judicial organ, the Committee was faced

capitalist
ironic situation of creating a self-appointed

court to decide a question of Soviet justice.
macy" could not be borrowed from

a

If "legiti-

governmental organ, then

be of such impecthe members of the proposed inquiry must

could fairly be
cable authority that no taint of partiality
moment in the Committee -s
this
at
Yet
them.
against
charged

i
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endeavors little attention had been given to this situation.
Then, of course, there was also the problem of proper judi-

cial procedures.

Was Trotsky to be the sole witness, or was

he to be confronted with his accusers?
A.

Statement of Principles had been adopted, but

these practical questions had been given little attention.

Yet the Committee was already committed to forming

Commission of Inquiry.

a

A whole host of voices were being

raised to begin at once the work of investigating the
charges.

Besides the defense committees in Canada, Mexico,

England, France, Czechoslavakia, Switzerland, and Holland,

there were other political groups agitating for
quiry.

a

quick in-

Among them were the Polish Bund, the International

Bureau of the Socialist Medical Doctors, and the Workers
Party of Marxist Unification in Spain (P.O.U.M.), along with
a series of groups

associated with the Fourth International.

In the United States such organizations as the Furniture
Workers' Union #1859, the Northern States Power Local Union
160, the General Drivers'

Union 544, and the Akron local of

idea
the United Rubber Workers of America all endorsed the
of an international commission of inquiry.

212

Such endorse-

ments hardly constituted an overwhelming show of support,
but they could not be easily ignored.

sion must be formed in quick order.

Some kind of commis-
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The Old Man Fumes

While New York liberals debated Dewey's "principles,"

Trotsky was consumed with impatience in Mexico.

From the

first day he stepped on the New World, Trotsky had inces-

santly agitated for the creation of a commission.

months later little had been accomplished.

Yet two

And there was the

danger that an unfriendly group might utilize

a

pseudo-

commission to discredit him.
In early March something called the Socialist Front
of Lawyers of Mexico moved to establish just such an inguiry.

Trotsky sensed a danger in such

a move.

In a letter addressed

to the President of the Lawyers' Front, he contended that

such

a

proposed inguiry indicated

a

"lack of confidence

which the Moscow trials have provoked in large sections of
public opinion."

However, a New York Committee of "entirely

authoritative composition" had taken upon itself the initiative for establishing

a

commission, including representa-

tives from the worlds of politics, arts, science, etc.

The

Committee's chief task was to "assure to the investigating

commission
authority."

a

composition such that it will enjoy general
Without guestioning the Front's motives,

Trotsky warned that other groups, not motivated by

a

dis-

ininterested search for truth, but "by political passions,

trigues behind the scenes, and even corruption pure and
simple," might form commissions of inguiry.

Therefore, it

the Fronts'
would be "disloyalty" on Trotsky's part to aid
New York one,
proposed commission without permission from the

"
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to which he had already offered his papers.

He suggested

that the Mexican commission collaborate with the inter-

national commission and direct its work into channels "which
will protect you from all reproach.

Trotsky had the jitters.

1,213

The unhurried pace of dis-

cussions in New York might allow the Stalinists to form
their own "so-called commission."

In sharp terms he criti-

cized the New York "'laggards'" on several occasions for

wanting to form an ideal commission of well-rounded proportions, and thus allow his enemies to steal a march on him. 214
One such impatient letter reached Suzanne La Follette, who

reacted with alacrity:
immediately took up the matter with the
Defense Committee and we proceeded to move
I think the reason we required
quickly.
Trotsky's prodding was that we had all
thought of an international commission as
necessarily consisting of Very Important
Trotsky took care of that by rePeople.
minding me that the Commission would gain
standing through the importance of its work.
I

Something had to be done, quickly.
Not only did Trotsky goad such liberals as Ms. La

Follette, but he laid down the line to his followers in

America.

In a revealing letter to "all the comrades in the

Committee," dated March 17, 1937, and marked
he gave them their marching orders.

"

Confidential

,

For two months, wrote

Trotsky, he had been very cautious about expressing his
"doubts,

apprehensions, and criticisms," but now he could

state without hesitation that "the general line of our comrades in the committee is not correct."

The weakness of

I
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policy, or rather, "the full absence of any policy," was

paralyzing the Committee and threatening to result in an impasse.

As a result, Trotsky delivered a scolding to his

political pupils.
In the first discussions with George Novack and Max

Shachtman, recalled the restless exile, the central topic
was the immediate creation of a commission of inguiry:
"This was the aim, the real aim, the general aim of all

further work."

But two months later he realized that this

question had been pushed aside, "first by the internal crisis
of the committee, and then by the lack of firmness, of

clarity, of a consistent line."

216

A certain "dilettantism,

joined by a political confusion," had probably created this
situation.

No matter, contended Trotsky, "the crisis was

overcome thanks to the masses"; the Hippodrome meeting in

February demonstrated "the desire of the workers to help the
committee."

Apparently confusing hordes of curious demi-

intellectuals with "the masses," Trotsky reproved his followers for not using this opportunity to present the first

nominees of the commission, and thus decisively encourage
the liberals.

But he was also guilty of not foreseeing this

depossibility, having believed the Committee would act

cisively

.

Continuing this partisan analysis, Trotsky expressed
which redispleasure with the "first draft of the statutes,"
the part
"purely adaptive and expectant" spirit on
Solow he had learned
Herbert
From
nucleus.
Trotskyite
the
of

vealed

a

"
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that Dewey's statutes were not

a

beginning, but "a thing in

themselves, a means of taking up time in the hope that from

good statutes an ideal commission will arise."

Such an ap-

proach was clearly unacceptable to the central figure of the
case, hardly a neophyte when it came to liberal tergiversa-

tions

:

This is a purely formalistic, purely juridical,
unpolitical and unMarxian conception. A small
inquiry commission, even though composed of
modest rank-and-file people (if the authorities
hesitate) can accomplish some very good work.
When it publishes the first collection of
depositions, documents, etc., about say, the
Copenhagen chapter, it will win an authority,
attract to itself the "nobility" and open up
new possibilities. However, the best statutes
in the world are sterile if the will to create
the inquiry commission immediately is lacking. 217

Even though John Dewey was primarily responsible for these
"unMarxian" statutes, Trotsky "highly" valued his participation, and understood he could not act otherwise, being not

for Stalin or Trotsky, just desiring to "establish the

truth."
"

This was not the case with the American Trotskyites:

You know the truth

.

"

They had a duty to preserve their

identity within the Committee, and any declaration of

principles should reflect both parties.

In his opinion,

a

special declaration should have been issued, setting forth
the Trotskyite position, and stating that an alliance had

been established with "honest liberals" in order to convince
the public of the justice of their case.

Such a declaration

would have been of "inappreciable value" in propaganda among
of
the masses, more important than "the abstract declaration

Dewey

.

.,218
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The issue was all important.

question, "but all questions will

Not only the trial
in the next period be

decided in dependence upon the inquiry commission."

Almost

issuing orders, Trotsky stated that the sub-commission delegation to Mexico must be organized in two or three davs.
"

Mon Dieu

,

the matter is not so complicated," he chided, if

the Committee were willing to accomplish its duty.

At the

same time the list of people for the full commission should
be established, and mandates obtained from international

committees in order to open an inquiry.

"This is the only

possibility of regaining the lost time and of beginning
new chapter in the history of the committee."

a

219

This sharply-worded communique clearly indicated

theoretical and practical differences within the Defense
Committee.

From Trotsky's standpoint, this was but another

tactical alliance with liberal opponents, a constant feature
of "Leninist-Bolshevik" experience, extending back to tem-

porary coalitions with Peter Struve and Paul Miliukov in the
early years of the century.

In such cases, the comrades

must strive to maintain their identity, identify the enemy,
and goad their transient allies into decisive action.

However, it was doubtful that John Dewey, Suzanne

La Follette, and Ben Stolberg understood that the Defense
Committee actually constituted
liberals and Trotskyites.

a

formal alliance between

In addition, while Trotsky had

general
scant patience for abstract declarations, such

participation
principles were the raison d'etre for liberal

289

in the effort.

hearing

— these

Fair play, political asylum, impartial
were not just empty words for Dewey & Co.

After all, the liberal members were being violently abused
for the defense of these very same "abstract" principles.
Also, at this late date Trotsky was willing to settle for
any commission, no matter how modest in composition, in line

with the dictum, "a bird in the hand

..."

But Suzanne La

Follette and others were concerned with recruiting "Very

Important People" in order to provide at least
authority.

truth

,

a

veneer of

Finally, Trotsky and his followers knew

"

the

and wanted a vehicle through which to propagandize

"

For their part, the liberals were much less

their message.

sure of the case, and wanted to establish the facts before

broadcasting them to the world.
Both sides desired the same goal:

a

quest for the facts, and thereby defend certain

principles dear to their hearts.
facts,

commission of

But the liberals were en-

inquiry to establish the truth.

gaged in

a

The Trotskyites knew the

and wanted to disseminate them for political purposes.

The "truth," then, came in assorted sizes, depending on the
angle of vision.
VI.

The Dewey Commission Is Born!

The impatient epistles from Mexico had their desired
effect.

Under the sting of Trotsky's acid pen, the Defense

and de
Committee abandoned the debate on general principles,

voted its energies to creating

a

commission of inquiry.
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Mandates were quickly obtained from the British Committee
for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, the French Comite pour
1

'

Enquete sur le Proces de Moscou

,

and the Czech

Internationales Komitee fur Recht und Wahrheit 220

The

.

necessary seed money for such an undertaking was obtained
from Margaret de Silver, a close friend of Carlo Tresca, who

later became his second wife.

Impressed by the drama of the

Hippodrome meeting, she donated $5,000 to the cause.
But it was still necessary to recruit public figures
for the "authoritative, impartial, international commission
of inquiry."

Faced with

a

personnel problem, the Defense

Committee took the initiative by "soliciting thirty competent
liberals, radicals and trade unionists committed neither to

Stalin's nor to Trotsky's political views, to serve upon it.
The first of this panel to accept membership constituted

themselves into an autonomous body."

222

But willing re-

cruits were hard to come by, for various reasons.

Among

those solicited were Edwin Borchard and Thomas Reed Powell
(two jurists), Van Wyck Brooks (writer), Abram L. Harris

(professor), Paul H. Douglas (economist), Frank

P.

Graham

(New-Dealer), and Gaetano Salvemini (anti-fascist refugee).
All declined the honor of joining the Trotsky jury.

"Impossible to Prove

a

223

Negative "

The many personal and political reasons for these
cases
figures to refuse the offer remain obscure, but in two

rejections.
there is ample evidence of the motives behind the
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The Defense Committee made a strenuous effort to enlist the

services of Charles A. Beard and Carl Becker, two of

America's most distinguished historians.

The invitation to

serve on the Commission was "a tribute to my sense of fair

play," wrote Beard to George Novack, "even if
serve it."

After

a

I

may not de-

"careful study" of the many documents in

the case, however, Beard reached certain conclusions which

precluded his acceptance of the offer.
In the first place, Beard wrote that even voluntary

confessions were not positive proof, especially when unsup-

ported by other evidence.

"Hence

I

do not regard the

charges that Mr. Trotsky entered into

a

conspiracy against

the Russian government as proved beyond all reasonable doubt."

Secondly, Beard argued that Trotsky should be considered

"innocent of these charges until corroborating evidence has

been produced."

But the famous historian also asserted that

the proposed commission would be unable to prove Trotsky's

innocence, since it was almost impossible to prove

a

negative

in such a case:

Naturally, as an old revolutionist, experienced
in the art, he would not keep incriminating records of the operations, if he did engage in them.
Furthermore, no person in the world could prove
that he was not engaged in a conspiracy, unless
he had a guard set over him every moment of the
In my opinion it
time covered by the charges.
is not incumbent upon Mr. Trotsky to do the impossible, that is, prove a negative by positive
It is incumbent upon his accusers to
evidence.
produce more than confessions, to produce corroborating evidence to specific and overt acts.

^

I
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Despite this emphatic refusal, both Louis Hacker and Norman

Thomas attempted to change Beard's mind.

However, Beard

once again replied that a sweeping negative could not be

proven, and that a "true verdict" was impossible, without

both sides being heard.

Only a "negative or qualified ver-

dict" could be brought in, which would serve "to enrage one
side or the other."

But personal considerations also en-

tered into this decision:

Although representatives of both sides who have
come to me now are sweet as honey, they have
written bitter things about me in the past, and
So I
will do so again, no matter what I do.
see no way to mitigate the bitterness of the
At
It will have to wear itself out.
conflict.
all events I am not under the delusion that I
could do anything that would satisfy either
side 225
.

Simply put, Beard had no stomach for the bitter attacks that

would inevitably come his way, if he agreed to lend his great
prestige to the Commission's endeavors.
Shortly after Beard's initial refusal, an offer was

tendered to Carl Becker to join the Mexican hearings or the
full Commission.

In a short note of regret, Becker cited

offer.
ill health and the press of work for refusing the

2

26

greater
Three weeks after the first letter, he replied at
not have
length, and informed Felix Morrow that he would

considerations,
served at any rate, irrespective of personal
Beard.
since he shared many of the objections raised by

In

needed to be
addition, he could not understand what Trotsky

opposed the
-•defended'" against, since the revolutionist

Soviet regime:
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From the point of view of his own philosophy
and his personal prestige, it would seem to
be his duty to further every effort to overthrow Stalin and establish true Communism in
Russia.
If Trotzky has not, as he asserts,
been involved in the alleged "conspiracy" to
attain that end the obvious question seems
to be, "Why not"?
,

No doubt Trotsky had good reasons, concluded Becker, and
these reasons
he needed.

,

whatever they might be

,

were all the

"'

defense

1
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Certainly the presence of either or both of these men
in Mexico would have "enhanced considerably the reputation of

the Commission."

themselves in

a

228

Yet they demurred, unwilling to involve

Russian "'family'" squabble.

Unlike John

Dewey, these two prominent liberals did not consider the

issues raised in the Trotsky case important tests of domestic

principles, in addition to their enormous implications for
any alliance with Stalin's Russia.

Since no "true verdict"

for time immemorial was possible, Beard and Becker preferred
to sit out this fracas. But surely questions of guilt or in-

nocence, judicial procedures, and the nature of evidence were

more than "'academic'" concerns.

229

In a real sense, the

Trotsky affair was testing the entire liberal ethos.
Members of the Sub-Commission
Despite some difficulties in recruiting likely candito hear
dates, a sub-commission was ready in early April 1937

Trotsky's testimony.

Three of its members had been active in

their exertions
the Defense Committee's labors, and continued
proceedings,
John Dewey agreed to chair the
on the new body.

"
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with Suzanne La Follette as the sub-commission's secretary.
In addition, the mercurial Ben Stolberg also joined the
230
,
select
group.

Another Defense Committee adherent scheduled to make
the long trek to Mexico was Carlo Tresca.

A refugee from

Italy, Tresca was a long-time anarcho-syndicalist, with an

impressive record in the American labor movement; he had

helped organize the Paterson, Lawrence, and Mesabi Range
strikes in the early years of the century.

Tresca had also

been active in the Sacco-Vanzetti defense effort.

With his

neatly trimmed beard, pince-nez, big black hat and flowing
cape, Tresca was one of America's

The editor of the strongly anti-

spected radicals in 1937.
fascist paper,

11^

most colorful and re-

Martello (The Hammer)

,

he had reportedly

been on the death list of his old friend, Mussolini, since
1931.

(In a fifty-year career Tresca had his throat cut, had

been kidnapped, had been shot at four times, and arrested
some thirty-six times.)

Browder & Co., being

a

In addition, he was no friend of

constant critic of the use of GPU

tactics in local political matters.

As a New York district

attorney phrased it, at one time or another Tresca had been
"'agin everything.'"

One of his enemies finally evened some

Tresca was gunned down on lower

scores on January 11, 1943.

Fifth Avenue in Manhatten,

a

mysterious attack still largely

unexplained to this day, but attributed both to the Fascists
and Communists.

232
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One member of the sub-commission was already living
in Mexico.

Otto Ruehle was a biographer of Karl Marx and,

as a Socialist member of the Reichstag, had joined Karl

Liebknecht in voting against war in 1914.

A leader of the

German Sparticist movement, 1919-22, Ruehle had dealt ex-

tensively with Lenin and Trotsky, an experience that still
rankled.

According to Ms. La Follette, he was "a bitter op-

ponent of Trotsky politically" and "sharply criticized the

policy of the Bolshevik government under Lenin and Trotsky
towards the socialist movement of Germany,"

which surfaced during the hearings.
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to her, feelings

But after the

counter-trial he became "a frequent guest" at Trotsky's
house, and the two old exiles brought out together The Living

Thoughts of Karl Marx

234
.

Another recruit for the sub-commission was Carleton
He was one

Beals, who arranged to meet the party in Mexico.

of Stolberg's "two or three best friends," and it was

Stolberg who suggested his name.

Well-known as

a

writer on

Latin-America, fluent in Spanish, and with special ties to
Mexico, Beals brought his own expertise to the panel, but

had taken no part in the Defense Committee's activities.

As

we shall see, however, Beals shattered the sub-commission's

solidarity in Mexico, and later castigated the panel's
"partisanship," much to the delight of its enemies.
*
staged his own side show to the main event.

Beals

235

Completing the sub-commission was its counsel, John
F.

Finerty.

kinds
In a lengthy career Finerty defended all

,
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of

political causes.

After protecting the American in-

terests of Eamon de Valera in the 1920s, he argued the last
writ of habeas corpus before Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti.

During the 1930s he was

the appeal lawyer in the incessant effort to free Tom Mooney
and also defended Earl Browder in a case before the Supreme

Court.

For many years active in the ACLU and Workers

Defense League, Finerty entered the Rosenberg case in the
1950s, after the initial conviction of the two alleged

spies.

2

36

Certainly Finerty had impressive legal credentials,

but he was less than a close student of Marxism and Russian
history, a fact which became quite obvious during the

Mexican hearings.
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Members of the Full Commission
To all intents and purposes, the sub-commission was
the commission of inquiry.

Ruehle, Finerty, Tresca

Dewey, La Follette, Stolberg,

— they

formed the core of the opera-

tion, especially the first three named.

But additional

foreign and American commissioners were enlisted to give the
panel a more international and cosmopolitan flavor.

Perhaps the most interesting of the foreign contingent on the full commission was Alfred Rosmer (1877-1964).

Born in Paterson, New Jersey, to French parents fleeing the

aftermath of the Paris Commune, Rosmer returned to France to
become

a

revolutionary syndicalist and work on La Vie

Ouvriere, organ of the General Labor Confederation.

238

One
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of the few labor leaders to oppose worker participation in

the "imperialist" war, 1914-18, he met Trotsky in wartime
Paris, and helped the Russian organize the anti-war

Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. 239
to be "decisive" for his future.

This friendship was

Later Rosmer represented

the French Communist Party on the Executive Committee of the

Comintern (1920-21).

He was also on the Central Committee

of the French Party and the administrative board of
1

1

Humanite (1923-24).

But following Trotsky's example, he

broke with the Party in 1924 and became active in the "Left

Opposition."

Rosmer had little use for the French

Trotskyites and their sectarian views, which strained his
relations with Trotsky.

Yet the Fourth International was

later founded in his home, and he and his wife remained the
"only intimate friends" of Leon and Natalya during the painful years of exile.

For eight months in 1939-40 the Rosmers

visited the Trotskys in Mexico, and became acquainted with
"Frank Jacson," the Old Man's future assassin.

Technically

Rosmer was not a "Trotskyite" in 1937, but he was certainly

^

240
«
no enemy of^ the Russian.

Completing the international side of the panel were
Wendelin Thomas and Francisco Zamorra.

Thomas had led the

famous Wilhelmshaven navy revolt of November

7,

1918,

and

was later an independent Socialist and Communist member of
the Reichstag (1920-24).

A "bitter opponent" of Trotsky

politically, Thomas "precipitated an acrimonious controversy"
affair
with the former War Commissar over the Kronstadt

I

,
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during the life of the Commission. 241

As for Zamorra, he

was a Mexican journalist of radical persuasion, who had been
an editorial writer for El Universal and on the national

committee of the Conf ederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico
powerful labor organization.

,

a

94?

Two other Americans also joined the panel.

The

"ACLU representative" was Professor E. A. Ross of the

University of Wisconsin.

Later the national chairman of the

Civil Liberties Union, he was

a

prominent sociologist and

the author of several works on the Soviet Union. 243

Like

Ross, John Chamberlain had signed his name to a number of

Trotsky Defense Committee releases.

A popular figure in the

New York left in the 1930s, and author of Farewell to Reform
(1932), Chamberlain was something of a gypsy writer, working
at one time or another for The New York Times

Saturday Review of Literature
among other publications.

,

,

Fortune

,

the

and the Wall Street Journal

Currently

syndicated columnist

a

and contributor to the National Review

,

he was close to

Stolberg and La Follette, and more or less "pro-Trotsky personally," in the opinion of Louis Adamic.

244

But Chamberlain's

many journalistic labors kept him from devoting much time to

^

_

.

the Commission.
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The Commission Assayed

Two questions remain to be asked, before describing
the Mexican hearings.

And was it "impartial"?

Was this an "authoritative" Commission?

Even before hearing Trotsky's testi-

to
mony, the panel's success or failure depended

a

large

extent on the image it projected to the public.
George Novack has argued to this writer that, con-

sidering the need for haste and difficulties encountered,
this was the "best possible group" that could be assembled
at the time.

et al.

(
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Certainly La Follette, Stolberg, Tresca,

were public figures of some distinction, but they

lacked international recognition.
a

Since the Commission was

self-appointed, unofficial band, lacking legal authority,

its moral authority was all-important.

sible exception of Tresca, it wanted for

Yet, with the posa

labor leader of

real distinction, a Friedrich Adler or even a Norman Thomas

for instance.
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It also missed a representative from the

world of letters, who enjoyed great moral distinction.

In

this regard, the names of H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw,

Andre Gide, and Edmund Wilson come to mind.

With the re-

fusal of Charles Beard and Carl Becker to join the under-

taking, the Commission also sorely missed the presence of a

trained historian.

For one reason or another, men like

Rabbi Stephen Wise, Gaetano Salvemini, and Arthur Garfield

Hays were not present on the panel
of God, Anti-Fascism, and Justice.

,

representing the worlds
Thus, with the single

exception of John Dewey, the panel was not graced with
majestic figures.

But in all fairness, the historic impor-

and
tance of the undertaking transcended the participants
pre
conveyed its own authority and grandeur, as Trotsky had

dieted.

"
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As could be expected, the members of the Commission

hotly defended themselves against charges of partisanship.
For instance, Suzanne La Follette wrote that the commissioners,

"holding widely divergent political and social

opinions, and none of them being a political adherent of

Leon Trotsky," had united together to find the historic
truth.
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There was much validity in this statement.

Yet

appearances were just as important as fact, especially with

regard to the sub-commission.

There was no use pretending

that the sub-commission had an "impartial appearance,"

charged The Nation
of all bias,

,

since only Dewey and Beals appeared free

and Dewey had been active on the Defense

Committee, a "serious liability."

minded its readers:

The liberal journal re-

"Where a feller least needs a friend is

on an impartial commission investigating his record."

All

Defense Committee members and friends of Trotsky should have

been ruthlessly eliminated, and the lists of defense and bar
associations searched for members free from political and
emotional commitments.

Nation

,

Failure to do this, concluded The

meant the Commission's "verdict has been discounted

in advance

.
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This disparagement was self-serving, as The Nation

had no stomach for an inquiry in the case, impartial or not.

And it was questionable that Stolberg and La Follette were
"warm admirers" of Trotsky, as charged.

Yet, six of the

commissioners (Dewey, Stolberg, La Follette, Tresca,
Chamberlain, Ross) had originally joined the "American
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Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky," and the im-

partiality of this body was open to question. 250

Also,

Ruehle and Thomas may have been Trotsky's "bitter" opponents,

but Alfred Rosmer was one of his closest friends.

Appearances

may be deceiving, but the conception of the Commission was

hardly immaculate, at least outwardly.
This body became known as "The Dewey Commission,"
and quite rightly.

The aging philosopher brought nobility

to the inquiry's labors.

On his probity, prudence, and im-

partiality depended the Commission's prestige and historical
reputation.

CHAPTER IV
DEWEY AND TROTSKY IN MEXICO

(I)

Both friends and foes of the Commission of Inquiry
ardently wooed John Dewey.

The investigation's success or

failure, many observers agreed, depended on enlisting Dewey's

active participation, especially since the inquiry lacked

other "great" names.

At the age of 78, Dewey was the pater-

familias of liberalism, the "liberal conscience of America,"
his personal integrity practically unassailable.

If he

agreed to chair the Commission, its reputation for impartiality would be immeasurably strengthened.

But there was some

doubt whether Dewey, considering his advanced age and personal predilections, would be willing to undertake such an

arduous and unfamiliar assignment.
At the behest of Sidney Hook, Dewey had signed the

original appeal to secure political asylum and an impartial

hearing for Trotsky.

1

In the ensuing months the famed

philosopher became even more convinced of the need for
commission of inquiry.
the panel?

a

But would he himself actually head

In March 1937 various emissaries approached him

on this question.

According to Suzanne La Follette, it was

his
Hook who once more interceded with Dewey and convinced
the commismentor and friend "to take the chairmanship of

sion."

2

Novack,
Another Defense Committee activist, George
302
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also recalled that Hook approached him.

Cannon and Novack

— Trotsky's

In addition, James

"ambassadors"

— visited

liberal, finally persuading him to head the panel.

3

the aging

Although

asked by Dewey, Hook has disclaimed all responsibility for
his decision:

"I

never urged him to accept the invitation."

Instead, Dewey reached this decision "only after he became
aware of the efforts and far-flung stratagems of the

Communist party to prevent him from going." 4

Nor were the Communists alone in attempting to dissuade Dewey.

His family feared for his life in volatile

Mexico, and "implored him not to tarnish the lustre of his
5

name by participating in a shady and shabby business.""

In

addition, his colleagues on the Editorial Board of The New

— where Dewey had been an active force for several
(In May 1937
decades — also counseled against involvement.
Republic

his name was dropped from the masthead as

editor."

a

"contributing

6
)

But it was the Communist Party, USA, which brought
the greatest pressure to bear on Dewey.

At first rumors

were spread that he was "naive" and approaching "senility."

influenced
Then, too, he was also charged with being unduly
and Max Eastman,
by two former students and Trotskyites, Hook

and "signed things blindly without reading them."

7

But be-

integrity, it
fore the Party dared to attack directly his

tried to "bribe" him.

According to Hook, one "R"— a singer

cultural work— apof slight talent active in the Party's
"'junket tour'" of the
proached Dewey and suggested a free

—
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Soviet Union.

When he declined the offer, citing the pos-

sible trip to Mexico, he was told in accented English:
"Trot-sky!
Stal-in!
We're not interested in
such matters, dear Professor Dewey. Ten years
ago you came and saw the schools of the Soviet
Union:
now it is time to come and give another
look.
VOKS doesn't care about Trotsky or
Stalin.
It cares only that you should come
and soon.
This month or next.
First-class
accommodations all the way and back." 8

But Dewey remained steadfast.

Heedless of both flattery and

ridicule, he dismissed all suggestions that "he was placing

himself and his health in jeopardy" and decided to make the

trip to Mexico.

9

This decision, wrote Hook, threw the Party into a
"panic. ""^

No longer was Dewey exempt from the more violent

forms of personal abuse.

He was placed on the index,

soon "drew the lightning of Muscovite damnation."
ally the Daily Worker described him as

American labor,

a

a

1

"1
'

and

Eventu-

"New Enemy" of

"puppet of disruption in America's liberal

and progressive movements," who sounded like Herr Goebbels

when discussing the labor movement.

Dewey, it lamented, had

become "the Charlie McCarthy of his former pupil, Sidney
Hook, notorious Trotzkyite, who has led his teacher into

swamp of filth."

a

i2

Despite the obloquy, Dewey stood his ground, and
.
13
m
Trotsky.
over
battles
polemical
the
in
home
soon was at

this onerous
But his decision to enter this fray and take on

pressures."
assignment was not based exclusively on "negative

There were also intellectual reasons.

"
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Dewey on The "Great Experiment "

John Dewey's defection to the "enemy" camp was some-

thing of

a shock,

considering his long-standing admiration

of Soviet achievements, especially in the realm of education.

This esteem had been reciprocated by progressive edu-

cators in Russia, and until the 1931 "de-Deweyization" campaign, he was widely read and emulated.

Indeed,

"Dzhon

D'yui" was almost the subject of a personality cult.

In

1924, for instance, Anna Louise Strong wrote that Soviet

school reform was "'modeled more on the Dewey ideas of edu-

cation than on anything else we have in America.

Every new

book by Dewey is seized and early translated into Russian
for consultation.

Then they make their own additions.'" 14

In 1928 Dewey joined

a

tour of American educators to

study Soviet pedagogical practices.

His impressions of this

trip were later published in the United States and received
much attention.

Although Soviet schools were in recess

during his visit, Dewey did have an interview with

N.

K.

Krupskaya, Lenin's widow and an official in the Commissariat
of Education.

children"
Peterhof.

(

15

He was also taken to a colony of "wild

bezprizornye "
"I

)

,

housed in

a

former palace at

have never seen anywhere in the world such

a

large proportion of intelligent, happy, and intelligently

occupied children," he wrote of the waifs:
great credit to any family.

16

they would be

a

Russian school children,

organized"
Dewey discovered, were "much more democratically
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than their American counterparts.

He regretted that a bar-

ricade of false reports were isolating American teachers
from this experiment, in which "our professed progressive

democratic ideas are most completely embodied."
be learned in Soviet Russia.

1

Much could

7

There was, of course, the trickly question of indoc-

trination in this system.
with this problem.

But Dewey was not overly concerned

Education as

social purposes, he argued,

a

means of realizing certain

"cannot be dismissed as propa-

ganda without relegating to that category all endeavor at
deliberate social control," an endeavor he strongly advocated.

1

p

Besides, all the flux and change in "transitional"

Russia might create

a

"collective mentality" very different

from the professed communist dogma:
It seems impossible that an education intellectually free will not militate against a
servile acceptance of dogma as dogma. One
hears all the time about the dialectic movement by means of which a movement contradicts
I think the schools are a
itself in the end.
"dialectic" factor in the evolution of Russian
communism.

The Revolution, almost "religious" in nature, had released

great amounts of mental and moral energy, resulting in

mentality and

a

new morality.

a

new

But the eventual society,

orthodox
asserted Dewey, would be "unlike the society which
^
Marxian formulae call for.
n

,

„20

Dewey
in these 1928 impressions of the Soviet Union
about Russia," adhad warned against "all generalized views
21
There was one
writings.
own
his
in
heed
to
vice he failed
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generalized Soviet technique, moreover, that he warmly endorsed for export to America
ends.

— social

planning for collective

In Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Dewey urged

that liberals include social planning and

economy in their reform programs.

A radical "re-formation'"

of society precluded piece-meal remedies:
"

socialized

a

America needed

'social goal based upon an inclusive plan.

1

"

a

Dewey en-

visioned, however, the intelligent application of scientific

methods to social problems, not the use of brute force:
"It requires an unusually credulous faith in
the Hegelian dialectic of opposites to think
that all of a sudden the use of force by a
class will be transmuted into a democratic
classless society. Force breeds counterIt is possible to look with
force.
considerable suspicion upon those who assert
that suppression of democracy is the road to
an adequate establishment of genuine democracy. " 22

...

Social planning, Yes!

Coercive force, No!

On this question

of the relationship of means and ends Dewey parted company

with Soviet ideologues

— both

Stalin and Trotsky.

23

This concern over the use of ruthless means to

achieve desirable humanitarian goals also surfaced in the

aforementioned article, "Why

I

Am Not A Communist."

24

There

small "c" and
was a vast difference between communism with a

rejected
official Communism, contended Dewey; he emphatically

which difthe latter as a panacea for America's maladies,

fered radically from Russia's problems.

It was "nothing

of Russian
short of fantastic to transfer the ideology

Communism to

.

a

in
country which is so profoundly different
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its economic, political and cultural history," he
contended.

Soviet Party domination in every field of culture, the

"ruthless extermination" of minority opinion, the "verbal

glorification of the mass," the "cult" of the infallible

leadership

— all

of these Soviet characteristics were a re-

sult of peculiar local conditions.

Yet official Communism,

with its "monistic and one-way philosophy of history,"
ignored concrete historical differences and imposed Soviet

experiences as "integral parts of the standard Communist
faith and dogma."

Such an outlook, claimed Dewey, verged on

"political insanity."

25

The American philosopher, in addition, recognized
the existence of class conflicts, but doubted that they were
"

the means" by which to achieve genuine social progress.

Convinced that the specter of class war had eased Hitler's
path to power, Dewey asserted that even

a

threat of such

social conflicts in western nations would result in "Fascism

with its terrible engines of repression,"
sibility.

a

frightening pos-

Furthermore, class war in a highly developed in-

dustrial society with

a

strong middle class would either be

drowned in blood or just result in

a

Pyrrhic victory:

two sides would destroy the country and each other."

"The

26

There was another, more personal reason, why Dewey

could not be

a

Communist.

Accustomed to civilized discourse,

he was a genial scholar who found the "emotional tone" in

communist disputes "extremely repugnant."

Such courtesies

.
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as fair-play and elementary honesty in presenting arguments

were more than '"bourgeois virtues,

1

"

but habits won only

after a long struggle:
The systematic, persistent and seemingly intentional disregard of these things by Communist
spokesmen in speech and press, the hysteria of
their denunciations, their attempts at character
assassination of their opponents, their misrepresentation of the views of the "liberals " to
whom they also appeal for aid in their defense
campaigns their policy of "rule or ruin" in
their so-called united front activities their
apparent conviction that what they take to be
the end justifies the use of any means if only
those means promise to be successful all
these, in my judgment, are fatal to the very
end which official Communists profess to have
at heart. 27
,

,

—

Such excesses, therefore, were alien to him, and created an

unbridgeable chasm between Dewey and official "Communism."
This increasing distaste for communist practices led

Dewey in the mid-1930s to oppose the Party on
issues.

a

number of

With other "anti-Communist liberals," he denounced

the executions resulting from the Kirov affair.

He also op-

posed the Popular Front strategy, despite an intense antipathy for all matters fascist.

And, reflecting his bitter ex-

perience in World War I, Dewey argued against any "collective
lead
security" agreement with the Soviet Union that might

America into another foolish crusade.

American democracy

with conwould end the moment war was declared, he asserted

siderable passion

28
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"Truth Is On The March "

Despite

a

distaste for communist squabbles, Dewey

did agree to investigate the schism between Stalin and
Trotsky.

But the personal dispute had no more meaning for

him than "the fight between Schmeling and Joe Louis," wrote
one journalist. 29

Nor was the political plight of Leon

Trotsky the central issue for Dewey.

If anything, Dewey was

inclined to favor the "pragmatic" Stalin over the "dogmatic"
Trotsky, as Isaac Deutscher has noted. 30

Even after meeting

the Russian outcast he was restrained in his admiration:

"'Personally,

have always disagreed with the ideas and

I

theories of Trotsky and
more than ever.

1

"

I

disagree with him now, if possible,

31

No, the central issue for Dewey was not a defense of

Trotsky, but a defense of American ideals.

He feared that

Bolshevism would infect the United States and destroy certain cherished traditions.

As he explained in a number of

articles and statements, his liberal faith was threatened.

32

At the opening session of the Mexican hearings, for instance,
he saw the basic issue as simple:

did Trotsky have

a

to be heard before final condemnation?

The right to a hearing before condemnation is
such an elementary right in every civilized
country that it would be absurd for us to reassert it were it not for the efforts which
have been made to prevent Mr. Trotsky from
being heard, and the efforts that now are
being made to discredit the work of this
Commission of Inquiry.

right
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Trotsky's denial of the charges was not
the Commission!

a

major concern of

"That he has been condemned without the op-

portunity to be heard is

a

matter of utmost concern to the

Commission and to the conscience of the whole world."
also had a personal stake in leading this inquiry.

gretted that

a

Dewey

He re-

chairman had not been found whose experience

better suited him for this difficult task:
But I have given my life to the work of education, which I have conceived to be that of
public enlightenment in the interests of
society.
If I finally accepted the responsible post I now occupy, it was because I
realized that to act otherwise would be to
be false to my lifework. ^

The Trotsky affair, then, was to be

a

vehicle for the "public

enlightenment" of America.

After Dewey's return from Mexico, he discussed

at

some length the importance of this Russian "family squabble"

for American liberals.

York's Mecca Temple (May

Before a large gathering at New
9,

1937), he vigorously complained

about the many efforts to sabotage the inquiry:

"When did

it become a farce in the United States to give a hearing to
a

man who had been convicted without a hearing?"

Charging

that those who obstructed this investigation were really
the ones on "trial before the civilized world," he ridiculed

his critics:
It would be impossible to find a grosser exhibition of colossal nerve than is seen in the
impudent proclamation that only those who are
convinced of Trotsky's guilt are impartial and
that everyone is partial who declines to pronounce judgment until both sides have been
heard. 34

312

Dewey could sympathize with those liberals who argued that
the Soviet Union was the "one successful attempt of all his-

tory to build
barrassed.

a

Socialist society," and should not be em-

But specific crimes had been alleged.

The in-

quiry was concerned with objective fact, not political issues.
It was not "fair or square" to find Trotsky guilty because of

antipathy to his political views:

When confusion of two entirely different matters is manifested by professed liberals, it
marks an intellectual shirking that is close
±o intellectual dishonesty. More than that,
it is treachery to the very cause of liberalism.
For if liberalism means anything, it
means complete and courageous devotion to
freedom of inquiry. 35
Fact, not theory, was the issue here.

But Dewey was not completely oblivious to the broader
implications of the inquiry.

In the Mecca speech he declared

that if Trotsky were found guilty, then "no condemnation can
be too severe."

If found innocent, however, then the Soviet

regime could not be acquitted of "deliberate, systematic

persecution and falsification."

These were unpleasant alter-

natives, but "unwillingness to face the unpleasant is the

standing weakness of liberals."

Too often they shirked

decisive action when "faced with disagreeable conditions":
"I

cannot believe that a single genuine liberal would, if he

once faced the alternatives, hold that persecution and

falsification are a sound basis upon which to build an enduring Socialist society."

36

i

Perhaps sensing that even greater shocks would
soon
shake America's peace of mind, Dewey concluded his
address

with

plea to support the pursuit of justice while there

a

still was time:

"Lines are being drawn between devotion to

justice and adherence to a faction, between fair play and

a

love of darkness that is reactionary in effect no matter

what banner it flaunts."

Quoting Emile Zola in the Dreyfus

case, he ended with a ringing declaration

march and nothing will stop it.
I.

— '"Truth

is on the

o7
1

11

Arrival in Mexico

Although Dewey had an ulterior motive in journeying
to Mexico

— to

reaffirm America's best traditions and expose

alien ideologies

tonic ideal.
Dewey

1

s

38

faith,

— this

trip was

a

hadj in search of a pla-

Magna est Veritas et praevalet

was

an almost unshakeable belief in the liberating

power of true fact, once discovered.
quarry.

— this

"Truth," then, was the

But it is notoriously enigmatic and elusive, and

means different things to different men.
Trotsky, however, already knew the truth.

Mexican hearings, for him, were not primarily

a

The

quest, but

an opportunity to convince the world of his innocence and

strike a mortal blow at Russia's "Bonapartist " regime.
like Dewey

1

s

#

his "truth" was a weapon in the dialectical

struggle, not an ideal in itself.

Un-
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Yet the two major figures in the inquiry shared cer-

tain assumptions.

Both agreed on the need to ascertain the

simple facts in the case.

And both gave little thought to

truth's sometime impotence in the face of totalitarian power.
It was a "piece of idle sentimentality," wrote John Stuart

Mill

a

century ago, "that truth has an inherent power denied

±o error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake."
New York to Mexico City
At the beginning of April 1937 the little band of in-

vestigators boarded the train for the long trip southward.
Besides Dewey, the passengers included Ben Stolberg, Suzanne

La Follette, George Novack, and Pearl Kluger.
Beals and John

F.

(Carleton

Finerty would make their own way to

Mexico, while Otto Ruehle already resided there.)
the train was James T. Farrell, who kept

...

Commission activities.

a

Also on

close eye on

39

According to the admiring Farrell, Dewey was extremely sociable during the long journey.
smoke a cigarette and drink
alert,

a

He would even

glass of beer!

Always "fresh,

and unruffled," Dewey allowed no special considera-

tions because of his age or prestige.

Never monopolizing

the conversation, his remarks were made in

a

"slow and some-

what drawling way," a manner which pleased Farrell:

"His

powers of attention, his dry wit, and his extraordinary

keenness of mind were revealed with such modesty and sim-

plicity that they come as

a

shock."

As Dewey conversed, the

"

,
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years dropped away from him, and one would forget that "this

kindly old man was John Dewey
Irishman from Chicago:

,

"

wrote the somewhat awed

"He was another human being,

mem-

a

ber of this temporary group.

During the trip Dewey spent many hours alone in his
small compartment studying the trial records and the works
of Trotsky.

Taking few notes, he found many "inconsisten-

cies" in the verbatim transcripts,

analysis."

a

product of "logical

His thinking was "much sharper and clearer" than

that of the other passengers on the train, claimed Farrell

who tended to make broad comparisons with Thermidor and the

French Revolution.
in the case.

42

41

Dewey, then, was "thoroughly versed"

And he was completely composed, despite
Dewey

being far from the cozy confines of his classroom.

traveled with as little sense of outward excitment "as
though he might have been an unknown man journeying from one
town to another in his native Vermont."

43

Yet there was some tension on the train.

Ben

Stolberg and Suzanne La Follette had every intention of

making

a

sharp distinction between the Defense Committee and

Commission of Inquiry,

a

well-nigh impossible task.

44

And

this aim was made more difficult by the presence of George

Novack among the travellers.

Secretary of the Committee and

an avowed Trotskyite, Novack might compromise the mission,

consideration to which Dewey apparently gave no thought.
the feelings of Miss La Follette were ruffled, especially

i

a

But
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when it was rumored that Stalinists might sabotage the train
at the Mexican border. 45

Novack could serve as a ready ex-

cuse for such a provocation.

As a result, the American

Trotskyite was relegated to the "back of the train" during
the long trip,

travelers.

and kept at some distance from the other

Once in Mexico Trotsky took Novack aside and

explained that they were dealing with "jittery" intellectuals
Their feelings, however, must be respected, considering the
importance of the work.

In order to express "solidarity"

with the American comrade, Trotsky showed him

draft of his

a

final argument to the Commission and asked for suggestions;

several of Novack

1

the final version.

s

recommendations were incorporated into

46

In this case Trotsky displayed

nice

a

sense of tact, but the tension between the Committee and

Commission was far from being guashed.

47

First Steps
The members of the sub-commission arrived in Mexico

City on the sixth of April.

Without delay Dewey granted an

interview to the local press, already bewildered that

The fol-

Soviet dispute was being transplanted to Mexico.

lowing day Excelsior

,

a

a

major daily newspaper in the Mexican

capital, ran a front-page story on the news conference, com-

plete with

a

photograph of the commissioners.

Dewey as-

sured the assembled journalists that the sessions would be
Mexican
open to the public, and that representatives of the
hearings
Communist Party were more than welcome to attend the

i
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The "veteran professor of philosophy" also announced that

special police protection had not been solicited, since he

doubted that anyone would attempt '"to obstruct or impede
our efforts to provide Trotsky with the opportunity to present the evidence, testimony and documents that he says he
has to refute all of the charges against him by the Moscow

government.'"

Stressing the impartiality and integrity of

the commissioners, Dewey declared that the only purpose of
the investigation into the Soviet accusations was to

"'establish the truth about this point which has divided the

working and progressive forces of the world at

a

moment in

which their unity is imperative in order to fight the reactionary forces.'"
The

"

Comision Norte americano " guickly established

headquarters at the home of Mrs. Robert Latham George; most
of the members lived there during the hearings.

49

m

Also

the capital were Charles Rumford and Adelaida Walker, Mrs.

George's daughter, who handled press relations for the commission.

Charles Walker was said to be

Trotskyite," reported Carleton Beals.

a

"simon-pure

The New Masses

,

a

pro-Communist journal, also accused Walker of being "an
Trotskyite
active Trotskyite propagandist, allied with the
Dunne brothers in Minneapolis."

50

When

a

New Masses reporter

press creattempted to gain admission to the hearings, using
Walker
dentials from the Nacional a Mexican newspaper, Mrs.
,

said,

"'Very sorry,

...

but we cannot allow more than one
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reporter from the Nacional

especially since they gave us

,

very bad write-up yesterday.

1

a

"

It hardly seems strange that Trotsky wanted a loyal-

ist to deal with the press, but Beals was upset for other

reasons.

Rather short of funds, and quick to perceive

slights to his amour - propre

,

Beals complained about not being

quartered in the Walker house:

"I

and my wife were left to

shift for ourselves, and live apart from the commission in

a

hotel, with little knowledge of the inner activities of the
group.

I

hired my own taxicabs, and it is

— _

z

Coyacan /sic/, and expensive."

a

long way out to
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Plans to hold the hearings in

a

large public hall

If Trotsky defended himself

soon ran into difficulties.

publicly, there would be trouble, promised the local

Communist Party:

the "'revolutionary workers'" would not

permit the outcast to make
reason.'"

a

public appearance "'for any

As a result of such threatening noises, the

hearings were held in Trotsky's "Blue House," which could
only accommodate about fifty spectators.

Dewey later ex-

plained it would not have been "fitting" to hold the sessions
elsewhere and thus require additional police protection from
the government.

54

Besides avoiding embarrassment to the

Mexican authorities, however, the change of venue also meant
a

saving of sorely needed cash.

55

Yet the police were highly visible.

On the opening

day of the hearings, according to one report, about forty

1
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uniformed police guarded the villa, supported by numerous
agents of the reserved police and by private detectives. 56

Passes were restricted, and armed guards searched each person entering the premises, which caused a certain amount of

discontent among the accredited reporters. 57

The villa it-

self, in the opinion of Beals, was just "a little adobe

house on a frowzy half-cobbled street of stagnant water,"

hardly suitable for such an event. 58
"impregnable fortress." 59

But it was also an

Behind the three large French win-

dows in the hearing room were constructed "six-foot barri-

cades of cemented brick and sandbags so that no assassins

might successfully shoot through the windows."

Various

secretaries and sympathizers of Trotsky had carried bricks
in order to complete the task in time.

6

*"*

But the menacing

atmosphere of the "fortress" was not without its compensating
charms.

The participants could see snow-capped mountains

looming in the distance.

And "grotesque iMexican idols, for-

gotten gods of another day," dominated the patio, perhaps
secretly amused by the strange proceedings within the villa.
The rectangular hearing room was partitioned into

sections, not unlike a Moscow courtroom.

Trotsky and his

secretaries sat at one end of the room, the two lawyers,
John Finerty and Albert Goldman,

62

at the other end.

To

Trotsky's left was seated the sub-commission, to his right
the gallery, including a number of journalists and photog-

raphers.

63

Among the reporters was Frank

The New York Times

,

L.

Kluckhohn of

who was "not in very good standing with

6

"
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the commission,

Walker kept

a

"

having publicly questioned its motives; and

wary eye on him. 64

Also in the gallery behind the high railing were the
hosts.

The "pistol-toting" Diego Rivera kept busy sketching

cartoons, when not "snoring."

He sported a large peacock

plume in his sombrero, while his wife

each day in

a "new

— Frida

Kahlo

— appeared

Indian costume with magnificent shawls

and heavy silver Tarascan jewelry."

Much to Beals' con-

sternation, she constantly chewed gum,

"repeatedly drawing

it out of her mouth in a long thread."

Completing the cast were Trotskyite sympathizers and,
according to Beals, the representatives of "a few rump
unions under Diego Rivera's thumb."

Vincente Lombardo

Toledano and other major figures in the Mexican labor movement had refused invitations to attend the hearings, not

wanting to lend any prestige to the proceedings and thereby
infuriate their Soviet friends.

66

Those labor officials who

did attend, however, had difficulty in understanding the
testimony, given almost entirely in English.

They solved

the problem by "going sound asleep," and during the six and
a half days of the trial,

rear row,
i
a
zled.

..

a

"chorus of snores" came from the

"where a solitary gendarme looked bored and puz-

67

Even if the labor leaders had stayed alert, however,
it is doubtful that they could have materially assisted the

inquiry.

Towards the end of the hearings Dewey invited one

such leader— Ramon Garibay of the Casa del Pueblo— to pose
some questions.
1.
2.

3.

4.

The response left something to be desired:

Why is Stalin persecuting Mr. Trotsky in
this way?
Where would Lenin be if he were still
alive today, and if Stalin had the same
power?
Has Stalin made a pact with the bureaucracy of the world?
Is Mr.. Trotsky in accord with the world
proletariat?

Perhaps stupefied by the sheer aridity of these queries,

Trotsky begged off, and promised to take up the questions in
his closing statement.

This was the beginning and end of

Mexican labor participation in the investigation.
The Commission of Inquiry had also made

a

68

valiant

effort to enlist the participation of bona fide Stalinists
The Soviet Ambassador to Washington,

in the proceedings.

Alexander A. Troyanovsky, and the American Communist Party
had been invited to send representatives, with full rights
of cross-examination.

69

And the Secretary of the Mexican

Communist Party, Hernan Laborde, had also been invited to
attend the hearings.

70

But in declining the invitation,

Senor Laborde declared that to attend the sessions would be
"'to give significance to something which has none.

We hope

all serious and responsible organizations will refuse to

participate in the Trotskyite comedy.

1

"

71

The other refusals

from the Stalinist camp were in a similar vein.
For his part, Trotsky had welcomed hostile ques-

tioning from his foes, as

a

boon to the inquiry's reputation

.

,
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for impartiality.

According to him,

The Commission has searched candle in hand, for
an authoritative Stalinist or a Stalinist sympathizer who would not limit himself to machinations in the cellars of the GPU, or to calumnies
and insinuations in publications without the
responsibility or honor, but who would have the
courage to openly submit the Moscow accusations
to the control of critics 7 2

But there were no takers of this double-edged dare

.

Instead

the Stalinists issued "demonstrative refusals whose haughty

tone tried to substitute for their cowardice," or so charged
the disappointed Trotsky.

73

Thus, Moscow went unrepresented during the Coyoacan

hearings, hardly an oversight on the Kremlin's part.

As a

result, the Commission was forced to accept the published

court records as embodying "the case for the prosecution,"

74

an unsatisfactory substitute for hostile cross-examination.

The way was clear for unfriendly critics to claim, with some

validity, that Trotsky was merely "investigating" himself.

75

The Hearings Commence

II.

Dewey opened the first session on the morning of
April 10, 1937.

Careful to flatter the nervous hosts, he

in
expressed personal pleasure at finding himself once again

their "most agreeable" capital.

He also asserted that for a

was "an
foreigner to defend himself before other foreigners

honor to Mexico, and

a

reproach to those countries whose

holding of our
political system or current policy bars the
no man should be
meetings on their soil." Believing that

.

condemned without

.

chance to defend himself, the Preliminary

a

Commission desired "to congratulate the Mexican Government
on
its broad interpretation of the meaning of political democracy, which makes our meeting possible." 76

Opening Statements

Having dispensed with the required amenities, Dewey
read an introductory statement for the panel that attempted
to explain its aims.

On behalf of his fellow commissioners,

Dewey declared that the Preliminary Commission was in Mexico
"neither as court nor as jury."

On the contrary,

We are here neither to defend nor to prosecute
Leon Trotsky
We are not here to pronounce a
verdict either of guilt or innocence
We are
here as an investigating body
Our function
is to hear whatever testimony Mr. Trotsky may
present to us, to cross-examine him, and to
give the results of our investigation to the
full Commission of which we are a part,
Our sole function is to ascertain the truth as
far as is humanly possible
.

.

.

.

.

.

After briefly recounting Trotsky's frustrating efforts to
secure a hearing, Dewey announced that "the conscience of the
world" was not yet satisfied; it demanded that Trotsky have
a chance to answer his critics.

Dewey appealed to "every

fair-minded person" to support the Commission, and especially
pleaded with the press "to safe-guard our task by living up
to its own highest tradition of scrupulous objectivity."

If

guilty, Trotsky should be condemned, but this was not the

chief matter at hand.
fore fair judgment

77

He deserved an impartial hearing be-
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At the onset, Dewey admitted that the
charges in the

official Soviet records were the foundation
of the investigation.
In fact, the "scope and content" of this
inquiry
was already determined by the testimony given
against

Trotsky in the Moscow trials.

As a result, the Commission

was forced to examine "the past activity of Mr. Trotsky
and

his faction, and to receive testimony, here and elsewhere,

upon the factual material brought forward by witnesses and
by the accused in the Moscow trials."

This was no easy task,

since it was impossible to secure the cooperation of Nazi

Germany and Soviet Russia:
It /Preliminary Commission/ is aware that a
long, tortuous course of events is involved,
every stage of which is beset by bitter controversy.
But even were the difficulties
more serious than they are, we should find
ourselves unwilling and unable to take the
defeatist position of those who proclaim in
advance that any attempt to ascertain the
facts upon which judgment must finally rest
is. doomed to failure.
.

To do otherwise, Dewey proclaimed, would be contrary to his
7
life's work. ^

In reply, Trotsky was both humble and thankful.

He

expressed his "profound respect" and "no less profound gratitude" to the Commission members for their labors, and

understood that their motives were "incomparably more important and more profound than an interest in the fate of a

single person.

But all the greater is my respect, and all

the more sincere my gratitude!"

He also threw some bouquets

in the direction of the Mexican government for its
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"magnanimous hospitality," and assured his hosts that the

composition of the Commission and the "high authority of its
chairman" precluded any intervention in Mexico's internal
life; his own obligation on this score was "absolutely un-

shakable."

Trotsky also thanked the local press for under-

standing that he must both answer his accusers and avoid any
steps which might be unwelcome to Mexican public opinion.

express

"I

a

sincere gratitude to the representatives of the

press for their loyal and sincere regard for the peculiarities of my situation/' continued Trotsky.

Certain "unfortu-

nate exceptions," however, need not be dwelt upon;

public

opinion would judge them as they deserved. 79
.

.

.

But the dignity of the veteran revolutionary was
also apparent in this opening statement.

dulgence for his English
tion"

— he

— "the

After begging in-

weakest point of my posi-

asked no further considerations.

For everything else I do not ask the slightest
I do not demand any a_ priori conindulgence.
fidence in my affirmations. The task of this
Commission of investigation is to verify everything from the beginning to the end. My duty
I will try
is simply to help it in its work.
to accomplish this duty faithfully before the
eyes of the whole world. 80
He was anything but contrite.

powers of persuasion

Supremely confident of his

and the strength of his brief, Trotsky

was ready to fulfill his self-appointed "duty"— to turn the

accusers into the accused.
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Limits of the Investigation
No trial!

No court!

Then why hold the hearings?

John Dewey, of course, had attempted to make clear that
this
was merely a "preliminary" investigation, only concerned

with hearing testimony, gathering facts, and accepting documents. 81

At a later time the full Commission would weigh

the evidence and submit a verdict.

But this distinction was

difficult to maintain, especially since Dewey was chairman
of both the preliminary and full commissions.

Even the

leading figures in the drama were hard put to treat the
Coyoacan proceedings as just
a

rather dull curtain raiser to

a

livelier production in the future.

For instance, Carleton

Beals urged that the sub-commission publish forthwith

a

resume of its findings and conclusions, in order to have an

effect on any new Soviet tri als

"The responsibility resting

:

upon the Preliminary Commission is
be faced,

a

heavy one, but it must

and we must present our honest conclusions at the

earliest date feasible.

11

82

And even the defense table ac-

cepted that this was the trial of Trotsky.

insisted that he was

a

"witness," not

alternated between conducting
against Stalin.

a

a

Though Trotsky

"defendant,"

defense and building

83

a

he

case

And his lawyer, Albert Goldman, apologized

at an early point in the proceedings for any slips of the

tongue:

"I

might call Mr. Trotsky the defendant, the ac-

cused, the witness, because it has always been emphasized

that the real defendant in the Soviet court was Trotsky.
we consider Mr. Trotsky as a witness."

He added that the

But

Trotsky side was attempting to turn the tables on the
Soviets
"We feel ourselves to be the accusers,

and they the accused."

In truth, the Coyoacan villa had been turned into

courthouse.
(Dewey),

Sitting in the hearing room were

"Jurors"

(commissioners),

"Counsel"

Goldman), and "Defendant" (Trotsky).

a

a

"Judge"

(Finerty and

Certainly this was

Trotsky's day in public court, with the press assembled to
report the proceedings.

In Trotsky's mind this may have been

merely a "counter-trial," with the disembodied spirit of
Stalin in the dock, but a trial it was.

And it was a political trial.

Dewey had taken great

*

pains to stress that the investigation was concerned with
facts relevant to Trotsky
cal theories

85
.

1

s

case

,

not with abstruse politi-

But was it possible to separate fact and

theory in any matter concerning the Bolshevik Party?

At the

first session Dewey asked Goldman to save the Commission from

"embarrassment by excluding all political material which does
not have a direct and close relationship with the charges

made against Mr. Trotsky."

The inquiry did not intend to

consider "the political issues" between th
the Opposition.

Government and

Even though some of this material related

to the charges, continued Dewey, the Commission "will draw a

line strictly between the political issues and the charges

made against Mr. Trotsky."

In response, Goldman promised to

limit himself, but added that he had had "some experience in

political trials in the United States, and it is always
ceases
difficult to say exactly where the political question
to be germane and becomes irrelevant."

86
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The point was well taken.

In "political trials,"

e.g., the Coyoacan hearings, theoretical and factual matters

were inseparately meshed.

For instance, it was impossible

to examine Pyatakov's "phantom flight" to Oslo without

raising serious questions about the fairness of Soviet justice and, by implication, the entire Soviet system.

In ad-

dition, Vyshinsky had attempted to prove the "historical

connection" between Trotsky's past activities and the present
charges, a "connection" that the Commission could not fail to

investigate.

Yet this line of inquiry opened up a whole can

of worms, such as Trotsky's relations with Lenin, the con-

flicting theories of "permanent revolution" and "socialism
in one country," political factionalism in the 1920s,

etcetera, etcetera.
In a real sense, then, the Soviet system was
on trial.

When the Commission's critics charged political

intervention in Soviet internal affairs, they were not overstating the case.

This was underlined by the final conclu-

sions of the Commission's report, Not Guil ty

.

The indict-

ments were determined "by the current internal difficulties,

economic and political, of the Soviet regime."

Therefore,

"we find that the trials have served not juridical but

political ends."
cluded,

The authors of the final report also con-

"On the basis of all the evidence herein examined

and all the conclusions stated, we find that the trials of

August, 1936, and January, 1937, were frame-ups."

87

Trotsky,

naturally, was delighted wirh this verdict, but it was hardly
apolitical in nature.

Conduct of the Investigation
In his opening statement Dewey had declared that the

"impartiality of any investigating body can be judged by one
test,

and one test only:

the way in which it conducts its

From this test, the Commission of Inguiry neither

affairs.

oo

can nor wishes to be exempt."

Following his own advice, the famed philosopher was
a model of

lished

a

restraint during the thirteen sessions.

He estab-

sense of judicial decorum in the hearing room, and

was quick to suppress polemical outbursts.

When Trotsky re-

marked, for instance, that the only reason Stalin avoided

being branded

a

German agent in 1917 was that "nobody knew

his name at that time," Dewey immediately stopped him.
was "purely

a

This

matter of Mr. Trotsky's interpretation," and

"should be struck from the record."

QQ"

Unwilling to accept

many of Trotsky's statements on face value, Dewey continually
asked,

"Will that be verified by documentary evidence?"

90

But the Chairman also had the duty to allow Trotsky great

freedom in conducting his defense.

After all, Trotsky was

a

voluntary witness before the Preliminary Commission, and his
revolutionary honor was at stake.

"Dewey, as Chairman and

as the outstanding member of the Commission, was in a deli-

cate position, one requiring great tact as well as fairness,"

correctly commented James T. Farrell.
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The burden of conducting the "hostile" cross-

examination lay with John

F.

Finerty.

The Commission's

counsel, who missed the first session, was described by

Beals as a "tall, thin, red-brown Irishman, dressed in

a

red-brown' suit, with handsome tie and flowing silk ker-

chief."

92

Although

a

veteran lawyer in political cases, his

familiarity with communist matters was slight even though he
once represented Earl Browder in a case before the Supreme
Court.

93

Solicitous of Trotsky's awkward position, Finerty
.

.

continually rephrased the Russian's testimony and on numerous occasions reminded the defense team that these were only

"alleged" charges being considered.

For instance, at one

point Goldman referred to Trotsky's "conspiratorial work,"

which upset Finerty 's sense of propriety:

"...

you had

better use the word 'alleged' for your purpose, because this
record will want to show these things."

94

,

.

When it was the

chief counsel's turn to cross-examine Trotsky, he began with

questions that admittedly were "elementary."
them banal and pointless.

95

Others found

Finerty asked Trotsky when the

"Communist Party" was organized, the dates of its congresses,
the
the names of its leading members, the relationship of

Party and Government,

and similar questions.

In the process

of
Finerty wasted valuable time and exposed his ignorance

Bolshevik history.

A quick look at

a

standard history text

could have avoided such queries as the following:

"At that

elements?
time /T9067, the Party was composed of what

~

~~

Mensheviks, Bolsheviks,

and Social Democrats?

96

"
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Carleton Beals, no admirer of Finerty, later wrote
that the lawyer had been "pathetically gentle with
Trotsky,"
and when the cross-examination was completed,

tively had wings on his shoulders."

"Trotsky posi-

Finerty had ignored

many crucial points in the Moscow trials, and for "all
practical purposes," charged Beals, he "merely continued
Goldman's defense of Trotsky; he filled in the gaps left by
Goldman in Trotsky's defense." 97

On balance, this was a

patently unfair description of Finerty 's conduct during the
hearings, yet the American lawyer was hardly a tiger in the

courtroom.

Even Trotsky was disappointed with the lack of

vigorous cross-examination.

When the Stalinists later ac-

cused Finerty of being too lenient, Trotsky commented:
"Possibly he was.
as sharp,

For my part,

I

hoped for nothing so much

distrustful and combative questions."

But the

Russian commiserated with the American's position:

"My

depositions and documents had completely destroyed the accusation.

,,98

In fact, a scant amount of time was devoted to

Finerty'

s

cross-examination.

At the first session Dewey an-

nounced that Albert Goldman would conduct the direct examination of Trotsky section by section, with the formal inter-

rogation to follow each segment.

99

But at the beginning of

the third session this procedure was revised.

In order to

"avoid duplication," Goldman was directed to complete his

questioning of Trotsky before Finerty began his interrogation.

Questions could be interjected at any time, "but the

main cross examination will be reserved." 100
In line with this modus operandi

tion dominated the hearings.

,

the direct examina-

The great bulk of the first

nine sessions (#§ days) was devoted to outlining the
defense.

And the thirteenth and final session was given to final arguments by Goldman and Trotsky.

This left Finerty just three

sessions (1% days) to conduct his "rigorous" cross-examination.

Beals complained that this procedure "smothered"

liberty of action and hindered honest investigation:
We could not run the investigation like a railroad train on schedule.
By leaving the entire
cross-examination until the end, the original
defense of Trotsky would be lost sight of, the
points at issue dulled and forgotten, even
with the best of note-taking. No transcript
of the trial was to be available until long
after the sessions ended. This made our work
very blind, and it also made it impossible to
guarantee a correct record. l^ 1

—

The situation was not quite this bad.

Many pointed questions

were asked during the regular examination
self.

— some

by Beals him-

Yet the Trotsky-Goldman team was usually on the of-

fensive.

The other participants had to mark time, trusting

that their memories would not fail them when the cross-

examination finally commenced.
During the proceedings the defense introduced

plethora of documents to buttress Trotsky's case.
volume of "evidence" was certainly impressive.
were problems with this material.

a

The sheer

Yet there

In the opinion of John

Finerty, all documents were subject to further investigation
and verification:

"Any evidence which would not be admitted

as legal evidence in a court, ultimately
will not be re-

ceived—that
gation." 102

is,

evidence not verified by subsequent investi-

Finerty appeared to imply that the Preliminary

Commission was

a "court,"

one that would enforce standard

judicial procedures on the admission of evidence.
But the defense was quick to question this procedure.

Goldman had already admitted that much of the evidence "would
not be admissible under Anglo-Saxon rules of evidence."

Strict rules of evidence should not apply in this case, he
argued, because the sub-commission was "not a court in the

ordinary sense of the term," being more like "a Congressional

investigation committee," and because the nature of the case

demanded "wide latitude in the introduction of evidence, in
order to get at the truth."

To apply strict rules would mean

throwing out most of the evidence, Goldman admitted.

This

case was also true of "ninety-five per cent" of the testi-

mony introduced against Trotsky in the Moscow trials.
was a difference, however.

There

"Whereas our 'inadmissible'

evidence is subject to verification if the Commission is in
the least doubtful of its truth," Goldman added,

"the 'inad-

missible' evidence of the Moscow trials cannot be verified."

To some degree Finerty retreated on this issue.

He

advised the sub-commission that "'the best-evidence rule'"
applied in this case, i.e., the best evidence would be ac-

cepted which conditions permitted.

The Commission was in

"a somewhat difficult position," since Trotsky's alleged ac-

complices were dead, and the Soviet authorities refused to

10
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assist the new inquiry.

As a result,

it was necessary to

determine "the question of the fairness of the trials
by

which the Soviet Government claims to have established
Mr.

Trotsky's guilt."

But, Finerty asserted, Trotsky's "unsup-

ported denial of his guilt" would not be accepted.

Archives,

documents, depositions, sworn statements— all would be examined and authenticated. 104 In this "practical situation,"
the Commission was attempting to secure the best evidence

that difficult circumstances would allow.

But such evidence

would necessarily be incomplete.

How good was the evidence?

Besides having published

materials, private documents, and notarized affidavits, the

Commission was offered free access to Trotsky's "archives."
For many months Trotsky has been telling the world press that
his correspondence and private papers would be made available
to any authoritative commission of inquiry

.

But when Beals

asked if the archives were physically present in Mexico

— the

complete archives

— Trotsky

"reservations."

After relating two attempts to steal his

records

,

answered in the affirmative, with

he declared:

The G.P.U. is professionally interested in this
matter. That is why I declared that my archives
are completely at the disposal of the Commission;
that I am ready to communicate immediately to
the Chairman of the Commission or to the
Commission as a whole in a secret session where
they are, where the originals are and where the
I am ready to present to the
copies are.
Commission legal copies as well as originals,
and I beg the Chairman not to compel me or make
me say where all my archives are.

But Beals was not totally satisfied with Trotsky's answer:
"what was the basis of the selection of evidence which you

brought with you which you thought would be most valuable to
this Commission?"

They were mostly "copies," adapted to the

indictment, admitted Trotsky, but the original documents
were also available.

He further assured Beals that the

archives contained thousands of letters, hundreds of articles, dozens of books

— all

of which would prove "that this

man could not commit the crimes of the indictment." 105

Dewey found Trotsky's demurrer, in the circumstances,
quite reasonable, and authorized him to provide in camera

specific information on the archives' location. 10

^*

Access

to both the Mexican and European archives was later granted
to the Commission.

107

But a certain amount of damage had

As expected, the press picked up the

already been done.

word "copies," and stressed that the Commission was in an
I

AO

awkward position.

The Nation

,

for instance, editorially

commiserated with the Commission for being "unlucky" in the
matter of evidence.

The discovery that Trotsky had few

originals of his letters must have caused "consternation"
among the investigators:

"They had to accept copies of im-

portant documents and take the existence of the originals,
for the time being at least, on trust."

109

To be sure, few, if any, correspondents keep the

originals of their letters, but the seeds of doubt had been
planted.

110

For those already prejudiced against Trotsky

that
and the inquiry, this was one more indication

the whole affair was "a farce."

—
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Trotsky at Center Stage
If the hearings were a personal trial for Trotsky,
he gave little indication of being under great stress.

close observer of the proceedings, James T. Farrell

,

A

found

the chief witness "infinitely well-poised and seemingly relaxed, but with inner intensity."

During the daily ques-

tioning he spoke with great precision, his manners "impeccable," his gestures "very graceful," but his "entire organism" appeared at times subordinated to his will:

Trotsky's

"volatile" temperament ranged from extraordinary self-control
to "irrepressible irony."

To Farrell, he was like a tightly

drawn bow, one that would never snap, but "would vibrate at
the slightest ripple of one's breath."

Here was a man of

tremendous intellectual pride, intolerant of stupidity, but
"his simplicity and extra-ordinary graciousness seemed like
an acquisition of experience."

In Farrell

could "properly say that Trotsky was

a

's

opinion, one

great man."'''^

But Carleton Beals assessed Trotsky differently

picturing him as presenting his "fading record" in

a

tiny

foreign hamlet, the crumbling walls of the villa underlining
the futility of his position:

"Pathos hovers about his proud

head with its wildly ruffled gray hair."

Only Beals, of

course, was not under the sway of this "pathos."

But the

other commissioners, he claimed, had joined in "the chorus of

sorrow over Trotsky's fallen star."

More "Tatar than Jewish,"

asserted Beals, Trotsky proved during the trial the old
Slavic proverb,

"'Scratch a Russian, and

'"

At times

:

337

Trotsky answered questions with "quiet simplicity," occasionally with "lauqhinq condescension" or "frothing defiance,"
but he was always ready to "sacrifice complete honesty of

reply to a quip or bon mot

that will set the court laughing."

This was an "embittered man," wrote Beals, only able to hold
his "choleric disposition" in check through superhuman

restraint
His mind is a vast repository of memory and
passion, its rapier-like sharpness dulled a
trifle now by the alternating years of overweening power and the shattering bitterness of
defeat and exile; above all, his mental
faculties are blurred by a consuming lust of
hate for Stalin, a furious uncontrollable venom
which has its counterpart in something bordering
on a persecution complex all who disagree with
him are bunched in the simple formula of G.P.U.
agents, people "corrupted by the gold of
Stalin. "112

—

It should be noted that when Trotsky bared his "sharklike

teeth" during the hearings, it was usually for Seals' benefit.

During the thirteen sessions Trotsky displayed "irrepressible irony," "magnificent bursts of eloquence,"
Most remarkable perhaps, he could

"laughing condescension."
be loquacious in English,

a

tongue strange to him.

It was,

stated Isaac Deutscher, "as if Demosthenes, his stammer uncured and his mouth full of pebbles, had come to court to
fight for his life."

113

Always the perfectionist, Trotsky

was acutely embarrassed by his defective pronunciation and

uncertain grammar.

At times the interpreter helped him when

"Quixotic" came out "exotic," or "patient" was confused with

"passions." 114

The most obvious malapropism came when

Trotsky was discussing social contradictions in backward
nations:

more."

"Everybody is hungry, and shows that the other has

After it was suggested he meant to

"shows," Trotsky agreed:

"Yes,

.say

"sees," not

sees— I must follow

my ideas

with my English together." 115
Yet his command of English was sufficient to allow

humorous asides and ironic rejoinders.
asked him

il

il

was true he omit worked as

York, Trotsky denied the story:

a

lailoi

"Unfortunately,

learn any productive trade in my life.
116
much."'

When Albert Goldman

I

I

in

New

did not

regret that very

At another point Carleton Beals reminded Trotsky

that American forces had occupied Soviet soil in 1918 in

order to spread "democracy," and then asked how Trotsky

would proceed to spread his ideas in the United States.
"At the moment,

I

have not at my disposition any armed force,

nor use of them," he answered:

"I

believe the danger for

the United States from my side is not so tremendous for

long period."

a

And he added that Robespierre once stated

people did not like missionaries with bayonets:
was right in this question."

117

"Robespierre

Deals temporarily withdrew

from the fray.
But there were also moments of dignity and pathos.

To Beals and others, Trotsky explained that he did not hunger
for power, despite stories to the contrary:
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Power is a burden, but it is necessary and an
inevitable evil.
When your ideas are victorious, you must accept it.
But the mechanics
of power is a miserable thing.
If you permit
me this personal observation:
During the time
I was in office, the best time was the vacations when I wrote my books.
I consider this
time a longer vacation.
I write my books.
It is giving me full satisfaction/ I am patient and await a new wave, a revolutionary
wave, and then, if I can serve the interests
of the proletariat, I will do anything I can. 118

And power, or the loss of it, had its penalties.

When Goldman

asked if the sins of the fathers were attributed to their sons

under Soviet law, Trotsky answered that the confessions were
based, in practice, on persecution of family members.

After

Dewey refused to accept this assertion without supporting
evidence, Goldman suggested this was merely Trotsky's
"opinion" on the issue:

Excuse me, it is not an opinion.
Trotsky:
It is my personal experience.
Goldman:

In what way?

I paid for the experience with
Trotsky:
my two children. 11^

During the hearings Trotsky took great pains to
counter the "criminal charges" lodged against him in the

Moscow trials.

There was

a

paucity of material evidence, as

he observed, directly linking him to the plot.
of letters

A series

(never produced) to Mrachkovsky, Radek

,

Pyatakov,

and Mural ov, three conspiratorial meetings in Copenhagen,
a

short interview in the Bois de Boulogne,

discussion in Norway

— this

a

two-hour

was the sum total of

— —
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Trotsky's direct complicity in the conspiracy.

In his eight

years of exile some 2,917 working days had been devoted to

writing books and articles that defended socialism, and only
three days to a conspiracy that furthered the interests of
fascism.

The figures were rather disproportionate, to say

the least:

—

The public that is, the "hypocritical"
activity, which served only as "camouflage,"
surpassed my secret that is, the "genuine"
activity almost a thousand times in guantity
and, I venture to assert, egually in guality.
One gets the impression that I built a skyscraper to "camouflage" a dead rat. No, it
is not convincing! 120

—

Not a single piece of concrete evidence was presented before
the Moscow tribunal.

Instead, the indictment was built on

confessions, or more exactly, "on recollections of alleged

conversations."

With this lack of factual evidence, charged

Trotsky, the judicial inguiry became "a conversation about

conversations."

The plot had "no flesh and blood."

121

As a result, the Preliminary Commission was left
only with the confessions.

But they would crumble, advised

the chief "witness," once verified.

There were too many

characters, circumstances, dates and documents to readily
fit into a libretto.
a

The task would have been too much for

Shakespeare, but "the G.P.U. does not have Shakespeares at

its beck and call."

122

donned the disguise of

With considerable relish, Trotsky
a

drama critic to castigate the

dilettantish efforts of the Moscow playwrights.

It was an

exercise in malice aforethought, exposing the incongruities
and absurdities of the two judicial farces.
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In particular, Trotsky focused on three episodes
or

foreign "threads" in the indictment— Holtzman

'

s

visit to

Copenhagen, Romm's sojourn in the Bois de Boulogne, and

Pyatakov's flight to Oslo.

If these alleged interviews

could be exposed to the light of truth, he confidently declared, then the "main props" of the entire indictment would

crash to the ground. 12 3

The peculiar conditions of his life

— police surveillance, security guards, countless
visitors — would allow him to prove in these three cases a
"•negative fact.'"
"To employ legal terminology —
am able
in exile

I

in all important instances, where exact dates are given, to

establish an unshakable alibi." 124
The promise was kept

— at

least in his opinion.

On

these "three decisive points," Trotsky later boasted, the

details of his life were clarified in such detail that "the
falsifiers could not find where to insert

a

pin."

Here the

Coyoacan inquiry reached its "highest point" and dealt "a
mortal blow" to the whole of Moscow justice.
III.
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"Something Rotten In Denmark"

Testimony in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial brought
great renown to Copenhagen's Hotel Bristol.
met Leon Sedov in its lobby

ing with the Old Man himself.

E.

S.

Holtzman

prior to their clandestine meet
But there was a snag.

hotel had been demolished many years earlier!

The

"'The evil

that men do lives after them, the good is often interred

with their bones,'" proclaimed Mark Antony.

With Danish
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hotels, scoffed Max Shachtman, it was somewhat
different:
"their good is not interred with their beams, it
lives after

them to form

foyer where the Fascist mad dogs of the

a

Zinovievist-Trotskyist counter-revolutionary terrorist Center
may meet to plot their evil." 126

Terrorism and the Hotel Bristol
For all its ensuing notoriety, only

few passing

a

references were made in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial to the
Hotel Bristol and the "terrorist week" in Copenhagen.

cording to

E.

Ac-

Holtzman, he met Leon (Lyova) Sedov in

S.

Berlin in November, 1932.

Trotsky's son had

"'As you are going to the U.S.S.R.

,

a

suggestion:

it would be a good thing

if you came with me to Copenhagen where my father is.'"

The

offer was accepted:

Holtzman
I agreed, but I told him that we
could not go together for reasons of secrecy.
I arranged with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within
two or three days to put up at the Hotel
I went to the
Bristol and meet him there.
hotel straight from the station and in the
lounge met Sedov.
:

,

From there they went to meet Trotsky, who was in "a rather

excited state," and told Holtzman that it was '"necessary
remove Stalin.

1
'

"

?7

to

Later Holtzman left for the Soviet

Union, but the details of his trips to and from Copenhagen

were not included in the testimony.

Another "agent,"

V.

P.

Olberg, also planned a trip

to Copenhagen to consult with the Chief, prior to departing

for a terrorist assignment in Russia:

.
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Before my departure for the Soviet Union,
I intended to go to Copenhagen with Sedov
to'
see Trotsky.
Our trip did not materialize,
but Suzanna, Sedov s wife went there. On her
return she brought a letter from Trotsky addressed to Sedov, in which Trotsky agreed to
my going to the U.S.S.R. and expressed the
hope that I would succeed in carrying out the
mission entrusted to me. Sedov showed me
this letter. 128
'

Sedov'

s

wife was named "Jeanne," not Suzanna," but more im-

portant, Olberg stated that Sedov remained in Berlin.

Holtzman placed him in Copenhagen!

Yet

Prosecutor Vyshinsky

never examined this discrepancy in the trial record.
Two other emissaries also made the trip to

Copenhagen, K. B. Berman-Yurin and Fritz David

(

Kruglyansky

)

Berman-Yurin arrived in the Danish capital from Berlin between the 25th and 28th of November and was met at "the
During

station by Grilevich," who took him to see Trotsky.

the interview in the "apartment," Trotsky "nervously paced

up and down the room and talked of Stalin with exceptional
hatred."

He advised Berman-Yurin that the Soviet leader

should be assassinated at
Comintern.

a

plenum or congress of the

Again at Sedov'

s

suggestion, David also made

the trip from Berlin on "a false passport."

As in the case

of Berman-Yurin, Trotsky instructed him to murder Stalin at
an international assembly,

in order for the shot "to rever-

berate throughout the whole world."

1

30

Both Berman-Yurin and

David left for Moscow in March 1933, and made plans for an

assassination attempt.

David managed to smuggle

a

Browning

pistol into the Vllth Congress of the Comintern, but was

I
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unable to fire at Stalin, as he was too far away.

But this

Congress of the Comintern occurred in July-August
1935— that
is,

32

months after the original instructions were given in

Copenhagen.

1

31

The story of the meeting in the Hotel Bristol had

hardly been broadcast to the world when it was torpedoed.
On September

1,

1936, the official organ of the Danish

government, the Sozialdemokraten

been

a

revealed that there had

,

Hotel Bristol, but it was demolished in 1917, and

only rebuilt in 1936.

In fact, it was opened to the public

during the period of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. 132
were red in Moscow.

Faces

Stalin was furious, according to the

NKVD defector, Alexander Orlov, and shouted, "'What the
devil did you need a hotel for!

You ought to have said that
The railway station is al-

they met at the railway station.
ways there

i

'

"

A special investigation revealed the circum-

stances of the embarrassing lapse.
Secret Political Department,

G.

A.

The head of the NKVD

Molchanov, had been

ordered to survey the hotel situation in Copenhagen.

In an

excess of caution, he had his secretary obtain the names of
several hotels in Copenhagen and Oslo, but

made on the typewritten list.

a

mistake was

The Copenhagen hotels were

listed under the heading "Oslo," and the Oslo hotels under
the heading "Copenhagen."

As a result of this error, the

nonexistent Hotel Bristol in Denmark appeared in the

Zinoviev-Kamenev trial and gained an international reputation,

just in time for its reopening.

133
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Soviet apologists attempted to put

bad situation.

good face on

a

a

The ever- reli able D. N. Pritt, drawing on

his judicial experience, claimed that it was not
unusual
for "one, or two, or three errors of that kind" to enter

into the court record when there were many defendents.

Such

mistakes should "excite no suspicion of any kind" that the
stories had been concocted. 134

And in March 1937 Soviet

Russ ia Today published a special "radio-photo" from Denmark,

which purported to show that a "Cafe Bristol' was located
1

next to a "Grand Hotel Copenhagen," and in 1932 even had "a

common entrance with it." 135

The obvious inference was that

Holtzman had confused the cafe with the hotel.

New Masses published

a

In addition,

letter from one Andor Braun, quoting

at length from an article by Martin Nielsen, editor of the

Copenhagen Arbeiderbl adet

,

a

Communist organ.

According to

Nielsen, this "'centrally-located Viennese cafe /the

Bristol/ was for years the meeting place of Danish
Trot sky ists as well as for Trotskyists who came from abroad.

'

"

A plan of the hotel and cafe showed that the two

were linked by a door:

the lobby of the Grand Hotel

Copenhagen immediately adjoined the cafe.

Thus

M,

a for-

eigner would naturally identify the internationally known
name of the Cafe Bristol with the name of the hotel,

especially since

a

1

"

neon sign, "Konditori Bristol," stretched
*

across the front of the combination cafe and candy store.

136
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Trotsky's Visit to Copenhagen
For once, the Kremlin's dramatists placed Trotsky
in
the proper city at the correct time.
He had, in fact,

visited the Danish capital in the last week of November,
As he explained at some length before the Preliminary

1932.

Commission,

a

group of Danish students (Social-Democrats)

invited him to give

a

lecture in honor of the XVth anni-

versary of the October Revolution.
Turkish isle, even for

a

Eager to leave his

brief period, Trotsky accepted the

invitation with alacrity, and sailed from Constantinople on

November 14, 1932.

The mysterious voyage of "Mr. Sedov"

and his small party attracted the attention of the world's

press, eager to read ulterior motives into the voyage.

Near

Marseilles the nervous Surete had the party off-loaded onto
a small boat,

and then rushed its unwelcome guests to

Dunkirk, where they boarded a vessel for Denmark. 137

Arriving in Copenhagen on November
immediately spirited away to

a

23,

Trotsky was

rented villa in the suburbs.

He found the furnishings rather "peculiar," as well he might.

Rented from

a

touring dancer, it featured bibelots, trinkets,

and "alluring" pictures of the owner, all in rather shocking
1

taste.

oo

While the local police and loyal followers took

turns guarding the makeshift headquarters, Trotsky worked

assiduously.

On November 27th he lectured in German before

an audience of some 2,000 while hostile demonstrators milled

around outside.

He also found time to make a gramophone

record for the Left Opposition,

a

radio broadcast in his
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shaky English for CBS, and a newsreel
film for Fox Movietone,
in addition, there were several car trips
and meetings with
local intellectuals and students. 139 But
much of his limited
time was spent consulting with the twenty-five
to thirty

"Trotsky ites" who gathered in Copenhagen to consult
with the
Chief.
It was almost an informal "'international conference,'" but hardly

a

clandestine meeting, observed Deutscher:

"Nothing could be less like a meeting of conspirators than
this little gathering of thrilled and rather garrulous de-

votees of an ineffectual sect." 140

Trotsky was eager to remain in Denmark, but his nervous hosts preferred to be rid of the "escaped lion," who was

becoming an acute embarrassment.

A member of the royal

family with fascist leanings, Prince Aage

,

denounced this

"'murderer of the Tsar's family,'" and declared that if

Trotsky were not expelled, "'there was something rotten in
Denmark.'" 141

On the other side of the political fence,

local communists rather indiscriminately accused him of being
an agent of the Social Democrats,

an ally of Marshall

Pilsudsky, and of being allied with Karl Liebknecht's
killers.

142

As a result of the growing pressure, the Danish

Social Democratic government unceremoniously sent him packing
on December

2,

1932, before the visa expired.

43

]
'

Once again

Trotsky was forced to return to Prince's Isle in Turkey.

:
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Trotsky on the Bristol
Thus, Trotsky readily admitted that he
had been in

Copenhagen at the time, but disputed almost everything
else
about "'the terrorist week.'" In particular, he
had nothing
but scorn for the GPU explanations of a nonexistent
hotel.
He rejected out of hand the allegation that the court
stenog

rapher in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial made

a "slip of the

over such an un-Russian word as Bristol.

And he jeered at

pen

the ''saving discovery" of the Comintern that a confectioner'

shop (or cafe) named "Bristol" shared

a joint wall

with

a

hotel

To be sure, this hotel is called the "Grand Hotel
Copenhagen," but it is, nevertheless, a hotel.
To be sure, the confectioner's shop is not a
hotel still its name is "Bristol " According
to Holtzman, the meeting took place in the
vestibule of the hotel. To be sure, the confectioner's shop has no vestibule; but on the
other hand, the hotel, which is not called the
"Bristol," does have a vestibule.
Now
where did the meeting really take place? In
the vestibule without the "Bristol" or in the
"Bristol" without the vestibule?
.

;

.

To his severely logical mind

,

.

.

the hypothesis that Holtzman

confused the shop and hotel after arranging the meeting with
Even if Sedov and Holtzman did

Sedov was doubly absurd.

meet in the vestibule of

a

hotel of another name, the story

collapsed:
But it is self-evident that Holtzman could have
made a mistake as regards the name of the hotel
During the meeting
only before the meeting.
the error must have been cleared up and imprinted all the more sharply in the memories of
both parties. After the meeting Holtzman could
in no case have spoken of the vestibule of the

—
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Bristol confectioner's shop. The hypothesis
thus collapses at the very first touch. 144
The other lame excuse of the Comintern press in
the

Bristol matter made no more sense to Trotsky.

shop could not have been

a

The Bristol

meeting place for Danish and tran-

sient Trotskyites, because in 1932 he was unable "to find

single 'Trotskyite' in Denmark."

Besides, it was highly un-

likely that Holtzman, concerned for secrecy, would fix

rendezvous in
hangout.'"

a

a

shop known to the Stalinists as

a

a

"'Trotskyite

If the shop were well-known to "Trotskyites,"

then Holtzman could not have mistaken it for the "Grand Hotel

Copenhagen" in the first place and would have certainly

shunned it like "a plague" in the second place.

"In such a

manner do these people correct the stenographer's 'slip of
the pen'

1,145
!

Sedov's Ghost in Copenhagen

Trotsky confidently asserted before the Dewey

Commission that the nonexistent Bristol Hotel discredited the
accusation.

But what "doubly" discredited the testimony was

the absent Sedov.

With voluminous documentation Trotsky

showed that his son could not have met Holtzman in the lobby
or anywhere else in Copenhagen.

Despite strenuous efforts,

Sedov was unable to leave Berlin in late November 1932.
was all so mysterious, declared Trotsky:

They /GPU_7 want us to believe that Sedov's ghost
found its way into the ghostly vestibule of the
confectioner's shop, which, after some delay,
was transformed into a hotel by the fantasy of
146
the agents of the G.P.U.

It

,

350

According to Trotsky and his secretary, Jan Frankel
Sedov lived in Berlin from February 1931 to March
1933.
Sedov was naturally eager to make the short journey to

Copenhagen to visit his parents in November 1932.

But he

was having increasing passport difficulties with the "inter-

mediary regime of Papen and Schleicher," 147 just prior to
Hitler's ascendancy.

On November

1,

1932, his permission

to remain in Germany expired; it was not renewed until

December

3,

and then only to January

2,

1933.

As a result,

during the month of November Sedov lacked official permission
to remain in Germany,

and official permission to return, if
I

AO

he did attempt the short trip to Denmark.

issuance of

a

But with the

new visa the problem was simplified; Sedov

could come and go from Germany for at least

a

month.

fore, on December

a

telegram to

3,

1932, Mme

.

Sedova sent

There-

Prime Minister Herriot of France, urging that Sedov be

granted

a

temporary French visa; his parents wanted to meet

him in France on their way back to Turkey.

granted and Sedov met them at
5th

— but

a

This request was

railway station on December

in Paris, not Copenhagen!

149

At the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky took great care to

document this minor episode, for Holtzman had clearly testified to meeting Sedov in person at the Bristol Hotel.

In

support of the defense contention, scores of depositions,
affidavits, and documents were offered, clearly showing that
Sedov had remained in Berlin during the week in question.

:

,
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Acquaintances in the German capital testified to seeing
Sedov there in late November; others in Copenhagen testified
to having telephone conversations with him over the line
to
Berlin. 150 Also introduced were a photostatic copy of
"

Sedov

1

s

passport, showing the dates of the visas, a copy of

the telegram to M. Herriot, and notebooks and examination

papers from the Technische Hochschule in Berlin, indicating
that Sedov took some exams at the same time he allegedly

visited his parents in Copenhagen. 151

Even more impressive

were letters between Lyova and his parents.
1932,

as his ship steamed away from Denmark,

On December

3,

Trotsky wrote

his son in Berlin

Dear Liovoussi atka so it seems that we
shall not succeed in meeting:
between the
arrival of the boat at Dunquerke and the departure of the boat from Marseilles, there is
just time to cross France.
To wait for the
next boat (a whole week I) will not, of course,
Mother is very, very
be permitted us.
dejected that the meeting did not take place
Nothing to be done.
and I also.
,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

This document of "exceptional importance" should be subjected
to "chemical analysis," advised the author, in order to

verify its date.

152

A series of communications between

mother and son was also submitted to the Preliminary
Commission, written in November-December, 1932.

153
'

Alto-

gether the documents placing Sedov in Berlin were "the most
decisive evidence of alibi that the human mind can imagine,"

confidently stated Trotsky.

154
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Other Couriers

With cool contempt Trotsky dismissed the accusations
made by David, Holtzman, Olberg, and Berman-Yurin

them had visited Trotsky in Copenhagen.

.

None of

In any event, it

was hardly credible that he would disclose his "terrorist

views" to "chance acquaintances." 155

Fritz David, for in-

stance, was a name completely unfamiliar to Trotsky before
the August 1936 trial. 156 He might have met E. S. Holtzman,

however, in 1926-27.

An old member of the Party, Holtzman

was "personally known" to Trotsky and his son, but hardly a
close associate. 157

Valentine Olberg was

a

different matter.

This young

"Trotskyite" had some dealings with Sedov and corresponded

with Trotsky.

In 1930 he applied for a position as the

exile's Russi an-1 anguage secretary.

But when interviewed by

Franz and Alexandra Pfemfert, two of Trotsky's close friends,
he produced "'the most unfavorable and the most untrust-

worthy impression.'"

The Pfemferts found his questions

"'tactless'" and advised Trotsky that "'Olberg has no place
in your house, because in twenty-four hours he would be an

insupportable burden to you and
reports for the G.P.U.'"

1

— possibly

.

.

.

fabricate

cp

After this kind of "recommenda-

tion" Trotsky gave no further thought to employing Olberg.
"It is all the more inconceivable that two years later

I

should have given him 'terrorist instructions,'" he told the
Dewey Commission.

159

K.

Berman-Yurin was another enigma.

B.

When his

name first surfaced in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Trotsky

thought he might actually be

"

Senin-Sobolevitzius

"

a

Russian-speaking follower who came to Copenhagen in
November 1932.

Even in 1932 there was some suspicion that

Senin was a secret Stalinist agent; shortly thereafter, he
and his brother,

"Well-Sobolevitzius

Trotskyite organization in Berlin.

,

"

helped split the
Although Berman-Yurin

and Senin were not the same person, Trotsky kept a close eye

on the latter, and in 1937 issued a "Declaration" on the

brothers Sobolevitzius

.

Having heard rumors that they were

involved in "dark machinations," he wanted to clarify the

situation in advance.
-

new frame-up.

They were logical candidates for

a

161

Trotsky's suspicions were correct.

On October 8,

1957, an American court sentenced Jack Soble (alias Senin-

Sobolevitzius) to
Soviet spy.

a

prison term of seven years for being

a

At the time Soble revealed that Stalin had been

"obsessed" with knowing about Trotsky's activities.

As a

result, Soble had been instructed to report on Trotsky's

Later he had been in charge

every move in the early 1930s.

of the Moscow file on Trotsky, before moving to Washington,

where he supervised a series of Soviet agents, including

Mark Zborowski ("Etienne"),
the Trotskyite camp.

162

a

notorious agent provocateur in

Certainly Soble had every oppor-

tunity to provide the GPU with
"terrorist week" in Copenhagen.

a

detailed description of the
Thus, it is rather peculiar
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that so few accurate details about Trotsky's brief
sojourn
in Denmark actually emerged in the Zinoviev-Kamenev
163
trial.

Dewey Commission Conclusions
The scores of documents and affidavits submitted on
the Copenhagen affair, recording Trotsky's every move in

Denmark, were almost an embarrassment of riches.
to make the same points ad nauseam

had the desired result.
final report, Not Guilty

They tended

But this pedantic effort

.

The Commission of Inguiry, in its
,

fully accepted his "alibi."

The Commission naturally devoted much attention to
the ephemeral Hotel Bristol.

The fact that the Hotel did not

exist in 1932 was a matter of "common knowledge," and not
open to guestion.

There were several reports, however, that

instead of being "demolished" or "razed," it had actually
been transformed into an office building.

164

Moreover,

a

series of photographs of the premises taken at different

times tended to be contradictory; it was far from clear if
in 1932 the Bristol Cafe/Confectionery was actually con-

tiguous to the Grand Hotel Copenhagen and if

connected the two establishments.
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a

common doorway

But the authors of the

final report accepted Trotsky's argument that since the

Cafe/Confectionery certainly lacked

a

vestibule, lobby, or

foyer, then the meeting between Sedov and Holtzman took

place "'in the vestibule without the "Bristol" or in the
"Bristol" without the vestibule.'"

In addition, Holtzman

could only have mistaken the Cafe for the Hotel prior to the

355

alleged rendezvous; any confusion over the
"Bristol" was
hardly credible after the meeting. it also seemed
unlikely
that Holtzman would have met Sedov in a notorious
Trotskyite

rendezvous after originally refusing to travel with
him from
Berlin "'for reasons of secrecy.'" 166

—

If Not Guilty was somewhat equivocal on the Hotel

Bristol per se, it was categorical in stating that Leon Sedov

could not have met Holtzman in Copenhagen:

"...

the evi-

dence proving that Sedov was not in Copenhagen during

Trotsky's sojourn is conclusive."

Citing the many affidavits

and documents that placed Sedov in Berlin in late November,

1932

— e.g.,

Hochschule
parents

,

— the

the attendance book from the Technische

his passport, the exchange of letters with his

Commission of Inquiry affirmed that Sedov could

not have escorted Holtzman to the meeting with Trotsky, as

claimed:

"He /Holtzman/ thus relegates the whole interview

to the realm of the imaginary.

11

Only one conclusion could

be reached:
We therefore hold the evidence to prove conthat Sedov was not in
clusively
1
Copenhagen at the time of Trotsky's visit to
that city; (2) that Holtzman did not meet Sedov
and go with him to see Trotsky; (3) that
Holtzman did not see Trotsky in Copenhagen. 167
:

(

)

The Commission was no less harsh in judging the other

episodes during that "terrorist week."
tween Holtzman'

s

The contradiction be-

and Olberg's testimony concerning Sedov

1

s

whereabouts was one "which could have escaped no Prosecutor
in possession of his sense and at all interested in

ascertaining the truth."

The discrepancy was so flagrant,

that "one is almost forced to suspect that Holtzman, testi-

fying the day after Olberg, placed Sedov in Copenhagen with
the intent of indicating to the world that his testimony was

false."

Moreover, the Prosecutor elicited from Holtzman few

details on how he traveled to Copenhagen or reached Trotsky's
apartment, the nature of the surroundings or the people

present.

Thus, even the trial record was "far from con-

vincing" on the matter of Holtzman'

s

trip.

168

As for the testimony of Valentine Olberg, there was

no question that he had known Sedov, worked for the

Opposition, and corresponded with Trotsky, but there were so

many falsehoods in his allegations, including the way he

contacted Sedov and Trotsky, that it would put "an extreme
tax upon credulity to believe that he was in Russia as an

emissary of Trotsky and Sedov for any purpose whatever."
Not Guilty concluded, therefore, that Olberg'

s

testimony was

"worthless" as proof of charges against Trotsky and his son,
and found that Olberg "never went to Russia with terrorist
169
instructions from Trotsky and Sedov."

Much the same applied to Berman-Yurin and David.

It

was doubtful that Trotsky would have asked the "supreme

sacrifice" to assassinate Stalin) from
(

a

pair of Stalinists,

one who was wavering on the question of terrorism, and the

other who was unknown to Sedov before August 1932.

As a re-

sult, the Commission of Inquiry stated that neither Berman-

Yurin nor David visited Trotsky in Copenhagen or received

terrorist instructions.

170

s

The revelations about the imaginary meeting in

vestibule without
trial.

a

a

hotel went far to discredit the first

Not only did news of the exposure spread throughout

the western world, it even seeped into the Soviet Union.

Recently a dissident Soviet historian, Roy Medvedev

,

has

written that the Hotel Bristol did not exist in 1932:
"Moreover,

a

commission headed by an American scholar proved

that Gol'tsman /Holtzman/ had not met Trotsky, and that
Sedov had not gone to Copenhagen on the days indicated.

1,171

Score one for Trotsky!
IV.

A Rendezvous In The Woods

A mysterious meeting in
Boulogne

— this

a

dark allee of the Bois de

was the second major "foreign thread" in the

Moscow indictment against Trotsky.

If it could be proven

that Trotsky had never met Vladimir Romm

with Radek and the "parallel center"
links in the case would be severed.

had just such proofs.

— his

— then
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"liaison man"

the necessary

In this case Trotsky

It was "a gift of heaven" that he

could refute Romm's deposition by offering positive evidence
"I

am very well

armed," he told the Preliminary Commission.

The Testimony of Vladimir Romm

Although merely

a

"witness" in the Pyatakov-Radek

trial, Romm was brought into court under guard.

A veteran

correspondent for Tass, and more recently Izvestia'

man in

Washington, he was a well-known figure in the international

1

1

.
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fraternity of newsmen.

in the opinion of Walter Duranty,

a

reporter present at the trial,
He /Romm/ spoke with the same charm and
courage that made him popular among Washington
newspaper men— one of the most exclusive and
intelligent groups in the world and one that
would never tolerate any one shoddy or second
rate
.

But there was little charm in the tale he related
to the

court

According to the testimony, Romm had been allied with
the Trotskyite opposition in 1926-27, mostly because of the

"Chinese question."

He resumed his underground activities

in 1931 at the behest of an old friend, Karl Radek, 175 who

needed

a

"liaison man" with the Trotskyite leadership abroad.

As Tass reporter in Geneva and Paris from 1930-34, it was

not difficult for him to carry between the two conspira-

torial centres secret messages, usually concealed in books,

such as an "Anglo-Russian technical dictionary."

17 6

In all

he conveyed five messages between the Soviet Union and

Western Europe, but none were produced in open court. 177
On one occasion Romm allegedly met Trotsky.

In

July 1933, after the journalist arrived in Paris from Geneva,

Leon Sedov telephoned him and arranged an appointment in
cafe on the Boulevard Montparnasse
met in the same cafe,

.

a

Several days later they

and then went to the "Bois de Boulogne"

for an interview with the Old Man:

a

Vyshinsky
When was that?
Romm
At the end of July 1933.
Vyshinsky
How long did that meetinq
y with
Trotsky last?
Romm:
Twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Vyshinsky
For what purpose did Trotsky
meet you?
Rpmm:
As far as I could understand, in
order verbally to confirm the instructions contained in the letter I was taking to Moscow.
;

:

;

:

.

According to Romm, Trotsky approved the creation of

.

.

a "par-

allel centre," endorsed terrorism and wrecking, even at loss

of life, and quoted the Latin proverb:

'"What medicine can-

not heal, iron will heal, and what iron cannot heal, fire
will heal.'"
a copy of

At the end of the discussion Trotsky gave him

Novikov-Priboi

'

s

novel, Tsusima

to Radek concealed in the cover.

1

I

zvesti

which had a letter

70

In May 1934 Romm handed Radek'
Sedov,

,

s

last letter over to

and also announced that he would shortly become the

correspondent in America.

Sedov responded that

Trotsky wanted to be kept informed of anything interesting
in "the sphere of Soviet-American relations."

This concern

followed, according to the son, "'from Trotsky's line on the

defeat of the U.S.S.R.

Inasmuch as the date of the war of

Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R. depends to

certain

a

extent on the state of Soviet-American relations, this cannot fail to be of interest to Trotsky.'"

But after the mur-

der of Kirov, Trotsky's "special correspondent" in the United
States decided to cease active work, and never sent any in-

formation from America to the leader of the conspiracy.
There was

a

postscript to the Romm caper.

Congressional Press Association in Washington sent

179

The
a

cable

:
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to Duranty in Moscow defending the
probity of their Soviet
colleague
In our dealings with Romm we have found
him a true friend and advocate of the U.S.S.R
Never once did he even faintly indicate lack
of sympathy for or disloyalty toward the
existing government. He did more than any
other Soviet envoy to popularize the Stalin
regime in this country.
We hope this testimonial can be strongly certified to his judges
and that you will ask Ambassador Davies also
to transmit these representations 180
.

_

.

.

'

.

This solicitious message was signed by, among others,
Arthur
Krock, Ernest K. Lindley, and Erwin D. Canham, and forwarded
to Moscow while the trial was still in progress. 181
In response, Joseph E. Davies, the newly-named

American Ambassador, wrote
of The New York Times

.

a

personal letter to Arthur Krock

Romm's testimony, according to

Davies , who had been attending the trial sessions, was "most

extraordinary," and given in great detail:
did not leave himself a leg to stand on."

"The poor devil

Although "rather

downcast," Romm looked physically well and his testimony bore
"the earmarks of credibility."

Davies would gladly have done

anything for "the poor chap," but after all he was "a Soviet
citizen, knew Soviet law, and entered into the situation

with his eyes open."

Any interposition in this exclusively

Russian business might prove "embarrassing" to the administration, and would be "quite improper."

182

But in February

Davies informally raised the Romm case with President Kalinin,

Premier Molotov, and Foreign Minister Litvinov.

He stressed

the beneficial effect on American public opinion if the

Soviet government gave consideration to the character
ref-

erences from the Washington correspondents.

At that time

Molotov promised nothing, but Davies later learned that
Romm
had been sent "to do work in the interior."

The action of

the American journalists had saved him, since "'the record
of Romm's activity was very bad,'" confided a Soviet diplo183
mat.
Although Trotsky could not change the course of

Soviet justice, apparently the Washington press corps had

greater influence.

Incognito in France
As briefly mentioned in a previous chapter, Trotsky

had, indeed, been domiciled in France during July 1933, but

hundreds of miles to the south of the Bois de Boulogne!
Before the Dewey Commission Trotsky narrated how

friends had interceded with the Radical Government of Prime

Minister Daladier to obtain

a

residence visa in France.

Much to Trotsky's pleasure and surprise, the visa was forthcoming, but only if he agreed to live a discreet existence
(The first choice for

in one of the Southern departments.
J.

a place of asylum had been Corsica. r

84

On July 17,

1933,

Trotsky and party sailed from Turkey on board an Italian
vessel, the "Bulgaria."

Once again,

as with the short

trip to Copenhagen in 1932, reporters awaited "Mr. Sedov" at
Piraeus with inquisitive questions on his plans.

There was

also a furious press campaign against allowing Trotsky to

interfere in European politics;

a

theory popular with the

362

Communists had him coming to France in
order to assist
Daladier in preparing military intervention
against the
USSR. 186

'

while the press speculated on the plans,
Trotsky

suffered during the voyage from an attack
of "lumbago,"
which caused him pain and made it difficult
187
to breathe.

No matter, he was eager to reach France

— at

almost any price.

But there was danger that Trotsky might receive
an

overly-warm reception at the dock in Marseilles.

Lyova Sedov worked out

a

stratagem that was "brilliantly suc-

cessful," proudly claimed Trotsky:
(Laughter)." 188

As a result,

"We landed on the sea

Copying an old ruse, the "Bulgaria" was

halted just short of Marseilles, in order to rendezvous with
a

motor boat, which then took Trotsky and his wife to the

little port of Cassis.

Trotsky with

a

After

a

Surete official had presented

formal decree revoking his 1916 expulsion

from France, 189 the small group headed north in two cars,

spending the night of July 24-25 in

a

small inn at Tonneins,

before arriving at St. Palais, near Royan, where

a

villa had

been rented for the Russian exile. 90
1

With pointer in hand, Trotsky traced the route on

a

map for the Dewey Commission, and explained how the other
members of the original party had headed in the direction of
Paris

#

as a "political measure of self-defense

.

"

Would-be

followers were supposed to believe that Trotsky also intended
to make the French capital his final destination.

was our purpose
them.

— to

191

"That

betray the adversaries, to disorientate

That we succeeded

— we

succeeded very well.

The

deposition of Vladimir Romm shows that we
succeeded in betraying the G.P.U.," declared Trotsky with
a certain amount
of smug satisfaction. 192

Arriving at "Les Embruns

,

"

a

rented villa, in the

afternoon of the 25th of July, the ailing Trotsky
immediately
took to bed.

But after an hour the atmosphere became "in-

tolerable, and directly
Some sparks from

a

I

fell from the bed onto the floor." 193

passing locomotive had started

which threatened the villa.

a fire,

one

As the flames licked at the

hedges, trees, and fence around the house, Trotsky took ref-

uge in a car.

The blaze attracted a crowd of some fifty

people, including policemen, firemen, and the press.

In

order to avoid discovery, Trotsky and his wife "presented

ourselves as Americans, in spite of my English (Laughter)."
The local newspaper duly reported that "'an elderly American

couple'" had been present during the fire, which was quickly

brought under control. 194
For two months

"

Les Embruns "

(or "The Sprays") was

home for Trotsky, ill with "lumbago" and high fever.
of the time

walking

a

I

"Half

spent in bed, and half of the time slowly

bit in the garden, and a bit in the house, in the

company of friends who visited me," he informed the Preliminary Commission.

Despite the presence of several loyal fol-

lowers, this was

a

period of extreme ennui for Trotsky.

Even the many visitors who flocked to
to improve his spirits.

"

Les Embruns

"

195

failed

Among the Frenchmen, Belgians,

Germans, etc., who took the occasion to consult the great

man— some

fifty in all

— were

Paul Henri Spaak, Ruth Fischer,

Andre Malraux, and Jenny Lee, wife of Aneurin
Bevan. 196

At

the beginning of October Trotsky and his
wife journeyed to

Bagneres de Bigorre, near the Pyrenees, where his
health improved.
Finally, in November 1933, the French government
al
lowed him to move to Barbizon,

a small

village near Paris.

Trotsky actually paid several visits to the French
capital,
but only months after the alleged meeting in the Bois de
Boulogne with Vladimir Romm. 197

Trotsky on his "Contact Man "
There were so few concrete details in the testimony
of Vladimir Romm that even Trotsky found the whole episode

rather baffling.

But Trotsky was determined to expose the

inherent absurdity of the unlikely tale.
Romm?

Who was Vladimir Romm?

Before Dewey and his

fellow commissioners Trotsky testified that he had never

heard the name until it appeared in the Pyat akov-Radek trial

Nor had he seen it in the columns of
avoided with

a

passion:

Isvestia /sic/ is

a

I

zvestia

,

which he

"Only the foreign people think

readable paper."

Certainly Trotsky

kept a close watch on articles in Pravda

eign developments in The New York Times

,

,

and followed for-

but there was no

need to keep abreast of Romm's articles in the government's
organ.

As he explained to Ben Stolberg,

Litvinov and

a

speech of Stalin, and then

"I
I

read

a

speech by

know what the

correspondence from Washington will convey for

a

month or

"

two/' just a confirmation of "the last slogan, or
the latest
slogan, 198
But Vyshinsky had an acute need for a "contact man,"
one who traveled freely in Europe and could provide a
link

between the "parallel centre" and its exiled leader.

As a

result, by "special appointment of the G.P.U.
Romm became
199
a "Trotskyite. "
Romm had the "technical facilities" for
11

"

fulfilling the assignment, admitted Trotsky, but the political or human motivation was lacking.

For years Romm had

evinced no interest in the Opposition.

Then he suddenly re-

turned to the fold, but still remained strangely inactive:
Does Romm bear any resemblance at all to a confirmed Trotskyite? Hardly; instead, he is as
like a G.P.U. agen t provocateur as one drop of
water is to another provided—provided he
really did commit the acts he describes
As a
matter of fact all these acts were thought up
200
retroactively
,

.

,

....

"whom nature has endowed with

Still the Prosecutor,

very sluggish brains,"

201

required confirmation that Trotsky

had authorized both Stalin
of a "parallel centre.

11

1

s

assassination and the creation

The accused were incapable of taking

"a single step without Trotsky

— or

rather, they seek to in-

form the universe through every channel that all crimes are

committed only in pursuance of Trotsky's directives," declared the chief defendant in absentia

.

As a result, Radek

informed Romm of the formation of the bloc in the autumn of
1932,

"not at all out of light-mindedness and altruistic

loquacity, so peculiar to him in general," but rather for
the sake of the supreme goal:

"The need to help Prosecutor

366

Vyshinsky patch up the looming gaps in the confessions
of
Zinoviev, Kamenev and others." 203 And Radek also

"'glanced

through'"

a

letter in Romm's presence (one written in code

and invisible ink!), and then informed him of its terrorist

message.

This was a violation of the "most elementary con-

spiratorial rule," but again was of crucial importance to
the Prosecutor's case. 204

But when Vyshinsky threw all "caution to the wind,"
and asked Romm about the date of the alleged rendezvous in

the Bois de Boulogne, the witness specified

a

"truly fatal

date," which buried the whole trial, in Trotsky's opinion.
The wealth of detail, even minutia, he presented to the

Commission was designed to demolish Romm's story and stand
in striking contrast to the "system of cowardly reticence." 205

The Prosecution had avoided asking embarrassing questions on
the details of the meeting:

There is not a single living trace, not a* single
subjective experience, not a single visual impression. Trotsky in an allee of the Bois de
Boulogne remains for Romm a phantom, an abstraction, a puppet from the folders of the
.206
G.P.U.
.

.

And instead of using an invulnerable intermediary to convey
the book,

as any conspirator over fifteen would have done,

Trotsky supposedly confirmed written instructions to an unfamiliar agent, an "authority for nobody," remarked the

veteran plotter:

"I

appeared in person to consummate the

performance, for the sake of drilling into Romm's head, for
twenty to twenty-five minutes, his future testimony at the

367

trial.

The methodology of the frame-up is not
distinguished

by refinement."

on 7

Other aspects of Romm's testimony also provoked

Trotsky's scorn.

The entire episode about Trotsky's interest

in "Soviet-American" relations was probably interjected into

the trial, charged the "defendant," only after it became

known that he was leaving for Mexico:

"The imagination of

the G.P.U. sought to overtake in its flight the oil tanker

transporting me from Oslo to Tampico."

In the interests of

supplying Japan with oil in case of war, he traveled on
tanker,

a

"an indispensable vehicle for further operations in

oil," he sneered.

In the next trial, Trotsky added, Romm

would probably recall that he had received instructions "to

plug up the Panama Canal and divert Niagara to flood New
York

— all

this during his hours off duty as correspondent of

Isvestia /sic/."

208

On another matter, why should fifty

visitors make the journey to St. Palais, if Trotsky were already in Paris at the time?

209

de Boulogne never took place.

.

No, the meeting in the Bois
It coi^ld not have occurred:

in general, there exists in this world such
a thing as an alibi, then in the given instance
it receives its most complete and consummate exThe
The unfortunate Romm lied.
pression.
Vyshinsky veiled
G.P.U. compelled him to lie.
his lie.
For the sake of precisely this lie,
Romm was arrested and included among the witnesses 210
If,

.

Romm's Testimony is Assessed
Once again Trotsky had supplied the Dewey Commission

with a surfeit of documentation on the Romm episode.

,

368

Together with testimony taken by the Commission Roqatoire
in
Paris and the sub-commission in New York, 212 there was abun-

dant evidence that Trotsky could not have met Vladimir Romm
in the Bois de Boulogne in late

port, Not Guilty

July, 1933.

The final re-

concurred completely with Trotsky's assess-

,

ment of the escapade.

According to the authors of Not Guilty

,

"nothing" in

Romm's testimony indicated a prime motive for undertaking

such a risky assignment, and "nothing" indicated why Trotsky

should have trusted him in the first place.
credible

— indeed

preposterous

rushed to Paris for
liaison man.

a

—

21 3

It was "in-

that Trotsky would have

"

brief interview with this unknown

With the "fantastic contradictions" about the

parallel center, Romm's testimony was simply "not convincing."
Besides, an abundance of evidence "proves conclusively" that

Trotsky never met Romm in Paris, and that Sedov was absent
from the French capital at the time specified:

"The positive

evidence that Romm testified falsely is impressive both in
its mass and its cohesion."

214

The only gap in the evidence, admitted the final report, was the lack of supporting documentation from the

French police, which had closely followed Trotsky's activities in France.

At least four attempts had been made to secure

this official record, but to no avail.
this lack of cooperation to the

Moscow in 1937-38.

"

Not Guilty attributed

quas i alliance" of Paris and

But it was "reasonable to assume," con-

Romm's
tinued the report, that if the record had borne out

testimony

369

the French government would not hesitate
to reveal it; and that its refusal indicates
unwillingness to embarrass a government with which
it
is in friendship and virtual alliance.
Therefore we hold that the refusal of the French
government to make this record public constitutes
strong presumptive evidence that it does not
bear
out the testimony of Vladimir Romm. 215
It is also "reasonable to assume," one might
add, that Paris

had no desire to become involved in the Trotsky affair
one
way or the other.

After all, Trotsky's sojourn in France

had caused the government nothing but acute embarrassment.
Despite this lacuna in the chain of evidence, the
Dewey Commission felt no qualms in absolving Trotsky of any

involvement with Vladimir Romm.

Based on the contradictions

in the testimony and positive evidence submitted on Trotsky's

behalf,
We therefore hold that Romm's testimony
is false_.
And since his evidence_on this crucial
point /the interview with Trotsky/ is false, it
follows that all his testimony concerning his
alleged activities ... is not worthy of credence.
And since the testimony of Radek to conspiracy with Leon Trotsky rests primarily upon
that of Romm
we hold Radek 's testimony
to be also false.
We therefore hold that none
of the letters allegedly exchanged between
Trotsky and Radek, whether through Vladimir
Romm or by unspecified means, ever existed, and
that all testimony to the contents of these alleged letters is sheer fabrication. 216
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

Thus, the "proof" linking Trotsky and Radek in a plot disin-

tegrated.

This was a logical chain of evidence in reverse.
V.

The Phantom Flight To Norway

The third alleged interview between Trotsky and his

co-conspirators occurred in December, 1935.

At that time

a
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Yuri Pyatakov supposedly flew in great
secrecy to Norway.
Along with the rendezvous in the Bois de
Boulogne, this was
the only direct link between Trotsky
and the "parallel

centre" in the Soviet Union.

asserted Trotsky.

But it was a "mythical flight,"

The G.P.U. dramaturgists had forced

Pyatakov to use "an imaginary airplane," he once
remarked,
"just as the Holy Inquisition forced witches
to go to their
rendezvous with the devil on a broomstick. The
technique
has changed, but the essence is the same." 217

Pyatakov on the Flight to Oslo
In the second trial Pyatakov testified that both he

and Radek had become deeply disturbed by Trotsky's new line
on "defeatism":

His isolation in exile and ignorance of

actual conditions had led to certain "illusions," e.g., the

Soviet Union would inevitably suffer defeat in any war with
Germany.

218

Pyatakov decided that it was imperative to see

Trotsky personally and discuss the disquieting instructions
that had reached the "centre" in the Soviet Union.
In December of 1935, testified Pyatakov, he made a

trip to Berlin on an official Soviet mission.
10th or 11th of the month he had

Berlin with Dmitri
for

I

zvesti

.

P.

a

brief conversation in

Bukhartsev, yet another correspondent

At that time Bukhartsev informed Pyatakov

that Trotsky might want to see him.

Pyatakov, and "Trotsky's
the Tiergarten.

On either the

The next day Bukhartsev,

man"— one Gustav Stirner--met

in

A brief note from Trotsky was handed to

i

"

Pyatakov:

"'Y.L., the bearer of this note can be
fully

trusted.'"

Stirner, also known as "Heinrich," asked the

high Soviet official if he were prepared to travel
by airplane to Oslo.
Pyatakov agreed, "although I realized how
risky such an operation was; but.
.1 thought it

was bet-

.

ter to take the risk of flying and meeting Trotsky than
to
shirk the risk and remain in the state of perplexity we were
in."

219

On the next day

— either

the 12th or 13th of December--

Pyatakov met Gustav Stirner at the Tempelhof airport, and

received

a

"German" passport, one which had been procured

through Stirner'

s

"connections in Berlin," i.e., German of-

Trotsky's agent had also arranged for

ficials.

a "special

plane" to take Pyatakov to Oslo and back, again with the as-

sistance of solicitous officials in Berlin. 2 20

The plane

set off, recalled Pyatakov:
We did not stop anywhere
and at approximately
3 p.m. we landed at the airdrome in Oslo.
There
an automobile awaited us.
We got in and drove
off.
We drove for about 30 minutes and came to
We got out, entered a small
a country suburb.
house that was not badly furnished and there I
saw Trotsky, whom I had not seen since 1928. It
was here that my conversation with Trotsky took
pi ace 221
,

,

#

For some two hours Trotsky delivered

a

"veritable phillipic

and formulated "very sharply" the general line

:

Trot sky ites

should become the "grave-diggers" of Stalin's state and stage
a

coup d

'

e t at

;

Soviet defeat in the coming war with Germany

was "inevitable";

an increase in "terrorist, wrecking and

diversive activities" was necessary; Rudolph Hess had agreed

a

372

to help the Trotskyite bloc gain power in exchange
for cer-

tain territorial and other concessions, signifying
to "capitalism."

a

retreat

What was "new" in this program, declared

Pyatakov, was that the Trotskyite organization was being

"transformed into an appendage of fascism." 222

Apparently

the same day Pyatakov, as perplexed as before, flew back to
Berlin, and told Bukhartsev that he had been to Norway and

seen Trotsky. 223
Pyatakov'

s

sensational disclosures came during the

evening session of January 23, 1937.
Af tenposten

,

conservative Norwegian paper, made its own

a

disclosures:

Two days later

no foreign plane had landed in Oslo during

December, 1935!

An investigation revealed that neither the

Kjeller field (a military airdrome twenty-five kilometers
east of Oslo) nor the Gressholmen field (a small island near

Oslo used for hydro- airpl anes

)

had received any foreign

224
civil aircraft during the entire month of December.

Then

on January 29 the official organ of the Norwegian government,

Arbeiderbl adet.

,

published an interview with the director of

the Kjeller Airdrome, who declared that only one plane

Norwegian craft with no passengers
December.

— had

—

landed at Kjeller in

In fact, no foreign planes landed there between

September 19, 1935 and May
Faced with

a

1,

1936.

225

problem of "credibility," Vyshinsky at-

tempted to finesse the situation while the trial was still
in progress.

In the evening session of January 27 he sud-

denly returned to the question of the flight, and asked

Pyatakov about the Norwegian airport.

This time the defen-

dant recalled it was "near Oslo," not "in Oslo,"
as he had
claimed earlier in the trial. Vyshinsky then read
into the

record

a

statement from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

According to the Soviet Embassy in Norway, "'the Kjellere
/sic/ Airdrome near Oslo receives all the year round, in
accordance with international regulations, airplanes of other
countries, and that the arrival and departure of airplanes
is possible also in winter months.'" 226

As Robert Conquest has commented, the official Soviet

agency certified merely the "technical possibility" of

landing near Oslo, not that it actually happened. 227

a

This

was a transparent evasion of the critical issue but

Vyshinsky was in an awkward spot.
Sick in Norway

Where was Trotsky in December, 1935?

As he testified

before the Preliminary Commission (also see Chapter II), this
was the period of his exile in Norway.

From June 1935, until

his internment in September 1936, Trotsky and his wife lived

with the Konrad Knudsen family in the small village of Weksal,
or Vexhall, some 55-60 kilometers from Oslo, a two-hour trip

by car during the winter.

Two of Trotsky

1

s

secretaries

— Jan

Frankel and Erwin Wolff—spent some time in the house, but

guard was not necessary:
But a guard in the very friendly
No, no guard.
It was for us very important
family of Knudsen.
In spite of our
to have such a friendly family.
differences in political views, they personally

a

.
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had sympathies for my wife and myself
and mv
secretaries also. They were occupied
with
the question of my safety.
.

.

During his stay in Weksal Trotsky received
ten to twelve
visitors— including Max Shachtman, A. J. Muste,
and Harold

Isaacs— but they were required

to contact either Knudsen or

his daughter, Hjordis, before being taken to
see the Russian
2

exile.

28

Trotsky was never alone, even during several

trips to Oslo, as he told Albert Goldman:
Never.

It is impossible, Mr. Attorney, because
if I am on the street and recognized by the
people I am absolutely helpless. I am surrounded by people, and especially in Norway--I
don't speak Norwegian I must have some Norwegian
people who can defend me.

—

It was almost impossible, therefore, that

a Soviet official

could secretly visit Trotsky without his constant companions

remarking on the fact. 229
December was

a

particularly trying month for Trotsky.

During the fall of 1935 his health had once again taken

a

turn for the worse, and much of October-November was spent
in an Oslo hospital.

2

30

As he told the commissioners, "The

month of December was the worst month of my life.
the time in bed.' 231
1

I

was all

Although he could not exactly recall

how he spent the 11th and 12th of December (the dates of
Pyatakov
20-22

'

— to

flight

s

a

)

,

he did remember a short trip--December

mountain cabin in

a

rugged area north of Oslo.

With the Trotskys went Erwin Wolff

,

Knudsen'

s

son

,

and

several others, but there were no unexpected visitors from

abroad

.

Weather conditions precluded cars reaching them

As two companions on the trip testified,

.
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"The winter was extremely severe; the roadless
country was completely submerged by snowdrifts
and gripped by Arctic ice.
We remember this
well, because once during the trip Trotsky was
trapped by snow and ice. We were on skis, and
he was not good at skiing; and so we had to
organize a regular rescue operation, and we
were very worried. "232

Despite the change of scenery, Trotsky's health did not improve, and they soon returned to the village of Wexhal

The brief visit to the "hut" became important when
the Communist press suggested that this had been the actual

site of the meeting with Pyatakov.

According to

a

report,

there was only one way to explain this "'otherwise completely

unmotivated visit'" to

a hut

in the wilderness:

Trotsky had

to carry out "'some business which had to be hidden from the
public,'" and there could hardly be "'a better place for

a

secret conference than this little hut deep in the forst.'" 2 3 3
But as Trotsky noted, for a plane to land on a frozen fjord,
it must be equipped with skis.

take off from TempelhofI

Yet it would need wheels to

"The hypothesis was contradictory,"

he asserted.

from a frozen fjord a trip cannot be made
Pyatakov informed them that
in an automobile.
On a frozen fjord he
he used an automobile.
must use skis— a horse with a sled. He could
not approach my cabin with an automobile,
especially in the mount ains 2 34

-Then,

.

And, considering that Pyatakov specified December 11-12 for
the trip, not December 20-22, these hypotheses about

rendezvous in the snow left "not

a

shred of Pyatakov'

a

secret

s

con-

fession, and at the same time they themselves crumble in face
of facts."

235

—

"
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Trotsky on Pyatakov's "Dream"
At one point in the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky asserted

that Vyshinsky had purposefully shirked his duty and failed
to

bring Pyatakov "down from the fourth dimension on to this sinful earth with its customs officials, restaurants, hotels, and
other troublesome details." 236 But in his analysis of the

episode Trotsky made it his business to remind the world of
these "troublesome details.

Trotsky readily granted that Pyatakov had made
visit to Berlin in December 1935.

a

But this was the problem.

"The G.P.U. was afterwards forced to adapt Pyatakov's mythical

trip to Oslo to his real trip to Berlin:
nate choice of the month of December." 237

hence the unfortuAs for Bukhartsev,

Trotsky had never heard of this "superfluous personage," but
admitted that he served
"the

1

messenger

1

a

valuable function in the trial

in a cl assical tragedy

,

who announces the

events which are occurring behind the scenes."
event, somehow this "'messenger

1

"

2 38

In any

had informed Trotsky of

Pyatakov's expected arrival in Berlin, but naturally no details were forthcoming on how Bukhartsev had accomplished
this task:

"In this court room dates and addresses are

generally avoided like

a

plague."

239

At the clandestine meeting in the Tiergarten

Pyatakov agreed to make the secret journey to Oslo, despite
the great risk of discovery.

Drawing on his own experience

in the Soviet government, Trotsky claimed that it was all but

impossible to drop out of sight for some forty-eight hours;

.

the watch over Soviet officials abroad
was "extremely strict,"
and at any time, Pyatakov might receive
an official communication from Moscow. 240 No matter, on the morning
of December
12 or 13 Pyatakov met "Heinrich-Gustav"

Tempelhof Airport and signed
but what name?

a name

(Gustav Stirner)

at

in the "German passport,"

"Nomina sunt odiosa." commented Trotsky with

ill-disguised contempt for the lack of details in the testimony.

Pyatakov, in addition, failed to amplify the circum-

stances of the flight or mention the inspection of passports
in Norway.

"The flight was made, so to speak, in the realm

of dreams, where people glide noiselessly, untroubled by

police or customs officials," scoffed Trotsky. 241

After a hiatus of eight years the two former colleagues in the Soviet government finally met, but once again
any "living reality" was omitted from Pyatakov'

s

testimony.

Instead he offered only "stereotyped commonplaces" about the
interview, i.e., the house was "'not badly furnished.'"

Trotsky considered it significant that Pyatakov had not discussed the furnishings in the house, the presence of Mme
Sedova, or the conditions of the exile's life.

In fact, the

defendant's mentors had taught him "elastic formulas and noncommital modes of expression."

242

There was also the guestion

where Pyatakov spent the night, since the plane must have re-

mained in Norway.

He might have stayed in a hotel,

at the

Soviet Embassy, or with the Trotskys, the last a normal pro-

cedure for

a

"'fellow-conspirator.'"

But it was the better

part of discretion "to slide over these prosaic details."

s
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et
r
suffer a lapse of memor
y
^
.t°
food, the December night, the
danger
of
meeting someone connected with the
Soviet
Embassy.
Better to hold one's tongue. Just
as previously, during the trip,
so now
Norway, Pyatakov is like the immaterial in
shadow of a dream. Let fools take this
shadow for reality 243

K:
the

T

I

During the Pyat akov-Radek trial Trotsky
had tel e
graphed many of these specific questions to
Moscow,
but

Vyshinsky never asked them of Pyatakov:
If the telegrams from Oslo and my telegraphic
questions did not exist, it would still be possible to speak of the remissness, negligence
and intellectual poverty of the Prosecutor and
the judges.
In the light of the above circumstances there can be no question of a judicial
error. 244

And Vyshinsky never directly acknowledged that the Kjeller
airport had not received any foreign planes during December
1935.

Even if the GPU were allowed 224 days for Pyatakov'

flight (September 19th to May 1st),
not save the situation."

Kremlin.

"even then Stalin could

Only one answer occurred to the

In order to avoid further questioning on the trip

Pyatakov was shot on the 1st of February.

But, claimed

Trotsky, enough evidence had been presented to prove that
the flight was nothing but a phantom:

"The question of

Pyatakov 's flight to Oslo may consequently,

I

hope, be con-

sidered closed for all time." 245
"Cynical Disregard for Facts"

Once more the Dewey Commission sided with Trotsky's

version of the affair, and scoffed at the Moscow testimony.
Many points in the trial led to the conclusion that Pyatakov'
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flight was a figment of the imagination.
front Pyatakov with evidence that not

a

The failure to con-

single foreign plane

had landed in Oslo at the time specified was "criminal
negligence" on the part of Vyshinsky; it provided strong
justifi-

cation for the "widespread suspicion that the whole trial
was
a frame-up at which the Prosecutor himself connived." 246

The

failure to put Trotsky's telegraphed questions to Pyatakov
was also reprehensible.

questions in any case.

Vyshinsky should have asked these
But if he had a "decent regard for

the truth," then he certainly should have afforded Trotsky an

opportunity to learn the truth.

And the failure to ascertain

the name in which the false passport was issued must be re-

garded "not as an oversight but as

a

deliberate and dis-

s

statement on the Kjeller

creditable evasion." 247

And so it went.

Vyshinsky'

airdrome could not compensate "for this cynical disregard for
the facts," continued the authors of Not Guilty

.

Besides, to

state that foreign planes could land year round was not

verification that "a given foreign plane landed at that port
in a given month; more especially in face of a denial by the

officer in charge that such

a

plane landed."

The drive from

Kjeller to Weksal, in addition, took at least two hours by
car, not thirty minutes.

If Pyatakov

1

s

testimony was cor-

rect, then Trotsky would have had to drive to some suburb

near the airport.

But it was "impossible" that Trotsky

could have been absent from Weksal for the time required
(six hours) --without others noticing his absence.

In any
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event, Trotsky wrote two letters on
December 12, and two
more on December 13:
"It seems hardly likely, therefore,
that he would have found time in addition
to write long letters, if indeed he had been able to find the
inclination on
the day of an interview so unusual." 248

To assume that Trotsky's agents and the officials
at

Kjeller, continued the final report, connived at concealing
the landing, would mean that everyone concerned—customs
of-

ficials and mechanics

unusual flight.

— had

agreed to keep silent about the

It was too much to believe.

"We therefore

regard this theory as farfetched."
We hold that the evidence concerning
Pyatakov s alleged flight in the record of the
trial is open to the gravest doubt; that the
Prosecutor's silence, and that of the Court,
in the face of published testimony impugning
that evidence during the trial, warrants a
suspicion of frame-up; that the doubt which
the record inspires is converted by the
evidence offered in rebuttal into certainty
that no such flight took place. We therefore
find that Pyatakov did not see Trotsky in
December, 1935, and did not receive from him
instructions of any kind; and that the disproof of Pyatakov s testimony on this crucial
point renders his whole confession worthless 249
1

1

.

*******************
The "folding pocket- si zed airpl ane

link in Trotsky's elaborate alibi.

covered "the disadvantages of

a

11

was the third

Once again Stalin dis-

foreign venue for

tion," commented Robert Conquest.

250

a f abrica-

Along with the Hotel

Bristol and Bois de Boulogne interview, this "mythical
flight" went far to discredit the first two Moscow trials,

.

1
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-

and was widely discussed, even in some Soviet
circles.

Let History Judge

,

in

Roy Medvedev asserted that Pyatakov had

confessed that "on the night of December 25, 1935
/sic?, he
flew to Oslo for a meeting with Trotsky." But two days
after this testimony a Norwegian paper reported that

,r

not a

single plane /si£7 n had landed at the airport in December,
and another paper printed a statement by the airport director
on the lack of foreign aircraft arriving in that month. 251

Medvedev

1

s

facts were awry, but he understood the main point

at issue.

Trotsky had presented an overwhelming mass of evidence on the three alleged interviews.

Here and there one

may question the value of his documentation.

Many of the

affidavits and depositions, for instance, were submitted by
friends or followers

In addition

.

,

official records in

Denmark, France, and Norway were not made available to the

investigators.

And there were some inconsistencies in the

various affidavits
But Trotsky had made a strong case against these

accusations.

He had accomplished what Charles Beard con-

sidered impossible

— to

prove

a

negative

.

This three-fold

alibi was a major reason for the Dewey Commission to find

him

— "Not

As Professor Dewey later declared, the

Guilty."

mass of notarized depositions tended to prove that the three

alleged interviews

11

never took place,'" and thereby helped

discredit the Moscow trials.
point of Trotsky's defense.

25 2

This was, indeed, the high

)

CHAPTER

V

DEWEY AND TROTSKY IN MEXICO (II
The so-called "foreign threads" linking Trotsky to
his "co-conspirators" were, obviously,

Mexican hearings.

a

major theme in the

But they were hardly the sum and sub-

stance of the counter-trial.

Besides discrediting the non-

interviews with Messrs. Holtzman, Romm and Pyatakov, Trotsky
was also forced to defend his personal honor and political
career.

For the Moscow indictments had accused him of

a

variety of nefarious political crimes

— from

Lenin to "plotting" Stalin's death.

In order to refute the

"betraying"

various charges, Trotsky had "to recount the main events of
his career, expound his beliefs, describe and explain the

bewildering changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union
from Lenin to Stalin."

As

a

result, George Novack has

written the record of the counter-trial became

a "valuable

compendium of information about the events, personalities,
and problems of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union."

This was "one of the greatest political interviews" ever

published, declared Edmund Wilson, after reading Trotsky's
testimony.

2

Certainly this testimony comprised an illumi-

nating commentary on Bolshevism and was also

a

revealing

self-portrait, almost too revealing in certain cases.

382
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An examination of each and every topic discussed before the Preliminary Commission would be an exercise in

futility; the complete trial record is, after all, readily

available in most libraries.

Yet the full range of Trotsky-,

defense cannot be assayed without analyzing some of the major
themes in the hearings.

As a result, three significant

facets of Trotsky's apologia will be examined in this chapter

— his

analysis of the "historical connection," his re-

futation of the "political charges," and his comments on the
"nature of the trials."
"The Historical Connection"

I.

As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, Vyshinsky

made a maximum effort in the Pyat akov-Radek trial to prove
the "historical connection" between Trotsky's conflicts with

Lenin and those with "the loyal guardian of Lenin's behests
and the continuator of his cause

accident here:

— Stalin."

3

There was no

"Trotsky and his friends fought against

Lenin and Lenin's Party, just

as they are

now fighting

against Stalin and the Party of Lenin and Stalin."

4

This

"uninterrupted chain of betrayals," charged the Prosecutor,
began with the birth of the Bolshevik movement.
Menshevism, Liquidationism

national-chauvinism
had served in turn.

rallying point" for
spies, murderers,

— all
5

,

Economism,

Kautskyism, Social Democracy and

of these false doctrines Trotsky

Eventually he became the "central
a

multitude of Soviet enemies:

and lackeys of capitalism.

bandits,

The Trotskyites
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reached "this shameful end," explained Vyshinsky,
because
"they had marched along this road for decades, singing
the

praises of capitalism, never believing in the success of
socialist construction, in the victory of socialism." 6

Trotsky sang the praises of capitalism from the be-

ginning of his career?

The charge was hardly credible for

anyone with a modicum of historical perspective.
was a certain logic in Vyshinsky'

Soviet standpoint.

s

allegations

Yet there

— from

the

It was difficult for even the staunchest

supporters of Stalin's regime to forget Trotsky's contributions to Bolshevism, especially during the period of 1917-21.
If the Kremlin could prove that "Judas-Trotsky" had always

plotted to scuttle Lenin's movement, then his alleged alliance with Nazi Germany in the 1930s would seem much less

incredible.

If,

on the other hand, Trotsky could success-

fully prove his lifelong loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, then
the accusations about being a "lackey of capitalism,"

etcetera, etcetera, would appear doubly absurd.

Trotsky and Lenin
Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico Trotsky

proudly declared that he had just completed "the fortieth
year of my uninterrupted participation in the working-class

movement under the banner of Marxism."

7

Much of this period,

he asserted, had been spent in close collaboration with

Lenin, or in preserving Lenin's legacy.

It was almost an

unconscious plagiarism of Stalin's boast that he was Lenin's
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legitimate heir, for Trotsky also stressed his unswerving

devotion to the ideals of Ilyich.

Yet there were certain

tiffs with Lenin over the years that Trotsky was hard-pressed
to explain.

Point by point Trotsky refuted Vyshinsky's litany of

"historical" sins, and reviewed the highlights of his re-

lations with Lenin.

Had he been

Certainly not.

1917?

a

Menshevik from 1903 to

With the political organization of

Bolshevism and Menshevism in 1904,

"I

remained formally out-

side of both factions," Trotsky declared at the Mexican

hearings.

Q

But he had also attempted to unify the two fac-

tions, believing that the majority of Mensheviks could "be

pushed onto the path of revolution."

In this "burning ques-

tion" he had been wrong, Trotsky admitted, and "Lenin was

entirely right."

But "my political line, in spite of con-

flicts and polemics, coincided in every fundamental way with
the line of Lenin."

9

If the two political lines were so similar, as

Trotsky claimed, then the violent polemics between the two
leaders after the 1903 Congress of the Russian Social-

Democratic Party would appear inexplicable.

In particular,

there was the case of Trotsky's 1904 pamphlet, Our Political
Tasks

.

A "most despicable pamphlet," Vyshinsky had described

it in the Pyatakov-Radek trial, one in which Trotsky squirted

"venomous saliva at the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism."

10

Trotsky had, indeed, attacked Lenin's "'Jacobinism'"
in this youthful polemic.

"'Maximilian Lenin,'" like

.

:
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Robespierre, divided people into good and bad
citizens.

"'malicious and morally repulsive suspiciousness is

a

His

flat

caricature of the tragic Jacobin intolerance,"' claimed
his
former disciple.
Trotsky also made ad hominem remarks
%

in

describing the self-appointed leader of the Bolshevik
faction
"

'hideous,

'

"

"'dissolute,'" '"demagogical."' 11

This verbal excess was one of many such outbursts
that Trotsky would have preferred to forget, but John Dewey

would not allow the "witness" to slide over the episode.
This was merely "a theoretical and political pamphlet," ex-

plained Trotsky," but "not objectionable," even though it

contained certain errors
can find in this book chapters which are not
so bad.
There are chapters which are wrong.
You know, as a young man I characterized Lenin
in a certain spirit, a spirit absolutely not
found in the real relations between him and myself.
But I corrected, by my subsequent attitude--! corrected the error
But it is not
objectionable and nothing abominable 12
I

.

.

Certainly this kind of "harsh and forthright accusation" was
hardly exceptional for the time, as the authors of the final
Dewey Commission report contended 13 but it raised serious
,

questions about the "fundamental " coincidence of their
political views
There were other disagreements during this bitter

period of wandering in the wilderness

.

Vyshinsky recalled

Trotsky's part in organizing the so-called "August Bloc"
(1911-12).

According to the Prosecutor, "Judas-Trotsky" had

brought together the "lackeys of capital," including
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Mensheviks, ex-Bolsheviks, "flabby intellectuals,
and the
refuse of the working class movement." This was
a paraphrase
of Lenin's remarks,

who also characterized the bloc as

I

"'built up on lack of principle, on hypocrisy and empty

phrases.'" 14

During

But Trotsky readily admitted this "mistake."

period of "dark reaction," he had attempted to

a

organize such

a group,

"an emanation of my conciliatory

tendency," but Lenin refused to cooperate.
"was absolutely right in this question,

opments showed."

as subsequent devel-

It was a "sterile attempt,

not play with the thing.

versaries."

Once again Lenin

and Lenin did

He gave serious blows to his ad-

But the epithet

— "lackeys

of capital"

— was

merely "a designation for reformists," claimed Trotsky, just
"a question of a political appreciation and not of criminal

thought."
"Judas."

15

And Lenin had never intended to call Trotsky

a

This was just another "frame-up.""'"^

During the war years there were also differences between Lenin and Trotsky over the slogan-- "United States of
Europe"

— which

implied that revolutions must simultaneously

erupt in both Russia and Europe.

Actually Lenin's criticisms

of Trotsky's slogan were concerned with emphases, not the

core of the argument, but Vyshinsky chose in the second trial
to repeat a favorite Stalinist canard.

Without mentioning

the slogan or its background, the Prosecutor flatly stated:
"In 1915 Trotsky came out in opposition to Lenin's doctrine

of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

Thus, he completely capitulated to capitalism over
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twenty years ago!" 17

But Trotsky absolutely denied that he

had ever opposed the law of uneven capitalistic
development,
at the center of the controversy.

Such

contention was

a

only "a variety of the banal and trivial distortion"
of the

debate over the "United States of Europe" slogan.

"The mis-

interpretation of this discussion tries to give the idea
that

I

denied the unequal development.

be absolutely ignored /sic/ to deny such

And then there was 1917.

believe one must

I

a

law."

18

In his litany of "betrayals"

Vyshinsky completely ignored Trotsky's contributions to the
October Revolution.

But the ex-Chairman of the Petrograd

Soviet was naturally eager to stress his actions in that
climactic year

,

and also his complete solidarity with Lenin.

Even before Trotsky reached Russia, Lenin had begun to
praise his fiery opponent.

Briefly imprisoned in

a

Canadian "concentration camp" under the pretext of being

a

German agent, Trotsky received welcomed assistance from his
old foe.

slander of

"'This is a patent, unheard-of, and malicious
a

revolutionary,'" charged Ilyich, soon to be

accused of the same charge. 19

Once Trotsky reached

Petrograd, the two leaders buried their old differences.

Lenin even recognized, at least implicitly, the validity of
Trotsky's "permanent revolution,"

a

theory that predicted

the bourgeois revolution would be transformed into a dicta-

torship of the proletariat.

"I

believe in this question

I

was right against Lenin," Trotsky told the commissioners, but

quickly added that Lenin's contributions to the Revolution

"
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were "immeasurably greater than mine."
the teacher.

I

was the pupil." 20

Trotsky formally became

a

Lenin, in fact,

"was

Finally in August 1917

Bolshevik, but for some time, he

asserted, their political lines had been "the same,
programma
21

tically.

A month earlier the Kerensky government arrested

Trotsky as
Finland.

German agent; at the same time Lenin fled to

a

But with the Kornilov insurrection in August the

government released the

Trotsky assumed

a

1,1

Bolshevik agents of Germany/" and

leading role in the revolutionary movement,

shortly thereafter being elected chairman of the Petrograd
Soviet.

22

"I

took a direct part in the preparation and

organization of the October Revolution, particularly during
the four decisive months when Lenin was forced to hide in

Finland,

"

he declared before the sub-commission.

had acknowledged this fact.
read from

a

With

1918 article in Pravda

Even Stalin

a

certain relish Trotsky

,

in which his mortal foe

declared:
"All the work of practical organization of
the insurrection was carried out under the immediate leadership of the chairman of the
We can say
Petrograd Soviet Comrade Trotsky
with certainty that the swift passing of the
garrison to the side of the Soviet and the
bold execution of the work of the Military
Revolutionary Committee the Party owes principally and above all to Comrade Trotsky." 23
,

.

Yet six years later Stalin asserted that Trotsky had been
111

a

comparatively new man in our Party in the period of

October, /and/ neither did nor could play

a

special part,

either in the Party or in the October Revolution.'"

24

Using
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"scientific methods/' Trotsky explained, the Stalin school

now considered "it beyond dispute that

I

October Revolution but was opposed to it.
historical falsifications do not concern

did not direct the

However these
my_

autobiography,

but the biography of Stalin." 25

October was perhaps the proudest moment in Trotsky's
long revolutionary career.

And his leading role in directing

the Petrograd Soviet and its Military Revolutionary Committee

has rarely been challenged.

Yet the "historical falsifica-

tions" of the Stalin school had even permeated the thinking
of a John Dewey.

At one point in the hearings Dewey referred

to a "committee of five" which had actually directed the

October uprising:

"It is plain that the controlling organi-

zation in the practical work of the insurrection of October
was a Party center composed of Stalin and others around the

Revolutionary Military Committee."

Trotsky was upset to

hear this falsification come from the lips of Dewey.
had never been

member of the committee of five because "it

a

There had been

never existed."

a

plan for Stalin and others

to enter the Military Revolutionary Committee, but

chairman before they were appointed."

a

"I

was

In any event, they

never took their places on this important body:
chaotic period,

No, he

"It was a

period of preparation, and the Central

Committee made one decision, and itself forgot about it."
Only in 1924 was this long-forgotten decision of the Central

Committee discovered.

At that time the legend of the

directing center was "invented," Trotsky explained.

"I

heard
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the name only for the first time in 1924.
at all."

It did not exist

The professor from Columbia was startled by
this

contention:

"Are you claiming that the earlier history
was

falsified?'-

"Absolutely," was Trotsky's reply. 26

There was, of course, such a "center" in 1917.

At a

crucial meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee (October
16-17, o.s.),

"a military revolutionary center" was estab-

lished, consisting of Stalin, Sverdlov, Andrei Bubnov

Uritsky, and Felix Dzerzhinsky.

This was to be

Moisei

,

liaison

a

group between the Central Committee and the Military

Revolutionary Committee.

But it was "one of those innumerable

committees, not only in Bolshevik experience, that once ap-

pointed never meet," once observed Robert Daniels.

27

Yet

Dewey had assumed as true the existence of this "center,"

which was to figure prominently in Stalin's claims to be the

directing genius of October.

28

Perhaps Trotsky was thinking

of this historical myth when he wrote that the Comintern's

"massive lying campaign" had "penetrated into the minds of

men who are honest and who think.

Many of the members of

the sub-commission did not know the real history of the

Bolshevik Party, especially of its degeneration."

29

During the Mexican hearings Trotsky also claimed that
he and Lenin had worked "hand in hand" from 1917 to 1924

with some differences of opinion:

recognized the authority of Lenin every time,
but I was sufficiently independent to explain
my opinion openly--openly even when not good
I believe my relations with Lenin
for me.
during the Soviet period were the best.
I

,

— but

:

.

,

—
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There had been, of course, efforts to falsify
this relationship.

But even in the last months of his life Ilyich
recog-

nized "the art of distortion of the nature of the living
re-

lationship between Lenin and myself." 30 Despite

a

few minor

differences of opinion, then, their close ties remained intact until Ilyich

1

s

death.

But Vyshinsky had charged that both Trotsky and

Pyatakov had risen "against Lenin in the stern days of
Brest."

31

Ben Stolberg and Carleton Beals, for the Commis-

sion, were also curious about the sharp disagreement between

Trotsky and Lenin over accepting the German peace terms at
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations in 1918.

Such differences,

replied Trotsky, had been "extremely exaggerated" by the

Comintern
They were absolutely of a transitory and conjunctural character- -the differences
I found
it necessary to say to world public opinion
and to the world toiling masses that we wished
to fight against Prussianism, but that we could
not do it
I tried to demonstrate by action
the falsehood of the accusation that we had a
secret agreement with German militarism. Lenin
said in answer that it was of certain importance
to show and to educate the masses by action, but
if we perished in this demonstration the group
that was to take its message to them--how could
they get the message? It was a question by what
line we could continue the fight against German
militarism in order not to perish ourselves
In the determination of this line, I had some
practical and empirical differences with Lenin
no more. J ^
.

.

—

But these "practical and empirical differences with Lenin"

over Trotsky's policy of "no war, no peace," almost resulted
in Lenin's resignation and an irrevocable split within the
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Bolshevik Party.

Fearing such

a

"split" more than the

onerous peace terms, Trotsky abstained when the
climactic
vote was taken in the Central Committee on accepting
the

German offer, thus ensuring Lenin's victory.

mained for some time within the Party.

The scars re-

It was hardly a

"transitory" episode. 33

There were other conflicts with Lenin during the

post-October period.

In October 1919 Lenin was ready to

surrender Petrograd to the advancing armies of General
Yudenich; Trotsky said no.

"We had heated discussions on

this, and the Central Committee sustained my opinion," re-

called Trotsky before the Dewey Commission:

"I

went to
O

A

Petrograd and we succeeded in saving Petrograd."

Then

in 1921 Lenin heeded the advice of some Polish emigrees,

and

authorized the invasion of Poland, which Trotsky opposed,
even though he recognized the "superiority of Lenin in this
respect, that he was better informed."

According to Trotsky,

this was "a war of defense which, by the logic of the

struggle
Warsaw.

transformed itself into

,

war of aggression against

At a subsequent Party Congress Lenin admitted "he

11

had made

a

a

great mistake.

Trotsky declared.

35

Lenin was

a

very honest adversary,"

And then there was the Trade-Union con-

troversy of 1921, just another "episodic discussion," asserted Trotsky, completely forgotten

a

month later.

36

During this lengthy recital of his relations with
Lenin, Trotsky repeatedly asserted that Lenin had expressed

complete confidence in his colleague, at least after 1917.
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Trotsky was particularly proud of

a 1919

carte blanche that

Lenin had signed, in case the War Commissar met
opposition:
"Comrades, knowing the harsh character of
Comrade Trotsky's orders, I am so convinved
so absolutely convinced, of the Tightness,
expediency and necessity, for the good of 'our
cause, of the orders he has given, that I give
them my full support."

Although Trotsky never used this document, it was "testimony
to the exceptional confidence of a man whom

I

consider to be

the highest model of revolutionary morality." 37

He was,

in-

deed, proud of such high praise.

Thus, Trotsky accented the "positive" in this narrative,

and deemphasized acrimonious conflicts with Ilyich in

past years, especially in 1903-17.

All such disagreements,

in retrospect, were "episodic," "false," or of "secondary

importance."

If Trotsky gilded the truth in certain accounts,

he also scrupulously avoided any blatant distortion of the

historical record.

Vyshinsky's claim that Trotsky had al-

ways fought against Lenin and Lenin's Party stood discredited.
But on one historical issue Trotsky's account was something

less than the full truth.

It was an issue that Vyshinsky had

left unexplored, for good reasons.

Lenin's "Testament"
The question of Lenin's so-called "Testament" of

1922-23 is of crucial importance in understanding Trotsky's

plummet from power and Stalin's rise to the apex of the Soviet
hierarchy.

If only

...

if only, many have mused, Trotsky

had publicized in 1923 Lenin's firm and unflattering appraisal

.
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of Stalin, then the Soviet Union would have
been spared the

worse excesses of the "benevolent Dictator."

Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico, Trotsky
once again gave his version of the circumstances
surrounding

Lenin's "Testament."

In the weeks prior to Lenin's second

stroke (December 16, 1922), the two Bolshevik leaders dis-

cussed launching

a joint

attack against "bureaucratism"

within the governmental apparatus.
form

a

But Trotsky refused to

"sub-commission" to fight this endemic malady; it was

just as important to cripple bureaucratism in the Orgburo and

Control Commission, two Party bodies controlled by Stalin.

Lenin agreed to this caveat:
Trotsky was delighted:
good thing.

'

"

'"I propose to you a bloc.'"

"'A good bloc with a good man is a

They agreed to lay plans for the joint cam-

paign within several days, but it was not to be:

this was

the last discussion between the two leading Bolshevik

figures

38

Shortly thereafter Lenin suffered

second stroke.

a

Increasingly anxious about the future of the Party,

a

weakened Ilyich began to dictate his "Testament" on December
23,

1922, really a continuing series of notes, and memoranda,

and articles

— all

his last writings

— which

was the true ex-

pression of his final will, as Moshe Lewin has contended.

39

In one such note he made his famous assessment of six leading

Party figures, including Trotsky and Stalin.

By January 4,

1923, his opinion of Stalin had declined to the point that he

urged the Party to find

a way

'"to remove'" Stalin from his

—
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high positions— the famous "Postscript." 40

m

subsequent

months Lenin's health and spirits
improved somewhat, but on
March 5, 1923, he dictated a final
communication to Stalin.
"The last letter of

Lenin"- "the last letter Lenin wrote

in

his life was the rupture with Stalin,"
declared Trotsky. 41

The Counsel for the Dewey Commission-- John
Finerty—

questioned Trotsky closely about Lenin's letter of
March
to Stalin.
Had Trotsky personally seen the message?
Yes;

5

was a little sick myself, in bed.
The
stenographer of Lenin came to me a woman with
this letter.
It was a letter written to Stalin.
I telephoned Kamenev
they were both against me
at that time, Stalin and Kamenev.
I consulted
with him.
I asked:
"What does this signify?"
Kamenev was absolutely disoriented. I consulted Krupskaya by telephone, and asked her
what this was.
She explained that Stalin tried
to surround Lenin to hinder him from having communications with the Party, under the pretext
that he was too sick; that it was not advisable
to give him information.
And he treated with
animus Krupskaya, the wife of Lenin, at this
time.
Lenin gave him some warning, about two
or three times, and the last time he dictated
this letter. And I gave the advice either to
Stalin_or Kamenev, to go to Krupskaya and make
some /excuse/ 4 2
I

—

—

But it was too late, added Trotsky.

Lenin had already suf-

fered a third stroke and lay unconscious.
In further comments on the history of the "Testament,"

or Lenin's specific comments on his colleagues, Trotsky

charged that the GPU concealed it, "in spite of the insistance of Lenin's widow on publishing it." 43

It was Max

Eastman who first revealed the existence of the document in
1925.
"Mr.

44

But this testimony caused Ben Stolberg to ask:

Trotsky, didn't you once disavow Max Eastman's statement

that there was such a thing as Lenin's testament."

"Yes,"

:
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admitted Trotsky, but he quibbled over its
substance,
claiming that it was not a testament in a
"juridical" sense.
Besides, he had only disavowed Eastman's
action, not its

existence
did not deny there was a document, a letter
from Lenin, but as a document which 'could be
officially named a testament in that sense I
made a denial.
Eastman published this document
without consulting me and the others, and by
these means he sharpened terribly the inner
struggle in the Soviet Union, in the Politburo,
which was the beginning of the split. We tried
on our side to avoid a split.
The majority of
the Politburo asked me, demanded of me, to
take a position toward this.
It was a' very
diplomatic document I signed at that time, in
that sense, that it was not a testament, and
that I had never had any connection with
Eastman and so on, at that time. Eastman, I
must say, is my friend, but he is not a member
of our organization, he is not a disciplined
militant of the Party. He is more or less of
a free lance.
It is his right, but it is my
right as a disciplined member of the organization to disavow him when it is necessary.
I

—

But this equivocal explanation failed to satisfy Stolberg,

who kept pressing Trotsky on the subject.

"If you ask me,"

Trotsky told Stolberg, "if it was the most clear truth

declared in my life,
genuine truth.

I

would answer 'No.

1

was not the full truth."

have

It was not the

It was an equivocal document."

political man he had no choice:

I

But as a

"It was not a lie, but it

45

Finerty quickly realized that this testimony raised
serious questions about Trotsky's basic veracity.

How far

might the "present situation" in Mexico and the Soviet Union
require Trotsky to equivocate with the truth, asked Finerty.
The chief "witness" was obviously on the defensive:

i

.

398

can say that never in my life did I
take the
interest take the contrary of the truth
If
you will, in plain words, a lie.
I believe
in
our society, which is very contradictory
that
the conventional rules of conduct in family
society, or corporation— everybody from time
to
time is obliged not to say the truth.
I committed it sometimes. I believe the question
can be decided only by comparison of the lies
I was obliged to give, and the truth.
I believe in the balance my truths are more heavy
than my lies.
It seems to me so, in the more
important questions, the decisive questions, in
the questions upon which depend the actions 'of
many people, of friends, of their fate— it seems
to me that I never committed such crimes.
I

—

In reply to this revealing statement Finerty stated that
the

Commission must judge whether political necessity might affect Trotsky's testimony.

This was only right, the "justifi-

cation of the Commission," agreed Trotsky.

"The Commission

does not consider me an angel."

These quotations on the final "rupture" with Stalin
and the first publication of Lenin's "Testament" have been

reproduced at some length, because Trotsky's account was an
exercise in selective recall*
pects of the affair

sciously

— the

,

By discussing only a few as-

he misrepresented

— at

least uncon-

Trotsky was no "angel" in this

full story.

case
In the first pi ace

,

the proposed "bloc " between Lenin

and Trotsky against Party bureaucratism is open to question.

Trotsky, after all, had a well-known weakness for adminis-

trative remedies when faced with political difficulties

.

In

his "Testament" Lenin had praised the War Commissar as "'the

most capable man in the current Central Committee,

1

"

but he

had also stressed that Trotsky was '"too much possessed by
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self-confidence and given too much to the
administrative side
of things.'"
Certainly Trotsky was a curious choice in
1922 for any attack on bureaucratic excesses in the
Party;

during the Trade-Union controversy he had shown himself
to
be more bureaucratic than the bureaucrats.

The proposed

bloc, in any event, may have been Lenin's device to smash
the "solicitous conspiracy" that kept him from directing

Party affairs.

According to Adam Ulam, not only Stalin kept

vital information from the suspicious Lenin.

Under a "veneer

of solicitude for his health," the entire Politburo, in-

cluding Trotsky, tried to prevent Lenin's "interference with
their rule and to keep any single politician from gaining

Lenin's ear." 48

If Trotsky could be enticed into a pseudo-

alliance, then Lenin's isolation would be ended.
It is also doubtful, in the second place, that Lenin

planned

a

"rupture" with Stalin in March 1923.

An irate

Lenin, of course, dictated on March 5-6 a scathing letter to
the comrade from Georgia.
"

'

rude

1

11

to Krupskaya

,

After castigating Stalin for being

Lenin gave him

a

choice

:

"

'

ask

I

therefore that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable
to retracting your words and apologizing, or whether you pref er

the severance of rel ations between us

actually offered Stalin

a

.

'

49
"

Thus

,

Lenin

graceful "exit" from this imbroglio

A simple apology would suffice.

dictated just such an apology.

And within two days Stalin
If Lenin had seriously de-

sired to sever relations with the Georgian, then

a

public

ultimatum would have been the better course of action,
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perhaps in the form of

a

letter to the Central Committee.

During the period of December 1922-March 1923, in
actual fact,
Lenin never "screwed up his determination" to have Stalin
re-

moved from his posts, to quote Robert

H.

McNeal. 50

For some

reason Lenin was loathe to press the so-called "rupture" to
its logical conclusion.

More important, Trotsky completely failed to discuss
a third aspect of the

"Testament" controversy, one which

covered him with little glory.

On the same day that Lenin

addressed the stern letter to Stalin, he also dictated

a

warm note to Trotsky; it was telephoned to him and then hand-

carried by two of Ilyich's secretaries.
Georgia.

Always

a

The subject was

determined foe of "Great Russian chauvin-

ism," Lenin had concluded that Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and

Ordzhonikidze were unjustly oppressing the Georgian minority
in favor of greater Russian interests.

In his note Lenin

requested that Trotsky assume the "'defense'" of the Georgian
minority at the next Party conclave.

He also included several

memoranda on the subject, dictated in late

December, 1922

and an "article" he had been preparing on Georgia, now

missing.

If Trotsky were unwilling to carry out this re-

quest, then the entire dossier should be returned:

consider that

a

sign of refusal from you.'"

"'I shall

This collection

of documents was the "'bomb'" that Lenin hoped to explode in

Stalin's face at the Party's Xllth Congress, scheduled for

April of that year.

A day later

— the

6th of March

— Lenin

wrote to the Georgian dissidents, with copies forwarded to
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Trotsky and Kamenev:
I

'"I follow your case with all my heart.

am appalled by the coarseness of Ordzhonikidze
and the

connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.
you notes ?nd a speech.

1

"

I

am preparing for

51

Certainly this was Trotsky's great opportunity.

With

Lenin's strong support, he had every chance of humbling the
leader of the Party's bureaucracy.

Yet Trotsky, also sick at

the time, stumbled, almost a fatal misstep. 52

He may have

verbally accepted the assignment, but he also returned the
dossier to Lenin, after making copies of the memoranda.

Soon

thereafter, apparently on the 6th of March, he conferred with
Kamenev, and promised not to start a fight at the forthcoming
Party Congress.

"I

am for preserving the status quo," he

told his brother-in-law.

Trotsky did insist that

a

radical

change be made in the policy toward Georgia, and that Stalin

apologize to Krupskaya, but agreed not to move against
Stalin, Dzerzhinsky or Ordzhonikidze.

This was one of those

"'rotten compromises'" that Lenin had been fearing.
Soon thereafter Lenin suffered

a

53

third stroke.

After

March 10 he was physically unfit to wage any kind of struggle
with Stalin.

This was, seemingly, Trotsky's task.

On several

occasions he did write on the situation in Georgia, but re-

frained from directly attacking Stalin.

54

Certainly he was

entirely silent on the existence of Lenin's "bomb" until

Lydia Fotyeva, one of Ilyich's secretaries, formally notified
Kamenev of the Georgian dossier just before the Xllth
Congress opened.

Trotsky was caught.

Not only had he

a

.
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concealed the existence of Lenin's communication, but he
had
not fulfilled Lenin's entreaty.
"He had shown himself both
devious and fainthearted/

1

in the opinion of Adam Ulam. 55

Then in an "astonishing" letter to Stalin and the
Central Committee, Trotsky asked permission to forsake

Lenin's trust and not publish the bombshell against Stalin:

— on
nature, the
evident — no

the basis of motive of an inner-Party
significance of which is selfmember of the Central Committee will
make this article in one or another form known to
the party or the Party Congress, I on my part,
will consider this as a decision of silence, a
decision which in connection with the Party
Congress removes me from personal responsibility
for this article. 56
"If

—

—

Stalin, in reply, was both magnanimous and devious.

He de-

clared that it was impossible to publish Lenin's notes, yet

criticized Trotsky for concealing them in the first place.
The "canny General Secretary was allowed to pass off this

sleight of hand," Robert McNeal has observed, with some
astonishment.

Trotsky quickly accepted Stalin's decision

personal decision

— not

to publish the documents,

—

and at the

Xllth Congress absented himself when the Georgian affair came

up for discussion.

57

Thus, Trotsky was personally responsible

for suppressing part of Lenin's "Testament."

And he failed

to take up the "defense" of Georgia, Ilyich's final request.

Not a word of this episode appeared in his testimony before
the Dewey Commission

There are also other points in Trotsky's testimony

before the Preliminary Commission that can be doubted.
1926,

in
at least, Krupskaya expressed little interest

Until
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publishing her husband's last will and testament.

For ex-

ample, when Max Eastman first published the substance of the

document in his 1925 book, Since Lenin Died

,

she repudiated

Eastman's claims that true Leninism was in decline, and

denied that Lenin had expressed in the alleged documents any
"'distrust'" of his colleagues. 58
Eastman, of course, had obtained from Trotsky's own
lips the sensational information about Lenin's final will.

Before publishing the material he consulted two of Trotsky's

closest associ ates--Christi an Rakovsky and Alfred Rosmer-who approved its release, while

a

counseled against such an action.

third, Boris Souvarine,
As a result, Eastman was

somewhat stunned, to say the least, when Trotsky publicly

disavowed the existence of the document.

Among other things,

the Soviet leader accused Eastman in 1925 of making "'falla-

cious and mendacious assertions'" about his relations with
the Politburo.

As for the Testament,

"'Lenin never left one:

All talk about a secreted or infringed "testament" is so much

mischievous invention.

.

.

.'"

59

This disavowal appeared

ridiculous after Krupskaya finally decided in mid-1926 to
smuggle the document out of the USSR.

An authentic copy of

the "Testament" was published in The New York Times on

October 18

,

1926.

Trotsky's repudiation of the Testament was

a

very

"diplomatic" statement, indeed, to repeat his comment before
the Preliminary Commission.

It caused him even more grief.

the
When Stalin finally revealed to the Party in October 1927
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existence of Lenin's last will, he also read
from Trotsky's
1925 disavowal of the document.
At the expense of

his rival

Stalin jeered:
"It's Trotsky writing that, not somebody else.
What basis then, have Trotsky, Zinoviev and
Kamenev for flapping their tongues now about
how the Party and its Central Committee 'concealed' the 'testament' of Lenin? Tongueflapping is 'permissible,' but there ought
to be a limit to it." 6 l

On the issue of the Testament Trotsky was still "tongue-

flapping," it would appear, as late as 1937.
"Political necessity"

— this

was Trotsky's dominant

concern in 1923, as it was fourteen years later.

If he did

not "lie" about the circumstances surrounding Lenin's

"Testament," he hardly provided the complete story to the

Dewey Commission.

And the commissioners appeared to be un-

aware of the discrepancies between his account and the

historical record.

Except for Ruehle and Rosmer, the members

of the panel were not close students of Bolshevism.

version of the incident, as

a result,

Trotsky's

appeared only briefly

in the final report of the Dewey Commission, without being
^
disputed.
,

62

Democracy and The Proletarian Dictatorship
Many other "historical" crimes were assayed during
the Mexican hearings, sometimes rather superficially.

But on

one issue the Preliminary Commission pressed Trotsky with

certain doggedness. Democracy and the Soviet Union

a

— this

question was uppermost in the minds of the skeptical liberals
on the panel,

and their repeated queries on the subject

.
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irritated Trotsky.

Several years later he wrote that
a

"Stolberg, lantern in hand, chases after
an ideal revolution,

unaccompanied by any excesses, and guaranteed
against
Thermidor and counter-revolution," 63 but Trotsky

was willing

to celebrate the triumph of the dictatorship,
excesses and
all.

John Finerty first questioned Trotsky on the re-

lationship of the Soviets and Party.

He wanted to ascertain

at what point the Party became "undemocratic" and prey to

bureaucratic deformities.

Even in 1917-18, readily admitted

the ex-Commissar, the government's ministers (commissars)

recognized the overriding authority of the Party.

But he

was unwilling to admit that the popularly elected Soviets

were more "democratic" than the Party's bodies:

—

It was a question
a more provisional question,
depending on the relationship between the Party
and the working class if they had confidence
in the Party.
Only formally, the Party was
less democratic than the Soviets.
One time the
people had the fullest confidence in the Party
which guided the people during the October insurrection and which gave to the peasants the
soil

—

There was no contradiction between the commissars obeying
the government and also accepting Party direction:
was a Bolshevik,

after all.

everyone

Trotsky explained that when

commissar stood for election, he announced:

"'I

Bolshevik, a member of the Bolshevik Party.

You know my

program.

Committee.

It is my program,

a

am a

the guide of which is my Central

It is for me the highest authority.'"

64

I

:
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But was the Party itself democratically organized,

Dewey wanted to know:

-Was there any organized, recognized

method by which, aside from criticism and discussion, the
worker could control the committees, the different branches
of the Party?"

Only members of the Party, not the toiling

masses, could participate in Party elections, answered
Trotsky.

Under these circumstances, continued Dewey, how

could this be considered

a

"democratic" system?

Rather

patiently Trotsky explained:
didn't say it was democratic in the absolute
sense.
I consider democracy not as a mathematical abstraction, but as a living experience
of the people.
It was a great step to democracy
from the old regime, but this democracy in its
formal expression was limited by the necessities of the revolutionary dictatorship.
I

Through the formula of "democratic centralism," he told the

commissioners
".

.

.

,

the Party exercised its responsibilities

everybody has the same right of discussion, control

and election of the leadership of the Party.

The leadership

of the Party has the right to direct the Party and later,

also the country."

Certainly this was

a

dictatorship, since

the Proletariat could not directly form a government, added

Trotsky, but a dictatorship

of_

the proletariat, the first

"experience of genuine proletarian democracy" in history.
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"Democratic Centralism" and "Dictatorship of the

Proletariat"

— this

times in the past.

was ground that Trotsky had covered many
But his interrogators, especially Dewey,

were not satisfied with the explanation.

dictatorship for, not of, the proletariat?

Was this not a
How,

asked Dewey,
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could there be

a

single-party dictatorship if one party could

not completely correspond to

a

class?

This would be

a

con-

tradiction, agreed Trotsky, but only in normal
times:
We never said, Mr. Chairman, that the single
party as an absolute expression of the class
is a normal status.
We answered to the
critics:
"We are in a civil war.
It is not
a measure of democracy, but a measure of civil
war." It was our honest answer.

Not only was the dictatorship sometimes at odds with the in-

terests of its own class, it did not necessarily reflect the
desires of other classes
and intelligentsia.

— the

peasantry, petit bourgeoisie,

Although Trotsky rejected as "pure in-

vention" the charge that he wanted to exclude the peasantry
and petit bourgeoisie from the proletarian dictatorship, he

did admit that conflicts with the peasants were inevitable.

Quoting Lenin, he contended:
peasants,

"'We can accomplish with the

all the peasants, the democratic revolution, but

when we attempt to set up Socialism, we will have the majority, or a great part, of the peasants against us.'"
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Material and cultural scarcities also made the proletarian dictatorship an absolute necessity, alleged Trotsky.
When the table was barren, when "a table d hote " was lacking,
'

then people forgot their manners, and made

necessary:

a

dictatorship

"The reason for the existence of gendarmes is

the misery of the people."
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But this movement implied that

the dictatorship of the proletariat in any backward and

isolated nation would degenerate into "the dictatorship of
the secretariat," suggested Dewey.

That's

a

"very good

formula," replied Trotsky, but he held his ground:

"I

must

.

.
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answer that even the dictatorship of the secretariat
now in
Russia is a very important progress in comparison with
the

dictatorship of the Tsar.

1,68

Extending the discussion to the period 1923-27,
Dewey asked if Trotsky had not been disloyal to the Party

dictatorship and its demands for strict discipline.
answer was somewhat disingenuous.
rule

— "full

Trotsky's

In line with the Party

freedom in discussion, and discipline in the ex-

ecution of decisions"

— he

had been completely loyal to the

Party:

can only repeat that I criticized decisions,
or a number of decisions, before the decision
in the Party; that I criticized them in the
Central Committee after they were accepted by
the majority, but I never acted practically
against the decisions and that is what I consider Party discipline
I

The prohibition of discussion was itself a violation of Party

statutes, a Stalinist
in his defense.

"

coup d etat in the Party," he asserted
1

And even when the Left Opposition

carried

placards critical of the Stalinist regime in an anniversary
parade (November 1927), this was not
viol at ion of Party statutes

a

counter-coup or

a
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Despite this line of defense, Trotsky and the

Trotskyites, of course, were eventually expelled from the
Party for just such "viol at ions" of discipline

.

Would Trotsky

have expelled the Stalinist clique for similar violations,

wondered Dewey, if he had the power.

Trotsky's reply was

both instinctive and revealing:

I
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You know the first thing I would do? it
is to
expel from the Party all the demoralized
people
such as Vyshinsky, Yagoda and others who
are the
enemies of the working class and who are working
now only for their personal material interest
Not persons with different opinions from mine.
Thet is a different thing. Not I myself would
expel them.
I would convoke a conference
of
workers:
"You may select between honest and
dishonest people in the Party." I mean, workers
from the factories, without ambitions for a
career.
I am sure they would make a good selec70
tion.

Although Trotsky denied that he would have expelled the
Stalinist faction simply for their political beliefs, his
response was almost
policy.

a

mirror-like reflection of Stalin's

Had not, in fact, "workers from the factories" voted

to expel Trotsky and his faction?

On the question of ensuring

Party unity it was often difficult to determine where Trotsky
left off and Stalin began.

This involved discussion of the "democratic" nature
of the Party and its proletarian dictatorship offered little

new in Trotsky's appreciation of the problem.
liberal members of the Commission it was

importance, especially for Dewey.

a

But for the

subject of some

In late 1937 he told an

interviewer that Trotsky
has never faced the question whether democracy
within the party can be maintained when there
is complete suppression of democracy outside
The idea of democracy is an exthe party.
The limitation of it to a
acting master.
small group involves such a contradiction
that in the end democracy even within the
party is bound to be destroyed. 71

Yet the Commission's final report, Not Guilty

,

had little to

say about the subject of "democratic centralism."

It did

"
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contend, however, that Lenin "considered
free criticism of
the Party's policy a fundament al right
of its members «
a

policy he had stressed at the Xth Party Congress
in 1921.
This was a curious example, since it was
precisely at this
Congress that Lenin voted to restrict intra-P ar ty
democracy.
Not wishing "to invoke Lenin as an infallible
authority,"
Not Guilty still left the impression that the
Bolshevik

leader had been
(he was,

a

staunch supporter of democratic rights

at times),

and that Trotsky supported him on this

issue (he did, also at times.) 72
But the Commission's own transcript of the Mexican

hearings had revealed Trotsky's extreme ambivalence on the

question of "democratic centralism," an inherently contradictory doctrine.

Until he renounced the old Party in 1933

and formed a new one, Trotsky had been handicapped in his

struggles with Stalin by
for iron discipline.

a

pro forma devotion to the needs

At times he stressed the need for

democratic safeguards, at other times the need for extreme
discipline, which led Stalin in 1924 to claim that "'democracy
is only a pawn,

a

strategic maneuver for him /Trotsky/.

'

Trotsky later wrote that the "equilibrium between democracy
and centralism establishes itself in the actual struggle, at

moments it is violated and then reestablished." 74

But the

extreme elasticity of this formulation tended to condone

political expediency.
To briefly review the historical record, in 1904 the

prescient Trotsky predicted that Lenin's organization methods

,
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would lead to

a

Party dictatorship:

the Party organization /the caucus7 at
first substitutes itself for the Party as" a
whole; then the Central Committee substitutes
itself for the organization; and finally a
single 'dictator substitutes himself for the
Central Committee.
."75
*

1

.

.

But after 1917 the new convert to Bolshevism forgot his
own
words.

There was no more zealous enforcer of Party statutes

on discipline than Trotsky after the October Revolution.

Even in 1924, when Party rules were handicapping his freedom
of maneuver, he declared at the Xlllth Congress:

"Comrades, none of us wishes or is able to be
right against his party.
The party in the last
analysis is always right, because the party is
the sole historical instrument given to the
proletariat for the solution of its basic problems.
I know that one cannot be right
against the party.
It is only possible to be
right with the party and through the party,
for history has not created other ways for the
realization of what is right." 76
.

.

.

Yet at approximately the same time he was also urging

a

Course" on the Party:
"Away with passive obedience, with mechanical levelling by the authorities with suppression of personality, with servility, and with
careerism! A Bolshevik is not merely a disciplined man: he is a man who in each case
and on each question forges a firm opinion of
his own and defends it courageously and independently not only against his enemies but
inside his own party
To-day perhaps he will
be in a minority ... he will submit
but this does not always signify that he is in
Perhaps he has seen or has underthe wrong.
stood a new task or the necessity of a turn
earlier than others have done. He will persistently raise the question a second a third
Thereby he will
a tenth time, if need be.
render his party a service helping it to meet
the new task fully armed, or to carry out the
,

.

.

.

.

,

I

"New
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necessary turn without organic upheaval
and
without factional convulsions " 77
.

And so Trotsky swung first to one antipode,
then to
the other, fluctuating between the extremes
of "democracy"
and "centralism."

After the single "dictator"

had substi-

tuted himself for the Party and after the Party,
"in the last
analysis always right," had expelled Trotsky from
its ranks,

he formed his own party.

But more than once Trotsky was

called upon to sanction the expulsion of
name of "discipline."

a

minority in the

It was an endless treadmill, one which

the Dewey Commission only dimly perceived.
II.

The Political Charges

In the litany of sins attributed to "Judas-Trotsky"

the Soviet indictment specified certain political crimes, in

addition to the aforementioned conspiratorial contacts and

historical transgressions.

Trotsky's alleged affinity for

"terrorism," in particular, was

a

prominent feature in both

the Zinoviev-Kamenev and Pyat akov-Radek trials.

There was

also the matter of systematic "wrecking" (sabotage),

charge in the second trial.

a

major

And, of course, Trotsky's fra-

ternal ties to the Nazi hierarchy received great attention,

especially in the Pyat akov-Radek spectacular.

In each case

Trotsky was eager to explode the accusations and demonstrate
before the Dewey Commission their inherent absurdity.

1

!

Terrorism

"My_

After the first trial Trotsky declared, in
sorrow,
participation in terrorism is thus a common
denominator

of all the confessions." 78

Certainly this "bloody thread"

ran through the indictments in both trials, and
was repeated,
ad nauseam, by most of the defendants.

I.

instance, asserted that only "the idea of

I.
a

Reingold, for

terrorist fight

against the leaders of the Party and the Government" held

together the heterogeneous bloc. 79

The use of individual

terrorism, of course, was incompatible with the Marxist
tradition, but the conspirators had no choice.

"They came

to terrorism, to murder," stated Prosecutor Vyshinsky, "be-

cause their position had become hopeless, because they

realized that they were isolated from power, from the working
class.

They came to terrorism because of the complete ab-

sence of favourable prospects for them in the fight for

power by other methods and by other means."

OQ

The "bestial

rage and hatred" of this association of political assassins
was turned against Stalin and his "glorious comrades-inarms "--Kirov

,

Ordzhonikidze

,

Zhdanov, Kossior, Postyshev.

8

In the Pyatakov-Radek trial more details were added
to this picture of widespread terroristic activity.

Gangs

of assassins roamed the streets of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev,

Rostov, Novosibirsk, Sochi, and other cities, searching for

their targets.
list

— Molotov,

Other names were added to the murderers'
Kaganovich, Yezhov, Eiche

,

Beria

— but

was little to show for this feverish enterprise.

there

Sergei
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Kirov, the "Beacon," was struck down;

volved in

and Molotov was in-

prearranged automobile "accident."

a

derous venture continued, despite setbacks.
there was an effort to fell Stalin.

told K.

B.

Berman-Yurin,

Yet the mur-

In particular

As Trotsky allegedly

"'Stalin must be physically de-

OO

stroyed.

1

"

Before the Dewey Commission Trotsky emphatically rejected the tactic of individual terrorism on historical and
political, but not moral grounds.

Many years earlier,

claimed Trotsky, the Bolsheviki had learned that terrorist
acts

— whether

successful or unsuccessful

— only

resulted in

massive repression and the destruction of the best cadres.
"Could the Oppositionists," he asked,

"educated upon the

enormous experience of the revolutionary movement, have en-

tertained even

a

moment's belief that terror is capable of

bringing them closer to power?

Russian history, Marxist

theory, political psychology reply:

No,

they could not!"

83

In support of this claim Trotsky introduced into the

record

a

number of his early writings on terrorism.

In 1902

the youthful Trotsky had rejected personal vengeance for the

martyrs incarcerated in Tsarist prisons

revolutionary vengeance

:

"

'

.

Instead he favored

Not for the execution of minis-

ters, but for the execution of the autocracy.

and in prison

,

he expl ained

,

1

"

In exile

the Marxists debated this "lif e-

and-death" matter with the Russian terrorists:

"How many

times did we break personal relationships on this most burning
of all questions!"

This fight against terrorism was not

a

.
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"mystical or religious principle" with the
Marxists, but
question of organizing the workers. As he
wrote in 1909,

a

the concentration of energy on the "'supreme
moment- ex-

eluded agitational and organizational activity
among the
masses:

"'Struggling against terrorism, the Marxian intel-

ligentsia defended their right or their duty not to
withdraw
from the working-class districts for the sake of tunneling
mines underneath the Grand Ducal and Tsarist palaces.'"
This tactic was just a "'blind alley'" that played into the

hands of the provocateurs; the system was important, not the
individual.
of Per Kampf

In 1911 Trotsky wrote Friedrich Adler, editor
,

that terrorism could produce confusion for only

a short time:

"...

The capitalist state does not rest upon
ministers and cannot be destroyed together with
them.
The classes whom the state serves will
always find new men the mechanism remains intact and continues to function.
But much deeper
is that confusion which the terrorist attempts
introduce into the ranks of the working masses
If it is enough to arm oneself with a revolver
to reach the goal then to what end are the
endeavors of the class struggle? If a pinch of
powder and a slug of lead are ample to shoot
the enemy through the neck, where is the need
of a class organization?
Individual terrorism in our eyes is inadmissible precisely
for the reason that it lowers the masses in
their own consciousness reconciles them to impotence, and directs their glances and hopes
towards the great avenger and emancipator who
will some day come and accomplish his mission.

—

,

.

.

.

,

11

Over the years Trotsky consistently argued that individual

terrorism merely substituted itself for mass action.

Con-

sequently, in the aftermath of the Kirov assassination, he

rejected Nikolayev's murderous action, and contended that

?
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both terrorism and bureaucratism
overestimated the individual
and disparaged the masses:
"
Individual terrorism in its very
essence is bureaucratism turned inside out. 1,84
Trotsky's opposition to individual terrorism,
however, was not based on a tenderhearted
attachment to the

sanctity of life.
made:

There was a political calculation to be

would terrorism help or hinder the liberation of the

masses?

If such a tactic would aid the working class move-

ment, he informed the Preliminary Commission,

"I

would pro-

claim it and appeal to the best elements of the working class
to resort to individual terror.

Say what is, what is neces-

sary; that is the first rule of my thoughts and my ac-

tions."

85

jected as

But on the grounds of expediency it must be rea

viable tactic:

Trotsky:
Politically, economically^ and
strategically, it /individual terrorism/ is
absolutely contrary to the best interests of
the working masses.
Finerty:
Without any question of, or any
moral point of view one way or another.
Excluding the moral question, it is not effective?

Trotsky:
If you permit me to say my
opinion
When the oppression of the masses
is so terrible, especially in certain countries,
then every method is morally justified if the
masses can be liberated. It is only a question,
if this method is capable of liberating the
masses or not.
:

Finerty
Your opposition to individual
terror while it may be morally justified is
that it is not an effective political movement
:

,

Trotsky

,

:

Absolutely so.^

.
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If individual terrorism was politically
inexpedient,

however,

"revolutionary" terror was a legitimate instrument

in the hands of the masses.

Without a sign of remorse,

Trotsky defended the execution of the Tsar and his
family
in

1918— "a military measure

of a local type or character"

—

and argued that the "Red Terror" of the Civil War
was a re-

sult of foreign capitalist intervention.

Certainly he felt

no guilt about his actions as leader of the Red Army:

"I

am

ready to carry all the responsibility for all the terroristic
acts committed by the Russian people against their oppres-

sors."

87

Revolutionary terror was

cumstances

a

necessity in the cir-

:

In this harsh work I was obliged to resort
to drastic measures.
For these I bear full
responsibility before the world working class
and before history.
The justification of rigorous measures lay in their historical necessity
and progressive character, in their correspondence with the fundamental interest of the
working class. To all repressive measures
dictated by the conditions of civil war I gave
their real designation, and I have given a
public accounting for them before the working
masses.
I had nothing to hide from the people,
as today I have nothincr to hide from the
Commission. 00
.

.

.

,

CI ass interests

— this

was the final justification for mass

executions
The defense of the "progressive" role of revolutionary terror raised other questions.

Considering the bureauc-

racy's oppression of the Soviet masses, would Trotsky coun-

tenance the use of revolutionary terror to overthrow the
regime?

And would he sanction the "execution" of Stalin?

.

,

At the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky testified
that until 1933
he had believed it possible to "reform"
the Soviet system

through peaceful means, but after the Comintern's
defeat in
Germany, he had changed his line:
"'The Comintern
is no

more a revolutionary organization, and the leading
party of
the Comintern, the old Bolshevik Party, is no longer
con-

sidered as

a

revolutionary party.

1

"

Only through

a

new

political revolution could the bureaucratic cadres be removed
Consequently,
stated:

'"

a 1936

resolution of the Fourth International

The working class of the U.S.S.R

has been robbed

.

of the last possibility of a legal reformation of the state

The struggle against the bureaucracy necessarily becomes
revolutionary struggle

"

.

a.

89

.'

To advocate a revolutionary struggle was not to

countenance individual terrorism or any "political adventurism,

"

but it certainly implied the use of violent force on

large scale

.

If the regime were overthrown

would it be "a necessary political measure,
political measure

,

asked Finer ty

,

a

defensive

to execute the bureaucracy? "

to this awkward question

,

a

In answer

Trotsky was somewhat equivocal

When the hour of the revolution arrived, he assured Finerty,
"it will be such a powerful uprising of the masses that the

bureaucracy will become immediately disoriented and disorganized
tion."

,

just as the Tsarist regime in the February revolu-

It was Trotsky's "hope" that at the critical moment

the "powerful and terrible bureaucracy would be absolutely

"

"
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pitiful," but he could not take responsibility for
its
course of action.

"If the bureaucracy will oppose the

masses, they will naturally take severe measures.

dividual extermination, no.
spective

.

But in-

It is not a revolutionary per-

90

The use of revolutionary force to overthrow the

Stalinist apparatus, continued Trotsky, did not imply the

liquidation of Stalin, as Vyshinsky had claimed.

In both

trials the Prosecutor contended that Trotsky had publicly

called for the use of terror in "documents which their
author has proclaimed urbi et orbi

.

He cited as proof of

"

this allegation Trotsky's "Open Letter" of March
and an article in the Bulletin of the Opposition
1933.

91

1,
,

1932,

October,

But in the case of the "Open Letter," which Trotsky

addressed to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee
of the USSR,

after he had been stripped of Soviet citizen-

ship, it was Lenin who was quoted on the need to remove

Stalin:

"...

Stalin has led you into a blind alley.
Without liquidating Stalinism there is no way
You must trust in the working class,
out.
give the proletarian vanguard the possibility
of reviewing the whole Soviet system and
pitilessly cleansing it of the accumulated
rubbish.
It i_s time finally to fulfill the
to remove Stalin
1 ast urgent advice of Lenin
,

—

,

.

Trotsky advised the Central Executive Committee in 1932 that
Stalin, without the bureaucratic apparatus, was "'nothing,

mere cipher.

myth.'"

...

a

It is high time to abandon the Stalin

In other words,

as Trotsky informed the Preliminary
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Commission, he had only been "invoking Lenin's Testament"

when he recommended that Stalin be removed from his post.
Thus, the terror charge stemmed from "a consciously
falsified

interpretation" of an article, which could be checked by any
literate person:

"Such are the methods of Vyshinsky!

Such

are the methods of Stalin!"

The 1932 admonition "to remove" Stalin, therefore,

did not imply his liquidation.

The Soviet authorities at

the time could have unseated him "in a legal way," argued

Trotsky before the Preliminary Commission. 93

But a year

later he had concluded that constitutional means would no
longer suffice in eliminating the ruling clique:

"'They can

be compelled to hand over power to the proletarian vanguard

only by force.

1

"

Trotsky, of course, had few qualms about

the use of revolutionary violence.

off as a pacifist, a Tolstoyan,

a

"I

never passed myself

follower of Gandhi," he in-

formed the commissioners rather needlessly

.

Serious revolu-

tionaries "never play with violence," but neither do they
refuse to use it "if history does not permit of other methods.
new politi-

After 1933 he urged the Russian masses to stage

a

cal revolution against the bureaucratic clique

and use

revolutionary violence

,

if necessary.

,

But revolutions could

not be provoked artificially; they were not made to order:

They spring from the development of society.
They cannot be evoked artificially. It is even
less possible to repl ace revoluti on by the adventurism of terrorist acts. When Vyshinsky
identifies, instead of counterposing, these two
methods that of individual terror and that of

—

—

mass insurrection he blots out the entire
history of the Russian Revolution and the entire philosophy of Marxism.
What does he put
in their place? A frame-up! 94

Mass violence, Yes!

Individual terror, No!

This was

Trotsky's line before the Dewey Commission.
In essence, then, Trotsky asserted that revolutionary

violence could be applied against the bureaucracy, but not
against Stalin personally:

"It is not a personal guestion.

It is a guestion of the regime." 95

The bureaucratic appara-

tus had created Stalin after "its own image," and its leaders

varied from one another only "a centimeter or so in height
and a few centimeters in girth."

To substitute a Kossior or

Kaganovich for Stalin would change little.
dividual terror appeared
he argued repeatedly.

'so

As a result, in-

pathetic and puny in our eyes,"

9^

Once again the final report of the Dewey Commission,

Not Guilty

,

reflected Trotsky's position, and scoffed at

Vyshinsky's accusations.

There were innumerable "terrorist"

groups operating throughout the Soviet Union, yet so little
was accomplished; this "'intense activity,'" one must assume,
"was chiefly in the line of conversation."

There were so

"many conversations about conversations on terrorism," con-

tinued the Dewey Commission, that only

a

careful scrutiny

could reveal "the extreme disproportion between the extent
and duration of the alleged terrorist activity,

crete result."

and its con-

The few details about the alleged attempts

indicated "such feebleness in planning and such want of
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resolution on the part of the executants as to inspire

skepticism rather than conviction."

Famous revolutionaries,

men with records of courage and resolution, had used
"dila-

tory and amateurish" means and "questionable agents" in their

alleged plots.

It was hardly "credible," especially since

they faced certain death.

In short,

"revolutionary motive"

was lacking in the State's case.
As for Trotsky's views on individual terrorism, Not

Guilty quoted at length from his historical writings and

testimony on the subject, and found the record convincing.

Certainly the 1932 "Open Letter" could not be interpreted as
a call

for Stalin's assassination, since "Lenin's advice to

'remove Stalin' has never been interpreted to imply terrorism," declared the authors of the report.

This "Open Letter"

could only be regarded as "treasonable" if one accepted the
position that "opposition to the policies of the leaders of
the Communist Party and the Soviet government is synonymous

with criminal activity against the Soviet state and people."

98

In the October 1933 article Trotsky did advocate the use of
force to remove the ruling clique, but Vyshinsky omitted many

passages which showed that Trotsky was calling for revolutionary mass action, not individual terrorism.
Vyshinsky, in his partial quotations,

Prosecutor

"deliberately identifies

revolutionary mass action with individual terrorism.
distinction is obvious and historical."

The

Vyshinsky could not

quote him accurately, because "all of Trotsky's writings on
the problem reject individual terror and justify only
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revolutionary mass action."

Thus, concluded Not Guilty

,

"the

charge of individual terrorism is not only not proved
but in-

credible

QQ
.

"

Doubtlessly "all" of Trotsky's writings on the subject did reject individual terrorism, but the question re-

mains:

why not assassinate Stalin?

Certainly the Soviet

dictator expected such an attempt as only logical, considering
the historical circumstances.

There had been such an accumu-

lation of power in the dictator's hands, that the image of
the bureaucracy had surely been refashioned in his image, and
not the obverse, as Trotsky contended.

As a loyal defender

of classical Marxism, Trotsky tended to overestimate

"objective " forces and underestimate the personal equation
in formulating his revolutionary strategy.

If Stalin had

been removed from the scene in 1937, one may speculate, his
epigones would have found themselves floundering between

demoralized bureaucracy and an embittered population.
f act

,

the "logic" of Trotsky

exclude such

a

'

s

a

In

position did not completely

"solution" to the problem.

In 1919 Trotsky had defended the use of mass terror

against the criticisms of Karl Kautsky.

100

Only through the

systematic and energetic use of violence could the "cl ass
will" of the enemy be broken, for it had an "educative"

question of expediency, not prin-

value.

This was merely

ciple.

Whereas the Tsar terrorized the workers, the Bolsheviks

a

applied terror to landlords, capitalists, and generals:
you grasp this

.

.

.

distinction?

Yes?

"Do

For us Communists it

"
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is quite sufficient."

Certainly the Bolsheviks rejected the

"Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle"
about the
sacredness of human life. To make the individual
sacred,

argued Trotsky,

"we must destroy the social order which

crucifies him.

And this problem can only be solved by blood

and iron. 101

Again in 1938, some nineteen years later, Trotsky

strenuously defended the use of violence to crush the class
enemy.

In a polemic against bourgeois critics of Bolshevik

"amorality

,

"

entitled "Their Morals and Ours," Trotsky as-

serted that to condemn civil war terror was merely to embrace
a

"counter-revolutionary" morality. 10?

Morality, after all,

was just "one of the ideological functions" of the class

struggle; it reflected social development and social interests
and had a definite class character.

What served the interests

of the proletarian class and the Party, therefore, was by

definition moral:

"To a revolutionary Marxist there can be

no contradiction between personal morality and the interests
of the party, since the party embodies in his ./sic/ con-

sciousness the very highest tasks and aims of mankind."

The

end was justified, he informed Max Eastman, John Dewey, and

their kind, if "it leads to increasing the power of man over
nature and to the abolition of the power of man over man."
This meant revolution.

The "liberating morality of the pro-

letariat of necessity is endowed with
acter," he argued.

a

revolutionary char-

Only in the "living experience of the

movement" were specific problems of revolutionary morality

clarified, but there was no dualism from means and
end:

end flows naturally from the historical movement."

"The

In short,

anything that "prepares the complete and final overthrow
of
imperialist bestiality is moral, and nothing else.

The wel-

fare of the revolution--that is the supreme lawi" 103

Trotsky, to recapitulate, was willing to use revolu-

tionary violence in 1937 against the bureaucratic "caste,"
but not against Stalin personally.

Yet the Stalinist social

order was "crucifying" the individual worker and the toiling
class as

a whole.

by striking

a

If the social order could be demoralized

mighty blow at its leader, was not that

pletely moral act?

com-

a

Although in the last years of his life

Trotsky increasingly stressed the personal evil of "CainD jugashvili

,

"

he continued to view the dictator as an agent

of a new "caste," if not new class.

But if he had carried

the logic of moral expediency to the end, he would have seen

that the revolution demanded an assault on the leader in

order to undermine the bureaucracy.

In terms of Bolshevik

"morality," it made little difference which blow came first.

Only success mattered, a fact Stalin well understood.

welfare of the revolution

Wrecking

— that

"The

is the supreme law!"

!

The most inspired charge in the Pyat akov-Radek trial

involved industrial sabotage.

A handful of Trotskyite

"diversionists" had conspired to undermine the Soviet economy
and create mass discontent.

Factories sabotaged, trains
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wrecked, mines flooded— these acts of wrecking were
specif-

ically ordered by the Trotskyite Chief, despite his long-

standing reputation as

a

"super-industrializer.
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In his final speech before tne Py at akov-Radek court,

Vyshinsky had argued that there was no contradiction between
Trotsky's public support for massive industrialization in the
Soviet Union and his clandestine campaign to sabotage the

very underpinnings of the economy.

In 1926-27,

admitted the

Prosecutor, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang had used "false
and sometimes outwardly seeming 'Left'

phrases about 'super-

industrialization,'" but this had been an effort to smash the
alliance of workers and peasants.

The chief aim then and now

was to wreck the foundation of the state.

"Strictly speaking, these proposals and demands

changed.
were on

Only the means had

a

line with the present acts of diversion and

Strictly speaking, there is only

wrecking.

a

difference in

form between the wrecking and diversive acts of 1926-27 and

those of the present time."

Ten years had passed, with the

destructive activities taking much sharper forms, "corresponding to the new conditions, to the conditions of the
fierce class struggle against the remnants of the capitalist

elements."

105

But Trotsky had not changed:

he was still an

enemy of the Soviet economy.
With a certain sense of de ja vu

,

Trotsky informed the

Preliminary Commission that the charge of "sabotage" was an
old accusation, extending back to 1929, but then it was just
a "literary

calumny," a link in preparing future judicial
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frame-ups.

He explained that the issue of
industrialization

had been the "first question" in his conflict
with Stalin.
During the 1920s Stalin had been "very timid" on

this issue,

but soon the conflict took on

a

"venomous character," in-

volving questions of democracy and the bribing of
functionaries:

"Then we had this feeling, that it was not incidental

differences, but that there were two minds, two methods, two
moods,

and two moralities, if you wish.

factional struggle."

Then it became a

While Trotsky was fighting in 1922-29

for "accelerated industrialization," his policy met strong

opposition:
that time:

"It was the official name for the Trotskyites at

Super-industrializers

.

"

Trotsky advocated the construction of

For instance, when
a

hydro-electric sta-

tion at Dnieprostroy in 1926, Stalin ridiculed the proposal:
"'For us to build up the Dnieprostroy station is the same as
for a peasant to buy a gramophone instead of

a

cow.'"

1

Of.

In 1925-26 plans for increased industrialization were

first discussed, but Trotsky was so outraged at the modest

goals envisioned that he labeled them

a

"'Sabotage of

Industry,'" an incarnation of the spirit of "economic cowardice."

107

however,

After the first Five-Year Plan was implemented,

"impractical men" scrapped all limits, and raised

"the coefficients without paying any attention to the living

conditions of the workers."

changed his tune.

In 1930, therefore, Trotsky

He incessantly warned against setting maxi-

mum tempos and allowing disproportions between branches of
industry:

factories were being built, but not housing for

.

,
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the workers.

Only free and unfettered discussion
and

criticism could correct the serious contradictions
within
the economy:
"A plan of socialist construction
cannot be

arrived at in the guise of an a priori department
directive.

For seven years, as he told the Preliminary

Commission
untiringly warned against the ruinous consequences of skipping the period of laboratory
preparation, of putting incomplete plants into
operation, of supplanting technical training
and correct organization by frantic and senseless reprisals, and, not infrequently, fantastic
premiums
I

But at the same time he defended the achievements of Soviet

industrialization against various critics.

The successes

were "very important," he asserted, but "two or three times

less than they could be under

a

regime of Soviet democracy." 1

Much the same criticism was made of Soviet forced
collectivization.

Once again Trotsky defended the

"successes" in collectivizing the Soviet peasantry, but

criticized the attempt to complete the process in the first
Five-Year Plan.

Too much was lacking

technicians, and

a

— tractors,

necessary level of culture.

roads,

Moreover,

the results of the campaign were difficult to assess, since
the statistics on collectivization were "as false as the in-

dictments," having been "totalitarianized.

"

But Trotsky was

convinced that the struggle had resulted in "hundreds, thousands and millions of exterminated peasants."

Hardly known

for his pro-peasant stance, Trotsky still contended that

'

.
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...

it was necessary to explain to them
to
teach them, to win them not to kill the
kulak
I am not afraid of the kulak.
The kulaks are
peasants who exploit the other peasants. But
the actions of the bureaucracy were to kill
the
kulaks and to push, by these methods, the other
peasants into the camp of the hostile elements
by fear. -LI 0

—

'

In other words, Trotsky would have followed the same
policy,

but achieved better results without the excessive use of
force
All of these internal contradictions, disproportions,

excesses

— argued

Trotsky

But these phenomena,

— resulted

in an inevitable crisis.

"long known as chronic diseases of

Soviet economic life," were then put forward as "the fruits
of a malicious conspiracy which Pyatakov led

under my orders."

— naturally,

The blame for disorganized plants,

damaged machinery, and industrial accidents should be placed
on the regime's use of naked commands, reprisals and premiums
(

"Stakhamvism"

)

.

"There is not the slightest ground for

dragging

a

clared.

But Trotsky was ready to admit that some of the de-

'Trotskyite conspiracy

1

into this matter," he de-

fendants might have committed real "errors" in managing the
economy, and even that

a

few might actually be spies:

was possible that some were genuine German

"It

and Japanese

agents, and that they committed sabotage on the orders of
the Japanese General Staff.

It is not excluded."

11 ^

No

matter, the wrecking charges were still the "crudest part of
the judicial frame-up," in Trotsky's opinion.

112

What was "perfectly incomprehensible" to Trotsky was
that apparently the leadership of the economy resided "not
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in the hands of the -genial,

infallible leader,'" nor in the

hands of his closest collaborators,

"but in the hands of an

isolated man, already nine years in banishment and
exile."
In the other parts of the indictment;, noted Trotsky,
his

followers were portrayed as "an insignificant handful,

isolated from and hated by the masses."

But such widespread

sabotage would only be possible "if the entire administrative
apparatus were in the hands of the saboteurs," if Trotskyites

completely dominated the bureaucracy.

Moreover, observed the

chief "saboteur," he had done everything to expose the various industrial "crimes," or ailments.

been extremely clever

— if

"All this would have

it were not so utterly nonsensical."

The Pyatakov-Radek trial, he commented with some wonderment,
was "intended to personify in Trotsky the causes for the

accidents and disasters."

It was rather arcane:

"Against

Ormuzd, the spirit of good, was to be set the evil spirit

Ahriman.
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Madness, all

become insane and

industry

— who

I

I

"Assume me to be mad,

assume

have

I

elaborate this plan"--to sabotage Soviet

would join in such

a

project?

The saboteurs

would have been caught immediately and liquidated, argued
Trotsky, without ever tasting power.
give their lives for false ideals:
ideal,

a

political ideal, or

a

Besides, men to not
"It must be a religious

national ideal."

But the

necessary motive was lacking in the allegations, the "weakest
point" in the wrecking charge.
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And such

•

policy, in any
•

a

event, would not have helped the Opposition gain power.

Only

on a higher political and cultural level
could the bureaucracy be overthrown.
"it is necessary to raise the people,

and not push them into the depths," asserted
this classical

Marxist.

Industrial sabotage would have disorganized the

economy and signified "the destruction of the best
capital
of the revolution, of the old generation of the revolution,

the best fighters of the Civil War who were educated to
repre-

sent the great tradition of history."

"absurd tactic," declared Trotsky,

cultural suicide.

I

To follow such an

"would be economic and

deny it categorically." 115

No,

the only

question here was one of benefit:
Was it advantageous for the Opposition to
enter into an alliance with Hitler and the
Mikado? And, if not, was it not advantageous
for the bureaucracy to obtain from the
Opposition the confession that it was in alliance with Hitler and the Mikado?

Merely to pose the question,

"

Qui prodest ?," or who profits,

was enough to have the first outlines of the answer, in

Trotsky's opinion. 116
The Dewey Commission also had few doubts about the

essential absurdity of the "wrecking" charge.

After reviewing

Trotsky's voluminous writings on the Soviet economy, the panel
reached certain conclusions:

Vyshinsky had "misrepresented"

the Opposition's 1927 platform, and Trotsky had continuously

"defended" industrialization and collectivization, although

criticizing many facets of the programs.
of camouflage, therefore, was "untenable."

the authors of Not Guilty

,

The elaborate theory
117

Moreover, wrote

the "fabric of the trial was so
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rotten" that it was impossible to ascertain the guilt or in-

nocence of the other accused wreckers.

Certainly the means

and motives for embarking on such a massive sabotage campaign

were lacking, inspiring "grave doubt of the charge of sabo-

tage."

More likely, as Trotsky testified and other evidence

indicated, the delays and disproportions in the economy were
not the result of sabotage but just "the chronic diseases of

Soviet industry."

The expiation of these shortcomings by

scapegoats was the "usual method of whitewashing the regime."
Therefore, the Dewey Commission found the charge of sabo-

taging the Soviet economy, especially as it concerned Trotsky
and his son,

"not only not proved but not credible."
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It is difficult to find fault with this logic.

Ap-

parently the Moscow outcry about "wrecking" was just another
example of the scapegoat syndrome.

Since someone had to take

the blame for the numerous problems besetting the Soviet

economy, the logical candidate was the "arch-fiend" living
abroad.

Nowhere in the Moscow indictments, however, was it

adequately explained how massive industrial sabotage could

bring Trotsky to power.

Wrecked trains in Siberia had little

or no political importance.

Agent of the Fascists

!

When it was initially charged in the Zinoviev-Kamenev
trial that Trotsky had established fraternal links with the

skepticism
German Nazis, the accusation was greeted with great
in Europe and America.

The first communique out of Moscow,

—
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with its mention of ties to the Gestapo, caused Trotsky himself to brand this "'the work of

a

drunken agent provocateur

and an illiterate one, to boot!'" 119

Yet in the second trial

Vyshinsky elaborated on the accusation:

Trotsky had promised

certain territorial, political, and material concessions to

Hitler and the Mikado in exchange for help in regaining power.
In personal negotiations with Rudolph Hess, Vice-Chairman of
the German National-Socialist Party, Trotsky had also pro-

mised to adopt

a

"defeatist" line in the forthcoming war and

sabotage Soviet military preparations. 120

lision

— provoke

"'Hasten the col-

war, prepare for the defeat of the U.S.S.R."

121
this was the Trotskyite foreign policy.

The allegation that he was in the pay of the Germans,

Trotsky told the Preliminary Commission, was another old accusation.

It was the second time he had been so accused.

Both the British and Kerensky's government made the same
charge in 1917:

"Today this accusation seems

from Stalin and Vyshinsky.

a

plagiarism

In fact, it is Stalin and

Vyshinsky who are plagiarizing from the Tsarist counterespionage system and the British Intelligence Service."

122

Two decades ago Lenin had refuted these "filthy insinuations,"
and nothing had changed in the ensuing twenty years.

Such a

policy was doomed beforehand:
enter into relations with fascists and the
Mikado, I am not a socialist, not a revolutionAnd if this
ary, but a miserable adventurist.
accusation is proved to be true and correct,
What can I have, except the
then I lose all.
power of my ideals for socialism? I compromise
If

I

I

"
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my aim, my ideal, myself.
It is so contrary to
all my Marxist education, to all my past
forty
years' work in the masses and through the
masses if I can conceive of the possibility of
such an indictment.

—

—

After reading the trial record, added Trotsky,
impression of reading Dostoyevsky

Certainly Trotsky had

serving his alleged allies.

.

"I

have the

12 3

a "very

peculiar manner" in

As he informed the Preliminary

Commission, article after article of his in the early 1930s

warned against Hitler's threat to the revolutionary movement
and urged Stalin to join with the German Social Democrats to

fight the Nazis.

"'By your policy,'" he reproached Stalin,

"'you prepare a new Wr angel
scale.

,

He will be Hitler.'"

remain in power only

a

a

super-Wrangel on

a

world-wide

But convinced that Hitler would

few months, followed by

a

Communist

triumph, the Comintern conceded power to the Nazis without

significant struggle.
"Left Social-Fascist."

As for Trotsky, he was branded

a

a

This was "one of the most miserable

treasons in history," Trotsky declared before the Dewey
Commission:

"I

can say that they /the Comintern and its

agents/ were objectively the allies of Hitler in that situation,

and not myself."
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After 1933 Trotsky continued to write numerous
of
articles castigating the Nazi leadership, and yet, miracle

negotiations
miracles, this Jewish Revolutionary entered into

with Rudolph Hessi

It was all so peculiar.

His whole life

conspiring with
was just "camouflage" for his "real" work—
little sense
This "alliance," added Trotsky, made
the Nazis.

from the fascist side.

The Nazis would never have allowed

him to fulfill his revolutionary program:

"Is it not clear

in advance that Hitler and the Mikado, after using such an

agent to the limit, would fling him aside like

lemon?"

a

squeezed

No, the several variants of the accusation were

"internally meaningless," especially since there was no hope
of escaping detection.

Only a "lunatic" could hope to gain

power in this way, he declared.

The alliance with Germany

and Japan rested "wholly in the domain of metaphysics," the
"most dastardly of all the police metaphysics in the history
of mankind!

1,125

But would not war spur revolution and help Trotsky

regain power, his critics asked?

Granted, war often

sharpened social contradictions and led to mass discontent,
admitted Trotsky, but this was insufficient for the
of the proletarian revolution.

"Without

a

"

triumph "

revolutionary

party rooted in the masses," he argued, "the revolutionary

situation leads to the most cruel defeats."

It was in the

"vital interest" of his movement that war be delayed as long
as possible.

without

a

Revolutionary situations came and went, but

"bold, courageous, consistent revolutionary party"

they came to naught and could be disastrous.

A strong revo-

lutionary party might even make war unnecessary.

"The more

firm, the more courageous, the more revolutionary the conduct

of the toilers," he contended,

"the more the imperialists

to postwill hesitate, the more surely will it be possible

the revolution
pone war, the greater will be the chance that

!
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will occur prior to war and perhaps make war itself

impossible

.

"

Certainly the ex-War Commissar had no great

love for military conflicts:

War and revolution are the gravest and most
tragic phenomena in human history
You cannot
joke with them.
They do not tolerate dilettantism.
We must understand clearly the interrelationship of war and revolution. We must
understand no less clearly the interrelationship
of the objective revolutionary factors, which
cannot be induced at will, and the subjective
factor of the revolution the conscious vanguard
of the proletariat
its party
It is necessary
to prepare this party with the utmost energy.
.

—

,

It was unimaginable

,

.

therefore

,

that the small band of

hounded and persecuted Trotskyites would engage in adventurism rather than preparing their party for the coming struggles.
"Only the cynical contempt of Stalin and his school for world

public opinion, together with Stalin's primitive police
cunning, are capable of creating such a monstrous and non-

sensical accusation

,..126

War without revolution, moreover, would signify

a

"tremendous historic retreat" and possibly the "decline of

European civilization."

127

Trotsky believed that military

defeat for the Soviet Union would mean "the restoration of

capitalism in

a

semi-colonial form under

a

fascist political

regime, the dismemberment of the country, and the wrecking
of the October Revolution."
"

Thus, he advocated the

unconditional " defense of the Soviet Union in any war with

the imperialists.

Again and again Trotsky broke with col-

leagues on this ticklish question.

In his view war threatened

which represents a
"the new social basis of the U.S.S.R.,

.

:

tremendous step forward in the development of mankind."
was a "deformed" workers'

This

state with a "deformed" socialist

economy, he admitted, but it was still

a

workers'

state.

Thus, the Trotskyites defended the Soviet Union as "an in-

heritance of the October Revolution, as an open door to

better future, in spite of Stalin and Vyshinsky."

1

a

28

This complicated position meant that in case of war

Trotsky would be

a

"good soldier" for the Soviet Union,

"sabotage the war machinery" of Germany and Japan, and yet

prepare a proletarian revolution in Britain and France.

Even

if they were allied with Stalin, he feared that these

bourgeois nations would impose social and economic concessions on the Soviet Union, and force it to become another

"bourgeois state."

If Soviet Russia resisted, France and

Great Britain would join her enemies

Union at the end of the war."

'to

stifle the Soviet

The French proletariat, there-

fore, should actively oppose their own bourgeoisie in order

to hinder the imposition of a "bourgois regime or capitalist

regime" on the Soviet Union at the end of the coming war.

Only the "consciousness of the revolutionary masses" could

guarantee against the triumph of reaction and fascism.

This

was the only hope
The defeat of the Soviet Union is inevitable
in case the new war shall not provoke a new
I believe it is impossible, it is
revolution.
incredible, that a new war will permit capitalism,
decadent capitalism, to remain as it is. The
revolution is inevitable. But if we theoretically admit war without revolution, then1Z the defeat of the Soviet Union is inevitable
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Was, then, Trotsky a "defeatist?"

In the Moscow

trials, of course, he had been tarred with this epithet, and
at one point Vyshinsky had even "quoted" Trotsky as writing:

"'We must restore the tactics of Clemenceau, who, as is well

known, rose against the French Government at

Germans were 80 kms

i
.

from Paris.'"

30

a

time when the

The chief "witness"

in the Coyoacan hearings had only scorn for this charge.

Clemenceau, after all, was known as "'the father of victory'"
in France,

and had never organized an insurrection.

Vyshinsky and the regime were merely justifying interior
violence by citing

Bonapartism

i

"

a

danger of war-- "cl assic subterfuge of

When Trotsky first brought up Clemenceau

's

experience, he was only attempting to stress the need for
free criticism even during wartime.

But Trotsky no longer

invoked the example of Clemenceau, he told the sub-commission,
because "the Bonapartism of Stalin has barred the road to
legal reform." Free criticism
no longer possible.

— in

peacetime or wartime

The Clemenceau accusation, in any event,

was just another Stalinist device.

"And it is of such

shoddy tricks that the whole accusation is made up.
Frame-ups and lies!

and frame-ups!
a
squad.

— was

Sum total

— the

Lies
firing

-131
"

The final report of the Dewey Commission devoted a

lengthy chapter

Powers"— to

a

— "The

Charge of Agreements with Foreign

discussion of Trotsky's "defeatism" and his

"links" with the fascists.

As in the case of the other

trials was compared to
charges, the testimony in the Moscow
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the testimony in the Mexican hearings, to Trotsky's writings,

and to the many affidavits in the Commission's possession. 132
All of this evidence indicated that Trotsky had "steadily ad-

vocated the defense of the Soviet Union," not defeatism, and
that he and his followers had never "had any connection with
agents of German fascism," despite the Moscow charges. 133

Even Radek and Vyshinsky had admitted that the policy of
"revanche" with the fascists had little hope of success and

could only result in the destruction of the Trotskyite
"bloc."

Thus, either Trotsky understood that this policy

would be "self-defeating" or his published articles on de-

fending the Soviet Union were

a

reflection of his true

Either way, the accusation made little sense.

opinion.

In order to accept the Moscow conclusions, added

Not Guilty

,

one must believe that "Trotsky is the most in-

teresting case of split personality in all history, or accept
the Prosecutor's contention that his public activity con-

stituted nothing but an elaborate camouflage for his secret

counter-revolutionary intrigues."

The Commission agreed

with Trotsky, moreover, that the activity ascribed to him was

characterized by an "extraordinary stupidity."

And his pub-

lished writings had followed "a consistent theoretical line,"
one "diametrically opposed" to the accusations in the two

Moscow trials.
a

Although the Commission was unwilling to take

position on Trotsky's aims and methods, it did state that

intelhis career had been "that of a man of extraordinary

ligence and ability.

To believe that his prodigious public
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activity was intended merely to cloak conspiratoral enterprises as stupid, inept and feeble as those ascribed to him
in the trials, would be to abandon any claim to common

sense."

Therefore, the charge of conspiracy with foreign

power was "not only not proved, but preposterous." 134
Thus, Trotsky and the Dewey Commission agreed on the

"stupidity" of the charge.

both missed

a

But it is possible that they

"signal" from Stalin to Hitler as was discussed

in the first chapter.

Trotsky himself had once remarked that

surely Berlin and Tokyo realized the Moscow accusations on

foreign alliances were "sheer twaddle." 135
were inherently absurd

— "sheer

twaddle"

If the charges

— then

why make them?

At one point in the Mexican hearings the partici-

pants touched upon another explanation for making this

particular charge.
opinion of

a

When Miss La Follette asked Trotsky's

possible Moscow-Berlin wartime alliance, the

"witness" responded that the possibility was "not excluded,"

but attributed such a desire to
"I

a

segment of the bureaucracy:

believe that the accusation against me is directed

against a certain part of the bureaucracy," which feared the
-I

consequences of war.

oc

At another point he agreed with

Miss La Follette that Stalin was using this charge for his
own reasons:
Many symptoms
Yes, it is very possible.
indicate that Stalin has to fight a certain
part of the bureaucracy which will assure its
position at any price, even at the price of
Stalin
an alliance or friendship with Hitler.
is, I suppose, not inclined now to go along in
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this way, but will expose this tendency by the
specter of Trotskyism:
"It is Trotsky's
policy; we will execute everybody who is of
the same opinion." This is not an opinion on
my part, only a supposition.

And when Otto Ruehle cited an article in

a Prague

newspaper

on the possibility of a secret understanding between Moscow

and Berlin, Trotsky replied that this was "an affirmation of

my hypothetical opinion,
this was

a

a

partial affirmation."

serious ploy or just

a

"diplomatic bluff" to force

closer French-Soviet relations, he could not say:
know.

But whether

But every bluff can become serious."

"I

don't
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Was the charge against Trotsky of conspiratorial

links with the Fascists merely part of the "frame-up" or an

elaborate and intricate pas de deux between Moscow and
Berlin?

Only the Party archives in the Kremlin can answer

this question with certainty.

But with a certain amount of

historical hindsight it appears that Stalin was not engaged
in a "diplomatic bluff."

The "foreign policy" attributed to

Trotsky in the Moscow trials bears

a

striking similarity to

the subterranean Soviet policy in those years, which only

surfaced in August, 1939.

If Trotsky was a stalking horse

for Stalin's new policy toward Hitlerite Germany, the Russian

exile remained unaware of his role in the drama.

He accepted

the accusation at face value.
III.

The Nature of the Trials

Despite innumerable volumes written about the "show
to this day
trials," they have remained essentially an enigma

!
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Some of the major questions asked in 1936-38 are still being

discussed.

Why did the Old Bolsheviks capitulate so easily?

Why did they make such abject confessions during the trials?

And perhapr most perplexing of all, why were the trials
staged in the first place?

To all of these questions Trotsky

had ready answers in 1937, based on a lifetime in the revolu-

tionary movement and many bitter experiences at the hands of
Stalin.

Karl Radek and Capitulation

Nothing disturbed Trotsky more than the sorry spectacle of once-proud revolutionists bowing before the

Dictator's knee and begging for absolution.

Beginning in

1927 he watched in impotent rage as his former associates

responded to Stalin's siren song and were turned into swine.
As each one capitulated Trotsky violently broke relations

with them, no matter how intimate the ties had been, and

condemned each and every one to historical damnation.
cruel jest

— these

Yet

—

very capitulators emerged in 1936-38 as

his "co-conspirators" in an elaborate plot to overthrow the

regime

Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico Trotsky

attempted to explain his chilly relations with previous associates.
fied,

"It is a historical and political law," he testi-

"that the relationship between the Oppositionists and

rethe capitulators was all these years more bitter than the

lationship between the Oppositionists and the Stalinists."

"
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Capitulation to him was

a

form of "political death," as he

once warned Zinoviev and Kamenev.

In the late 1920s and

early 1930s Trotsky devoted at least 84 articles to this de-

grading behavior, and was unsparing in his vitriolic abuse
of the practice.

As a result, there was no possibility of

forming a new bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev:

"My apprecia-

tion of them, my total contempt after the capitulation, my

hostility to them and their hostility tc me, excluded that
139

absolutely.

During the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky was systematically questioned about his relations with each of the
capitul ator-conspirators

Only for a few of his former as-

.

sociates did he temper his criticism.

Trotsky praised

Mural ov, for instance, as an "exceptionally honest man,"

whose false deposition reflected the fear of
soldier" that the state was in danger.
Rakovsky,

140

a "simple

As for Christian

"my geniune old friend" for some thirty-five years,

Trotsky refrained from attacking him and suggested that
Rakovsky might soon become the victim of

a

new frame-up.
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But he described Smirnov's capitulation as differing "little

from the cowardly declaration of Radek."
"the first

•

As for Pyatakov--

Trotskyite' who capitulated publicly"

"'politically finished'"

a

— he

was

long time ago and could not be

relied on when great questions arose, as Lenin once con*
tended and Trotsky repeated.

142

from
Trotsky took great pains to disassociate himself
was his brotherZinoviev and Kamenev, even though the latter
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in-law.

At some length he recalled that they had been "ad-

versaries of the October insurrection," and members of the
"Troika," which directed the Party in 1922-25; Zinoviev and

Kamenev were even more "embittered adversaries" of Trotskv
than Stalin at the time. 143

For the commissioners he re-

viewed the split (1925-26) in the Troika
absolutely unexpected by me"
in 1926-27.

— and

— "the

explosion was

the subsequent joint bloc

With the failure of this alliance Trotsky's

group was prepared to accept expulsion from the Party, but
•".the

Zinoviev group would avoid the expulsion at any price,"

and capitulated.

comrades.

After 1927 Trotsky broke with his erstwhile

In subsequent years he characterized them as

"'weathercocks and turncoats'" and wrote that their personal
fate was "profoundly tragic."

Despite their character de-

ficiencies, however, Trotsky never doubted that Zinoviev and

Kamenev had rejected personal terrorism and taken no part in
Kirov's assassination.

"Real terrorists" would have begun

with Stalin, but Zinoviev and Kamenev were serving the
144
u
dictator, not attempting to assassinate him.
.

In order, however, to explain the psychology of the

capitulators Trotsky chose the "clearest and most typical"

example— Karl Radek.

He had in mind not "arbitrary psycholo-

gical improvisations" after the fact, "but objective charac-

terizations based on unimpeachable documents" which had been
written years earlier.

Since Radek had been described by

artificial"
some foreign journalists as giving the "least
for Trotsky's
testimony during the trial, it was important

!

:

,

s

,
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defense to demonstrate that on the defendants' bench sat "not
the real Radek,

but a 'robot

1

as nature and his political past made him,

out of the laboratory of the G.P.U."

Such a

study wouia help to clarify the role of the other accused
the trials.

iri
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According to Vyshinsky, Radek was one of the "'most
able and persistent Trotskyites

chief of this gang, Trotsky.'"

1

"

intimate with "'the big

But "the big chief" found

this characterization an exercise in "inept jesting"

Radek s outstanding characteristics as a
matter of fact are impulsiveness instability
undependability a predisposition toward falling
into panic at the first sign of danger, and exhibiting extreme loquacity when all is well.
The qualities make him a journalistic Figaro of
first-rate skill, an invaluable guide for
foreign correspondents and tourists but utterly unsuited for the role of conspirator.
Among informed persons it is simply unthinkable
to speak of Radek as an inspirer of terrorist
attempts or the organizer of an international
conspiracy
,

'

,

,

,

,

Trotsky conceded that Radek knew something of international
relations; he had been a member of the Council of the People's
But

Commissariat of Foreign Relations after the Revolution.

Soviet diplomats complained that "'anything said in Radek'

presence is spread all over Moscow by the next morning.

1

"

Lenin refrained from discussing secret matters in Politburo
meetings when Radek was present, and even Stalin asserted in
1924:

"'Most men's heads control their tongues; Radek's

tongue controls his head.'"

would place in charge of

a

Who could believe that Trotsky

grandiose project an "individual

in consequence
whose tongue controls his head and who is

i
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capable of expressing serious ideas only 'by accident

1

?" 146

According to Trotsky, the Bolshevik "literary representative" in Stockholm

— Radek — returned

to Russia only at

the end of 1918; he had not played a role in the Revolution.

Trotsky also skipped over Radek'

s

1

significant role in

several German insurrections, 148 but did quote from a 1923

Radek article, "Leon Trotsky, the Organizer of the Victory."
"The need of the hour was for a man who
would incarnate the call to struggle, a man
who, subordinating himself completely to the
requirements of the struggle, would become
the ringing summons to arms, the will which
exacts from all unconditional submission to
Only a man
a great, sacrificial necessity.
with Trotsky's capacity for work, only a man
so unsparing of himself as Trotsky, only a
man who knew how to speak to the soldiers as
Trotsky did only such a man could have become the standard bearer of the armed " toilers.
He was all things rolled into one." 14

—

This article "astonished me by its exalted tone," declared

Trotsky, but was important when compared to Radek

writings, where Trotsky became "'nothing.'"

1

s

later
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From 1923-26, according to Trotsky, Radek had
"vacillated" between the Russian Left Opposition and the

German Communist Right Opposition, but for the next three

years ("an unusual period for him!") he had belonged to the
At the end of 1927 Radek was banished to
151
For about
Siberia with hundreds of other oppositionists.

Left Opposition.

a year,

thereafter, he "tried to stand erect" and attacked

other capitulators.

In May 1928, for instance, Radek wrote

to Preobrazhensky that:

Pyatakovism as

I

"'I reject Zinovievism and

reject Dostoievskyism

.

Doing violence to
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their convictions, they recant.

working class by falsehood.
truth.'"

It is impossible to help the

Those who remain must speak the

And in October 1928 he protested to the Central

Committee on the conditions of Trotsky's exile:

'"We cannot

remain silent and passive while malaria eats away the strength
of the fighter who all his life has served the working class

and who was the sword of the October Revolution.'"

But by

the middle of the next year he had capitulated and told some

fellow exiles:

"'I have completely broken with L.D.

now on we are political adversaries.

.

.

.

From

With the collabora-

tor of Lord Beaverbrook we have nothing in common.

'

"

Quickly

Radek's work took on "'an exceptionally despicable character,'" wrote one exiled oppositionist.

And Rakovsky ob-

served that each new capitulator was obliged '"to kick at
Trotsky'" using hoofs shod with

"
•

Radekist nails.'"

Trotsky

reciprocated the verbal abuse in 1929:
"In capitulating, Radek strikes himself from
He will fall into the
the roll of the living.
category of the half-doomed, half-pardoned,
headed by Zinoviev. These people fear to utter
a single syllable aloud, fear to have minds of
their own, and thus live in constant dread of
their own shadows.

Henceforth, Trotsky declared, Radek became the "symbol of the

most degrading forms of capitulation and the knifing of

yesterday's friends."

152

Jacob
At this point in time occurred the execution of

Blumkin.

This GPU agent with

a

"conflict of loyalties," was

"inner party offence,
the first Party member liquidated for an
153
Trotsky."
with
contact
in
being
an offence no graver than
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It was Radek, charged Trotsky, who betrayed Blumkin.

Curious was the career of the unfortunate Blumkin.
As a young Social-Revolutionary in 1918 he had shot Count

Mirbach, the German Ambassador, which was the signal for
general uprising against the Bolsheviks.

a

The Party "offi-

cially had to prosecute him," Trotsky told the Dewey
Commission, but actually allowed Blumkin to disappear.

During the Civil War he reappeared as one of Trotsky's most

trusted and courageous aids:

"I

secretariat and throughout, when
Blumkin was at my disposal."

employed him in my military
I

needed

Nominally

a

a

courageous man,

member of the

Opposition in the 1920s, he was close to both Trotsky and
Radek, but finally capitulated in "a very modest manner,"
154
and continued his work for the Party.
In the summer of 1929 Blumkin unexpectedly arrived in

Constantinople.

According to Trotsky, this was an official

mission for the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," but in actual
fact this was GPU business.

By chance Blumkin met Leon

(Lyova) Sedov on the street and insisted that Trotsky grant

him an interview.

"'Absolutely impossible.

It is too

risky,'" was Trotsky's first reaction to this request, but

then relented and received his former colleague for

lengthly discussion.

a

When Blumkin returned to Soviet Russia

he informed Radek of the interview, who then "denounced

Blumkin immediately to the G.P.U.," claimed Trotsky.
"such a stupid thing" on Blumkin'

would never have advised.

s

It was

part, one that Trotsky

But in December of 1929 Trotsky

.
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got a measure of revenge.

He denounced this

and charged that Radek had lost

equilibrium.

vileness.'"

,

" betrayal

1

M

the last remnants of moral

In the future he would stop "'before no

11
'

Henceforth the Opposition considered Radek

a

"traitor" as well as a capitul ator 155
In this account of the Blumkin affair, however,

Trotsky had omitted one fact:

Blumkin had carried a secret

letter from Trotsky to the Opposition in the USSR.

The young

GPU agent also had plans to use Turkish fishermen for

smuggling the Bulletin of the Opposition across the Black Sea
Only later did Trotsky admit to the Dewey Commission the

existence of the secret communique
a

,

but contended it had only

"general political character," and was not addressed to

Radek.

The message was so general and trivial,

agreed Isaac

Deutscher, that it was "feckless of Trotsky and Blumkin to
take any rish at all in transmitting it."
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There are other curious aspects of the affair.

One

may doubt with Isaac Deutscher that the meeting in
a "chance

Constantinople was just

encounter.

"

In addition,

there is a possibility that Blumkin was sent to spy on
Trotsky, or even assassinate him.

viewed Blumkin
a

1

s

confession as

a
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And Radek may have

test of his loyalty, or even

provocation, and felt he had no choice but to inform his

masters of the meeting in Turkey.

158

In any event, the break between Radek and Trotsky was

complete after Blumkin'

s

execution.

Soon Radek was one of

in his
Stalin's loyal courtiers, and became "'quite notorious
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new role as Stalin's personal friend,
Trotsky.
"
'

159

1

"

an informant wrote

In subsequent years Trotsky castigated this

lightminded man,'" while Radek denied that the War

Commissar had ever played

a

leading role in the Civil War;

in August 1936 he even wrote an article entitled,

"The

Zinovievite-Trotskyite Fascist Gang and Its Hetman Trotsky."
Finally it was Radek

1

s

turn to take

a

place in the dock, with

"the Damocles sword of the death penalty" suspended above his

head, observed Trotsky with a certain lack of sympathy.

160

This elaborate review of Trotsky's stormy relations

with Radek was presented for one reason only:

it was un-

thinkable that Trotsky would conspire with the likes of
Radek.

a

On the contrary, he was "an old capitulator, the be-

trayer of Blumkin, demoralized agent of Stalin and the
G.P.U.," perhaps the "most perfidious of all my enemies."

And only capitulators like Radek, "who had passed through the
school of recantation, self-abasement and self-vilification,"

were presented in open court.

"Such is the method of Stalin.

Such is the present political system in the U.S.S.R.

The

case of Radek is only the most striking example.

Although Trotsky once admitted that Radek had lent
remaking them,
"a shadow of probability to the accusations" by

struggled to underhe was unwilling to admit that Radek had
162
Yet Radek may have attempted a
mine the State's case.
comments at the
"last service" to Trotsky with his wicked

Chapter
expense of Vyshinsky, as discussed in

I.

Angelica

would never sell himself to
Radek
that
wrote
once
Balabanoff

i
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the enemies of the Revolution:

too.'"

163

"'These would be his enemies

The common enemy in this case was possibly Stalin,

but Trotsky was unforgiving.

Trocsky's withering contempt for capitul ators
should be noted, may have been
with the dreaded "disease."

a

,

it

reflection of his own brush

For in 1926 he came perilously

close to becoming a "capitul ator" himself.

Zinoviev at the time agreed to

a

Both Trotsky and

truce with the Politburo:

the oppositionists would not recant their criticisms of the

Stalinist system, but swore to abide by Central Committee

decisions and to cease factional activity.

following statement appeared in Pravda

On October 16 the

:

"We consider it our duty openly to confess before the Party that in the struggle for our
we have taken steps that were a
opinions
violation of party discipline and have transgressed in the direction of factionalism the
boundaries set by the party for intra-party
We hope the cessaideological struggle.
tion of struggle on the part of the Opposition
will make it possible for expelled comrades,
having acknowledged their mistake, to return
We promise the
to the ranks of the party.
party all possible cooperation in its
violastruggle against a recurrence of such
164
tions of discipline in the future."

...

...

...

.

.

.

Max Eastman,
Several observers of Soviet affairs, most notably
the beginning
have considered this "momentous political lie"

of a sorry parade:

"Signed by Trotsky and his co-leaders, it

capitulations which conwas the first of a long series of
last trace of any
tinued for over a decade, until finally the
private fireside
objection to Stalin's dictatorship, or any
in the Great Purge of 1936
out
wiped
was
it,
against
murmur
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to 1939."
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But Trotsky's "capitulation" stopped there.

For the next decade he stood erect, while many of his former

colleagues groveled at Stalin's feet.
This 1926 incident was omitted in Trotsky's testimony

before the Preliminary Commission, and failed to appear in
the final report, Not Guilty

.

But the commissioners were

impressed with the vehemence of Trotsky's contempt for his
"co-conspirators."
Not Guilty

,

It was "at least questionable," asserted

that Trotsky would have directed such scathing

epithets against his alleged followers, knowing these com166
ments would undermine their position within Russia.

Al-

though Trotsky might have formed a new political "bloc with
Zinoviev and Kamenev against Stalin, it was doubtful that he

would have joined with them in

a

secret terrorist conspiracy;

for such a "risky" enterprise one needed accomplices upon
"whose loyalty one can place absolute reliance."

Trotsky,

apparently, had "very little reason to trust them in an al-

liance as dangerous as an underground conspiracy."

In addi-

tion, the prolonged struggle of Rakovsky and Mural ov to avoid

capitulating undermined the hypothesis that Trotskyists returned to the Party "in pursuance of
duplicity" inaugurated by Trotsky.

a

deliberate policy of

If this theory were cor-

rect, why did not all of Trotsky's followers return forth-

with to the Party?

Based on testimony given by Victor Serge,

Anton Ciliga, and "Tarov," the authors of Not Guilty also
noted that "mutual distrust" between the Trotskyists and
raised
Zinovievites, even in exile and prison, which again

453

doubts about a "legitimate basis" for any new terrorist
bloc.
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Thus, the Dewey Commission had little faith in

Vyshinsky's elaborate theory about the "deceitful"

Trotskyism, who wormed their way back into the Party's bosom
under false pretenses.
Confessions

1

In contrast to the capitulations, Trotsky gave meager

attention during the Mexican hearings to the "voluntary" conTo some degree he shared the public's sense of be-

fessions.

wilderment in trying to explain the inexplicable:
the history of the revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary struggle alike knows of
no case in which dozens of seasoned conspirators over a period of years, committed unparalleled crimes, and, after their arrest,
despite the absence of evidence, confessed
without exception, betraying one another and
furiously blasting their absent "leader."
How do criminals who yesterday assassinated
leaders, shattered industry, prepared war
and the dismemberment of the country, today
so docilely sing the Prosecutor's tune?
.

.

.

,

Trotsky granted that the

"

epidemic character of the confes -

sions " was a fundamental feature of the Moscow trials, but
he was not prepared to offer a definitive judgment on their

raison d'etre

.

"In the nature of the case,

I

am not obliged

to answer these questions," he contended, since it was im-

possible to question Yezhov, Yagoda, Vyshinsky, Stalin, or
the victims themselves.

"That is why the Commission cannot

fully uncover the inquisitorial technique of the Moscow

trials."

But the mainsprings of the technique were apparent.

Oppositionists, nor
"The accused are not Trotskyites, nor

l

"
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fighters, but docile capitulators

,

"

in his opinion. 168

other words, the confessions were only

a

in

logical product of

the capitulations, obtained through prolonged exposure to

GPU "educational" methods.

Yet not all the accused had been "docile capitulators."

John Finerty, for one, was curious about N.

Muralov's motives in confessing.

I.

In response to Finerty

1

s

questions, Trotsky presented several possible explanations
for Muralov's confession in the second trial.

As Trotsky

noted, his former colleague spent eight months in prison before finally giving way.

But the interrogators showed him

"one confession after another," which undermined his resolve.

A promise of clemency was also involved, in Trotsky's opinion.

"Even a heroic personality such as Muralov asserts the

will not to be assassinated, not to be executed.

done what he promised to the end.

form he declared,

And then in

a

He had

very sober

'If you can save my life, good.'"

If only

he had the confessions in hand, Trotsky would show Finerty
"all the ties, the inquisitorial mechanics of the extortion

of confessions, because these mechanics are very individual."

The interrogators had time, they were "psychoanalysts."
the desire to live was paramount:

But

"When anybody has to

choose between death at one hundred per cent, and death at

ninety-nine per cent, when he is in the hands of the G.P.U.,
hundred
he will choose the ninety-nine per cent against the

per cent

.
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Trotsky also credited the arrest of family members
as an important factor in obtaining confessions.

Noting that

his son, Sergei, was under arrest in the Soviet Union,

Trotsky suggested the likely GPU technique for putting pressure on the entire family:
If we were in Russia, the mother would be arrested, I would be arrested.
They press her
with the thought.
"If you will save your son
you must confess your man /husband/ to be such
and such a criminal."
They address the
son and they say, "If you want to see your
mother free, you must confess that and that."
I believe it is very probable the son could
Then they come with the confession
confess.
of the mother to me and ask me, "What will
you do?"
.

Trotsky admitted that this was

.

.

a "very

one which occurred thousands of times.

difficult" situation,

Pyatakov's wife was

arrested eight months before her husband, he recalled.

In

his last words before the court, Pyatakov declared,

lost

all, my family and all.'"

"'I
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Trotsky testified, therefore, that the wall of confessions, arrest of relatives, and sheer instinct for sur-

vival explained in part the phenomenon, but he emphatically

rejected the hypothesis that Bolsheviks were conditioned to
surrender in this fashion.

The counsel for the Commission

was curious about Trotsky's reaction to this popular theory:
Is there anything in the Bolshevik
Finerty:
the old Bolshevik Party— discipline on the attitude of the members of the Bolshevik Party towards
the Party, that would psychologically expose them
to serve the Party at the expense of personal
honor, by confessing anything that was not the
truth?
,

Trotsky:
No.
The Bolshevik discipline
was very strong, very often severe.
But it was
a discipline of dignity, revolutionary dignity;
it was discipline based on discussions, inner
struggles, and then democratic decisions.

Such degrading confessions, continued Trotsky, could only

"demoralize" the Party, which depended on human beings, not
robots:

"The method of a revolutionary is a combination of

dignity and the spirit of concession and sacrifice.

It is

absolutely impossible to ask from him such degrade /sic/
actions as in the Moscow trials."

171

But in the case of Mural ov, Trotsky admitted, the desire to serve the Party may have been a contributing factor
in his final confession; the "psychosis of war" was used to

force submission to the Party.

Comrades like Muralov only

saw Soviet newspapers, and thus for years only read that

Trotsky was acting against the Soviet Union, that he was "in
alliance with Lord Beaverbrook and Winston Churchill."

reports shook their confidence.

These

Then came the argument:

"Stalin is the chief of the country. If we
fight against Germany and Japan, we will fight
under the leadership of Stalin. You are a
friend of Trotsky, but you can't invite him to
In the situation his activities are
come here.
prejudicial to the defense of the Soviet Union."
and
Muralov hesitated for eight months, but then broke down

satisfied his accusers in every way.

Trotsky could not be-

but it
lieve that Muralov actually believed the accusation,
the ruling caste
was possible that the exile's critigue of
the Soviet
"seemed to him prejudicial for the defense of
important to Muralov
Union." This motive was probably more

than the promise of clemency, suggested Trotsky.
was "in the full sense of the word
fact, he was a "pure man,

a

For Muralov

heroic personality."

In

an absolutely pure personality." 172

Following the lead of Trotsky, the authors of Not
Guilty declared that it was "impossible to pronounce upon
the motives which prompted the accused and witnesses to„con-

fess."

But to a greater degree than Trotsky, this report

stressed the element of "duress" in obtaining the confessions.

Depositions were introduced once again from Ciliga, Serge,
and "Tarov," giving first-hand evidence of the coercion used

to force incredible statements.

As a result of this testi-

mony, the Commission was convinced

that the extortion of confessions through torture, both mental and physical, is a common
practice of the Soviet police today. We find
that this testimony, taken in connection with
the fantastic discrepancies which we have
pointed out in the confessions of the accused
and witnesses in the two Moscow trials, and
the demonstrated falsity of the testimony implicating Leon Trotsky and Leon Sedov, justifies the presumption of duress in the obtaining
of these confessions 173
.

A close study of the trial records, in addition, indicated
that pressure was used to force the confessions of Smirnov
and others.

The accused resisted their captors for long

periods of time; only after "repeated interrogations and con-

frontations did they consent to make the confessions which
cost all but four of them their lives."
law,

as

Trials

,

defined by Professor
a

M.

S.

According to Soviet

Strogovich in Criminal

Textbook for Law Schools and Juridical Courses, and

Vyshinsky, this
edited by no less an authority than Andrei
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procedure for obtaining confessions was "in violation of the
immunity conceded to accused persons," and "itself constituted
duress," at least in the cases of Smirnov, Mural ov, and
174
Radek.
Thus, force was the key to obtaining confessions.
In all fairness to Trotsky, he did comment at length
on the mechanics of forcing admissions in a number of
-i

nc

articles written before and after the Coyoacan hearings.
But unlike the authors of Not Guilty

,

he tended to underplay

the element of "duress," even though he was one of the first

observers to style the entire process

a

"devilish conveyor,"

one which fed on its own victims in an endless progression.

The

"
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konveer " system has been subject to numerous and

extended analyses, but several of its most prominent facets
should be mentioned here.

In the "long" variant, one which

lasted from four months to two years, the accused was allowed
ample time to re-evaluate his entire career.

Such victims as

Nikolai Bukharin and "Rubashov" in Darkness at Noon eventually

became morally isolated and saw no recourse except to return
to the Party's bosom, even at the cost of self-annihilation.

This method, akin to Trotsky's emphasis on "moral torture,"

had the virtue of making subsequent recantations highly uni

likely.
a week,

But in the "short" variant, rarely lasting more than

relays of interrogators ceaselessly bombarded the

victim with questions.

Systematically deprived of nourish-

ment and sleep, until there was

a

"severe toxic effect" with

forced to
resultant hallucinations, the subject was often
feet swelled into
stand at tip-toe (stoika) until the

.

"shapeless lumps," or compelled to sit on a stool until the

groin was inflamed and extremely painful.

Few,

if any of the

victims successfully resisted this form of "duress," which
was the moLt common GPU technique for securing "voluntary"
177
confessions

And outright torture was also used, which Trotsky
178
had tended to doubt.

After August 1937 the GPU interroga-

tors were free to use physical pressure at will; Stalin had

authorized such methods, as there was no reason his secret
service should be "'more humanitarian'" than the bourgeois
secret services.

179

Kidneys were systematically beaten,

cigarette butts were snuffed out in human flesh, husbands
were tortured in front of their wives, or vice versa, and so
it went.

180

No less an authority than Nikita

S.

Khrushchev

contended that only physical pressure explained the confessions

:

—

_
Only in one way because of application of
victim/,
/the
him
physical methods of pressuring
tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking
In this manner were
away of his human dignity.
"confessions" acquired.
Kossior, Chubar, and many other prominent Party figures were
,
exposed to this kind of persuasion.
.

,
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Perhaps most important, Trotsky failed to perceive
apostates —perhaps a
the overwhelming need of the Party's

majority— to confess and be re-united with their brethren.
"'to stand at
At one time Trotsky had advised all members
182
and, in a sense, they were
Party,
the
before
tention'"

at-
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following his advice when they confessed.

Above all, there

was a need to purge a pervasive sense of guilt.

As one

victim of the system wrote, most Soviet citizens carried
with them "a consciousness of guilt, an inexplicable sense
of sin, a vague and indefinable feeling of having trans-

gressed, combined with an ineradicable expectation of in-

evitable punishment."

The interrogators used this sense of

guilt to obtain the necessary admissions.
instance, were reguested
for being arrested.

The accused, for

to suggest their own hypotheses

These guestions were designed "to pro-

duce the bricks for the subseguent guilt edifice." 183
This technigue was doubly effective with Party members.

Having devoted their lives to the "instrument" of
final rupture in the

history, they were unprepared for

a

twilight years of their service.

And they were exhausted,

as Arthur Koestler has observed:

"It was the past that was telling on them, the
years of conspiracy, prison and exile; the
years of the famine and the Civil War; and
sticking to the rules of a game that demanded
that at every moment a man's whole life should
They were indeed "dead men on
be at stake.
furlough," as Lenin has called them. Nothing
could frighten them any more, nothing surprises them. They had given all they had.
History had sgueezed them out to the last drop,
had burnt them out to the last spiritual
calorie; yet they were still glowing in cold
phosphorescent corpses." 184

devotion, like

Then these "phosphorescent corpses" were accused of heinous
crimes against the Party, endangered by enemies both within
and without.

render

a

Only by confessing the incredible could they

the
"last service" and strike a blow against
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opposition.

It was an intolerable choice, to keep silent

and die, to confess and die.

But many lacked the moral re-

solves to resist the Party's pressures.

To tell a "useful"

lie and be saved was preferable to dying outside the fold,
just as Dostoevsky once asserted he would choose Christ over

the truth, if it became necessary.

As a result,

a "peace

pact" was made with Stalin and his minions to avoid

party hell.

"I" gave way to the imperative "We."

a

non-

Not all

the accused, it must be stressed, surrendered to this logic;

Abel Yenukidze, for instance, preferred to die rather than

humili ate himsel f publicly

But others forsook their egos

.

and personal honor at the behest of the Party.
nado, prichyem sdes moral ?"

Partiya eto

The Party needs this, so why

'

bring ethics into it?

"

The contract was made.
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There were other aspects of the confessions that

Trotsky tended to downpl ay- -the mass character of the phenomenon, the use of Aesopian language in court, the degree of
186
Despite his acute
resistance in some of the testimony.

understanding of the capituation process, he was still
stunned when "hysterical flagellants" indulged in these
"ritual rites of the church."

only compare the mystery to

a

With Friedrich Adler, he could
"typical inquisitorial trial,

with every witch full-heartedly repenting of her evil relations with the Devil."

The supremely rational Trotsky, in

the last analysis, was simply unprepared to decipher the

work of the Devil.

187
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Why Stage The Trials ?

The motivation underlying the decision to stage

"show trials" remains somewhat murky to this day.

But in

1937 Trotsky analysed for the Dewey Commission the rationale

behind the Kremlin's judgment.

Stalin and the bureaucracy,

in his opinion, had no other choice.

"Show trials" were not entirely foreign to Trotsky's

experience.

In 1918 he advocated the production of a great

trial-demonstration with Tsar Nicholas II in the dock.

In

1922 he was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the

public trial of the Social-Revolutionary Central Committee.

And his faith in such spectaculars led him in 1931 to make "a
grievous error of judgment," in Deutscher's opinion.

For he

accepted at "face value" the fraudulent charges against the

Menshevik Union Bureau.

"It was a great error on my part,"

he later admitted, one that he deeply regretted.
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But the Moscow trials of 1936-38 were another matter

entirely.

Before the Dewey Commission he attempted to put

them in perspective.

Certainly these dramas reflected more

than just a personal struggle between Stalin and Trotsky:

Each of us is drawn into this drama as the
representative of definite ideas and principles.
In their turn, the ideas and principles do not
fall from the sky, but have profound social
That is why one must take, not the
roots.
psychological abstraction of Stalin as a "man,"
but his concrete, historical personality as
leader of the Soviet bureaucracy. One can
understand the acts of Stalin only by starting
from the conditions of existence of the new
privileged stratum, greedy for power, greedy
for material comforts, apprehensive for its

.
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positions, fearing the masses, and mortally
hating all opposition.
Stalin, in Trotsky's view, was just a creature of the bu-

reaucracy, which had raised on its shoulders "the man who
best, most resolutely and most ruthlessly expresses its in-

terests.

Thus, Stalin, who was once a revolutionist, became

the leader of the Thermidorian caste."
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But this "caste of upstarts," he continued, had in-

creasing difficulties:
was forced to lie,

to cover up its "social ulcers" it

"a vital political necessity."

Soon the

spiritual atmosphere of the Soviet Union was "completely im-

pregnated with the poison of conventionalities, lies and
direct frame-ups."

But when the falsifications were ex-

hausted, the bureaucracy turned to criminal accusations,

charged Trotsky:
To justify the repressions, it was necessary to
have framed accusations. To give weight to the
false accusations, it was necessary to reinforce
them with more brutal repressions. Thus the
logic of the struggle drove Stalin along the
road of gigantic judicial amalgams.

Stalin had become the victim of his own bureaucracy, this

Frankenstein, and attempted to satisfy his

with salt water, i.e., with
frame-ups

a

"

soif " or thirst

geometric progression of
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for
There was also an important international reason

International.
the purges and trials— to crush the Fourth

Comintern was so
According to Trotsky, the bankruptcy of the

obvious that it opened the way for

ment

:

a

new revolutionary move-

,
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Since 1933, the idea of new revolutionary
parties under the banner of the Fourth
International has met with great success in
the Old and New Worlds.
Only with difficulty can an outside observer appreciate
the real dimensions of this success
It
cannot be measured by membership statistics
alone
The general tendency of development
is of much greater importance
Deep internal fissures are spreading throughout all
the sections of the Comintern which at the
first historic shock will result in splits
and debacles.
If Stalin fears the little
Bulletin of the Opposition and punishes its
introduction into the U S S R. with death
it is not difficult to understand what
fright seizes the bureaucracy at the possibility that news of the self-sacrificing
work of the Fourth International in the service of the working class may penetrate into
the U.S.S.R. 191
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

In other words, the tiny Fourth International was

a

mortal

threat to the Soviet regime, one that must be crushed.
As Trotsky testified at the Coyoacan hearings, there
was a symbiotic relationship between the Comintern and the

Bureaucracy.

The moral authority of the Soviet leaders

rested in large part on the Comintern, this "Tower of Babel
of slanders and falsifications erected over a period of

thirteen years."

In turn, the moral authority of the

Comintern rested exclusively on the political and moral
strength of the Soviet bureaucracy:
This Tower of Babel, which frightens its own
builders, is maintained inside the U.S.S.R.
with the aid of more and more terrible repressions, and outside the U.S.S.R. with the aid
of a gigantic apparatus which, through resources drawn from the labor of the Soviet
workers and peasants, poisons world public
opinion with the virus of lies, falsifications
Millions of people throughout
and blackmail.
with
the world identify the October Revolution
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the Thermidorian bureaucracy, the Soviet Union
with Stalin's clique, the revolutionary workers
with the utterly demoralized Comintern apparatus .

The first "great breach in this Tower of Babel," argued

Trotsky, would produce a final collapse, and also "bury be-

neath its debris the authority of the Thermidorian chiefs."
As a result, it was for Stalin "a lif e-and-death question to
kill the Fourth International while it is still in embryo! 9?
1

Thus, the purges and trials were aimed at the

Trotskyites and at Trotsky personally, at "enemy number one"
(

vrag nomer pervyj

).
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To recapitulate Trotsky's argument,

the trials were long in preparation, as the bureaucracy in-

creasingly lost control of its policies.

Falsification fol-

lowed falsification, repression followed repression, until
more and more victims were included in the ever-expanding

circle of frame-ups.

economic excesses

— all

Caste privileges, immense inequalities,
of these called for scapegoats.

Hence

the various alleged conspiracies, for the GPU argued, "'If
the alliance does not exist, it is necessary to fabricate

it.'"

But from Stalin's "devil's kitchen" even "spicier
Still, there

dishes" were still to come, predicted Trotsky.
was no hope for the regime.

Trotsky was completely confident

that the trials had been "cruel" fiascoes.

"Saving tempo-

rarily Stalin's rule, the bloody purge has shaken asunder
the social and political props of Bonapartism.

bureaucracy, devouring itself, cried out in

a

"

The

frenzy for more

but this was
vigilance against its foes— the Trotskyites—
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"the cry of a beast mortally wounded."

To Trotsky, the con-

vulsions of the purge had great symptomatic importance:
was the regime's last crisis, its "death agony."

this

4

At the center of Trotsky's analysis was the re-

lationship of the bureaucracy and its "leader-victim,"
Joseph Stalin.

As in the case of the Kirov affair, however,

Trotsky had difficulty in isolating Stalin's role in the
Stalinism was but

purge.

he contended,

a "cipher"

in the realm of ideas,

and Stalin himself was known for his "congeni-

tal empirical narrowness."

Then

came his criminal role in

history:

"It is so criminal that revulsion is multiplied by

horror."

Originally Stalin sought support from "revolution-

ary elements," but an abyss had opened between these elements

and the privileged bureaucrats.

As a result,

close ties to Bolshevism were being purged.

all those with

Trotsky warned

that in the near future even Stalin would become

a

"burden

to the ruling stratum," for the more he dispensed with as-

sistance,

"the closer draws the hour when he himself

prove needed by nobody."

wilJ.

Quite possibly the counter-

revolutionary bureaucracy would make short work of Stalin,
probably charging him with "Trotskyism."
fell,

No matter how he

Stalin would depart from the scene laden with crimes--

as the
"not only as the grave-digger of the revolution but

most sinister figure in the history of mankind."
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the
Yet Trotsky also argued that Stalin was directing

"cleansing."

After he purged the upper echelons of the

the intermediate layer of
with
deal
must
he
then
bureaucracy,
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the "Postyshevs

,

"

and,

of course, there was the layer of "in-

different administrators, if not plain shysters and careerists," which Stalin understood better than anyone else.

"Therefore he feels that after stif ] ing the masses and ex-

terminating the Old Guard, the salvation of socialism lies in
him alone."

He must, in Trotsky's view, strive for the

"juridical confirmation of his personal power, whether in the

capacity of 'leader' for life, president with extraordinary
power, or finally, crowned emperor."

Opposition to these

"Caesarist plans" would arise, however.

Before Stalin fell

into the abyss, crowned or uncrowned, he would try "to ex-

terminate all the best elements of the state apparatus."

196

In short, the trials and purges were directed pri-

marily at the chief international threat to the ruling
stratum

— Trotsky.

But unresolved in his thought was whether

Stalin purged the bureaucracy and remnants of October to ensure his own survival, or whether the bureaucracy purged old

Bolsheviki as a threat to its privileged status,
that would lead to Stalin's own demise.

Stalin victim or master of the purge?

standing of the purge's raison

a

tendency

Was, therefore,

A fundamental under-

d'etre rested on the answer

to this guestion.

There are almost as many interpretations of the purge
as there are commentators on Soviet affairs.

remains:

Zachto ?

What for?

Why?

197

But the question

Some ingenious theories

of the purge
have been produced to explain the mystery

phenomenon.

To mention

a

few of the more fanciful theses,

^
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there is the "Book-of- Job" hypothesis:

the sufferings were

tests of faith, with the true believers finally being re-

united with the regime.

In the "Jews in the Wilderness"

theory, the Russians had forty years to wander in the wilderness;

once they had forgotten the fleshpots of Tsarist Russia

they could enter the Promised Land of Socialism.
there was the straightforward explanation of

a

And then

former presi-

dent of the International League of the Godless:

an increase

of sunspots had caused the purge.

But most serious explanations of the purge have re-

flected one of two basic approaches:

the "cleansing" was a

reaction to Stalin's personal and political needs or the objective requirements of the bureaucratic system.

One politi-

cal argument, popularized by Isaac Deutscher, theorized that

Stalin's aim was "to destroy the men who represented the

potentiality of alternative government, perhaps not of one
but of several alternative governments," especially since
The ac-

war with Hitler had become a distinct possibility.

cusations were shameless inventions, but based on

a

"grotesquely brutalized and distorting anticipation of possible developments."

1

"

George Kennan has also stressed that

Stalin was faced with either fighting the German leader or

coming to terms with him.

In either case he would be "ex-

posed to severe criticism among his comrades at home," hence
possibly
the need to liquidate physically anyone "who could
which
profit from the inevitable political embarrassment
200
And Robert Tucker
himself."
for
up
looming
saw
now
Stalin
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has suggested that Stalin was preparing to collaborate with

Hitler, not wage war against him; anti-fascist Bolsheviks
like Bukharin were purged as a class in order to soften the

impact of eventual detente

.

This complicated theory of "external-internal dialectics" had additional domestic ramifications.
"Party Struggle" or "Bonapartist

dictator required
populace which

,

a

11

In the

hypothesis, the insecure

disciplined organization and cowered

incidentally, would further his lust for per-

sonal aggrandizement and self-glorification.

Less flattering

was the contention that Stalin had a "Caesarian Persecution-

Mania," like Ivan the Terrible, which led to the elimination
of his closest advisors and supporters.

Tucker has written:

202

In this connection

"Not the needs of the Soviet system but

Stalin's own needs, both political and psychological, underlay the events of 1937-38 in Russia."

The trials, in particu-

lar, served "the psychological symbolic function of ration-

alizing Stalin's own mental world," argued Tucker, and were
"vehicles for the acting out of something similar to

a

para-

noid delusional system complete with central theme (the great
conspiracy) and malevolent pseudo-community ('Bloc of Rights
and Trotskyites

,
'

etc.)."
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None of the above theories are mutually exclusive,
and all probably contain a modicum of truth.

But a second

basic approach stressed the impact of objective social forces.
basis of
The theory of "Neo-Absolutism" contended that the
as it did
power in Soviet Russia resided in office-holding,

"
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in Ptolemaic Egypt.

Built into the system was

a

continuous

power struggle between the supreme ruling group and the mass
of office holders, with the inert masses sometimes siding

with the ruling clique.

In the "Social Supply" theory, a

corrective to "Neo-Absolutism

,

"

the political elite desired

to exterminate a mandarine class of hungry party activists

without destroying the basic social structure of the bureaucratic state.

The GPU was given the task of managing the

"social conveyor," banishing the new privileged class to the

lower depths, while raising to the top new bureaucrats. 204
A more sophisticated version of this theory was put forward

by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that the "permanent purge"
in a totalitarian system provided security for the leader-

ship through the unremitting elimination of both actual and

potential opposition.

This constant process weeded out

careerists, helped eliminate stagnation, and furthered social

mobility, while directing aggression away from the regime.
In essence, it was "a utilization of coercive techniques of

totalitarian government for the achievement of not only the
negative objectives (elimination, intimidation) but also the

positive objectives (efficiency, discipline, loyalty) of the

totalitarian regime."

This technique of totalitarian govern-

ment arose from inherent strains within the system, and was

channeled into achieving specific political and socio-economic
objectives:
the purge

.

"The original revolution is thus reincarnated in

,,205

,
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Merely to enumerate conflicting theories of the purge
is enough to underline the basic weakness of Trotsky's analysis.

In the first place, it was highly doubtful if the purge

was aimed directly at Trotsky.

At most, as he once admitted,

Stalin created the figure of an "arch-conspirator" in order
to strike his internal foes and stage a

war

,

"

206

"

preventive civil

More important, Trotsky wavered between attributing

the purge to objective social needs (the bureaucracy) and

personal desires (Stalin).

As a result, he seriously under-

estimated its strength and scope
"equilibrium of forces

— the

establishment of

new

a

the elimination of potential enemies

11

the revolution within the Party

,

the complete cowering of the

populace, and the immense strengthening of Stalin's personal

position

.

The purge and show trials were hardly

signs of weakness.

f iascoes

or

On the contrary, they were manifestations

of strength, the final triumph of a totalitarian dictator

over a docile Party and prostrated nation.
fied the end of Trotsky

1

s

And they signi-

hopes to wage a new political

revolution within the Soviet Union.

If

"

Judas— Trotsky

11

was

not the chief target of the entire process, he may have been
its major victim.

#

CHAPTER VI
FINALE!
In the closing moments of the Mexican hearings

Trotsky once again expressed his radiant faith in the future,
one which had been strengthened by the Commission's labors:

Esteemed Commissioners! The experience of
my life, in which there has been no lack either
of successes or of failures, has not only not
destroyed my faith in the clear, bright future
of mankind, but, on the contrary, has given it
This faith in reason,
an indestructible temper.
in truth in human solidarity which at the age
of eighteen I took with me into the workers
quarters of the provincial Russian town of
Nikolaiev this faith I have preserved fully
It has become more mature, but
and completely.
In the very fact of your
not less ardent
Commission s formation in the fact that at
its head, is a man of unshakable moral authority, a man who by virtue of his age should have
the right to remain outside of the skirmishes
in the political arena in this fact I see a
new and truly magnificent reinforcement of the
revolutionary optimism which constitutes the
fundamental element of my life.
,

,

1

—

.

1

—

,

—

Trotsky had "warm gratitude" for all the participants in the
proceedings, but he signaled out Dewey for special praise,

stressing his "profound respect to the educator, philosopher
and personification of genuine American idealism, the scholar

who heads the work of your Commission.

(Applause)"

1

This eloquent peroration concluded one of "the

greatest and most dramatic moments in the life of Leon
last he had
Trotsky," remarked James T. Farrell, for at long
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l

.

refuted the charges of Vyshinsky and Stalin.

2

Dewey realized

that this was Trotsky's moment to stand alone, and quickly

brought the hearings to
an anti-cl? max.

"

3
~

a close:

"Anything

I

can say will be

The American educator left almost immedi-

"moved deeply" by Trotsky's final remarks, and even

ately,

more moved by the presence of Mme

.

Trotsky-Sedova, "a faded,

tired-looking, brave woman," on whose face appeared to be

stamped the entire tragedy that had unfolded during the sessions

4

History had been made in Coyoacan, even though the
"academic atmosphere" of the hearings was more characteristic
of a Ph.D. examination than a trial before world public

opinion.

The chief participants parted with pride in their

mutual achievement, and new respect for each other's gifts.

Dewey still considered Trotsky

a

rather "tactless man," and

regretted that his "brilliant native intelligence /was/
locked up in absolutes," but admired the intellectual performance:

the Russian had said nothing "foolish" in eight

days of testimony.

Many years later Dewey recalled with ad-

miration '"the intellectual power with which Trotsky had assembled and organized the mass of his evidence and argumentation and conveyed to us the meaning of every relevant fact.'"
For his part, Trotsky sincerely admired Dewey's efforts.

Originally the Russian "defendant" had feared the elderly
issues
American philosopher might be too far removed from the

and even fall asleep during the hearings.

After reading

still tended to
several of Dewey's theoretical works he

7
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identify his pragmatism with crude British empiricism, but

Trotsky appreciated the moral stature of the American:
respect for and gratitude to Dewey were personal.

"His

He saw

Dewey's idealism as genuine." g
But not all was bucolic in the lush setting of the

Blue Villa.

Tempers had become frayed around the edges.

In

one of the last sessions, for instance, Albert Goldman had

come to "blows" with the stenographer-typist, who had briefly

ceased working in order to distribute
ment to the press.

a

mimeographed state-

Trotsky's secretary separated the two

combatants, but the tiff was front-page news in the Mexican
Q

press.

This was just a pale reflection, however, of

a

livelier dispute which marred the Commission's illusion
complete harmony.

much
of

At the beginning of the twelfth session

Carleton Beals dramatically resigned from the panel,

a

"bomb-

shell" which stunned the other commissioners and gave critics
an opportunity to slander the Commission's endeavor.

I

"A Pink Tea Party"

.

Carleton Beals had received

a last

minute invitation

of Ben
to join the sub-commission in Mexico at the suggestion

journalistic
Stolberg, who greatly admired Beals' honesty and
gifts.

to
As a result, the Commission wired an invitation

rather "broke" at
Beals in California, but the journalist was
enable
Therefore, the Commission raised "$250 to
the time.
City in their car," rehim and his wife to drive to Mexico
, ,
called Suzanne La Follette.
.

.

1°

2
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Although not

a

figure of international stature, Beals

brought certain assets to the Preliminary Commission.

A

native of Kansas and grandson of Carrie Nation, he had roamed
the world as a journalist for the North American Newspaper

Alliance and other enterprises, covering Mussolini's rise to
power, the Scottsboro trial, and even securing an exclusive
and much- acclaimed interview in 1928 with General Sandino,
the idealistic leader of the Nicaraguan insurgents.

Along

the way he had been the principal of an American High School
in Mexico City and become fluent in Spanish.

Beals also

found time to write scores of books on America and Latin-

America^ including at least two on the locale of the hearings,
11
Mexican Maze (1931) and Porfirio Diaz (1932).

Thus, Beals

was well-acquainted with Mexico and had many contacts in the

capital city.
But Beals was also a prickly character, almost ex-

cessively proud of not being in anyone's camp.

In the view

of the Daily Worker he had pursued "a career of facile politi-

cal adventurism, changing his colors with ease as the occa-

sion requires."
a

"

1

toughie

'

"

1

But in Louis Adamic's opinion, Beals had

personality,

"a kind of subdued, held-in

Hotspur, with hard words for sentiments, and an inclination
.'
for 'quick-conceiving discontents

"

He was also "intensely

self-conscious" about his independence and love of danger.
As Adamic asked in his diary:
Is he /Beals7 naturally independent, or is it an
effort to be so? His independence has a hasty,
assertive quality, though he tries to disguise
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it in matter-of-f actness
It can be reckless
and rash; one better not offend it! And it may
be quick to perceive or interpret offense where
none is intended, or where there is an omission
of recognition of it.
.1 doubt if he gets
along well with very many people at close
quarters for any length of time. He likes
(probably needs) to stand out in situations in
which he finds himself. It is possible that
he and Ben are such good friends because Beals
is so seldom in New York and they see one another briefly only two or three times a
.13
year.
.

.

.

.

.

This "friendship" was to be severely tested in Mexico City.

Neither Stolberg, Trotsky, nor the other commissioners appeared to understand that Beals needed special attention, if
he were not to take "offense" at the first opportunity.

Beals already had his own opinion of Soviet justice,
as he expressed to V.

F.

Calverton of Modern Monthly

of intellectual brokerage house for revolution."

described as

a

"a kind

,

Variously

"'colossus of left-wing literature,'"

a

'"Peter Pan of piquant paganism,'" and an "'ideological

racketeer,'" Calverton attempted to include in his personal
journal anything and everything "Modern," from sex to psycho-

Conceiving himself as

analysis to Marxian dialectics.

kind of "Lenin-Casanova- Pericles

,

"

a

he opened his pages to

both Stalinists and Trotskyites, but alienated the former
when he took

a

firm stand against the Moscow trials.

14

Soon

thereafter, as we shall see, Calverton was to throw Beals to
the wolves over his conduct in the Mexican hearings.

But in March 1937 Calverton invited the intrepid and

patented
belligerent journalist to participate in one of his
symposia,

"Is Trotsky Guilty?"

Beals wrote rather

6

facetiously

that the trials were in

style, but the show stopped at Act 1.

back.'"

the best Grand Guignol

11

and

I

want my money

As for the question of Trotsky's guilt,
"Once the wily serviter /sic^ of Kind /s±c/
Tutankamen, dressed up in a red kerchief on
his head, a dress suit with tails and no
pants, tried to smash other people's peanuts
with a sledgehammer, and merely hit his own
toe.
A loud shriek is not evidence."

In addition to these frivolous remarks, however, Beals also

expressed his opinion of the trials' effect on public sentiment toward the Soviet Union:

"Entirely unfavorable."

1

5

Thus, Beals was hardly a "Stalinist stooge," as later

charged, but once in Mexico he became "aloof," rarely visited
the Commission

1

s

headquarters

,

and "was constantly with

people who were known to be against the purposes of the

Commission," charged the Dewey panel in

a

later statement:

"We made every effort to secure his full cooperation.

viously, we failed."

Ob-

Beals, not surprisingly, saw the prob-

lem from a different perspective:

the other commissioners

allowed the writer and his wife "to shift for ourselves,"
and excluded them from "the inner activities of the group."

The stage was set for one of Beals'

contents

.

'

1

"'quick-conceiving dis-

11

Signs of "division" between Beals and the other mem-

bers of the sub-commission surfaced soon after the hearings

had commenced.

At the beginning of the third session Beals

interrupted the examination to make
ord.

a

statement for the rec-

He took issue, in particular, with Dewey's opening
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declaration, "since

I

was in no way consulted regarding the

formulation of or the contents of the statement which was
issued to the press as the official position of the
Commission."

He took pains to declare that he approved

giving Trotsky a fair hearing and was "honored and glad" to
be a member of the Commission:

But I wish it definitely on record that I engage
in the work of this Commission without any prior
I do not subscribe to the doctrines
commitments.
of Mr. Trotsky or to any of the groups that utilI am not motivated by animosity
ize his name.
toward any existing government involved or toward
any partisan groups that favor or oppose Mr.
I should not wish that the work of
Trotsky.
this Commission be improperly utilized by any
such groups against any person or government.

After Beals had made clear his independent stance, he corrected Dewey in the interest of actual accuracy on extraditing

Trotsky from Mexico to the Soviet Union (it was impossible,
since diplomatic relations were lacking), and urged that the

Preliminary Commission submit

a

before the full Commission met.

report of its findings, even
He concluded this personal

hint
protest with assurances that he had not "the slightest
the Commission."
of antagonism toward the other members of

constructive and in
On the contrary, his purpose was "purely
the other members of
full harmony with the statement made by
the Commission.

.,18

Dewey was taken back by this declaration.

Rather

for the error on extradition.
"responsibility"
took
he
tartly
particularly since Beals
He also welcomed the assistance,
in the preparation of
consulted
be
to
time
in
here
not
"was

.
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the statement" that was read at the opening session.

But

Beals had, as it turned out, been present when the final
draft was discussed, if not in the early part of the week

when the opening declaration was first discussed.

"I

am

sure that if we had had the benefit of Mr. Beals' counsel,

that address would have benefited," added Dewey.

There the

matter lay for the time being, but Beals had served notice
that his need to make "independent opinions" and "constructive suggestions" might upset the equanimity of the Commission.

19

During the ensuing hearings Beals was practically
the only member of the panel who questioned Trotsky's word
and asked embarrassing questions, both in his opinion and

that of the other commissioners.

Again and again Beals

rather testily demanded "proof" for some of Trotsky's allegations, even when the subject under discussion was

ter of common knowledge.

a

mat-

When Trotsky contended, for in-

stance, that Soviet pressure had led to his internment in

Norway, Beals quickly asked:
that pressure?"

"Will you present proof of

At another point Beals demanded "evidence"

(July 1933),
that the GPU might have followed Trotsky in France
a

question that bewildered the Russian refugee:
You know, this question makes me a bit perplexed.
Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner. You see, all the
trials are directed against me. The G.P.U.
It is the aim of
wants to give me a vital blow.
It signifies that before the
all the trials.
against
trials the G.P.U. must collect material
me
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Trotsky added that every functionary of the Comintern and
foreign politburos was "an agent of the G.P.U."

would not be put off:

your statement.

But Beals

was just asking for evidence of

"I

You made a statement, and

whether you could prove it."

I

was wondering

When Trotsky admitted this was

just his "conclusion," not a matter of certain knowledge,

his interrogator replied:

but

I

"I

have not the proof."

And so it went.

might have the same conclusion,

on

It was Beals who forced Trotsky to

admit that not all of his archives were in Mexico.

It was

also Beals who suggested that Trotsky had once written for
the Hearst press,
ary movement,

an unpardonable offense to the revolution-

and that Jan Frankel

,

one of the Old Man's

secretaries, might lie to aid his chief's case.

It was this

dogged journalist, in addition, who discovered that Trotsky
had only minimal contacts with the Soviet Union, which made
it practically impossible for the oppositionist leader to

encourage mass revolutionary action against the bureaucracy.
When Beals suggested that Trotsky might cede territory to
Nazi Germany in order to gain power,

"analogous" to Lenin's

action in 1918, he found himself "the cynosure of glowering
eyes."

In the gallery Rivera told his friends,

Carleton Beals.

He's a G.P.U. agent.'"

21

"'That is

It was Beals,

toward
finally, who questioned Trotsky closely on his policy
the Spanish Civil War.

Apparently he believed that the

Spanish "Trotskyites " were actually fifth-columnists

sabotaging the loyalist cause.

When Trotsky defended the

"
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tactic of waging a revolution within the revolution, even at
the price of unity, Beals was shaken:

"This would mean, by

the policy you follow, the probable victory of Franco, would
it not?"

Trotsky argued that it was the Comintern's narrow

program which would actually assure Franco's victory, but
Beals had put him on the defensive. 22

Trotsky later argued that Beals had tried to "support
the official Moscow version and to expose contradictions in

my answers," but the Russian was "grateful" for this approach;

After Trotsky answered each question,

he had all the "facts."

"this singular member of the Commission kept silent, com-

pletely disorientated."

23

The other commissioners, however,

were clearly uncomfortable with Beals' tactics, even though
his "hostile" questions were

rather gentle interrogation.

counterweight to Finerty's

a

According to the journalist,

at a sharp interrogatory of Trotsky, Ruehle
Sehr Schade
shuddered at my elbow, " Sehr Schade
How sad! How sad that I should speak in a per-

Once,

I

I

emptory tone to the master! Thereafter, every
time I asked a question, Ruehle would writhe in
his seat and emit a series of low groans, like
a man in pain.

While the other commissioners, like Stolberg, asked "a few
hundreds
erudite, very respectful interrogations," Beals had
but that
of additional questions to ask, sharp questions,
eyes of the
would merely have made him "a nuisance in the
of questioning,
commission, invariably hostile toward my line

which almost invariably they sought to interrupt."
is a hint of paranoia in Beals'

24

There

remark, but without a doubt

of the hearings, and
his queries were the most provocative
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often exposed chinks in Trotsky's armor.
Beals'

short and unhappy career as a member of the

Commission came to an abrupt end at the close of the eleventh
session.

VThen he

asked Trotsky at one point when the con-

troversy over socialism in one country first erupted, the
answer was 1924, a date Beals believed suspect.

In order to

elicit more information on the tactic of "world revolution,"
he then inquired whether Trotsky had even known Mikhail

Borodin, a Comintern agent who later gained a certain fame
by advising the Chinese Kuomintang in 1925-27.

No, Trotsky

did not know Borodin personally, but of course knew him by
reputation, and might have met him several times.

The

journalist, however, pursued this line further:
He /Borodin/ came secretly to Mexico
Beals:
toward the end of 1919 or toward the early part
of 1920.

Trotsky:

Yes?

He founded the first Communist Party
Beals:
He at that time made the statement
in Mexico.
that he was an emissary of yours.

Of mine? At that time I was in my
Trotsky:
I forgot all the world geography
military train.
except the geography of the front.
The reason I ask that is, that at
Beals:
that time he stated there was a controversy along
these lines in the Soviet Union.

May I ask the source of this senTrotsky:
no?
sational communication? It is published—
Beals:

It is not published.

the
I can only give the advice to
Trotsky:
is
Commissioner to say to his informant that he
a liar.

"
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Beals:

Thank you, Mr. Trotsky.

Borodin is the liar.
Trotsky:

Mr.

Yes, it is very possible. 25

At this point the line of questioning was shifted,

and soon

thereafter Dewey "lifted" the session, to Beals' consternation, for the Borodin question was left hanging. 26
It was all rather innocent, not to say trivial, but

the Borodin affair caused an uproar in the Commission, pro-

voked an angry outburst from Trotsky, and caused Beals'
resignation.
Beals'

John Finerty, in particular, was incensed with

provocative question.

Immediately after the public

session ended, apparently, Finerty informed the sub-commission
that questions "based on private information were highly improper, would be sufficient cause for mistrial in any ordi-

nary court, and that he could not continue as counsel if they
were to be permitted in future."

According to

a

later re-

port of the Commission, Beals then "angrily declared that

either he or Mr. Finerty must leave the sub-commission
Beals, rather naturally, had

meeting.

a

.

27

different view of the

A "junta" had taken him to task on his line of

questioning, but he suggested his "word" was as good as
Trotsky's, and promised to take the stand in his own defense;

years earlier, in fact, he had published the record of

Borodin's activities in Mexico.

The Commission, however,

had no intention of putting Trotsky in

a

"tight spot."

least he
Finally Beals stung Finerty with the remark that at

could not be accused of being Trotsky's own lawyer:

484

Beals," he raged, "henceforth our relations will be purely official, not personal.
''Mr.

"They shall not even be official," I answered.
"Either you cease to be lawyer of
this commission or I leave the commission."

At this point Miss La Follette "burst into tears," according
to Beals.

"This is a great historical occasion, Carleton;

don't mar it," she supposedly said:

"'Tell Mr. Finerty

you're sorry.'"

Instead, Beals guickly left the meeting.

"The commission,

alarmed, pattered after me.

I

was through."

That night (April 16) the Commission called

a

special

conference to discuss the uproar, one Beals supposedly pro-

mised to attend:

"But although we waited for him until mid-

night he did not come."

29

In the meantime Trotsky was pre-

paring his own counter-attack.

Fresh from the bitter

Norwegian experience, Trotsky feared that Beals' question
had been designed to compromise his standing with Mexican
public opinion, and thus make any further stay in Mexico impossible.

30

As a result, the morning session of April 17 be-

gan with Goldman reading a statement for Trotsky.

The chief

"witness" admitted that he had been completely taken back by
the question on Borodin, but wanted to reiterate certain

points:

"Mr.

Beals'

informant is a liar.

The falsehood

definite purpose— to compromise

which he had utilized has

a

my situation in Mexico."

Once again Trotsky denied having

to Mexico on
personal relations with Borodin or sending him
a

clandestine mission.

Furthermore, he requested that the

source of
Commission launch an investigation into the

.
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Beals'

honor."

information, which involved the journalist's "personal
Such an inquiry, claimed Trotsky, would discover

another plot,

"a new amalgam created with the purpose of pre-

venting me from unmasking the judicial crimes in Moscow."
If Beals were not directly and consciously involved in the

"new intrigue," he should provide all the necessary explana-

tions in order "to unmask the true source of the intrigue."

31

The Commission, in a private session, had already

"formally expressed itself as aware of the complete impro-

priety of Mr. Beals

question

,

"

replied Dewey, but a new

development made the requested investigation quite difficult.
He then read

a

letter from Beals addressed to the Chairman,

dated April 17:
Kindly accept my irrevocable resignation
This step is for the best
from the Commission.
interests of Mr. Trotsky, the Commission and
myself
The important purpose, among others, for
which I became a member of the Commission,
to give Mr. Trotsky the opportunity
namely:
which every accused person should have, to present his full case to the world, has been fulfilled to the extent possible with the present
arrangements. Unfortunately, I do not consider
the proceedings of the Commission a truly seriFor this and
ous investigation of the charges.
other reasons, my further participation in the
work of the Commission, now that the sessions
have been completed, would not prove fruitful.
immediately
In commenting on this letter of resignation, Dewey

took issue with several of Beals'

allegations:

the resigned

questions"
commissioner had received "full opportunity to ask
the hearings had
and it was an "obvious error" to state that

already been completed.

Furthermore, Dewey regretted that
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Beals had "prejudged" the case before the "preliminary"

hearings had ended or the full Commission had
study the evidence.

a

chance to

Besides, every member understood from

the beginning of the inquiry that he had the right to submit
"an independent or minority report to the full Commission." 32

This almost trivial but embarrassing affair might
have ended here, but once again Beals felt "offended" and

took his case to the Mexican press.

Convinced that Dewey had

"twisted" the meaning of his simple resignation statement,
he rushed into print an explication de text

.

33

"Why does he

/Dewey_/ distort the meaning of my resignation and ascribe to

me motives

I

do not have and have not stated?"

No,

Beals

had not "prejudged" the case; he was still in the "dark" on
the trials and the guilt or innocence of Trotsky.

The resig-

nation had merely been intended as "fair judgment on the

commission and

it's

intolerable methods."

To label the

panel's efforts as an investigation, he continued, was "to
sully a fair word."

The Commission's methods were just "a

schoolboy joke," and the hearings merely "a pink tea party
with every one but myself uttering sweet platitudes."

Beals

reiterated his criticism of the Commission's procedure and
scope,

and emphatically denied he had had full freedom of

questioning, no matter what Dewey contended.

In particular,

cross-examinathe offended journalist attacked the "banal"
with such
tion, conducted in "such kindergarten fashion and

commissioners as to
eager adoration for Mr. Trotsky by the
any intelligent
make the proceedings the laughing stock of

:
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person."

As a result, he could only resign, his "minority"

report
"How can I possibly pass on the guilt or
innocence of Trotsky if the very foundations
of the commission's work are eaten with the
termites of partiality? No fumbling over
documents later in New York can overcome the
commission's errors already committed here in
For me to bring in any other minority
Mexico.
report than that of my resignation would be to
commit a grave injustice to Mr. Trotsky.

Self-righteous to the end, Beals concluded that the Commission
could "pass its bad check on the public if it desires, but

I

will not lend my name to the possibility of further childishness similar to that already committed."

34

Once in the limelight, Beals found it difficult to

relinquish his new-found pre-eminence.

Critics of the

Commission, especially communist editors, were eager to reprint Beals'

remarks on the hearings; he was good copy and

his "purple prose" read well.

Despite protestations from

the "cynosure" of the controversy that he wanted to avoid a

"squabble," he returned to the attack in

a

long article for

to The
the Mexican press, which eventually found its way

Saturday Evening Post

.

Published under the title, "The

"hatchet job"
Fewer Outsiders The Better," this inspired
commissioners.
took to task Trotsky, Dewey, and the other
been
remarks in the Post article have already
(Many of Beals-

quoted in earlier sections of this paper.)

The essential

that only Beals
point of this clever effort, however, was
Trotsky; the other inhad asked penetrating questions of
allowed the hearings
vestigators had "fawned" over him and
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to be pervaded by an "air of hushed adoration for the roaster."

Suzanne, her head on her hand, gazes steadfastly, her eyes filled with expectant worship.
Benjamin Stolberg mustache, face, hair all one
ash-gray color nods, chuckles, snorts understanding^ at each of Trotsky's sallies. Mr.
Otto Ruehle, the former Reichstag member, who
knows no English, never lets his eyes stray
from the master's face.
Doctor Dewey stares
abstractedly, quizzically, once or ^twice asks
a very, very respectful question.
Everyone is
so deucedly rapt.

—

—

Beals could not, in good conscience, be

a

part of this

"chummy clubroom," and so resigned from the Commission.

"sadder and wiser man," he added a final remark:
on both their houses."

A

"a plague

35

Although Beals' resignation and subsequent tirades
were hardly "fatal" to the Commission's work, they could not
be left unanswered.

An interim report of the Preliminary

Commission reviewed the affair (most of the points already
mentioned), and disputed many of Beals'

allegations.

It

concluded:

Much as we regret the resignation of Mr.
The Commission
Beals, it does not disturb us.
is investigating a great historic controversy.
Powerful interests are engaged in attempting
to disrupt it and sabotage its work. 3 gore
efforts of this kind may be expected.

And Trotsky also took

a

turn at puncturing Beals' balloon.

place
According to the miffed Russian, Beals had taken "the

prevented at the
of individuals of greater authority who were
actually been
last moment from coming to Mexico," and had
explode it from
"pushed into the Commission only in order to

Stolberg was
the interior," a doubtful assertion since
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responsible for Beals' invitation.

Trotsky also claimed the

commissioner's questions were "deliberate provocations" and
Beals had been seen collaborating with Messrs. Lombardo

Toledano, Kluckhohn

and "other 'fiiends'

of the GPU." 37

Trotsky also wrote of the erstwhile investigator:
do not say that Mr. Beals, former correspondent of TASS, is now also a paid agent of
Moscow.
I can admit that he is a halfconscious instrument in the hands of the GPU.
But this changes nothing.
He applies the same
methods as the professional agents of the GPU.
For his part he adds only a certain amount of
disinterested confusion. 38
I

Once again Trotsky branded a political foe with the GPU
stigma,

a

"slander" rather beneath the great man.

Seven months later Trotsky got

a

small measure of

revenge, using the dubious method of "blacklisting," essentially.

Beals, in the meanwhile, had been subjected to a

personal attack in the pages of Modern Monthly by Ernest

Sutherland Bates, one that he found "a bit underhanded."
But worse was to come.

39

In October 1937 V. F. Calverton of

Modern Monthly wrote to "Dear Comrade Trotsky," soliciting
magazine.
an article for a forthcoming "war issue" in his
of
Trotsky replied on October 15, 1937, that the presence

Beals on Calverton'

s

editorial board precluded him from con-

Monthly aptributing to the issue, especially since Modern

pealed to Marxism and the revolution:

"I

consider it im-

for Mr. Beals
possible to carry any responsibility not only
tolerates him in
himself but also for the publication which

its ranks."

"syphilis"
Contending that Stalinism was the
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of the workers' movement, and any direct or indirect carriers
of the contamination should "be submitted to a pitiless

quarantine," Trotsky charged that Beals was only using the
magazine to preserve his mask of independence:
If the name of Mr. Beals remains on your
list only through over-sight (and I should be
glad to hear from you that this is the case)
then you can immediately correct this error.
In the opposite case I shall be forced to ask
you to publish this letter in your magazine
in explanation for my taking away my name from
the roll of your contributors 40
.

To underline the seriousness of the threat, Diego Rivera
also wrote Calverton that Beals'

attitude had been that of

"an absolutely dishonest agent of the Moscow hangmen."

Re-

moval from the editorial board, however, was not sufficient
in Rivera's opinion:

he must be

"

ejected " from Modern

Monthly with an accompanying statement publicly explaining
the action.

If this action were not taken, Rivera would re-

move his own name from the list of editors.

41

The unhappy Calverton was on the spot.

The prestige

of his personal hobby-horse would suffer if Rivera and

Trotsky dropped by the wayside.
friend.

Yet Beals was a personal

In this awkward situation Calverton decided to

temporize.

He wrote Trotsky in December that Modern Monthly

alleged
had "spared no effort in carefully analyzing the
Beals
proofs which have been available" on the charge that

acted for the GPU.

A careful study of all the relevant docu-

Beals is not, and
ments led to the conclusion that "Carleton
But, continued
was an agent of the G.P.U."
at no time,
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Calverton, the "nature" of Beals' conduct affected the magazine and seriously impaired his value as an associate of

Modern Monthly

.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings,

therefore, Beals had been "dropped from the Board."

But

Calverton hastened to add that this action should not be

interpreted as indicating "agreement with the view that he
acted as a G.P.U. agent."
as before, were open to all

And the pages of Modern Monthly

,

"honest radicals who wish to ad-

vance the revolutionary cause.

Accepting dictation from no

individual or faction, its editorial policy continues in-

dependent and non-partisan." 42
Despite brave words to the contrary, Calverton had

bowed to the pressures of Trotsky and Rivera.

And only after

the fact did he inform the journalist of his ouster from the

editorial board.

He wrote Beals that it was a "curious and

most difficult situation" he found himself in, but the en-

closed copy of the December letter to Trotsky was "sufficiently explanatory" of the problem.
out.

In short, Beals was

As Calverton told his old friend,
am sure that your motivation in the Trotsky
business was decent and honest and fairminded
(I should qualify that, however, Carleton, with
I

the remark that I think your Borodin question
but at the same
was unwise and unjustified)
time the editors of the Modern Monthly feel
that the implications drawn from your position
in the matter would lead, if you continued to
be an editor of the magazine, to a misinterpretation of the periodical.
,

Certainly Beals could appreciate the situation and understand
that his name should be removed from the masthead:

"I

am
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sure that you will have no quarrel with us in this connec-

tion."

Besides, continued Calverton, "you have done very

little work on the magazine for

a

long time anyway, so your

not being on the board would not make very much difference
to you."

Calverton concluded this letter of dismissal with

the hope that the political disagreement would not "alter

our friendship which

I

continue to cherish."

43

In fact, Beals took his dismissal in "good humor,"

and replied to Calverton that he was amused by the "wild and

hysterical battle" that had apparently swirled around his
head:

"Everybody seems to have stuck up a dummy called

Carleton Beals into which they have been plunging their
verbal bayonets.

I

wish them all success in such brave

storming of the revolutionary battlements."

He added that

Trotsky, the "wounded lion in Coyoacan," revealed all the

symptoms of

a

"disordered temperament."

44

For a while, anyway, Beals was the center of a storm
of controversy.

Trotskyite circles in New York "buzzed"
As for Ben

with the rumor that Beals had "'gone Stalinist.'"

Stolberg, he was "too pained" to say anything about his erstpuzzled'"
while friend, while Suzanne La Follette was "'simply

over the affair.

Louis Adamic mulled over the resignation

and attributed it at least partly to Beals'

independence,

offended.
which "the setup of the Commission had, somehow

motives, which beHe resigned amid a confusion of superficial
them."
came less convincing the more he explained

45

i

493

Yet Beals received some consolation, in addition to
the abuse.
ity.

Distinguished periodicals gave him free public-

In reporting the resignation, News- Week called Beals

an "authority on Latin America," while Time wrote he was an

"authority on Central America."

The Nation asserted that

the Commission's impression of bias was "reinforced" by the

resignation and accusations of Carleton Beals.
journal, The New Republic

,

Her sister

declared that the resignation of

this "well known American writer" had somewhat "impaired"
the usefulness of the investigation.

And Bertram

D.

Wolfe

wrote also in New Republic that the Preliminary Commission's

work would have carried more weight if it had followed Beals'
line of "thinking up searching and embarrassing (if sometimes
In the opinion of

indelicate, or irrelevant) questions."

Selden Rodman of Common Sense

,

however, Beals had asked "un-

fair questions and precipitated his own resignation, thereby

striking (whether deliberately or not)

a

serious blow at the

Commission's impartiality, but not proving himself thereby
'

Stalinist.

1

"

a
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There was little glory in this "minor" episode for
any of the participants.

Undoubtedly Beals had been treated

question on
in a shabby fashion by the Commission, yet his

Borodin was "indelicate" in the extreme.

Then Dewey offended

provocative
Beals anew, which resulted in intemperate and
press under
articles appearing in the Mexican and American
Beals-

imprimatur.

And Trotsky jumped to the unjustified

was serving
conclusion that Beals, at least "objectively,"

"
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the GPU; he then used pressure tactics to sever the American

journalist from the editorial board of Modern Monthly

Calverton's lukewarm agreement.

,

with

Much of the blame for the

clash must be laid to simple "personality" differences,
which could have been mitigated, if not totally avoided.
But the Commission's reputation for impartiality was tar-

nished,

and Beals'

own reputation suffered.

Dewey and his

panel had seriously misjudged the situation.

The only winner,

in fact, was the American Communist Party, which repeated
ad nauseam Beals' uncharitable comments about the "pink tea
x.

party.
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II.

First Reviews of the Mexican Hearings

The "counter-trial" in Coyoacan had barely come to

a

close before the Commission received its first notices.

Trotsky, rather predictably, found much to praise in the
hearings.

The communist press, also rather predictably, had

nothing positive to say on the proceedings.

And the

"bourgeois" and liberal journals were successfully able to

restrain their enthusiasm for the just-completed inquiry.
All in all, the notices could have been better.

Trotsky's Appraisal of the Preliminary Com mission
to
The "wounded lion" of Coyoacan had good reason

praise the efforts of Dewey & Co.

The mere fact that the

hearings had been held in the first place was

a

major triumph,

of an
For years he had been demanding the creation
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international commission of inquiry, without success.
day

I

"The

received the telegram about the creation of your sub-

commission was

a

panel in Mexico.

great holiday in my life," he informed the

Trotsky was confident that with the help

of the Commission's efforts, the conscience of the world

would score "one of its most splendid victories." 48
With the completion of the initial investigation, he

could appraise its labors and his own performance.

Of course

the "raucous barkings" of Soviet sympathizers would continue,

but this should not affect anyone, in line with the old
proverb:

"'The friends bark, the caravan goes on its way.'"

The allegation that this was

a

"biased" commission, in par-

ticular, should be ignored, for it included many distinguished

members and was led by Dewey, "one of the veterans of American
liberalism," declared Trotsky, normally
any hue.

a foe of

liberals of

"Contrary to absurd Comintern press statements, not

one of the members of the commission was or is among my

political friends."

Their only partiality, he added with

some satisfaction, was in not believing "the word of Yagoda,

Vyshinsky, nor of Stalin himself.
ask for them.

They want proofs, they

And it is no fault of theirs if Stalin refuses

to give what he does not have."

49

surprised
Even the pedantic Trotsky was somewhat
"extraordinarily
that the Preliminary Commission took such
transcript amounting
broad views of its work," with the final

to some 250,000 words.

"Whoever wants to learn the truth, or

at least to come near to it,

should begin by comparing the

:
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two stenographic reports, the one from Moscow, the other

from Coyoacan," he advised curious students of the trials.

Not all subjects were adequately examined, however.

The ses-

sions devoted to his political biography and relations with

Lenin might have been "more thoroughly" covered, in his
"It is possible that this first part of the in-

opinion:

vestigation would then have given
cal picture.

But all

I

a

more rounded-out politi-

could do was refer to my different

works and ask that they be added to the file."

And when the

political charges were under investigation, he could use
only "a twentieth part" of his material:

"The main diffi-

culty was in selecting promptly the most striking documents,
the briefest texts, and the simplest arguments."

And Trotsky

regretted that the majority of the members tended to believe
that the Stalinist bureaucracy was "the inevitable product of

revolutionary dictatorship," which Trotsky would not admit,
naturally
The profound difference between the formal
democratic way of thinking and the dialectic,
when faced with historical problems, will
forcibly emerge from these passages of the
Coyoacan investigation, showing how far from
"Trotskyism" is the majority of the members
of the Commission. 50
that
But the chief "witness" was supremely confident

charges (alleged
on the "three decisive points" of the Moscow

interviews with Messrs. Holtzman, Romm

,

Pyatakov), the details

that the falsifiers
of his "life were clarified in such detail
This was the "highest
pin."
a
insert
to
where
find
could not
had
In the little blue house judgment
point" of the inquiry.

1

:

already been reached, predicted Trotsky; the rest was only a

matter of time and printing the record.
would continue:

"I

The investigation

can ask for nothing more.

The New York

International Commission will resume its work.

The verdict

5
it will formulate will enter into history."

Communist Criticism of the Commission

Whitewash

I

This was the considered opinion of

Trotsky's well-wishers within the communist orbit.
Russia Today called the hearings

Soviet

"farce" and New Masses

a

echoed the charge, recalling Marx's dictum that history re-

peated itself, first "'as

a

tragedy and then as

And Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, in

a

a

farce.'"
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speech before the

National Press club in Washington, ridiculed the inquiry, begun with such fanfare:

been

a

"But this unfortunate commission has

flop; the mountain has given birth to a mouse.

spite of the fanfaronade this result was expected."
"biased" commission could hope to investigate
the Soviet Union by holding

a

and listening to only one man

The Daily Worker

,

a

In

Only

a

conspiracy in

few days of hearings in Mexico

— mTrotsky. 53
.

1

naturally, spared few adjectives

which was on the
in condemning the "whitewashing expedition"

rocks
investigaIt is hard to make out now who is
place
ting whom in the "bed-room trial" taking
Trotsky
in the boudoir of Diego Rivera; whether
whether he
is still "investigating" himself, or
from his
is trying to distract public attention
mounfailure to wipe away one scintilla of the
the
tains of evidence against him by_ turning
associate,
searchlight on his earstwhile /sic/
Carleton Beals.

"
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Soviet courts had "finally and irrefutably exposed" Trotsky's

plotting with German Fascism and Japanese militarism:

"The

rump jaunt to Mexico City could, therefore, only have been
crude whitewash or
both."

a

consummate farce.

a

It turned out to be

It was an "occasion for Homeric laughter," jeered

the Daily Worker

that Trotsky had first helped condemn him-

,

self with this "'investigation,'" and then turned "savagely"
on his former protector and "paranoically " demanded Beals'

investigation as

a

"'plotter.'"

With Beals'

"walk," the only

"'investigators'" left were those who had distinguished themselves by attacking the Soviet Union, or those who, if they

continued with "the whitewashing farce," would end by condemning themselves in the opinion of all honest friends of
the Soviet Union and world peace."
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To show its lack of prejudice, the Daily Worker also

reprinted an amusing piece from the Providence Evening
Bulletin

,

which portrayed Trotsky as the prosecutor, chief

witness, defendant, and counsel in the hearings, all but the
judge,

"an oversight."

Ladies
for the prosecution:
and gentlemen, I shall bring before you a perfectly innocent man, a patriot with a heart as
big as all outdoors, a lover of animals and
little children, a deep thinker arid a beautiful
soul which I shall lay bear /sic/ in all its
innoc.
"Mr. Trotzky,

I object!
"Mr. Trotzky for the defense:
The prosecution is taking the words
I object!
(Objection overruled.)
right out of my mouth.

Thank you

.

declared:
When the "witness" finally took the stand he
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"Mr. Trotzky himself:

Deus ex machinal
where shall I begin.
Rooshia I love. The
Rooshians are as dear to me as my heart's
valves.
Stalin I love, though I bleed for
I have said so in many, many letters
him.
to Izvestia, our beloved house organ. "55

And so it went.

The Coyoacan investigation was a fit subject

for burlesque, not sober attention.

"Bourgeois" and Liberal Reaction

Neither News-Week nor Time was willing to concede
that the Preliminary Commission had made a concerted effort
to uncover the truth about the Moscow trials and Trotsky's

guilt or innocence.

According to News-Week

in a "sunny-

,

blue" Mexican villa the "septuagenarian" Dewey had presided

over "the most harmonious Trial by Jury since Gilbert and
Sullivan."

Trotsky had been allowed to thunder "sublime

denunciations" during the "august proceedings."

In fact,

"no one contradicted him; there was no prosecution."

The

jury had returned to New York to deliberate but spies were

predicting

a

verdict of:
and you are right
I am right
And all is right as right can be
,

,

.

^

"kindly, grizzled"
Time magazine also stressed the age of
in the
Professor Dewey and the lack of serious content
Commission had
"elaborate mock trial" in Mexico City. The
for eight years
proved "nothing at all," except that Trotsky,
revolutionist," had become
impotent
virtually
and
disowned
"a

extremist in the world.
"the most important revolutionary

„57
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Journals such as Common Sense found some merit in the
proceedings, 58 but not The Nation

,

which continued its nega-

tive coverage of the defense effort.

According to an edito-

rial in Freda Kirchwey's periodical,

"we have gained the in-

escapable impression that the whole performance so far has

been

a

waste of time, effort, and money."

A final judgment

could not be pronounced until the full Commission produced
its verdict, but the "whole procedure seems to us doomed to

futility for the same reasons that the preliminary hearings
in Coyoacan were futile."

In support of these "reasons" the

editorial cited the appearance of bias in the commissioners,
the resignation of Beals, and the lack of original documents.

Apparently the investigation did produce evidence that
Trotsky had not been visited by Pyatakov or Romm, certainly
"crucial points" in the case, but not "sufficient" to estab-

lish his innocence:
But they /the crucial points/ cannot be proved
because the evidence cannot be subject to the
scrutiny and attack that would be provided in
That, in fact, is
any ordinary court of law.
the fatal flaw in the whole effort to solve
this burning question through the amateur efforts of an unofficial commission, however wellEven after the final verdict has been
meaning.
rendered we shall still not know whether Trotsky
Skeptics who from the
is innocent or guilty.
first have refused to accept without reservation
testimony presented in ex parte proceedings will
continue in their present state of uncomfortable
59
agnosticism. J:7
a.

•

squabbles on
In line with its policy not to stir up partisan
the
the left, The New Republic refrained from covering

Mexican hearings.

But the issue could not be avoided,

s
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altogether.

Haven?

Then why not banish the whole affair to New

The editors of The New Republic requested the expert

opinion of Professor Fred Rodell (Yale Law School) on the
trial records and Trotsky's published testimony.

The learned

jurist replied:

"After reading all the material, I feel that
I know just as little about what really happened
as before I started.
I might just as well have
read "Alice in Wonderland" and then tried to
write up the trials.
Briefly, the reports were
not convincing to me, in either direction. There
was nothing sufficiently tangible for me to feel
this is true, or this isn't true. Nothing but
words and words and talk and talk; ... So far
as I'm concerned the whole thing might still
have been a frame-up or every word might have
been gospel truth.
"The Trotsky side's material does bring out
the helter-skelterness the occasional contradictions, the absence of convincing proof which
But the
I felt when reading the reports.
Trotsky stuff is not affirmatively convincing
It is purely defensive, critical, ineither.
tent only on showing the absence of a cold case
The two cancel each other
on the other side.
out and leave, to my skeptical mind, exactly
nothing.
,

Rodell added that he was "'completely neutral, or agnostic'"
on the issues raised.

Until more proof was available, any

judgments would just be "'wishful preconceptions.'"

60

This "know-nothing" attitude, of course, reinforced
The New Republic'

own feelings on the trials.

American liberals take part in

a

"Why should

violent quarrel based on

insufficient evidence," asked the editors, "particularly in

view of the fact that unity is necessary on the tasks facing
us in the United States?"

Judgment need not be suspended

forever; the facts would come out some time.

"But in the

—
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meantime it is more courageous to admit that

a

conclusion is

impossible than to attempt to reach one." 61
"Agnosticism," therefore, still reigned supreme in
the editorial hearts of The Nation
III.

-and

The New Republic 62
.

Interregnum

Amid the faint praise and caustic attacks, the
Commission pursued its business, preparing for the day when
a final

"verdict" would be issued in the case.

May and December

— something

But between

of an anti-climactic period

various problems had to be overcome.

In the first place,

momentum must be maintained, primarily by keeping the
Commission's labors before the public eye.

There was also

the prosaic task of soliciting funds to underwrite the con-

tinuing investigation:

affidavits were being collected and

checked, other hearings were being held.

And it was neces-

sary to dampen the open rift between the Trotskyites and

Socialists, on the one hand, and Trotsky and Wendelin Thomas
Commison the other, which threatened the equanimity of the
sion.

The inquiry's difficulties, therefore, were far from

over.

Mecca Meeting
and the one
The incomplete press reports from Mexico

threatened the
sided appraisals in American periodicals
was necessary
Commission's public support. As a result, it

Mexico and answer its
to explain the Commission's work in
ruled supreme. Another
cynicism
and
apathy
before
critics,

503

"great" meeting, therefore, was called for May
be held in New York's Mecca Temple.

The public was urged to

attend (and make donations) in order to learn:

Happened at the Trotsky Hearings in Mexico?"
Once again

a

1937, to

9,

(->

"What

3

large crowd, some 3,500 people, packed

the Mecca Temple to hear Finerty, Stolberg, La Follette, and

Dewey discourse on the sojourn in Mexico.

An interim report

was presented to the meeting, as already mentioned.

refuting Beals'

Besides

accusations point by point, this report dis-

cussed the function and scope of the Mexican hearings, along
with some of the documentary evidence already gathered.
Dewey & Co. also commented on Trotsky's demeanor as
ness

a

wit-

:

It is an established rule even in legally constituted courts that the bearing of the witness
may be taken into account in weighing the value
Throughout the hearings he
of_ his testimony.
/Trotsky/ seemed eager to cooperate with the
Commission in its efforts to ascertain the
truth about all the phases of his life and his
political and literary activity. He answered
readily and with every appearance of helpfulness and candor all questions put to him by the
counsel for the sub-commission and by its mem-

bers

.

only
The interim report stressed that the Mexican inquiry had

been an exploratory operation.

It should continue, however.

"Mr. Trotsky
In the opinion of the Preliminary Commission,

has established

tion."

a

case amply warranting further investiga-

of this
Therefore, it was recommended that "the work

Commission proceed to its conclusion,"

under the circumstances.

64

hardly

a

bombshell
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But the highlight of the meeting was Dewey's speech,

"'Truth is on the March.'"

To the assembled multitude Dewey

promised that the various trial records, affidavits, and
transcripts would be "even more minutely" examined than previously.

Only then could

he also declared:

final judgment be rendered.

a

Yet

"The only three matters of fact upon which

there was a show of independent objective evidence have been

subjected to grave doubt,"
final verdict.

a

clear hint of the Commission's

In addition, Trotsky's public record stood

in "striking contrast" to the Moscow charges, and the offi-

cial trial records showed "the absence of cross-examination

upon every vital point as well as many gaps, inconsistencies
and contradictions."

added Dewey.

But the public could judge for itself,

Not only would the findings be published, but

the verbatim transcript of the Mexican hearings and the docu-

mentation in the case would also be issued.

"All fairminded

persons will be in a position to judge for themselves.

..65

Dewey also took the opportunity to lecture his lisas
teners on the liberal faith and castigate his critics,
addition, howalready mentioned in an earlier chapter. In

on the assertion
ever, Dewey chided Ambassador Troyanovsky
It was only natural
that the investigation was a "'flop!'"
"It
the issues:
becloud
to
wanted
official
Soviet
the
that
But Dewey was surseems to be part of his official job."
eyes to be blinded by
prised that liberals permitted "their

emitted," for Troyanovsky
the smokescreens so deliberately
"incautious
the American public to be

had virtually invited
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and credulous"
fair.

— i.e.,

to accept Moscow's version of the af-

For the Commission's part, it was going to be extremely

"'cautious and skeptical'" in weighing the evidence, and accept nothing on faith.

There was only one aim:

"discovery

of the truth as far as that is humanly possible."

To repeat,

"•Truth is on the march and nothing will stop it.'"

66

Money and Other Matters
In the meanwhile, George Novack and the Trotsky

Defense Committee made every effort to secure the necessary
funds to support the Commission's work.
were distributed

— in

"News Bulletins"

exchange for fifty cents.

As Novack

wrote in one appeal of many to the Committee's "friends,"
"This tremendous task requires finances.
They are giving
Not for the Commissioners.
their time and energy at great sacrifice. But
they require court stenographers, technical
assistance, translators, materials, expense of
hearing rooms, etc. etc. If they can sacrifice
so much to carry out this grave responsibility,
the rest of us owe them the little material assistance they require. They are giving far
more than you are being asked to give."

'"Truth is on
After all, as Novack stated in another letter,
should not be permitted
the march,'" and mere money problems
Donations arrived at the Committee's
to impede its progress.
,m
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mounted.
New York headquarters, but debts also
the activities of two
A pressing need was to finance
and perhaps spurious
other sub-commissions. Of the sundry,
the French Comiti pour
lands,
foreign
in
committees
defense
It
was the most active.
1 Enqueue sur le Proces de Moscou
held eleven hearings
and
Ragotoire
Commission
established a
.
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in Paris between May 12 and June 22, 1937.

Paris sub-commission was

brother and

a

G.

E.

Chairman of the

Modigliani, the artist's

member of the Executive Committee of the Labor

and Socialist International.

expected, were

a

mixed lot.

The other members,

as

could be

They included Mme. Cesar Chabrun

(Chairman of the Committee for Aid to Political Prisoners),

Maurice Delepine (member of the Permanent Administrative

Committee for the French Socialist Party), Jean GaltierBoissiere (editor of Crapouiliot

)

,

Jacques Madaule (a

Catholic writer and professor), and Jean Mathe (former secreThis group

tary of the French National Union of Postmen).

heard testimony from Victor Serge, Eugene Bauer, Franz and

Alexandra Pfemfert, and most important, from Leon Sedov.
Much of Sedov'

s

testimony, in particular, was later included

in the Commission's final report.
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In addition, a New York sub-commission held five

hearings on July 26-27, 1937, in order to corroborate some
of the information gathered in Mexico.

Stolberg, La Follette,

Alfred Rosmer, Carlo Tresca, and Wendelin Thomas constituted
this panel, assisted by the lawyers, Finerty and Goldman.

variety of witnesses were heard, including

B.

J.

A

and Esther

Solow,
Field, A. J. Muste, Sara Weber, Max Shachtman, Herbert

Robinson.
Max Sterling, Davis Herron, Harold Isaacs, and Viola
but the
Few if any major details were added to the case,
he could
testimony tended to support Trotsky's claims that
as Moscow claimed.
not possibly have met Pyatakov and Romm,
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Meanwhile, Miss La Follette labored to arrange the

mounting evidence into

a

logical sequence.

Letters went back

and forth between New York and Mexico City, with requests for

additional material and the verification of certain aspects
of the developing case.

Lacking secretarial help, the

Commission's factotum was forced to memorize the Moscow trial
records (not indexed) and compare them with the evidence sub-

mitted to the inquiry.
a

The product of her arduous work was

veritable mountain of folders containing affidavits, de-

positions, and extracts from the testimony.

pared
Romm,

She also pre-

precis of the evidence in the cases of Holtzman,
and Pyatakov, which were models of lucidity and

coherence.

Then in September the full Commission held ple-

nary sessions in New York, and discussed the evidence pre-

sented by Miss La Follette.

At the session of September 21,

the members signed a statement of their general findings, and

commissioned La Follette, Dewey, and Stolberg to write the
final report.

70

One suspects, in any event, that only these

commissioners fully graspe

the complicated case.

Most of

the other members were "decoration," to some extent.

In ef-

opinions
fect, the findings of the Dewey Commission were the
of Dewey, La Follette,

and Stolberg, the "real" commission

of inquiry.

More Purges and More Dissension
commisThe work of Miss La Follette and the other

sioners was

from
given added urgency with the stunning news
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Moscow in June that the leadership of the Red Army had been
liquidated.

Marshall Tukhachevsky and most of the Army's

general staff had been accused of treason and then swiftly

executed. 71

A definitive analysis of the trials and purges

was even more imperative than before, especially since the

liberal magazines were showing new signs of confusion over
the incredible events in Moscow.

The New Republ ic

for instance, had begun to have

,

serious doubts about the state of Soviet "morale" and the

loyalty of Soviet officials:

".

.

.if

high officers in the

army cannot be depended upon for loyalty, it is hard to know

where loyalty could be found."

brief for the Trotskyites

1

The magazine still held no

effort "to make an issue of these

trials for political purposes," and doubted that Trotsky

would be "any less inflexible and ruthless than Stalin— In
he would
fact, there is a good deal of reason to suppose that

be more so."

But a nation "shot through with espionage and

be
suspicion" was one in which "real progress" could hardly

expected.

All these plots and counter-plots were bound to

better for
have "a chilling influence" on those who wished
the Soviet Union:
to
The blow that these incidents have delivered the
the prestige of the Soviet Union throughout
world is at present beyond measure. Communists
reason;
should not deceive themselves as to the
faintit is not just wicked Trotskyites or
events
hearted liberals who are responsible. The carry
themselves are of historic significance and
their own implications.

dismay" over the execuAnd The Nation also expressed "deep
that its international
predicted
and
generals
the
of
tions
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effect would be "unfavorable."

In the editors'

opinion, the

"mystery that still obscures the earlier trials undoubtedly
accounts for the suspicions that surround the present one." 7 1

Both magazines, obviously, were in need of informed guidance.

Rather naturally, the communist press thundered that
the Red Army purge was just another great chapter in Soviet

history:

the state,

as

a result,

was stronger, not weaker.

74

Trotsky, on the contrary, felt that the Red Army had been

dealt "a fearful blow," with the interests of Soviet defense

sacrificed "to the interests of self-preservation of the
ruling clique."

But theoretically, at least, he was ready to

admit the existence of a potential plot.

In a long analysis

of the army's "decapitation," he denounced the accusation that

the generals were German agents as "so stupid and so shame-

less that it does not merit refutation."

Yet the General

Staff might have tried to free itself from the Politburo's
yoke, fearing involvement in the purge:

outright conspiracy is still

ditions of

a

long way.

"From this to an
But under the con-

totalitarian regime it is already the first step."

a

suggested
Admitting much "guesswork" in his analysis, Trotsky

that Stalin feared the army:

Bonapartism always has the tendency to assume
Regardthe form of naked rule by the sword.
less of the real or alleged ambitions of
been
Tukhachevsky, the officer corps must have
increasingly steeped in consciousness of its
superiority over the dictators in waistcoats.
The danger was too apparent. As yet
certain.
there was not a conspiracy— that is
The bloodletting
But it was on the agenda.
Stalin made use
had a preventive character.
.

.

.
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of a "happy" incident to teach the officer
corps a bloody lesson.

Certainly the situation was becoming more desperate.

This

was the "beginning of the end of the Stalinist dictatorship,"
in his hopeful opinion.

75

Also in the summer of 1937 Trotsky was forced to
analyze another Soviet cause celebre

— Kronstadt.

Some of his

associates and followers, both in America and Europe, were

beginning

a

painful re-interpretation of Bolshevism,

searching for the "fatal flaw" or "original sin" in Leninism
that had led to Stalinism.

Several of them, including

Eastman, Serge, Boris Souvarineand Anton Ciliga, located the

genesis of the political malady in the suppression of the

Kronstadt uprising of 1921.

Trotsky, of course, had been

War Commissar at the time, and took responsibility for the

bloody extinction of the sailors' revolt.

76

This rather hoary controversy would have had little
that
bearing on the Dewey Commission's investigation, except

Stalinism
several of its members already tended to identify
and Trotskyism as "Siamese twins."

Wendelin Thomas,

a

In addition, however,

member of the Commission and ex-Communist

sent some
deputy in the Reichstag, on his own initiative
with the inquestions to Trotsky, ostensibly in connection
similarity bevestigation. Arguing that there was a basic
as proof Lenin's attween Bolshevism and Stalinism, he cited
independent Makhno
titude toward the Mensheviks, toward the
Kronstadt insurgents.
bands in the Ukraine, and toward the

.

.
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This demarche

"precipitated an acrimonious controversy," and

threatened the friendly ties between Trotsky and the
Commission

77

Trocsky tended to doubt that Thomas' questions had

a

"direct relationship" to the New York investigation, but was

willing to defend once again the Party's suppression of the
1921 insurrection.

Unlike his critics, he saw nothing ideal-

istic or romantic in the sailors'

The "best, most

revolt.

sacrificing sailors," those who had played
the October revolution, were long gone.

a

heroic part in

What remained, in

Trotsky's opinion, was "the gray mass with big pretensions
('We are from Kronstadt'), but without political education

and unprepared for revolutionary sacrifice."

In fact, the

uprising was dictated by the simple desire to obtain privileged food rations during

a

period of acute scarcity.

Almost

immediately, he claimed, reactionary elements within Russia
and white emigres abroad took up the cause of the insurrection:

The victory of this uprising could bring nothing
but a victory of counter-revolution, entirely
independent of the ideas that sailors had in
But the ideas themselves were
their heads.
deeply reactionary. They reflected the
hostility of the backward peasantry to the
worker the conceit of the soldier or sailor
the
in relation to the "civilian" Petersburg,
hatred of the petty bourgeois for revolutionary
The movement therefore had a
discipline.
counter-revolutionary character and since the
insurgents took possession of the arms in the
forts they could only be crushed with the aid
of arms

I

Trotsky also wrote Thomas that Stalin's forgeries did not
flow from the alleged "'amoralism'" of the Bolsheviks.

On

the contrary, the system of falsification reflected the need
of the Stalinist bureaucracy to conceal its struggle to ob-

tain undue privileges at the expense of the masses.

Instead

of seeking an explanation in "the material conditions of

historical development," chided Trotsky, "you create the
theory of 'the original sin,' which fits the church but not
the socialist republic."
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This controversy over Kronstadt persisted into the

winter of 1937-38, with Trotsky forced more than once to
amplify his remarks on the "counter-revolutionary" nature of
the uprising.

79

It overlapped with another "acrimonious"

dispute, this time between Norman Thomas'

Trotsky's American followers.

Socialists and

As will be recalled, the

Trotskyites "dissolved" their sect in March 1936 and entered
the Socialist Party.

This fortuitous marriage of convenience

materially aided the effort to secure asylum and
hearing" for Trotsky.

a

"fair

In fact, the Socialist Party took the

Committee for
lead in establishing the "Provisional" American
the Defense of Leon Trotsky in October 1936.

During the en-

Socialist
suing months Norman Thomas, Roy Burt, and other
bitter releaders continued to back the inquiry, despite
the Mexican
proaches from the communist press. Even after
Executive Committee of
hearings a resolution of the National
of an impartial in"'endorsement'"
its
continued
the Party
refused to commit itself
vestigation for Trotsky, although it

.
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to the "'precise findings'" of Dewey's commission of in80

quiry

In fact, the marriage of the Trotskyites and

Socialists was already close to annulment.

The refusal of

the Trotskyites to liquidate their organized factions or

suppress their "literary" organs rankled.

March 1937 the Socialist Party held
which internal organs were banned,
the Socialist Appe al

,

a

a
a

As a result, in

special convention in
move aimed primarily at

Trotskyite periodical in Chicago.

Local Socialist Party organizations also began to expel their

Trotskyite "comrades" in the summer of 1937.

Almost every

expulsion notice was greeted with great rejoicing by the
Daily Worker

,

and variations of the homily,

"We told you so!"

Even Pravda gave some attention to the rift in the Socialist

organization.
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Finally in September the National Executive

Committee formally ousted the Trotskyite faction.

As a re-

sult of this bitter experience, Norman Thomas and the

Socialist Call cursed the Trotskyites and Stalinists alike,
both sectarians in their affinity for splits and repression,

"children born of one womb."

82

Certainly the initial good will and solidarity that
Committee was
had led to the founding of the Trotsky Defense

severely weakened, if not shattered.

But the split in the

only
Socialist Party, like the Kronstadt controversy, had

marginal effect on the continuing investigation.

a

After all,

in September 1937 on
the Dewey Commission had already agreed
No longer was Socialist
its basic findings in the case.

.
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support of such paramount importance, as it had been in 1936.
When the final verdict was finally issued in December 1937,
the Socialist Call duly reported the Commission's findings,

but with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm.
out of the al 1 i ance
IV.

The bloom had gone
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"The Case of Leon Trotsky"

Nagging, if minor problems continued to plague the

investigation.

The Defense Committee suffered yet another

resignation of a prominent backer.
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Material witnesses re-

fused to testify before the commission of inquiry; in one
some
case a Stalinist "secret agent" may have even destroyed

correspondence germane to Trotsky's case.
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And the attacks

continued unabated, with Corliss Lamont, for instance,
on the
piously hoping that Dewey, "stung by the comments
Defense Committee,"
tragic farce he has acted out on the Trotsky

haters and
would not slip into the ranks of "professional
"I have always had a profound
baiters" of Soviet Russia.

individual and
respect for Professor Dewey both as an

a

Columbia, "and I should
philosopher," wrote his colleague at
finally and irrevocably
hate to see him mar his career by

turning against the Soviet Union."
But,

at long last,
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bear
the Commission's work was to

transcript of the Mexican
fruit in the publication of the
monument of the inquiry's
hearings, perhaps the most enduring
Albert Glotzer, had
Trotskyite,
Chicago
A
arduous effort.
laboring to follow
Mexico,
in
stenographer
been the official

—
»
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the many shifts and turns in the testimony.

During the last

session Glotzer informed Dewey that he had "most of the record finished," and was going to stay several days to "finish
the transcript before

I

leave Mexico."

Apparently, how-

ever, Glotzer only finished the transcript back in America

from "cold notes"

—a

difficult task, since the true text had

to be established by asking the

they had meant by such and such

various participants what
a

passage.

Glotzer had

publicly stated he would remain in Mexico in order to mislead any would-be thieves
the notes,

who might have plans to appropriate

according to Suzanne La Follette.
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There were several other difficulties to be overcome,
however, before the transcript actually appeared in bookstores.

According to Miss La Follette, some Trotskyite mem-

bers of the Defense Committee desired to expropriate the

record of the counter-trial for their own purposes; Felix
enMorrow, James Burnham and George Novack were actually

But James

gaged in negotiating the publication of the text.

that
Rorty and Suzanne La Follette firmly informed Trotsky
there would
without sole control of the verbatim transcript
As a result, Trotsky directed
be no commission of inquiry.

efforts to thwart the
his American followers to cease their
88
But when the inrecord.
the
publish
to
right
Commission's
on the projvestigating panel approached Harpers & Brothers
the bulky record only if
ect, the publishers agreed to print
"
copies in advance,
the Defense Committee purchased 2^000
In late August,
resources.
Committee
on
strain
a
something of

I

.
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therefore, the Defense Committee advertised

a

special:

workers could purchase the 617-page volume at "half-rate,"
two dollars a piece for a paper-bound edition. 89
In September the first review of The Case of Leon

Trotsky appeared in the Soci alist Appe al

This Trotskyite

.

organ found the verbatim record impressive, to say the least:
Never, from a purely legal point of view, has
a refutation been so completely and relentlessly established in a case of like nature
and magnitude. 90

Shortly thereafter James T. Farrell contributed

view to the Saturday Review of Literature
a

.

a

similar re-

Farrell

,

hardly

neutral observer, used this opportunity to take pot shots

at The Nation and The New Republic for questioning the

Commission's impartiality and yet accepting the impartiality
of Justice Hugo Black, then under attack for once being as-

sociated with the Klu Klux Klan.

"I

merely think that sauce

for the goose is sauce for the gander," remarked Farrell,

ever ready to score

a

point at the expense of these liberal

magazines
In Farrell'

s

opinion, the primary question in

and
Trotsky's case and the Moscow trials was one of "fact,"

echoing Dewey's
the basic test was one of "verification,"

point of view.
Romm,

On the alleged interviews with Holtzman,

no corroborative
and Pyatakov the Moscow court offered

on
evidence, but Trotsky's defense was based

of documents and affidavits:

a

whole series

"These go to constitute an

acceptable to any fair
alibi sufficiently ironclad to be

I
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court."
Farrell.

There was also the test of "probability," added

Trotsky had examined every possible circumstantial

deduction relevant to the charges with "brilliant and ruthless logic," and thus passed Farrell'

s

test.

His final

speech, in particular, would most likely "go down in history
as one of the greatest indictments of all time," for it con-

tained "a closely reasoned and brilliant analysis of every
aspect of the Moscow trials."
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Farrell, in short, was a be-

liever.

Other appraisals followed, including two in British
periodicals.

An unsigned review in the Times Literary

Supplement compared the Mexican hearings to the London in-

quiry in the Reichstag fire case:
There is a necessarily unsatisfactory element
No formal issue conabout such proceedings.
There is no indictment,
fronts the 'court.'
no law to be administered, and no power to
obtain vital evidence, even where it is known
to exist.
with
But Professor Dewey had presided over the Mexican trial

"great fairness," and "considerable impartiality" had been

shown in the selection of members.

According to the London

success with
review, much attention should be paid "to the
of circumwhich Trotsky has refuted the meager fragments
It had
stantial evidence produced at the Moscow trials."
that Trotsky
been shown beyond a "reasonable doubt," besides,

had not met his three alleged contacts.

"Nobody interested

can neglect this
in the unraveling of this tangled skein

Commission."
mass of evidence elicited by the

92

Kingsley

"
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Martin in another British periodical, The New Statesman and
Nation

,

agreed that the verbatim transcript emphasized "the

substantial reasons for doubting parts of the confessions,"
but argued that "the evidence cannot in the nature of things
be conclusive."

And he guestioned whether the judges in the

counter-trial were in

a

"better position to reach a fair

conclusion" than the Russian judges who condemned Trotsky:
"The one court heard only the case for the prosecution, the

other court listened only to the defense." 93

Writing in Common Sense

Michael Ross reviewed both

,

the transcript of the Mexican hearings and the record of the

Pyatakov-Radek trial.

"Intellectuals who are half-ashamed

of their love for thrillers can openly enjoy these two books
on the Trotsky Mystery," wrote Ross in his mock-serious re-

view.

There was "a plethora of clues," and following the

thriller technique, the reader might decide the real criminal
was "the least suspicious of all the characters."

To Ross,

the Moscow transcript was "amazing and nauseating in its

revelation of degradation," while the Trotsky transcript was
"much better theatre," since his speeches often sparkled

"with the logical clarity and wit of

a

Shavian hero against

Commission's
the background of the ignorance of Finerty, the

counsel

.

reached
But the chief conclusion of Ross was one also

by Beals and other Americans:

a

plague on both their houses.

Reflecting the position of Common Sense

'

s

editors, he argued

did not mean Trotskyism
that a belief in Trotsky's innocence

had any importance for America in the political field; and

a

belief in the validity of the Moscow trials did not convert
"the Soviet Union into a Utopia or make Stalin and Browder

our guides in social thought and activity."

On the contrary,

Americans should learn from the "tragic mistakes" that had
accompanied the first attempt to construct

a

planned, profit-

The Soviet Union had registered "tremendous

less economy.

advances" in industrial production and social services, "but
its methods,

absolutism and terror, cannot be ours," since

the American goal was the transformation of the nation "into
a more

rationally organized society."

On the contrary, this

goal would not be helped "if we shackle our minds in the

strait jacket which the Russians call Marxism."

In short,

argued Ross, the "self-appointed popes" of Bolshevism and

their "interminable disputes" had no meaning for American
progressivism.
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But the most important critiques of The Case of Leon

Trotsky appeared in The Nation and The New Republic
case the reviews, and reviewers, were something of

For The Nation

,

.

a

In each

surprise

Edmund Wilson wrote that the Mexican record

makes one
was "a remarkably interesting document, which

newspaper
realize the inadequacy, if not frivolity, of the

accounts of the Mexican hearings."

One of the first members

contended that the
of the Trotsky Defense Committee, Wilson
which
counter-trial made public "a great deal of material
Stalinists,
helps to establish his /Trotsky's/ innocence."
conspirators had covered
of course, could claim that the
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their tracks, that the Commission members were Trotskyites,
and that the documents were forgeries.

"But what seems to

me of overwhelming impressiveness is the review of Trotsky's

whole career,

"

wrote Wilson, who noted the extreme dispro-

portion between the time Trotsky devoted to his public
activities and to his secret "plotting."

Those people out-

side Russia who still swallowed the trials, wrote Wilson,

were no doubt:

"naive persons who cannot believe that Soviet

officials would do such things as would be implied by the

frame-up of the Old Bolsheviks, persons so ignorant of
Russian politics and history that they are disqualified from

holding an opinion, and fanatical or job-holding partisans
who,

.

.

.

take the position that all methods are permissible

for the maintenance of the Stalinist power."

Those puzzled

by the trials, however, should compare the official accounts

with the Trotsky record, "one of the greatest political interviews ever printed," in which the commissioners managed to
cover "an enormous amount of ground," in Wilson's opinion.
From the viewpoint of the ordinary reader, it was possible
that Trotsky's world view was presented here more impressively
writings,
and more effectively than in his pamphlets and other

between
where the technical language of Marxism sometimes gets
us and the events."
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In the course of this review Wilson had, in effect,
The Nation
thrown down the gauntlet to the "naive" editors of

And Bertram

D.

also
Wolfe, in a review for The New Republic,

Weltanschauung of
took issue implicitly with the prevailing

.

—

"
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that magazine.

Veteran of innumerable sectarian struggles,

Wolfe was no friend of Trotsky's, but brought considerable

expertise to the subject of the trials.

He had approached

this "bulky report with considerable misgiving," he wrote:
The whole idea of the "Impartial Commission"
seemed such a preposterous one. Fathered by
Trotsky partisans, it had of necessity to be
one-sided and reduce itself to a stage for a
single, all-important actor.
The Commission
was chosen with some ineptness to include a
majority (Stolberg, Ruehle, La Follette
three out of five) already publicly on record
as convinced of the innocence of the
" accused.

Of the remaining members, Beals resigned before the hearings

were completed and Dewey's "undoubted impartiality" was "no

guarantee that he would be equal to judging the intricacies
of Russian factional strife."

These misgivings were deepened

by the earlier portions of the stenogram:

Goldman was "a not

very effective" defense attorney; Finerty showed no awareness
that he might have strengthened the investigation by "really

trying to break down" some of the testimony; Dewey asked
"naive" questions designed to convince Trotsky of the superi-

ority of a "liberal philosophy" to the tenets of

tarian dictatorship and social revolution;

a

prole-

and Stolberg,

at
Ruehle and La Follette asked leading questions aimed

shedding light "on their pet doctrinal puzzles."

Only Beals

questions, though
had asked "searching and embarrassing"
opinion.
sometimes "indelicate" or "irrelevant," in Wolfe's
outDespite the "ineptness of the procedure," the

clearer to Wolfe as
lines of Trotsky's case became steadily

the hearings continued.

In fact,

"all else became dwarfed

and unimportant, until audience, attorneys and Commission

seemed to disappear and the 'investigation' became at last

monologue cf the exiled War Commissar"

— expounding

a

his

doctrines, fighting for his revolutionary honor, turning
the accusers into the accused.

Wolfe, in particular, was

impressed by Trotsky's "powerful closing speech," which
should not be missed by anyone desiring to discover the truth
about the perplexing trials:

"in retrospect the chief func-

tion of the Commission turns out to be that it served as oc-

casion and sounding-board for this speech."
But there were still "painful and intolerable di-

lemmas" to be faced, since it was difficult to believe that

Trotsky had conspired with Germany and Japan to hasten war,
and egually difficult to believe that the leadership of the

Party and Comintern had framed the accusations and executed

innocent men.

"Yet one of these two series of monstrous

and discreditable hypotheses must be true," wrote Wolfe.

A

study of the trials and counter-trial records, however,

helped remove "from the realm of merely subjective preference
the choice between them."

Admitting that he had previously

asgiven "credence rather to Stalin than to Trotsky," Wolfe

serted that

a

re-reading of all the transcripts "carried

not
literally overwhelming conviction that Trotsky could

Zinovievhave done the things charged against him in the

Kamenev and Radek-Pyat akov trials."
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Moreover, contended this ex-Communist

,

"epidemic of executions" of various Trotskyites

the subsequent
,

spies,

wreckers, traitors, etc., had been on "such a scale as to

make the Mexican hearings largely superfluous."

In pic-

turing Trotsky as in control of virtually all leading posts
in the Soviet Union,

"Stalin has literally proved too much

and reduced the original charges to absurdity."

concluded that Trotsky faced

a

But Wolfe

new dilemma:

Throughout the hearings he maintains that the
others were being tried and executed merely to
make a case against him
Now it is becoming
clear that he has been made into a devil
largely to make a case against others leaders
of a new opposition which has grown up against
Stalin and his methods among his closest supporters.
What then happens to Trotsky's central theory that the entire military and
police and party and state machinery were so
degenerate that no opposition could any more
arise within the Party, and that a new revolution was necessary as the only road to renovation?
.

—

in Wolfe's opinion, Trotsky had been completely silent on the

issue, since "he has no way of squaring his theory with what
.

.

has long been his central position."
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Many prominent periodicals neglected to review the
record of the Mexican hearings.
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But the Commission's ef-

forts and Trotsky's logic were beginning to have an effect.

Certainly the largely favorable reviews in The Nation and The

New Republic could not help but shake some complacent opinions
and keep open the question of the Moscow trials'

integrity.

outThe "painful and intolerable dilemmas" which Wolfe had

lined would not disappear by themselves:
choice must be made.

at some point a
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V.

"Not Guilty

1"

With considerable fanfare the climactic meeting to
present the Commission's verdict was announced for the

evening of December 12, 1937.

Special invitations were is-

sued and Committee members were urged to reserve ten-seat

boxes in the Hotel Center.

Press releases were prepared to

appear in the next day's papers.

Unfortunately for the

meeting's organizers, the headlines on December 13 were

dominated by the news that Japanese warplanes had sunk the
US gunboat "Panay," but the gathering still received considerable attention.
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George Novack presided over the meeting attended by
some 2,000 people, curious to learn the final verdict.

First

La Follette, then Stolberg, Wendelin Thomas, John Chamberlain,
and Carlo Tresca addressed the meeting, discoursing on their

personal reasons for joining the inquiry, and stressing the

"impartiality" of the Commission.
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Finally, Professor Dewey

addressed the meeting, and attempted to put the entire in-

vestigation into perspective.

That the report was as "nearly

pos100% water-tight and fool-proof as any such document can

sibly be," declared Dewey, was

a

result of "the constant, de-

voted and intelligent work of our Secretary, Miss La
was
Follette," to whom "an inexpressible debt of gratitude"

owed.

the
The only way to repay her was to contribute to

final publication of the Commission's findings.

After re-

and various
viewing the backgrounds of the commissioners

efforts to slander them with the stigma of "'Trotskyism,'"

Dewey predicted:
so great that

I

"The efficacy of truth once made known is

forsee the day in the not distant future when

every honest liberal who reads the p inal Report will be grateful to the Commission for undertaking against seeming odds

its historic task."

He further predicted that as new evi-

dence became available,

"every finding of the Commission will

be confirmed to the hilt as this new material becomes public.
I

am so confident in this matter that

I

am willing to stake

,,100
.4
my reputation upon it."
•

In this lengthy address Professor Dewey also reviewed

some of the more glaring contradictions in the Moscow testimony, such as the many dates assigned for the formation of the

"united center" and "reserve center," mutually contradictory

dates many times over.

And on Radek's contention that some

fellow "conspirators" understood his state of mind merely by
seeing him on

a

Moscow street, the Chairman commented:

"I

submit that anybody who can swallow this series of Alice-in-

Wonderland testimony can swallow anything."
the other evidence and documentation,

Together with

"every honest and in-

telligent person should agree with the Commission in being
the whole
appalled by the utterly discreditable character of

Moscow trial proceedings, at once flimsy and vicious."

It

the existence
was possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt

of "a frame-up," added Dewey:

Commission has done just that."

".
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.

.1

submit that the

From Dewey's perspective, the implications of the
findings were "profoundly disturbing."

The Soviet regime

was attempting to identify political opposition to itself

with criminal activity against the Soviet Union.

And com-

munist parties throughout the world were using the "vicious
'

Trotskyist-terrorist-f ascist-amalgam

'

"

as a means of de-

stroying opposition and justifying assassination.

In America

the Communist Party had used this "strictly amoral tactic,

indistinguishable from the tactic of Fascism," to slander
opposition and disrupt the forces of economic and political
progress, which could not be too strongly condemned, declared
Dewey.

A disciplined organization was repudiating "the prin-

ciples of truth and justice upon which the foundations of

civilization are laid."

This development signified in Dewey's

opinion the "extraordinary corruption of the idealistic
heritage" of the Russian Revolution, and also signified

a

10 2
"danger" against which all Americans must guard themselves.

Finally Dewey read the verdict in the form of twentythree paragraphs, each one linked to some aspect of the Moscow
"case" against Trotsky.

Independent of other evidence, the

full Commission of Inquiry found:

That the conduct of the Moscow trials
was such as to convince any unprejudiced person that no effort was made to ascertain the
truth.
(1)

While confessions are necessarily entitled to the most serious consideration, the
confessions themselves contain such inherent
improbabilities as to convince the Commission
that they do not represent the truth, irrespective of any means used to obtain them.
(2)
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There followed the Commission's conclusions on such subjects
as Holtzman's alleged meeting with Sedov and Trotsky in

Copenhagen, Romm's "interview" with Trotsky in the Bois de
Boulogne, and Pyatakov's "flight" to Oslo

took place.

— none

of which ever

In addition, the alleged letters from Trotsky

containing terrorist instructions "never existed."

He had

always "been a consistent opponent of individual terror,"

never advocated "sabotage as

a

method of opposition to any

political regime," and "never" instructed any of the accused
to enter into agreements with foreign powers against the

Soviet Union, having "always uncompromisingly advocated the

defense of the U.S.S.R."

In addition, Trotsky "never recom-

mended, plotted, or attempted the restoration of capitalism
in the U.S.S.R."

In fact, the Prosecutor "fantastically

falsified Trotsky's role before, during and after the October
Revolution."

But the final paragraphs were the capstone of

the entire investigation:
(22) We therefore find the Moscow trials to

be frame-ups.
We therefore find Trotsky and Sedov not
guilty. 1° 3
(23)

VI

.

For and Against

With the completion of the Commission's major task,
a

fatigued Dewey should have been allowedsome rest.

was not to be.

But it

The very next evening (December 13) he de-

the
bated with Corliss Lamont over the CBS radio network

significance of the Commission's findings.

The bulk of his

I
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address was devoted to assaying the importance of the Moscow

trials for America, these "living events on the consequences
of which the American people and our democracy are involved,"

and which had disrupted anti-Fascist unity in Spain and were

dividing the American labor movement.

Dewey was also con-

cerned that Soviet sympathizers were advocating
front with Stalin if the USSR went to war:

a

common

"Remember how we

got into the last war in order to make the world safe for

democracy and you will not dismiss this organized propaganda

with

a

laugh."

In the light of the danger of being dragged

into war on Stalin's side, "who will say that the truth about
the Soviet Union is of no significance to us here in America?"

Profoundly disturbed by the parallels he perceived between
Soviet Russian and Fascist Germany, Dewey argued that a

"country that uses all the methods of fascism to suppress

opposition can hardly be held up to us,
model to follow against Fascism."

a

democracy, as

a

Even though he disagreed

with the theories of Trotsky even more than before, "the
claims of justice, truth and humanity come first."

Political

expediency should not be allowed to transcend these ends:
"If we do not insist upon putting truth and justice first,
„1° 4
doomed.
is
movement
liberal
the

In reply, Lamont "most deeply and sincerely" regretted

that his former teacher had

aligned himself with the "pro-

fessional enemies" of the Soviet people.

Trotsky had been

Commission's
found as innocent as "a seraphic angel," but the
and a majority of
inner purpose had been to "whitewash" him
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its members had been "hopelessly prejudiced" in his favor.

In support of this criticism of the Commission, Lamont quoted

from the "eminent author," Carleton Beals, and from the let-

ter of resignation of Mauritz Hallgren.

Lamont resented in

particular the Commission's general attack on the Soviet
government, that "old Communist bugaboo," which had been the
"chief stock in trade of Fascists and reactionaries," eager
to justify war and crush democratic liberties.

After men-

tioning Soviet "progress" in a number of fields, Lamont

claimed that the government had "no military or aggressive
designs against any other nation on earth."

In fact, the

"Soviet regime and its achievements are indivisible; and we

cannot believe that its system of justice is completely out
of step with its splendid accomplishments in practically all

other fields."

After making this rather incredible argument,

Lamont concluded that most Americans were friendly toward the
USSR, whose basic "ethical principle is loyalty to the wel105
fare and progress of all mankind."

Less respectful was the immediate reaction of

Ambassador Troyanovsky, which forced Dewey once again to
publicly defend the Commission's work.
wash," of course.

It was all a "white-

The Soviet diplomat also found the

'"cordial relations between Trotsky and his committee

really touching.'"

.

.

More important, Dewey had embarked on

dangerous path:
"Is it astonishing that the representative
commission seems to hesitate in his choice

of the

.

a

.
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between the Soviet regime and fascist regimes?
From sympathy for the Soviet Union through
hesitation in the choice between the Soviet
Union and fascism, to embracing reaction and
red-baiting is a logical path for Trotskyist
sympathizers and their supporters."! 06
But in reply Dewey warned of a possible new "frame-up" in

Moscow to "besmirch this Commission and discredit its work,"
and repeated that "the systematic use of the technique of

political frame-up is

a

danger against which our own people

mu st guard themselves without illusion and without comprom ise."

Rather unkindly he mentioned that Troyanovsky had

had "nothing" to do with the October Revolution and was not
"an Old Bolshevik."

Possibly, therefore, the Soviet diplomat

considered himself "immune in the present 'purge,'"
gestion which must have brought

a

a sug-

shudder to the Ambassador's

heart
No holds were barred, henceforth.

Dewey had declared

himself an enemy of the Soviet regime and suggested the
view he

similarity of the Hitlerite and Soviet systems,

a

was to develop more fully in subsequent years.

For their

part the communist spokesmen now considered Dewey

"Trotskyite
The verdict

,

"

a

"red-baiter," and incipient ally of fascism.

— "Not

Guilty"

— had

opened an unbridgeable chasm

between "critical" liberals of the Dewey type and "friends"
of the Soviet Union.

Open war had been declared.

"
"The Hour of Truth Has Struck

Trotsky had been vindicated!

His gamble in placing

honor in the hands
his personal reputation and revolutionary

'

of American liberals had finally reaped the desired dividends.

Apparently forewarned of the impending verdict of "Not
Guilty," Trotsky had prepared beforehand a telegram to be
sent to the Dewey Commission.
a more

It was "impossible to imagine

terrible verdict," he cabled the panel, for it accused

the Soviet rulers of committing a
"

"

to deceive

unworthy

'

"

'

"

"'

frame-up " of attempting
,

the toilers of the world,

and of being

of serving the Socialist movement.

In his view

the verdict had "immeasurable political importance"; the use
of lies, slander, and frame-ups in the Soviet Union had re-

ceived "a terrible blow."

According to Trotsky, the

Commission, in aiming "to serve the truth," had also "served
the liberating struggle of all mankind."

Henceforth, "the

work of the commission as well as the names of its participants belong to history."
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Trotsky, in particular, was pleased that the verdict

affirmed the trials' basic fradulence:
a

such a statement was

valuable political weapon in the struggle with Stalin.

As

he declared in a written statement to the Mexican press on

the last phrases in the verdict,

"Two lines in all!

But

there are few lines which have such weight in the library of

humanity."

Not only had the Commission found him innocent,

but it had taken "upon itself an enormous moral and political

responsibility" by declaring the trials to be frame-ups.

The

only possible answer was more violence: "With such an argument
the voice
one can annihilate an opponent, but not assassinate

of the world's conscience.

The decision of the Commission
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cannot be affected by revolver or knife.

drowned in water."

It cannot be

Stalin and his lackeys, gleefully de-

clared Trotsky, had been "branded forever as the perpetrators
of the greatest crimes in history."

In his opinion,

The drawing-room chatterers, disguised as
revolutionaries, the male and female votaries
of the solemn anniversaries of the Soviet
bureaucracy, the lawyers who make their careers
upon the shoulders of the workers is it necessary to give their names? and all the other
intriguers and charlatans who have permitted
themselves to play with my political honor and
even to make capital for themselves in this
manner, all these gentlemen, one after the
other, will be called to order by public opinion.

—

It was all over.

—

The "hour of truth has struck.

be able to turn the wheel of justice backward.

No one will

Every new

revelation will reinforce the crushing verdict and extend the
"j.
aof its
radius
action.",,109
*»

i

In answer to some guestions posed by the Mexican and

foreign press at this December 13 briefing, Trotsky again

stressed the political importance of the verdict, in contrast
to Dewey's emphasis on the triumphof truth and justice.

Stalin's victims would eventually be rehabilitated, Trotsky
claimed, but for "Stalin there is no rehabilitation," for he

would only leave the stage "covered in disgrace."

Even the

trumpet of truth would not immediately cause the walls of

Jericho to fall, but Trotsky expected the Commission's verdict in the long run to have "tremendous political conse-

quences both in relation to the Comintern and to the Soviet

bureaucracy."

The authority of the Comintern would be under-

blow" to
mined by the judgment, and thereby deliver "a severe

the Soviet oligarchy.

The Commission's verdict would also

become one of the "elements" in the internal struggle, for
the left opposition had been cleared of disgusting slander:
"The verdict thus heightens the chances for a progressive up-

rising.

In this lies its greatest historical service."

There was every reason for optimism:

Humanity has developed from the ape to the
Comintern.
It will advance from the Comintern
The judgment of the
to actual Socialism.
Commission demonstrates once more that the
correct idea is stronger than the most powerIn this conviction lies the
ful police force.
unshakable basis of revolutionary optimism.
Despite Trotsky's rather fulsome public praise of the

Commission's work, he had some private reservations.

He re-

sented Dewey's alleged obiter dictum during the meeting in
the Hotel Center that Stalinism was

Bolshevism.

a

logical outgrowth of

According to George Novack, Trotsky felt that

Dewey had "abused his post" and used the "wrong platform" to

present private opinions:

it was "unjudicial,"

and "unwar-

ranted," and "not compatible" with the Commission's assignment.

And James Cannon also charged that Dewey was "'not

wholly impartial,'" and had taken advantage of the occasion
•"to attack the theory of socialism,'" which was

from '"strict morality.'"

a

departure

111

the
Dewey, of course, had stressed the importance of

its political
verdict for America, while Trotsky had stressed
Although the
weight in the continuing struggle with Stalin.

suspicion of
investigation had reinforced Dewey's deep

Stalinist—
Bolshevism— whether Leninist, Trotskyite, or

"
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apparently he refrained from directly attacking the theory of

socialism while announcing the verdict.

But, in a sense,

Russian Marxism had been at the center of the Dewey

Commission's deliberations.

Implied in the verdict was not

only a judgment on the Stalinist variety but on all forms of
the ideology.

Response of Friends and Foes

Following the December 12 meeting, the Commission's
verdict was already inscribed in history, but both its shortAlmost

run and long-range effect was yet to be ascertained.

immediately

a

few periodicals greeted the judgment with con-

siderable favor.

An editorial in The New York Times

,

for in-

stance, briefly declared that the Dewey report was a "minority

vote against Stalin," and reflected "a giant body of world
opinion" on the trials.
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Norman Thomas rather cautiously

contended in the Socialist Call that the report could not be
dismissed out of hand.

It should be judged on the basis of

evidence and on the basis of the "high character and disin-

terested loyalty to truth as must be attributed to Professor
Dewey."
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And the Socialist Appeal in

a

characteristic re-

view asserted that the "commission report was the greatest
extriumph of truth against frame-up" since Smile Zola had

posed the Dreyfus trials.
Stalinism.

"It was a mortal blow to

114

of Inquiry
But the forces opposed to the Commission

volume and violence of
were more vocal, at least in terms of
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abuse.

An article in Soviet Russia Today

,

for instance, con-

tended that Dewey apparently did not speak or read Russian,
and had no access to information except that provided by his

Trotskyist friends.
Fortune:

John Chamberlain?

enough said.

baiting" since 1925.

Stolberg?

He was an editor of

He had engaged in "red-

"Dewey and Chamberlain and Stolberg.

While fascist armies torture the people of Spain and China,
this trio and their associates defend the agents of fascism
in the Soviet Union."

In fact, they had joined "Berlin, Rome

and Tokyo in the campaign 'against communism,'" and were

"eager pushovers for every fake concocted by Trotsky's ex-

perts

.

But the remarks in Soviet Russi a Today were rather

subdued compared to some of the comments in the Daily Worker

.

This communist daily reported that the so-called Trotsky

Defense Committee had submitted "its elephantine report" and
come to "its shameful conclusion."

Exposed as "part and par-

cel of the Trotzkyite propaganda apparatus," the Committee's

report presented no new evidence to disprove the conspiracy

between Trotskyism and Hitler, and was nothing but "an en-

cyclopedia of Trotzky's speeches and writings and constitutes
in its entirety a grovelling paean of praise to Trotzkyism."

Perhaps referring to The Case of Leon Trotsky

,

not the

contended
Commission's final report, the Daily Worker further
reeked with
that "every syllable" of Trotsky's writings
the Soviet
"ferocious calls for murder and violence against
to "the monstrous
Government," and only added new confirmation
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guilt of Trotzky's conspiracy."

The Committee had become

part of "the coalition of American fascist reactionaries,"
and ended "as a sneaking piece of deception, behind whose

window dressing stands the director of the puppets, the conspirator and co-worker of the Gestapo, Trotzky."
Dewey, he had,

As for

"alas," become the "Charlie McCarthy" of

Sidney Hook, who had led his teacher into "a swamp of
filth." 116

The Worker also charged that Dewey was

a

"puppet

of disruption" in the American progressive movement, sounded

like "Goebbels" on the Soviet Union, and had wiped out his

standing "as

a

liberal."
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Other Party organs also chimed in with savage judgments on Dewey's apostasy.

The Communist

,

for instance, as-

serted that the elderly American educator had knowingly
joined "the camp of the Trotskyite fascist gangsters," and
was spreading "poisonous hatred" of the Soviet people:

"No

honest person will want to have anything to do with this man
Dewey."
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And Robert Forsythe (Kyle Crichton) in the pages

of the New Masses contended that Dewey was "a most disarming

old gentlemen," but capable of "great viciousness

as when

,

"

he warned in his CBS broadcast against joining forces with

the Soviet Union in the forthcoming war.

Dewey had ceased

being "disarming" and graduated into "dishonesty," charged
Forsythe,

"not downright, vulgar, beautiful dishonesty, but

dishonesty of the sort which comes from presenting

a

problem

that
falsely and arguing furiously and righteously from
"
fascism, precisely
basis." He had become a propagandist for
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because he had misstated the problem of war for America." 119
These ad hominem remarks became the order of the day.

Instead of dealing with the substance of the final report,
the Party oracles chose to strike directly at Dewey and his

cohorts, and brand them as proto-f ascists

.

As Eugene Lyons

wrote, Dewey went from being the darling of the red press to

being an ogre, and drew "the lightning of Muscovite damnation" after his efforts to investigate Trotsky. 70
1

article in The Bolshevik

,

A 1947

for instance, included Dewey among

the "Philosophizing Armor-Bearers of American reaction."

Another piece in the same Soviet ideological journal called
him "a faithful lackey of the imperialist bourgeoisie," whose

instrumentalist philosophy attempted to provide the "imperialist bourgeoisie with means and methods of suppressing
A "bitter opponent

the class consciousness of the workers."

of Marxism," he had turned into "a vicious enemy of the Soviet

Union and joined hands with the Trotskyite agent, Sidney
Hook."
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And an article in the 1952 Bol shaya Sovetskaya
'

Entsiklopediya /Large Soviet Encyclopedia / described him
a

as

"reactionary bourgeois philosopher," whose ideology served

the interests of aggressive American imperialism:

The philosophy of Dewey is the philosophy
Dewey is a herald of conof war and fascism.
temporary imperialistic reaction, the ideologue
of American imperialism, a violent enemy of the
USSR, land of the people's democracy and revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism. 122
But it was difficult to dismiss the verdict out of
hand.

Even The Nation and New Republic appeared somewhat
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shaken by the final report.

"The Commission,

although ham-

pered by limited resources and much opposition," commented
The Nation

,

"worked hard to assemble evidence to support its

preliminary findings published seven months ago, and the
document which has resulted from its labors is both an impressive defense of Leon Trotsky and an attack on the Soviet
trials which resulted in his 'conviction.'"

Many "damaging

discrepancies" in the charges against Trotsky were exposed,
and the "inherent improbability" of his complicity in the

crimes was shown.

But the former objections to the investi-

gation were still "sound," declared Freda Kirchwey's journal.

Trotsky's evidence could not be tested by counter-evidence in
the possession of the Soviet government;

and his testimony

could not be subjected to cross-examination.

In addition,

prethe Commission was at least "partly suspect" as being

committed to

a

belief in Trotsky's innocence:

It goes without saying that Trotsky has not
been proven guilty by any process that could
be acceptable to a dispassionate observer;
but ex parte and extra-legal proceedings, however"thorough, cannot prove his innocence. At
restatethe most they can produce an amplified
it was a
ment of the case of the defendant."
mistake to call it a "verdict

cautious.
The New Republic was a little more

After

Dewey verdict, the
briefly reviewing the chief points in the
comment on these
liberal journal declared that a "detailed
we have had an
extremely serious charges must wait until
and learn how much new
text
full
the
examine
to
opportunity
This plea for more
assembled."
has
committee
the
evidence

i

—

"
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time

The New Republic always wanted more time, hoping that

the Trotsky affair would disappear- -was coupled with the re-

gret that the Commission had not examined more fully the

question of "a widespread conspiracy" against the Soviet
regime.

Most Americans, it added, were more concerned with

this question than with the allegation that "Trotsky was its
master mind. 124
In effect, therefore, The New Republic refused to

comment on the Dewey Commission's verdict, while lamenting
that it had not embarked on another investigation altogether.
But no longer did this liberal magazine explicitly defend the

Moscow trials or automatically accept Trotsky's guilt, in
contrast to its position sixteen months earlier.

Public

opinion was moving, if not in Trotsky's direction, at least
away from Moscow.
VII.

Trotsky was tired.

Aftermath
The many months of gathering af-

fidavits, issuing statements, and preparing testimony had

taken their toll.

The Dewey Commission's verdict had been

greeted with "great joy" in the Blue House, but nothing was
changed.

The judgment had little or no immediate effect in

Europe, where the gathering storm of war preoccupied the
public.

And the "nightmare" continued, with more news from

Moscow of arrests and executions.

125

literary
The Russian refugee returned to his various
respite.
projects, working twelve-hour days with little

Each

.

!
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day, however, he took time to feed his beloved rabbits,

and

occasionally there were "war expeditions" into the countryside to collect huge cacti.

Visitors came to the door of

the villa from time to time, and so did tragedy.

One after

another of his secretaries and associates met untimely deaths

under mysterious circumstances.
son

— Lyova — unexpectedly

Then in February 1938 his

died in

a

Paris hospital, the cause

of death something of an enigma, perhaps one concocted by GPU

"physicians." 127

This was a shattering loss for Trotsky and

his wife; with some dread associates in Mexico remembered the
1911 suicide of Paul and Laura Laf argue (Marx's daughter).

There were other fears
and his

,

moreover

.

Vincent e Lombardo Toledano

Mexican Confederation of Labor stepped up the cam-

paign to expel Trotsky, the "Standard-Bearer of All Enemies
of Labor."

There was more than a hint of violence in the air.

An attempt on his life would come as

a

surprise to hardly any-

one close to the volatile political situation in Mexico.

"Forgery

128

"

The work of the Dewey Commission was almost completed.

Only Not Guilty had to be prepared for publication.

March 1938 began the trial of Bukharin, Rykov
"The Great Trial."

,

But in

and Company--

This final act in the tragic-comedy once

again involved Trotsky and the commission of inquiry.

From

Mexico, in fact, Trotsky announced the trial was to some deDewey
gree Stalin's "dramatized answer" to the verdict of the

Commission

129
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When news reached New York of the impending BukharinRykov trial, Suzanne La Follette reacted almost automatically.

A statement condemning the new "frame-up" was issued in the
name of th^ investigating commissicn.

It reviewed the

earlier '"demonstration trials'" and predicted that the

Bukharin-Rykov drama would produce "similar demonstrable
falsifications of fact and history."

And the Commission's

statement repeated an earlier warning, "that the systematic
use of the technique of political frame-up is

a

danger

against which the American people must guard themselves without illusion and without compromise."

1 30

This declaration was printed in The New York Times on

March

2,

along with a similar statement issued by the Trotsky

Defense Committee:
"Like its predecessors, this will not be a trial
at all but a well rehearsed theatrical presentation based upon the ability of the G.P.U. to
extort false 'confessions' from the actors in
order to destroy, morally and physically,
Stalin's political opponents. ..."

Among those "supporting" this declaration, reported the Times,
were sixteen Committee members, including

B.

Charney Vladeck,

Norman Thomas, Franz Boas, John Dos Passos, Horace Kallen,

Alexander Goldenweiser

,

William H. Kilpatrick, Joseph Wood

Krutch, William Ellery Leonard, Ferdinand Lundberg, Gorham

Munson, Max C. Otto, Burton Rascoe
Howard, and Gaetano Salvemini.
•

•

,

Selig Perlman, Sidney
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These "premature" condemnations of the Moscow trial,

even before it started, created

a

contretemps in New York,

of Moscow justice,
and further alienated friends and foes
i
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firmly wedded to their respective "truths."

The Daily Worker,

in particular, was outraged by the Committee's audacity, and

began to poll the members who allegedly were "supporting" the
accusation.

In its issue of March

revelation:

"Trotzkyist Forgery Repudiated By Four Alleged

5

appeared a triumphant

of Letter for Investigation of Trial."

'Signers'

In a

"desperate effort" to discredit the trial, the Defense

Committee had resorted to "deliberate forgery of prominent
names," claimed the communist organ.

The energetic Worker

had solicited statements from Professors Boas, Leonard, and

Goldenweiser

,

all of whom denied that they had authorized the

use of their names in connection with the statement.

Ferdinand Lundberg and Gaetano Salvemimi

,

in addition,

also

expressed some surprise over the declaration, of which they
lacked foreknowledge.
Daily Worker

,

This was a "smear," contended the

on the part of Trotskyites, who were resorting

to "duplicity, forgery, trickery."
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Corliss Lamont also utilized this "forgery" in an inspired effort to split the forces opposed to Soviet justice.
On March

5

he sent a telegram to Professor Dewey, vacationing

in Florida:

Surprised to see in the New York Times of March
second that the Commission headed by you without
waiting to hear one word of the testimony in
present Moscow treason trials denounced these
trials as frameups. This is precise opposite of
experimental scientific methods advocated in
your philosophy. Committee for Defense of
Trotsky issued similar statement with Times
Professor Boaz
printing sixteen signatures.
/"sic/, Goldenweiser, Leonard and Ferdinand

I
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Lundberg have publicly repudiated use of their
names as unauthorized and several others are
expected to do so.
Sorry to bother you but as
Chairman of organizations, you must necessarily
expect constant involvement in these issues.
Would appreciate a wire collect. 33
Concerned for the "good names" of misguided liberals, Lamont
followed up this wire with

a

series of phone calls and

"circular" letters to the Committee's membership.

The

"shocking use of names under false pretenses," he wrote,
showed how liberals were being exploited on the Committee by
"an inner group of professional Trotskyites

.

"

Lamont also

charged that both the Defense Committee and Dewey Commission
had abandoned any pretense of impartiality in their precipitous condemnation of the trial:

"May

I

ask how many of you

approve of this method of prejudging the trials?"

134

The "forgery" episode was easily explained.

munication printed in the Times (March

2)

The com-

had been typed on

Committee stationery, which also listed various members.

Ac-

cording to an editor of the newspaper, "'We considered that
we were entirely justified in presuming that it was presented
as the opinion of the Committee,

and we saw no reason for not

selecting sixteen prominent names among those presented as
members of the Committee making the appeal.'"

Lamont was

somewhat chagrined with this simple explanation.

He had only

reached the "natural conclusion" that the sixteen members had
signed the statement, in the sense they gave permission, even
to a
if they had not "physically affixed their signatures

paper."
•

affair.

Still,
135

"gross negligence" was involved in the whole
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But George Novack was unforgiving.

He wrote Lamont

that he was just shedding "crocodile tears" over ruined reputations; Lamont had helped to slander these names originally.
The secretary of the Defense Committee, however, could under-

stand the millionaire's "desperate mood," for he had defended
"an abominable mass slaughter" for eighteen months,

"knee-deep in blood."

A few lies must have seemed

and was
a

cheap

price to pay if these murders could be made "a contribution
to civilization."
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And so ended

a

minor "frame-up," New

York variety.
The "Great Frame-up "
The third and final "show" trial opened in Moscow on
the second of March.

trials.

Little was changed from the earlier

The Bukharin-Rykov extravaganza was held in the same

former ballroom, where nobles had danced under the cheerful
frieze of dancing girls.

But a "casually grim atmosphere"

now gripped the hall.

V.

V.

Ulrikh was once again the pre-

siding judge, but more obese than ever, with "rolls of fat"

bulging over his collar.

Andrei Vyshinsky was nattily attired

in a blue suit and appeared to one reporter as a "successful

American business man in

a small

Middle Western City."

And

in the gallery sat the "hoi-polloi" or the "'proletarian

aristocrats,'" laughing and chattering, who had come to be
"horrified, and perhaps even terrified," wrote one British
of
"by a spectacle which would partake at once both
137
film."
gangster
modern
the
of
and
the medieval morality play

observer,
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Also in the courtroom were

a

dozen NKVD "giants,"

keeping a watchful eye on the twenty-one defendants behind
the "flimsy pine fence," which served as the dock.

Their

prey again was most distinguished, including three members
of Lenin's Politburo.

Nikolai Bukharin, the Party's "be-

loved," had been a leading theoretician and chairman of the

Comintern.

Alexei Rykov had held a number of major govern-

mental posts, including that of Premier.

And Nikolai

Krestinsky had been Moscow's Ambassador to Berlin in the
1920s and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in
the 1930s.

Also in the dock was the brilliant Christian

Rakovsky, a veteran of the revolutionary movement and perhaps
From the Party's

Trotsky's closest confidant in the movement.

underworld came Genrikh Yagoda, police agent extraordinaire
and former chief of the NKVD.

,

Rounding out the twenty-one

defendants were ex-Commissars, nationalist leaders, respected
physicians, and close associates of Party notables.
a flock of

what

a

138

"'What

carion crows (a crew of desperadoes gathered),

medley of raiment and faces,'" wrote

for the Daily Worker

,

quoting Pushkin.

a

correspondent

139

"For sheer blood and thunder the indictment left

nothing to be desired," observed Fitzroy Maclean."

mixed bag of Trotskyites, Zinovievites

,

140

This

Rightists, Mensheviks,

Socialist-Revolutionaries, and bourgeois nationalists—the
"Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites "—were accused of

a

myriad

threads of the
of crimes, which tied together the multiple

far-flung conspiracy.

Economic crimes, for instance, had
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reached new heights of daring.

Timber Industry

— V.

I.

Ivanov

The ex-Minister of the

— had

helped cause

a

paper

shortage, thereby striking "a blow at the cultural revolution,

interrupting the supply of exercise books and thus rousing
discontent among the masses."

M.

Chernov, who had once

A.

been Minister of Agriculture, had overseen the artificial infection of pigs with "erysipelas" and the "plague."

Isaak

Zelensky of the Consumers' Cooperative had been even more
In order to arouse worker discontent, members

imaginative.

of his organization had actually thrown "glass" and "nails"

into butter, which made it all that "tastier," noted
At this startling revelation a "grunt of rage

Vyshinsky.

and horror rose from the audience."
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Even more startling revelations were to come.

To the

consternation of the gallery it was revealed that the deaths
of V. R. Menzhinsky (GPU chief), V. V. Kuibyshev (Party

leader), A. M.

"Maxim" Gorky and his son, M. Peshkov, had

been "medical murders."

A series of eminent doctors and

close associates of the murdered men testified on the methods

used for encouraging their untimely deaths.
had prescribed for Menzhinsky'

s

A Dr. Kazakov

heart condition

a

medication

of "lysates of thyroid gland, hypophysis and the medullar

stratum of the suprarenal gland"— a rather unusual prescription.

P.

P.

Kryuchkov. Gorky's secretary, had gotten Peshkov

drunk and left him unconscious on

a

bench in the cold; when

pneumonia resulted, champagne and

a

laxative were prescribed.

had
Kryuchkov had also arranged for Gorky, who

a

history of

.
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tuberculosis, to sit near bonfires, for the "smoke of the

bonfire naturally affected Gorky's weak lungs."

When the

writer returned to Moscow and caught the grippe, Drs
Pletnev and Levin gave him large doses of "digalen" (digitalis) and "camphor."
the first show trial.

Death resulted in June 1936, prior to
142

And then there was the "Bloodhound Yagoda," some
kind of "abnormal and evil figure," wrote Mikhail Koltsov,
leading Soviet journalist. 143

a

Formerly the feared head of

the NKVD, Yagoda had become "a broken, white-haired man,"

whose once jaunty toothbrush moustache had
air."

a

rather "pathetic

He was in a daze during the court proceedings.
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Al-

though Yagoda resisted Vyshinsky's blandishments in his first
appearance before the court, the "poor battered wreck"
finally admitted responsibility for most of the heinous
crimes outlined in the case.

Not only had he been involved

in the assassination of Kirov, but he had facilitated the

deaths of Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Gorky, and Peshkov.

After

his removal from the NKVD post in September 1936, in addition,

Yagoda ordered that his office be sprayed several times with
a

solution of mercury mixed in acid, an ingenious effort to

"poison" his successor, Nikolai Yezhov.

But Yagoda managed

to undermine the state's case in several instances, and in-

serted one telling point in the record:
I

"Had

I

been

a spy,

assure you that dozens of states would have been compelled

to disband their intelligence services.

.,145
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The chief attraction of the trial, however, was "that

damnable cross of

a

fox and a swine," Nikolai Bukharin.

His

distinguished reputation was systematically undermined during
the trial until a new portrait emerged:

with horns, hooves and tail,
mercenary,

a

a

"a demon, complete

traitor, a spy and

a

capitalist

sinister figure, skulking in the shadows, poi-

soning Soviet hogs, slaughtering Soviet stallions, slipping

powdered glass into the workers' butter."

Although

Bukharin accepted "general responsibility" for the bloc's
activities, and pleaded guilty to "the sum total of crimes

committed by this counter-revolutionary organization," he
steadfastly denied any part in Kirov's assassination, any desire to eliminate Stalin, any wish to "open" the front in

case of war, and any conspiratorial ties to foreign intel-

ligence agencies.
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In particular, he rejected the allega-

tion that he had plotted Lenin's death in 1918 at the time of
the Brest-Litovsk controversy.

rest Lenin, Stalin,

There had been

and Sverdlov,

a

plan to ar-

admitted Bukharin, but this

did not imply loss of life, contrary to Vyshinsky's allegation.

In fact,

as

Bukharin reminded the Prosecutor,

You arrested me, that is an act of violence;
however, I am still alive, but perhaps I will
not be alive and I am almost certain of it, yet
bv the
I am still alive, which is testified to
1
fact that I am speaking from this dock.

Bukharin's many asides, highly gualified admissions,
severely
sarcastic rejoinders, and outright denials of fact
professor lectured
tried Vyshinsky's patience. The learned

meanings of certain
his less-educated tormentor on the

"
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Russian and German words, and even discoursed on Hegel
philosophy.

's

Vyshinsky ordered him to stop this "pettifogging"

and refrain from hiding behind "a flood of words/

would cut short the interrogation.

1

or he

In his final speech the

Prosecutor exclaimed:
Philosophy and espionage, philosophy and
wrecking, philosophy and acts of diversion,
philosophy and murder, like genius and villainy, are two things that do not go together!
I know of no other instances
this is the
first instance in history of a spy and a murderer using philosophy, like powdered glass,
to hurl it into his victims eyes before
dashing his brains out with a footpad s
bludgeon. 149

—

1

1

This "garrulous little gentlemen

sented the

11

150

"

to quote Vyshinsky

acme of monstrous hypocrisy

and inhuman villainy."

tactics."

,

,

perfidy

,

,

repre-

jesuitry

He was also following "definite
.

In the opinion of Robert Tucker, these "definite
.

tactics" were an exercise in using Aesopian language or the

"technique of indirection to transform his trial into an
anti-trial, an indictment and conviction of his accuser,
Stalin.
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But whether Bukharin was using "veiled" or "Aesopian"

language to turn Stalin into the accused, he appeared to have
accepted the Bolshevik logic of offering
the Party.

a

"last service" to

In his final plea he explained his reasons for

confessing:

Because while in prison I made a revaluation of
"If
For when you ask yourself:
my entire past.
an absoyou must die, what are you dying for?"
lutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you
with startling vividness. There was nothing to
die for, if one wanted to die unrepented. And,

—
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on the contrary, everything positive that
glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new
dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end
disarmed me completely and led me to bend my
knees before the Party and the country.

In other wcrds, it was better to die within the Party then
to live outside its folds, branded "an enemy of the people." 152

There were many other important facets to this trial,
the longest and most complicated of all the proceedings.

Alexei Rykov also attempted to refute some of the specific

terrorist charges, but his testimony lacked coherence, perhaps because of a liquor problem.

He appeared "to have gone

to pieces completely," wrote a British observer, and punctu-

ated his incoherent utterences with "inane giggles."
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Christian Rakovsky implicated Max Eastman, among others.
Supposedly Great Britain accepted Rakovsky as the Soviet
ambassador in the 1920s, only after Eastman assured London
that the diplomat was on "intimate terms" with Trotsky.
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Faisullah Khodjayev and Akmal Ikramov testified that they had
attempted to turn Uzbekistan into "a British Protectorate."

And Zelensky

,

Zubarev, and Ivanov admitted that they had

been Okhrana agents before the Revolution.
pathetic admission came from Rosengoltz.
the NKVD discovered sewn into

wrapped in cloth.
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a
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But the most

After his arrest

pocket a small piece of bread

Inside the bread was a message:

his wife

This
had written eight verses from the 68th and 91st Psalms.
smirking
was a kind of "family talisman," Rosengoltz told a
"good luck."
Vyshinsky, one that was supposed to bring him
from the gallery and
At that there was a "roar of laughter"

the court broke up in an "atmosphere of general hilarity." 157

In his closing statement Vyshinsky demanded that "the

traitors and spies who were selling our country to the enemy
I CO
must be shct like dirty dogs.* ,J JO
-

But this was a super-

fluous appeal, since even the defendants had realized they
were doomed; Pravda had called for their swift destruction

before the trial opened.

On March 12th President Ulrikh read

in a "toneless voice" the verdict.

Eighteen of the twenty-

one defendants had received the supreme penalty

— "to

be shot,

with the confiscation of all their personal property."
Dr.

Only

Pletnev (25 years), Rakovsky (20 years), and Bessonov

(15 years) were spared,

at least temporarily.
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Trotsky and the "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites "
When news of the new trial reached Trotsky in Mexico,
he immediately prepared his staff to issue daily statements

during the trial's run.

As one secretary has written, timing

was absolutely "crucial," in order to take advantage of in-

ternational attention:

"Even hours could make a difference."

The Old Man worked eighteen-hour days in order to refute the

accusations before public opinion tired of the bloody drama
in Moscow.

The impact of his daily statements on the trial

was "devastating," claimed Joseph Hansen, for the swift re-

sponse to the initial indictment exposed "the frame-up before
the
the show even opened, turned the trial against Stalin in

became
eyes of world opinion from the first day, and each day

worse."

"turning
Once again the chief defendant succeeded in

accuser.
the tables on Stalin, becoming the chief

,,160

.

One may doubt Hansen's claims.

True, Trotsky's

statements on the trial received considerable attention
in
the world press, but there was a certain lack of
"punch" in
the counter-accusations.

It was as if both Stalin and

Trotsky were going through previously rehearsed roles learned
by heart, with little or no deviation.

From Moscow, as usual,

came claims that Trotsky had sent innumerable letters to his

co-conspirators (all burnt, of course), and met with them for
clandestine interviews (few details provided).

If this trial

were an "answer" to the Dewey Commission, as Trotsky claimed,
then Stalin had learned little about shoring up the weak

points in his "frame-up."

In fact, the "sameness" of the

case implied Stalin's contempt and lack of concern for

Trotsky's valiant efforts to expose the contradictions in the
charges
There were so many juicy morsels in the BukharinRykov trial that Trotsky, in

a

sense, took a "back seat" to

the likes of Bukharin, Yagoda, etc.
of "the inspirers" of the conspiracy.

True, he was still one

But unlike the first

two trials, the final verdict did not assert that "enemy of
the people TROTSKY" had been found guilty and would be tried
if found on Soviet territory.

Instead, there were variations

on old themes, played out by the four alleged "Trotskyites"
in the dock

— Krestinsky,

Rosengoltz, Rakovsky, and Bessonov.

According to Rakovsky, the Trotskyite conspirators
had attempted to juggle "three cards" at the same time in
tt
their feverish attempt to regain power in the Soviet Union.
•
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The first "card" involved the Germans, a threadbare charge,

but the indictment announced that Trotsky had actually been
a

German agent since 1921!

He had arranged an alliance with

General Seeckt, Commander-in-Chief of the German Reichswehr.
In exchange for espionage information conveyed by Krestinsky,

Rosengoltz, and Bessonov, and permission for German espionage "bases" to be established secretly on Soviet territory,
the German army provided Trotsky with a yearly subsidy,

amounting to two million gold marks from 1923-30. 162

Trotsky had been their

second card concerned the British:
agent since 1926!

The

In fact, he had helped the conservative

government of Great Britain in 1927 to arrange the raid on
the Arcos office (Soviet Trade Mission) in London which re-

sulted in

a

rupture of diplomatic relations.

And there had

also been plans in 1928 for Trotsky to use British help to

escape from exile in Alma-Ata.
was Japanese.

As for the final card, it

Rakovsky in 1934 made

a

trip to Japan, where

he contacted Japanese intelligence officers, and relayed in164
At one
formation to Trotsky on the developing alliance.

and the same time, therefore, Trotsky had been a German,

British, and Japanese agent!
In reply, Trotsky admitted that after 1921 the

Reichswehr and the Kremlin had secretly helped each other
militarily, but this was
one,

a

Politburo decision, not

a

personal

of coland Stalin himself was "a most dogged partisan

general." Belaboration with the Reichswehr and Germany in
to chose a "disarmed
sides, there was no reason for Trotsky

554

and humiliated Germany" as an ally in 1921.

gigantic subsidy, amounting to over

a

As for the

million dollars, Trotsky

noted that his son had lived and died in extremely "modest
circumstances," and such
not remain unnoticed:
rial trace."

a

large sun in his own budget could

"So large a sum must leave some mate-

He challenged Ambassador Troyanovsky to launch

an investigation into his finances.

The alleged ties with

Great Britain and Japan also made little sense.

But Trotsky

noted Stalin had become less strident in his anti-German
The inclusion of Great Britain, in particular,

propaganda.

in the conspiracy was meant as "a diplomatic warning" to

Prime Minister Chamberlain.
I

continue to perform

a

"Thus, even in my 'betrayals,'

patriotic function."
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Such an enormously complicated conspiracy, of course,

required many surreptitious contacts
munications.

— both

meetings and com-

The Bukharin-Rykov trial abounded in undocu-

mented allegations that the Trotskyite conspirators had contacted Trotsky and his son on many occasions.

For instance,

Rosengoltz supposedly met Sedov at Felden (Austria) in 1933
and at Karlsbad

(

Czchoslovakia) in 1934; but Sedov lived first

in Germany (1933) and then France (1933-34), and could not

travel to either Austria or Czechoslovakia.

Bessonov, in

addition, supposedly met Trotsky in July 1934 (Paris) and

received

a

letter from him in early January 1937.

But in

surveillance
July 1934 Trotsky was under strict French police
detected.
and could not have met Bessonov without being
on board the "Ruth,"
in December 1936- January 1937 he was

And

steaming to Mexico and out of contact with the world.

In

another geographic fantasy, Krestinsky met Sedov in

Kissingen (Germany) in September 1929 (when Trotsky's son was
living in Turkey), and had an interview with Trotsky in the

Italian spa of Meran around the 10th of October, 1933.

But

at that time Trotsky was a patient in France closely watched

by doctors and police agents.

In each case Trotsky referred

skeptical critics to documents in the possession of the Dewey

Commission to buttress his claims.

But after the exertion

made earlier to demolish the alleged interview in the Hotel
Bristol, for instance, there was little reason to launch

full-scale exposure of the new allegations.

been made many times

—

ad_

nause

am
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a

The point had

Once again the GPU's

calendar did not mesh with the calendar used by Trotsky and
his son.
In the third trial other details were added to com-

plete the picture of Trotsky as the arch-conspirator.

cording to Bessonov, Trotsky had

a

Ac-

deep hatred for Gorky,

that "intimate" friend of Stalin's, and relayed instructions:

"'GORKY must be physically exterminated at all costs.'"

And Trotsky was willing to encourage Tukhachevsky

'

s
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military

"coup," but feared that the general was a "Bonapartist " type,

who might not allow Trotsky to return to Moscow after the uprising.

168

Even more important, Bukharin and others testified

that Trotsky participated in the alleged 1918 plot to arrest
their
Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov, which would lead to

"physical removal,"

169 with Trotsky's approval.
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But perhaps the most painful accusation in the entire

trial for Trotsky came from Rakovsky, his old friend.

In his

final plea he told the court:

Citizen Judges, I share the State
Prosecutor's regret that enemy of the people
Trotsky is not here in the dock alongside of
us.
The picture of our trial loses in completeness and depth because of the fact that
the ataman of our gang is not present here.
I regret his absence here for considerations of a political nature.
I am sorry, because Trotsky's absence in this dock means
that no matter how his opportunities may be
limited, his activities will continue, and
this presents a danger, even if a small one,
for the international labour movement.
It is
true that even beyond the Mexican meridian
Trotsky will not escape that complete, final,
shameful ignominy which we all are undergoing
.

.

.

here. 170

In effect, Rakovsky announced that a death sentence hung over

Trotsky's head, one that was redeemed in August 1940.
If the accusations were basically the same, so was

The sadistic charges represented the

Trotsky's response.
"delirium of

a

lunatic armed with enormous power," saturated

with "the spirit of totalitarian idiocy

,"

in his opinion:

It is with almost _a physical effort that J_
tear my own thought away from the nightmarish
combinations of the OGPU and direct them u pon
" How and why
could all this be
the guestion
,

made possible ?

More than ever he was convinved that the incredible accusations prefigured the end of the regime, which he compared to
the "odor of decay" that had arisen from the Rasputin affair
at the end of the Tsar's reign:

disgorging such gases is doomed.

"The ruling layer capable of

The present trial is the

dictatorship.
tragic death-struggle of the Stalinist

,.l

7l

"

'
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Trotsky still considered Stalin

victim of his own

a

politics, "forced to drink salt water in order to quench his

thirst."
"

Czar

'

"

But this "outstanding mediocrity" had become the
"

of a

caste of rapacious parvenus

,"

who felt

threatened by the living traditions of October.

Supported by

the totalitarian apparatus and unlimited material resources,
he created even "spicier" dishes until he decided "to ravish

the conscience of the world," with yet another trial.

The

defendants in the trial used Yezhov's "illiterate cribs,"
but behind the scene "Cain-D jugashvili rubs his hands and

cackles evilly," charged Trotsky, whose personal distaste for
Stalin was becoming more pronounced.

But the rats were

leaving the sinking ship, hatred was accumulating around
Stalin, and terrible revenge hung over his head.

Another

bureaucratic "'genius'" would only succeed him, if he were
But Trotsky confidently predicted:

struck down.

The monuments he /Stalin/ built to himself will
be destroyed or put in museums of totalitarian
But the victorious working class
gangsterism.
will look through all the trials, public and
secret, and erect on the squares of the liberated
Soviet 'union monuments to the unfortunate victims2
1
of the Stalin system of baseness and dishonor.
'

The rehabilitations did begin in 1956, but the representative
of the "victorious working class" was N.
a

"Trotskyite

S.

Khrushchev, hardly

.

VIII.

Liquidation

began, the
Even before the Bukharin-Rykov trial
for the Defense of
Executive Board of the American Committee

.
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Leon Trotsky had voted to disband (February 17, 1938).

But

a final

membership meeting was held in the Hotel Center on

March

"to try to save the lives" of the new defendants

9

standing trial in Moscow.

Approximately 2,000 people at-

tended, but they only contributed $370.68 to the Committee's

coffers.

No matter, George Novack was highly pleased with

the meeting:

The turnout and enthusiasm generated by our
meeting is a new testimony to the achievement
of the Committee in illuminating American public opinion on the issues which concern us.
So
great is that achievement that the Communist
Party is losing its head with rage. It has begun a new campaign of slander against the

Committee
Novack, in particular, was gratified that during the Lamont
"forgery" affair, the Committee's membership had rallied

around the Executive Board.

This support proved to him that

"an unbreakable phalanx of fighters for democratic rights

enlisted under our banner."

173

Besides speeches from Suzanne La Follette, Eugene
Lyons, Carlo Tresca, Bertram Wolfe, and Max Shachtman, the

gathering in the Hotel Center heard prepared messages read
for Norman Thomas and Horace Kallen.

The Socialist leader

took the opportunity to condemn the Soviet Union, unfit in
his opinion to lead the working class or mankind:

"There is

no good society which can exist shot through with lies, terby
rorism, plots, counter-plots and everything else revealed

these trials."

Still perplexed by the issue of the confes-

in self-abuse, in
sions, Thomas declared that these exercises
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any event, constituted "an irreparable injury to the movement

for true socialism."

Certainly the accusations against

Bolshevik leaders were "incredible" and "Stalin's own thirst
for blood is pathological."

Thomas concluded that progres-

sive forces in America needed to free themselves from these
174
Soviet conflicts.

Kallen, always concerned for refugee rights, informed
the meeting that their specific tasks with regard to Trotsky

has been accomplished, but the problem of providing political

refugees with the right of asylum and equal justice before
the law was more critical than ever:

old as civilization.
of free society."

"These rights are as

They are a part of the great tradition

But they were threatened everywhere in the

world which, in turn, threatened "all values which democracy
has bred and is nourishing."

In the opinion of this liberal,

even though Trotsky was a communist revolutionary, he was "an
apt symbol of the necessity to make secure beyond question

the right of asylum and the right to equal justice."

For,

democracy requires the right of asylum and
the right of equal justice shall be recognized
everywhere, and for everyone, beyond question.
If they can be established for the terrible
Trotsky, they can hardly be denied to the
anonymous, stateless multitudes who are in
flight from persecution, cruelty and demoralization at the hands of the anti-democratic
dictatorships of the world. Leon Trotsky is
the symbol of them all.
.

.

.

In the future,

added this noted philosopher, it would be

recognized that Dewey's work had grown out "of the highest
Dewey,

tradition of liberty and justice of our country."

I
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indeed, was among the foremost liberals holding aloft the

torch of this tradition:
of America speaks,

"In him and through him the soul

and speaks for all suppliants of the right

of asylum and equal justice before the law." 175

On March 21 the Executive Board met to conclude the

business of the Defense Committee.

It voted to send to the

membership a referendum ballot, requesting approval to disband the enterprise.

And

a

"Liquidating Committee" was pro-

posed to assume control of the Committee's assets, and reduce
the "considerable deficit" that was reflected in its accounts.

In fact, the total bank credit at the time was

a

mere $9.53.

Against liabilities of $3,258.04, the Committee only had assets amounting to $2,251.33.

And the bulk of these "assets"

176
represented 1,350 unsold copies of The Case of Leon Trotsky
.

As a result, Novack sent out one last appeal to the membership,

urging that each supporter contribute another $10 in order to
reduce the "book" deficit of $1000.

This was the "final

voluntary effort" requested by the American Committee for the
Defense of Leon Trotsky.

177
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CONCLUSION

Leon Trotsky and the other participants in the Com-

mission of inquiry had few doubts about its historical significance.

According to the chief witness in the case, it

"would not be an exaggeration to say that the decision of the

Commission will enter history

as the most

verdicts ever pronounced by any

court."'''

important of all

And the final re-

port of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky

proudly claimed:
The prime agency in interesting public opinion in the issue of investigating the Moscow
trials, not only in this country but the world
The motto which
over, has been our Committee.
"Let the
we carried on our bulletins was:
truth be known." Today we can say that our
banner has been planted on a high peak where it
waves for all to see.

This self-approbation was hardly surprising, of course, but it

need not be taken at face value.
to be answered.

Important questions remain

In line with Dewey's goal, did the Commission

of Inquiry vindicate "truth and justice" with its investiga-

tion?

And in line with Trotsky's aim, did he clear his polit-

ical name and turn his accuser--St alin— into the accused?

In a narrow sense, both the American Committee for
fulthe Defense of Leon Trotsky and the Commission of Inquiry

filled their self-appointed tasks.

Certainly the Defense

Committee materially aided Trotsky in gaining
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a "safe" refuge

i

—
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in Mexico.

And it was the decisive force in creating the

"international" commission of inquiry.

This Commission, in

turn, undertook a painstaking and basically impartial in-

vestigation of Trotsky with considerable integrity.
final verdict

— "Not

Guilty"

— was

Its

not universally accepted

when issued, but with the passage of time it has gained

greater weight.

In December of 1937 Dewey predicted that as

new evidence appeared, "every finding of the Commission will
be confirmed to the hilt as this new material becomes public.

Within certain limits Dewey's prediction has been vindicated
in the ensuing years.
Speech" was, in

a

Nikita

sense,

S.

Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret

just the continuation and cumulation

of the Dewey Commission's labors.

4

Yet the investigation was not without flaws, which
affected its reputation in 1936-33.

Certainly the very name

of the Defense Committee caused unnecessary complications.
"The American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky"

this was not a "neutral" sounding organization.

To some de-

gree, the communist claim that this was a "Trotskyite" front

was deserved, considering the work of George Novack, Felix

Morrow, and others.

This stigma, in turn, unfairly sullied

the good name of the Commission of Inquiry, a progeny of the

original organization.

It is hard to fault The Nation and

other periodicals when they criticized the close ties between
of
the two groups, which at least conveyed the "appearance"

bias.

Instead of picking wholly impartial jurists, theolo-

investigative
gians, historians, etc., the founders of the
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body named three Defense Committee members

— Dewey,

La Follette— on the preliminary commission.

Stolberg,

The investiga-

tion was hardly a "whitewash," but it was somewhat tainted

by its membership.
Any self-appointed investigative body has certain

built-in handicaps.

Lacking any kind of quasi- judicial or

governmental legitimacy, it can only depend on its reputation and the conduct of the investigation to lend authority
to the findings.

In this case, John Dewey was the "moral"

authority and arbiter for the commission of inquiry.

His

great prestige and judicious bearing gave dignity to the endeavor.

Certainly the work of the commission reflected his

scholarly habits and personal integrity.

But even Dewey was

During the Mexican hearings he should

not without faults.

have insisted on a much more rigorous examination of the

"accused."

Although it proved impossible to include

a

"Stalinist" in the counter-trial, Moscow should have been

represented in the Blue House, even if only by
appointed counsel" for the Kremlin.
truly antagonistic to Trotsky
disgust, partly as

a

a

"court-

The only commissioner

— Carleton

Beals

— resigned

in

result of his own prickly disposition,

and partly as a result of Dewey's inept handling of the affair.

Perhaps most important, Dewey should have followed

his own good advice and avoided political controversies as

much as possible.

Almost imperceptily the investigation be-

Soviet system
came as much concerned with the nature of the

innocence.
as it was with Trotsky's guilt or

Certainly it

i

5
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was extremely difficult to separate the two aspects of the

inquiry.

But the Commission transcended its own mandate, to

Trotsky's glee and its critics despair
•

Thus, the final

.

sentences of Not Guilty declared:
the indictments and confessions in the
widely publicized series of trials of alleged
plotters against the Soviet regime were determined in each case including the trials of
August, 1936, and January, 1937 by the current internal difficulties, economic and
political, and by the current situation in
the foreign relations, of the Soviet regime.
In other words, we find that the trials have
served not juridical but political ends.
.

.

.

—

—

This was, on balance, "political intervention" in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, as Corliss Lamont and other

critics correctly charged.
On certain subjects, such as Lenin's "Testament,"
the investigators were unable to challenge Trotsky's testi-

mony because of their ignorance of Soviet history.

But they

grasped the most important points of Trotsky's case, developed
their own evidence, and presented their conclusions in
logical and lucid manner.

a

If truth was not on "the march"

after their efforts, certainly it was a little farther down
By preserving their faith in the worth of truth,

the road.
justice,

and fair play, Dewey & Company stood in dramatic

contrast to the political and moral expediency practiced by
many leading American liberals and radicals in the late
1930s.

provoked

The Moscow trials and subsequent Dewey Commission
a

the
crisis of conscience that undermined faith in

leader of "the
Popular Front and the Soviet Union as the
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forces of peace."

The editorials in The Nation and The New

Republic during the Bukharin-Rykov trial, for instance, re-

flected increased doubt about the integrity of Soviet justice
and the value of being aligned with the Soviet Union.

These

doubts were reinforced ten-fold when the Soviet-German Non-

Agression Pact of August 1939 was signed, a "climax of
smaller but cumulative crises," in the opinion of Norman

H.

In hindsight, it "was a better preservation of

Pearson.

values to have used them than simply to have stood pat," he
added.

In this context, John Dewey and his ilk provided a

service by standing firm for their values, and thus providing
a lesson to other liberals,

one only partially learned after

1939.

Perhaps most important in the long run, the investi-

gation of the Dewey Commission had "unexpected consequences,"
just as the purges did in the Soviet Union.

Dewey personally

became more intransigent toward the Soviet Union and more

enamored with the United States.

In an interview granted

just after the final verdict was announced, Dewey declared

that the "great lesson to be derived from these amazing

revelations is the complete breakdown of revolutionary
Marxism."

Americans, in particular, should be aware of the

about
whole question of "truly democratic methods of bringing

approach
social changes and of truly democratic methods of
to social progress."

As he did in his debate with Trotsky

Dewey asserted that the
over the question of means and ends,
consequences that are
or
ends
"the
decided
employed
methods

actually attained."

If Soviet methods were merging with

those of Hitlerism, asked Dewey, then how could Americans
rely upon them?

"The essence of fascism is no sweeter if

called by some other name."

The many revelations of the

trials had been "a bitter disillusionment" to Dewey, who no

longer viewed the Soviet Union as
experiment.

a

highly important social

The prevalence of ignorance and widespread lying

in the USSR meant real progress was practically impossible:

"For truth, instead of being a bourgeois virtue, is the main-

spring of all human progress."

7

Dewey's tendency to see all versions of Marxism as

tainted

— "Siamese

Twins" in their degeneracy

other liberals in the late 1930s.

— was

echoed by

And when it became in-

creasingly likely that Soviet Russia and Hitlerite Germany
might become new bedfellows, Dewey and others took the lead
in rejecting both varieties of "fascism."

appeared

a

In May 1939 there

"Manifesto" in The Nation urging the creation of

Committee for Cultural Freedom.

a

Announcing that the "tide of

totalitarianism" was rising throughout the world, and
and
threatened the integrity of the artist, writer, scholar,

scientist, this proclamation asserted that the totalitarian
Japan,
idea was already "enthroned in Germany, Italy, Russia,

and Spain."

Instead of resisting and denouncing all attempts

states glorified,
to "strait- jacket the human mind," these
color or the cut of
"under deceptive slogans and names, the
one strait- jacket rather than another."

Unless combated, the

to America:
specter of totalitarianism would spread
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We therefore call for the formation of a
Committee for Cultural Freedom, an organization independent of control, whether open or
secret, by any political group, pledged to
expose repression of intellectual freedom
under whatever pretext, to defend individuals
and groups victimized by totalitarian practices anywhere, to propagate courageously the
ideal of untrammeled intellectual activity.

Among those joining together on the least common denominator
of a civilized culture

lectual freedom"

— were

Dewey Commission.

— "the

defense of creative and intel-

a number of names associated with the

Besides Dewey, others signing their names

to this "manifesto," included Adamic, Calverton, Chamberlain,

Eastman, Hook, Kallen, La Follette, Lyons, Dos Passos, Rorty,
Stolberg, and Thomas.

Q

Many of these people became violent

anti-communists after World War II and contributed "their
quotas to the ideological virulence of the Cold War," as

Novack has stated; and its adherents were strongly represented in the original call for the creation of
for Cultural Freedom.

took

a

a

Committee

And the Committee for Cultural Freedom

leading ideological role in combating communism

the financial assistance of the C.I. A. —in the 1950s.

experience of "defending" Trotsky had soured

a

— with
The

significant

segment of the radical left on any kind of Marxism.

9

*************
The "counter-trial" was only a qualified success for

Certainly he had little choice but to stage some

Trotsky.

form of

a

judicial inquiry.

Although much of the world press

on the trials, these
was willing to publish his articles
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episodic statements could hardly counter successfully the

massive "lying" campaign being conducted by the Comintern and
its agents.

A dramatic confrontation with Stalin, even if

only his specter, was a necessity.

The great orator, in

short, needed a platform.

But the Dewey Commission was not the ideal body to

vindicate the political reputation of
tionary.

a

professional revolu-

The absence of representatives from the two so-

cialist internationals meant that this was scarcely
"workers'

court."

a

In addition, the panel missed the presence

of a Gide, Shaw, or Malraux, an international intellectual

leader who could command respect outside the United States.

Alfred Rosmer, Wendelin Thomas, and Otto Ruehle were not
"moral" leaders of world stature.

Instead, Trotsky placed

his honor in the hands of American liberals and radicals,
for whom he normally had the utmost disdain.

Dewey Commission was

a

Basically the

"liberal" court trying a Bolshevik

revolutionary, something of

a

historical jest.

Trotsky, however, was correct that even if the

Commission lacked "VIPs," it would gain prestige as the case
unfolded.

The "defense" he presented was detailed, coherent,

and well-nigh irrefutable in many important aspects.

"By the

end no question had been left unanswered, no important issue
blurred, no serious historic event unilluminated

Deutscher has written.

10

,

"

Isaac

The eminent historian was exag-

particular,
gerating, for on his relations with Lenin, in

Trotsky's testimony left much to be desired.

Yet his
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painstaking and pedantic effort to document the impossibility
of meeting Messrs. Holtzman, Romm, and Pyatakov
as stipulated
in the Moscow indictments bore fruit.

Henceforth any serious

study of the Moscow trials had to take into consideration

Trotsky's "alibi" on these three decisive points, which went
far toward discrediting the trials themselves.

To a large

degree, he had succeeded in proving "a negative fact."
But the Mexican '"counter-trial" had also exposed some

limitations in his own understanding of the purge phenomenon.

Trotsky expressed scant interest in the black wave of NKVD
agents who were terrorizing millions of innocent victims.

Like Khrushchev, his concern was for unjustly accused Party
members, most of all for Trotskyites.

Never did he emphati-

cally condemn the purges or show trials without qualification;
he saved his condemnation for Stalin's "falsifications" and

"frame-ups," not the Bolshevik tendency to cleanse the Party

publicly of unwanted members.

As a result, it was sometimes

difficult during the hearings to understand where Trotsky
left off and Stalin began.

In addition, his oft-repeated

assertion that the trials represented the regime's "death
agony" revealed a serious misunderstanding of Stalin's

strength.

Instead of fearing Trotsky and the Fourth

International, Stalin was using the "devil-figure" of Trotsky
to justify a "social prophylaxis" of immense dimensions.

If

Trotsky had not existed, Stalin would have needed to create
him.

The exiled Russian leader provided

a

"last service" to

Stalin by becoming the pretense for his final "coronation."
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With Trotsky's help, Stalin became the undisputed master of
the Party and nation after the purge was terminated.

In fact,

the end of the purges signaled the beginning of Trotsky's
own "death agony."

For Stalin no longer needed him.

Execu-

tion followed in 1940.

Certainly Trotsky's defense and the Dewey Commission's

verdict undermined Soviet prestige, but not fatally.

Only

four months after the verdict was announced, Stalin staged
the Bukharin-Rykov trial, with scant regard for contradic-

tions or inconsistencies in the case.

This act was almost a

slap in the face for Trotsky and Dewey, expressing Stalin's

contempt for his critics.

Apparently the Soviet dictator

still considered that Western public opinion would "swallow"

almost any tale, no matter how absurd.

"Faith" in the Soviet

Union survived even the most damning exposures, simply because it was a matter of the "heart, not head."

And even

after the war he returned to this genre, authorizing
of "show" trials in the eastern satellite nations.

a

series

Thus,

Trotsky's rational analysis of the "frame-up" did not
seriously affect western

useless as
fall.

a

"gullibility," and proved almost

political weapon to bring about Stalin's down-

Trotsky had "truth" on his side, but Stalin had power.

apparatus was
At least in the short run the totalitarian

triumphant over the isolated seekers of truth.

Stalin, not

had justice on
Trotsky, was on the march, even if the latter

his side.

************
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Trotsky did not live to see the verdict of "not
guilty" vindicated by the passage of time.

But against great

odds, the lonely exile fought for his personal and profes-

sional honor, certainly a heroic undertaking.

Eventually, as

he predicted, some of "the unfortunate victims of the Stalin

system of baseness and dishonor" were rehabilitated, even if
the new Soviet leaders did not erect statues to them in

Russian squares. 11

But the monuments to Stalin did come

down, and he was judged responsible for the great "frame-up,"

both in the West and in the East.

Decades after the counter-

trial Stalin had been turned into the "accused," Trotsky's

great goal in beginning the unequal battle to expose "the

greatest falsification" in all of history.
He had triumphed in the main, with one great ex-

ception.

The rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky in the Soviet

Union is still unfinished business.

When,

and if,

a

monument

to Lev Davidovich Trotsky is erected in Moscow, then his

triumph will be complete.
Guilty" will be rendered.

And the final verdict of "Not

.
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account must be used with some care, since much of it was
based on prison gossip. Also, she clearly placed the incident in "the summer of 1932," and claimed that Nadya
Alliluyevna was "shocked" by Stalin's behavior; she committed
In repeating this tale, however,
suicide in November, 1932.
Hyde placed the attempted assassination in 1935, or sometime
before Yenukidze 's fall from grace. In addition, Orlov has
written of a "'princess'" in the Kremlin, and Nicolaevsky has
suggested she was Countess Orlova-Davydova later shot for
attempting to take Stalin's life. Accounts vary, but ap,
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* n January 1938 Trotsky wrote an extremely warm
w
for him) eulogy of Yenukidze, the "Biblical
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Abel" to
Stalin's "Cain." He favorably described the Georgian's
mild
character, strong attachment to Lenin and himself
dislike
of Stalin, and efforts to mitigate the harsh treatment
meted
out to the "Old Bolsheviks." In conclusion, Trotsky
stated
"With him, the old generation of Bolsheviks disappeared
from
the scene— he, at least, without self-humiliation." in this
article Trotsky revealed several anecdotes almost gossipy
in nature about the "domestic" life of the Kremlin.
See Leon
Trotsky, "Behind the Kremlin Walls" (January 13, 1938)
in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 ed. by George Breitman
and Evelyn Reed (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp.
165-69, reproduced from New International March, 1939.
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See Conquest, Great Purge pp. 88-89; Orlov, Secret
History p. 312; and Nicolaevsky, "Rehabilitation of'
Yenukidze," in Power and the Soviet Elite pp. 218-25.
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See Orlov, Secret History p. 313, and Hyde, Stalin
In the Bukharin-Rykov trial it was stated that the
p. 369.
"case of A. S. Yenukidze was tried by the Military Collegium
of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. on December 15, 1937."
However, his "corpse" figured prominently in the trial.
Rykov, Bukharin, and Yagoda testified that Yenukidze was a
"mainstay" in the plot to stage a "palace coup," had ordered
Kirov's death, and had a hand in the "medical murders." See
"
Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites " pp. 35, 177, 390-91, 57075.
_/Tucker and Cohen, eds., Great Purge Trial
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"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky, Power
and the Soviet Elite p. 57.
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A copy of this letter from the "Smolensk
Archiveswas provided courtesy of Prof. Robert
H. McNeal.
In some
1S lGtter included accusations not
mentioned in the
official summary of the Zinoviev-Kamenev
trialcomparison of the two might prove fruitful. In a detailed
the official
summary of the trial, based on the account in
Izvesti a only
76 pages out of 171 were devoted to the testi mony
of th e defendants; the rest of the English-version
consists
indictment and Vyshinsky's summation speech. Other of the
summaries
appeared in International Press Correspondence
September 10
1936, and Rundschau September 1, 1936.
As far as this
writer knows, no one has compared the press reports of
the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, official English summary of its proceedings, and daily accounts of the testimony in Pravda.
Such a study might produce some surprising discrepancies.
After the Pyat akov-Radek and Bukharin-Rykov trials, Moscow
issued "verbatim" accounts of the proceedings, but 'here again
there is some evidence that judicious cuts were made.
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Robert H. McNeal, "The Decisions of the CPSU and
The Great Purge," Soviet Studies XXXII (October 1971)
180-81.
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Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, "Secret Letter of the TsK VKP (b):~ On the
terroristic activity of the trotskyite-zinovievite counterrevolutionary bloc," July 29, 1936, Smolensk Archives pp.
13-14.
A short section of the "Secret Letter" is translated
in Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule p. 233.
It is also
mentioned in Schapiro, Communist Party p. 408, and Conquest,
Great Terror p. 101.
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Walter Duranty, "Proof of
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Harold Denny, "Trials Dramatize Soviet Struggles,"
New York Times August 23, 1936, IV, p. 5.
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Orlov, Secret History p. 159.
Also see Conquest,
Great Terror p. 105, and Harold Denny, "16 in Soviet Admit
August 20,
2 Plots to Kill Stalin and Others," New York Times
1936, p. 5.
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Joshua Kunitz, "The Moscow Trials
October 20, 1936, p. 4.
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Orlov, Secret History
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"With Despair," Time
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March 14, 1938, p. 21.
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Conquest, Great Terror pp. 104-05. In January 1946
a British section of the Fourth International reminded the
High Tribunal at Nuremburg of the charges against Trotsky in
the Moscow purge trials.
In addition, a British committee,
led by H. G. Wells, and an American group, headed by Norman
Thomas, petitioned the Tribunal to question Rudolph Hess and
Alfred Rosenberg about Trotsky's alleged ties to the Nazi
leadership.
In May 1946 Albert Goldman, Trotsky's former
lawyer, demanded the right to cross-examine witnesses and
examine documents, a demand supported by Natalya Sedova.
But Washington, London, and Paris joined with Moscow to
squash any attempt to reopen the old charges. For more on
this belated attempt to clear Trotsky's name see the New York
Times, March 27, 1946, p. 12; Victor Serge, Vie et Mort de
Trotsky (Paris: Amiot *Dumont 1951), p. 26ln; and Joseph
Hansen, "Forward" to Leon Trotsky, Stalin' s Frame-up System
and the Moscow Trials (New York:
Pioneer Publishers, 1950),
xix-xx.
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Orlov, Secret History p. 328.
Also see pp. 329-39
for Orlov' s comments on Vyshinsky's character and career.
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"Perfect Dictator," Time August 31, 1936, p. 16.
The editors of Time also cooperated with Stalin in underlining
the anti-semitic undertones of the trial. Under the pictures
of Zinoviev Kamenev and Trotsky were helpful captions
reading, respectively "ne Apf elbaum " "ne Rosenf eld, " and
At least ten of the
See loc. cit.
"ne Bronstein."
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sixteen defendants were of Jewish ancestry.
Armstrong, Politics of Totalitarianism
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Grigori E Evdokimov was a veteran Party member
and one time Central Committee member.
V. A. Ter-Vaganyan
was a Party ideologist and leader of the Armenian Bolsheviks.
S. V. Mrachkovsky had long been active for the Party
in the
Ural region.
I. P. Bakayev was a former head of the Petrograd
Cheka and member of the Central Control Commission. Y. A.
Dreitzer had been a Civil War hero and chief of Trotsky's
bodyguard. The eight lesser figures in the trial were:
I. I. Reingold, R. V. Pickel
E. S. Holtzman, F. David
(Kruglyansky)
V. P. Olberg, K. B. Berman-Yurin
M. I. Lurye
and N. L. Lurye.
See Trot sky ite-Zinovievite Centre pp. 38-'
Olberg, David and Berman-Yurin had more than casual ties
39.
with the NKVD.
See Orlov, Secret History pp. 61-65, 108-09.
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the scenario.
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Tucker, "Introduction," to Tucker and Cohen
Great Purge Trial, p. xix.

eds

126

Quoted in Leites and Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation
Although copious quotations make this original study
p. 276.
all but impossible to fathom, the authors have made a careful
study of the reasons for capitulation, the modes of confession, various tactics of resistance, and the use of veiled
language, using a quasi-psychological approach that is both
stimulating and irritating, since much of their argument is
unprovable
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This "Open Letter" (March 1, 1932) was in response
to the Soviet decree of February 20, 1932, depriving Trotsky
It was printed in Russian, German,
of Soviet citizenship.
French, Belgian, Spanish, Greek, and American periodicals.
Piconeer
See Max Shachtman, Behin d the Moscow Trial (New York:
Publishers, 1936), pp. 79-80.
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According to Orlov, in May 1936 the NKVD producers
of the upcoming drama met with Stalin to go over the
script
At that time G. A. Molchanov displayed a special diagram
featuring multi-colored lines, indicating how and when
Trotsky had made contact with his many emissaries. Although
the diagram looked "imposing and linked Trotsky firmly with
the chiefs of the conspiracy in the Soviet Union," Stalin
was not overly impressed with this example of bureaucratic
legerdemain and pointed out that none of the accused could
testify to having personally received instructions from
Trotsky to commit various terroristic acts. As a result,
the NKVD hastily surfaced David and Berman-Yurin from its
German apparatus; they were instructed to testify about
meeting Trotsky in Copenhagen in December, 1932, and receiving orders to eliminate Stalin. See Orlov ,' Secret
History pp. 107-08, and Hyde, Stalin pp. 367-68^
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These phrases are an accurate
pp. 135-37.
description of Stalin's behavior toward Kirov, as Conquest
has implied, Great Terror, p. 51.
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Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre pp. 138-40. Supposedly Stalin's favorite bedtime reading was The Prince
But in 1936 the implied comparison of Stalin and Machiavelli
hero was no longer acceptable. One Soviet medievalist, who
had missed this exchange on The Prince in the trial, continued
to lecture his students on Marx's admiration for Machiavelli.
He was censored for being politically indifferent.
See Beck
and Godin, Russian Purge pp. 175-76.
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him "'I scat
in his face.'" Finally Mrachkovsky bowed
to the 'argument
that one must remain within the Party even
unto death and
he wept, along with Slutsky.
At the confrontation
Mrachkovsky and Smirnov cried on each other's necks
but
Smirnov would not capitulate until later, after
Mrachkovsky
had signed his confession.
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Ter-Vaganyan had been one of the
last to give a full confession (August 4, 1936) during the
preliminary examination. At that point his interrogator
suggested the Party might still find useful work for him.
It is reported he replied:
"'I have not the slightest desire to be in a high post.
If my party, for which I lived,
and for which I was ready to die any minute, forced me to
sign this then I don't want to be in the Party. Today I
envy the most ignorant non-Party man. " Quoted in Conquest
Gre at Terror p. 134.
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Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre, pp. 170-71. This is
a classic example of what Leites and Bernaut have called the
"rules of translation," where the accused were convinced
that there was some kind of equivalence between the opposition they felt and the extreme offenses to which they confessed; unintended consequences of certain thoughts were
"translated" into deliberate aims.
See Leites and Bernaut,
Ritual of Liquidation pp. Ill, 250.
But Tucker has contended that these "rules" e.g., anti-Stalin equals "counterrevolutionary," oppositional activity equals "treason," etc
etc. -were actually forced on the defendants.
See his "Introducti on
to Tucker and Cohen, eds., Great Purge Trial p. xxxi
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The King asked the jury to consider
its verdict
"'No, no! said the Queen,
'Sentence firstverdict afterward.'
"'Stuff and nonsense!' said Alice loudly.
The idea of having the sentence first!'
"•Hold your tongue!' said the Queen
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"'I won't!
said Alice.
"'Off with her head!' the Queen shouted at
the top of her voice.
Nobody moved." See Carroll
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Quoted in Hyde, Stalin p. 343. At a drunken NKVD
debauch in December, 1936, which Stalin attended, K. V.
Pauker, something of the court buffoon, gave an impression
of Zinoviev's last minutes before death:
"'Please, for God's
sake, comrade, call up Yosif Vissarionovich
"
supposedly
cried Zinoviev on his knees.
Since his Chief was convulsed
with laughter, Pauker gave a repeat performance, this time
adding, with hands raised, "'Hear, Israel, our God is the
only God!'" Pauker had to stop, as the general hilarity was
too much for Stalin.
See Orlov, Secret History p. 353.
Also quoted in Conquest, Great Terror p. 163.
,

1

!

,

,

188

Orlov, Secret History

189„
Conquest, Great Terror
1

191

Ibid.

,

p.

p.

,

,

p.

172.
118.

121.

Liberal reaction to this trial in America will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter III. However, an acute
observation by the "reactionary" magazine, Time (August 31,
1936, p. 18) should be noted here.
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From Moscow Harold Denny reported that this appeal caused much indignation
and was considered a "stupid maneuvre.
See Harold Denny
Sentences 16 to Die in Plot to Kill Red Leaders'" "Soviet
New York
Times August 24, 1936, p. 3.
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Quoted in The American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky, World Voices on the Moscow Trials
A compilation from the Labor and Liberal press of the worlds/compiled
by Sidney Hook and Max Nomad/ (New York: Pioneer Publishers
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Pritt's analysis is also discussed
in Adler, Witchcraft Trial pp. 16-22; Conquest
"The Great
Purge," Encounter XXI (October, 1968), 86; and'soviet Russia
Today Vol. 5 (November 1936), 8.
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and The Soviet Elite p. 64.
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See Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre pp. 55, 65, 73.
In his preliminary testimony Kamenev, in speaking of various
ways to gain power, said, "Besides, we considered it not excluded that taking part in the organization of the new
government authority would also be the Rights Bukharin,
Tomsky and Rykov." See Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, "Secret Letter of the Tsk (VKP
(b):
On the terroristic activity of the trotskyitezinovievite counterrevolutionary bloc," July 29, 1936,
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Quoted in Bailey, Conspirators pp. 205-07. Also
see "Question of a September 1936 Plenum of the CPSU
Central
Committee," Slavic Review XXVI (December, 1967), 667-68.
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See "Question of a September 1936 Plenum of the
CPSU
Central Committee," Slavic Review XXVI (December,
1967)
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f0r a ful1 discuss i°n of the issue, with comments by
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Abdurakhman
Avtorkhanov, John A. Armstrong, Robert M. Slusser
and George Kennan.
Also see Conquest, Great Terror pp. 151-'
Among the many pieces of evidence bearing on the case
53.
"Letter of an Old Bolshevik" states that "when the trial was
in full swing," Stalin left "for a rest in Caucasus:
His
departure was designed to make impossible the convocation of
the Politburo to discuss the fate of the accused." It is
doubtful that a Central Committee Plenum could have been held
in his absence.
However, the "Letter" also claims that there
was "some conflict with respect to the advisability of additional trials and the persons who were to be incriminated.
Under pressure of some members of the Politburo, announcement
was made rehabilitating Bukharin and Rykov." See "Letter,"
Nicolaevsky, Power and The Soviet Elite p. 63.
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See "Question of a September 1936 Plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee," Slavic Review XXVI (December, 1967),
676-77.
In his Russia and The West
Under Lenin and Stalin
Mentor Book (New York: New American Library, 1962T7~p. 289,'
Kennan contended that "During Stalin's absence, at the beginning of September, there took place a plenary session of
the Central Committee at which, once again, Stalin's will
appears to have been defied by his associates."
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Orlov, Secret History pp. 198-99. Lion
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Feuchtwanqer
had an interview with Stalin shortly before the
second trial
11
At th S timS Stalin "spoke bitterly and with
feeling"
;
i
of Radek, with
whom he had had friendly relations:
'"You
Jews,' he said, 'have created one eternally true
legend—
that of Judas,'" reported Feuchtwanger
Also Stalin complained that Radek had written him a long letter professing
1
00611065
and then confes sed the next day.
See Moscow
a?-,
1937: My visit described for my friends trans, by Irene
Josephy (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1937)
p. 128.
216
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.
Re P° rt 21 Court Proceedings in the case of the Anti-Sovi
et
Trotskyite Centre (Moscow:
People's Commissariat of Justice
of the U.S.S.R., 1937), p. 549.
Hereafter cited as AntiSoviet Trotskyite Centre
Krivitsky reported that RadeT held
out until a meeting with Stalin in the Kremlin, but then did
an about-face, and told his interrogator, "'You can go to
sleep, Kedrov.
I'll do the rest.'"" From then on Radek conducted the investigation himself.
See In_ Stalin's Secret
Service p. 204.
Walter Duranty, in "Sensation is Seen in
Trial of Radek," the New York Times January 21, 1937, p. 13,
also contended that both Pyatakov and Radek had'seen Stalin
after their investigation had begun.
Radek' s biographer,
Warren Lerner, is more cautious:
"There is some evidence
that Radek insisted on an interview with Stalin before he
agreed to confess; perhaps a deal was made at this meeting."
See Karl Radek p. 168.
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had new respect for constitutional guarantees However he
selflncnmination in American courts, rights which against
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very real meaning when faced with a trial such as
this "
See loc. cit
pp. 36-41.
This book went throuah at least
twenty editions, and was widely read in America" Not
unexpectedly, the correspondent for the Daily Worker remarked
on the "utmost fairness of procedure" in the trial,
"so
characteristic of proletarian justice," which avoided the use
of "lawyers' tricks" in its conduct.
Ulrikh was "a roundfaced, dignified, kindly looking man," and Vyshinsky was
"a tall, impressive, scholarly looking man," who spoke in
a
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towards the accused." For more of this view see Sender
Garlin, "Trial Is Marked by Fairness of Procedure " Daily
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From Moscow Duranty postulated various explanations for
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the inexplicable.
The confessions reflected a national guilt
complex, a la Dostoevsky.
The trial also reminded him of a
Greek tragedy, with "weak men fighting for friends and ideas
they believed to be right." In addition, it was a
Shakespearian tragedy, but the losers paid with their lives:
"This trial is pure Hamlet, but there will be no comeback
for the actors when the curtain falls." Despite a certain
lack of documentary evidence, Vyshinsky had presented a
"painstaking case," wrote Duranty, but he wondered if labeling
all opposition groups as Trotskyite would not magnify Trotsky"
"beyond his desserts." No matter, the "future historian will
probably accept the Stalinist version," he concluded. The
last quotation is from Conquest, G y at Terror pp. 504-05.
For Duranty' s other comments on the trial see the New York
Times
"Radek Wins Tilt of Wits at Trial; Confession Amazes
Spectators," January 25, 1937, p. 3; "Russian on Trial Names
Reich Again," January 26, 1937, p. 11; "Death of 17 Asked at
Moscow Trial," January 29, 1937, p. 2; "Soviet Dooms 13:
Radek and Others Get 10-Year Terms," January 30, 1937, p. 2;
February 1, 1937, pp. 1, 12.
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was eager to establish the type of injuries:
"Heads pierced,
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p. 384.
Knyazev was quoted as testifying, '".
The Japanese intelligence service strongly stressed the necessity of using
bacteriological means in time of war with the object of contaminating troop trains, canteens and army sanitary centres
with highly virulent bacilli.
.'"
See loc cit
p. 14.
During the trial Knyazev identified "Mr. H " as Mr.
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"Russian Plotters Say War on Soviet Was Fixed for 1937," New
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name from the list of intended victims in the first trial
caused a mild sensation; apparently, he was in bad odor in
the Spring of 1936, but had returned to Stalin's good graces
by the time of the second trial.
See Conquest, Great Terror
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that in the 1934 accident the right wheels of Molotov's car
.

,

pp.

17,

219-22.

,

,

.

595

landed in a ditch, causing no injuries
whatsoever
wnatsoever.
Conquest, Great Terror p. 174.

^

Cited in
r-i

•

,

236

alt r Durant Y,
?
t.?

"Audience Laughs at Soviet Trial
riai
When Plotter Annoys Prosecutor
*
New York
£ew
yotk Times, January
01

1937, p. 10.
237

see pp.
2

38

,

_

Anti-Soviet Trotskyi te Centre do
±£^-' PP

302-08.

'

3l i

^

^2£lk ILS

ti " S ° viet Trots ^Yite Centre

240_,

241 T

243

ai
Also

,

p.

*i

'anuary^,

Also see

319.

_

Ibid., p.

242

-

Walter Duranty, "Audience Laughs at
Soviet Tri
AnnOYS Pr ° SeCUt -<"

SS?/"!";!
pp>

308
in
jua - 10

*

27,

Also see pp. 320 25.

324.

Ibid,

.

,

pp.

323-29.

Ibid

.

,

pp.

389-90.

,

* bid

47 $, 481.
In his final plea Arnold
blamed his troubles on having been branded an "'illegitimate
child'" in Tsarist Russia.
But he added that there was no
more "filth" on him:
"Citizen Judges:
I am not yet an altogether lost man." See p. 566.
244
Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, p. 579. See Hyde
2
Stalin p. 348.
.

-

.

PP-

,

245

Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre

246_,

247
248
p.

.

Ibid

.

,

pp.

Ibid

.

,

p.

.

,

p.

6.

, 0
6-8

483.

"Old & New Bolsheviks," Time, February

1

1937

20.

249
250
251

Orlov, Secret History

,

p.

200.

Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, pp. 108-09.
Ibid

According to Conquest, Great
Terror p. 218, the attache in question was General Kostring
of the German Embassy, who was not declared persona non grata
somewhat unusual considering the circumstances.
Gustav Hilger
and Alfred G. Meyer, in The Incompatible Allies
A Memoir of
German-Soviet Relations 1918-41 (New York: Macmillan Company,
1953), pp. 267-68, contended that^in August 1934 Bukharin and
Radek met the German Press Attache and Professor Oberlander
.

,

pp.

443-44.,

,

,

:

,

.

596

^^V^^^^^^^t
k~
be throwing hand grenades for
-

i.

>

-

Moscow.

tne aay will come when
n thw
rne ^ 11
«
mv fe
^
u<5
1

<

l

\:r^er

d

*«^iS7
set
the Soviet government was
j-s
SiSTf

thereby disavowing
i
' the
V ° iCed and castigating such ideas
tr-T^nT^
treasonable,
many more leading personalities,
should
n SqUallY Punish
including
*<V'
Kaganovich and
MoIotov!
'

.

252

.

.

Leite

and Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation
p. 475.
his From Purge to Coexistence pp. 38-39
has
charged that Stalin accused his opponents of his
own plans:
to make a deal with Hitler based on collaboration
in world
affairs, agreement on spheres of influence and
accords on
extensive trade and territorial concessions.
253
For varying versions of the approach see Conquest
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to his readers that Radek 's final speech, with its "verbatim
adoption" of the prosecution thesis, made some believe that
the trial was not a genuine article.
Some experienced observers even wondered if his last words were not "a final
circuitous counter-attack, instead of an apology." See
"Soviet Dooms 13:
Radek And Others Get 10-Year Terms " New
York Times January 30, 1937, p. 2. Radek's charge that
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have the slightest doubt that his exaggerated confessions of
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There is some doubt
that Tukhachevsky and the other commanders were actually
tried.
Ilya Ehrenburg once heard a Corps Commander and member of the Military Court describe Tukhachevsky s trial. Yet
Krivitsky has noted that at least one of the supposed judges
General Alksnis was actually in jail at the time. And
Orlov repeated a remark attributed to M. Frinovsky, a high
NKVD official:
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See_Ehrenburg, Eve of
War, 1933-1941 /Vol. IV of Men Years Life/ trans, by
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improved the quality of the officer corps, allowing younger
officers to replace their ill-trained superiors:
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See Beck and Godin, Russian Purge pp. 98-152, for a discussion of these various categories.
,

;

—

,

320„
Conquest, Great Terror
321

323
324
325

326

pp.

298,

See Beck and Godin, Russian Purge

Weissberg, Accused
322

,

,

pp.

321-22,
,

pp.

Conquest, Great Terror

,

p.

Beck and Godin, Russian Purge

.

,

pp.

207,

and

298.

Quoted in Medvedev, Let History Judge

Ibid

43,

109.

24,

Weissberg, Accused

328-29.

,

,

p.

,

p.

235.

44.

389.

p.

314-16.

327

There are many other tales about the
Ibid
p. 313.
inherent absurdity of the arrest and denunciation syndrome.
See Medvedev, Let History Judge pp. 352-53, for several such
anecdotes.
Hyde, in his Stalin p. 365, includes a story
.

,

,

,

phoned the NKVD again

602

Ported"'
P

31
ten men
^
^nd^L™
thS inves tigation is

So free

fessedl'"^'

iStly!

•

^

C ° mrade Stalin
'

328^

S

S

al ^ady,.

™

the Minister re-

continuinq.'
'*

h

™

*

SSVen ° f them have ^ready con-

f ^V*^

566 Con

<3 uest
Great Terror
n 332-66, and David J. Dallin
Chapter 10,
cnapter
10
D
pp.
and Boris" T~.
Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia
(New Haven Conn
l
r81ty PrSSS ^^-^Hi-NKVD-^nt to g?ea?'leng?
n;
to Hide the camps from inquiring visitors.
In 1944 for in
stance Vice President Henry Wallace and Owen
visited the city of Magadan in eastern Siberia.Lattimore
Lattimore
later wrote that Magadan was part of Dalstroy
/Far-Eastern
Construction Trust/, a truly "remarkable conceTn"
which could
be compared roughly to "a combination Hudson's
Bay Company
and TVA." According to him, the Nikishovs (Dalstroys chief
and his wife), had "a trained and sensitive interest
in
and music and also a deep sense of civic responsibility."art
Dalstroy, of course, was a slave labor empire the
"'cold
Auschwitz of the north,'" four times larger than France.
Both the Nikishovs were noted for their cruelty and were
ranking NKVD officials. For this visit prisoners were hidden
watch towers demolished, and at the best farm in the area,
"fake girl swineherds, who were in fact NKVD office staff,'
replaced the prisoners for the occasion." See Owen Lattimore
"New Road to Asia," National Geographic Magazine LXXXVI
(December, 1944), 641-76. Also see Conquest, Great Terror
pp. 350, 354-55, and Dallin and Nicolaevsky ,' Forced Labor

2^E E

fi

,

,

•

'

,

,

pp.

110-46.

'

REFERENCE NOTES

CHAPTER II:

"THE PLANET WITHOUT A VISA"

1

See Joseph Wittlin, "Sorrow and Grandeur of Exile,"
Polish Review II (Spring-Summer, 1957), 99-111.
,

2

A Russian proverb on this subject reads, "A man
consists of a body, a soul, and a passport."
3

See Erich Maria Remarque, Flotsam trans, from the
German by
Little, Brown and Company,
y Denver Lindley (Boston:
1941), p
,

4

See Nina Berberova, The Italics are Mine trans, by
Philippe Radley (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969),
This autobiography vividly portrays the Russian
£p. 358-59.
emigre experience, especially among the literati. Also see
Vladimir Nabokov, Speak Memory
An Autobiography Revised
(New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1947/1966).
,

:

,

Wittlin, "Sorrow and Grandeur of Exile, " P olish
Review II (Spring-Summer, 1957), 110-11. An emigr£ Writer
of many years experience Wittlin observes that it is difficult
for the shoemaker-writer when his readers prefer to walk barefoot; shoes for imaginary feet gradually lose their charm.
But the grandeur of this solitary existence consists in the
opportunity for the writer to craft shoes for feet which will
tread this earth a hundred years hence.
,

,

6

Ibid .

,

109.

7

Leon Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 trans, from the
Russian by Elena Zarudnaya (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp.
90-91. Also quoted in Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast
Random House,
1929-1940 f Vintage Books (New York:
Trotsky
1965), p. 8
,

,

,

:

Q

In 1902 Lev Davidovich Bronstein wrote the name
former jailer one "Trotsky" in a false passport. This
his nom de guerre for the rest of his career, but in the
decade of his life he traveled on a passport bearing his

—

—

t

of a

was
last
wife
Trotsky

See Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed
Sedov.
name, Sedov
1879-1921 Vintage Books (New York: Random House, 1965 ), p.
56.
E. Victor Wolfenstein has suggested that Trotsky, in a
sense, was posing as his jailer when escaping captivity In
1902, thus exposing his ambivalence toward Tsarist authority,
,

,

603

1

:

8.

.

.

604

and authority in general.
See his The Revolutionar y Personality : Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi (Princeton, N. J.
Pr inceto n
University Press, 1967), p. 138.
:

9

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

10

,

8.

p.

Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Armed

,

pp.

53-55.

1:L

See "Testament" (February 27 and March
Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 pp. 162-64.
,

3,

1940), in

,

12 T

Leon m
Trotsky, My Life The Universal Library (New
Grosset & Dunlap, 1930/1960), p. 582.
,

York:

13

Quoted in Berberova Italics are Mine p. 148.
poet in question was her close companion, Vladislav F.
Khodasevich
,

14

,

Trotsky, Diary in Exile

,

1935

The

pp. 46-47.

,

15

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 126-27. See pp.
122-27 for an excellent discussion of the personalization of
the conflict, with Trotsky eventually playing the "Anti-Pope"
to Stalin's "Pope."
,

16

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

33,

p.

quoting Heinrich

Brandler
17

Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 p. 3. Also quoted in
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 257.
See p. 4 of this volume
for Deutscher' s analysis of Trotsky's plight.
,

,

,

1

19

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

Quoted in Ibid .

p.

,

,

12.

p.

363.

20

My Journey through
Max Eastman, Love and Revolution
Random House, 1964), p. 563. Also see
an Epoch (New York:
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 8.
:

,

21

22
23
•

24
25

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

Quoted in Ibid .

p.

,

,

14.

Eastman, Love and Revolution

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
Ibid .

,

pp.

13.

p.

,

,

pp.

pp.

562-63.

14-15.

16-17.

26

Trotsky, My Life p. 579. See pp. 567-79 for Trotsky's rather sardonic view of his visa difficulties at the
time
,

605

27

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

162.

p.

28
"

Winston S. Churchill, "Leon Trotsky, alias Bronstein,"
in Great Contemporaries (London:
Thorton Butterworth Ltd.,
1937), pp. 197-205.
Also- quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
(Churchill's original essay was entitled, "The Ogre
p. 19.
of Europe.")
See p. 220 for Deutscher's comparison of Trotsky
and Churchill as historians.
_

,

29

In November-December, 1932, Trotsky made a short trip
to Copenhagen to deliver a lecture before some Danish students.
It figured materially in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, and will
be discussed at some length in a later chapter.
30
On Prinkipo Trotsky also worked on The Real Situation
ill Russia
The Stalinist School of Falsification and The
Third International After Lenin among other literary labors.
31
Trotsky's encounters with the Sobolevicius brothers,
as well as with Blumkin, will receive more detailed attention
in a later chapter.
,

,

,

32

See note in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 24-25.
Also see Leon Trotsky, "Farewell to Prinkipo: Pages from a
Diary" (July 19, 1933), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1932-33
ed. by George Breitman and Sarah Lovell (New York:
Pathfinder
Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 312-18, reprinted from The Modern
Monthly March, 1934.
In this article Trotsky described his
trips with a Turkish fisherman one Charolambos who was not
overly impressed with the Russian's technique with a net.
But Trotsky had great admiration for the Turk, and his natural
harmony with the changing moods of the sea. This article is
one of Trotsky's most lyrical efforts.
,

,

,

—

,

—

33

Jean van Heijenoort, "Lev Davidovich," in Leon
Merit Publishers,
Trotsky
The Man and His Work (New York:
1969), p. 45, reprinted from Fourth International August,
1941.
:

,

34
35

36

37

1935

,

pp.

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
,

p.

Ibid.

,

pp.

38,

pp.

216-17

216.

Ibid.

See Ibid .

,

,

260-66.
273-74, and Trotsky, Diary in Exile

pp.

40.

38

See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
Trotsky, Diary in Exile pp. 109-13.

,

pp.

274-75, and

,

39

Trotsky, Diary in Exile

,

1935

,

p.

99.

,

606

Ibid., pp. 22-23.

41,
Ibid
.

.

.

,

p.

126.

42

Ibid., p. 152.
Among other writers, he read at this
time Marcel Prevost, Emma Goldman, Edgar Allen
Poe, and a
biography of Eugene Debs.
43
Ibid. , p. 125.
L935
44
Ibid .
p. 57.
,

45

Ibid*
p. 148.
Norwegian period.
i

This passage came from Trotsky's

46

Robert H. McNeal has suggested that his fever was
"psychosomatic" in nature. See his The Bolshevik Tradition
Lervin, Stalin
Khrushchev Spectrum Book (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 103n. Also, in writing
aboutthe 1935 Diary Bernard Wolfe has suggested: "Brave
official words overlaying a dead-end feeling, studied optimism
punctuated by dark visions and ennui his moods in the diary
fluctuate as dramatically as his fever chart." It is Wolfe's
thesis that there may have been another name for "his surging
malaise" Kronstadt. The start of the purge in 1935 reminded
him of the "heavy emotional residue" of the Kronstadt affair,
when he took a hand in liquidating families of the fallen
sailors. With these memories came the fever and a loss of
nerve.
Wolfe admits, "Guesswork, all of it. There is simply
no way to trace the echoes of 'great events' in the internal
movements of fever, hypertension, 'nerves,' death longings."
But Trotsky may have " collaborated " with the GPU in the 1940
assassination, since the door of the Coyoacan villa could
"easily, so very, very easily, have been closed to the
assassin. . . ." Seehis "Trotsky: 55," in Works in Progress
no. 8, ed. by Martha Saxton (New York:
The Literary Guild of
America, Inc., 1973), pp. 434-60.
:

,

,

"

,

—

—

,

47

Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 pp. 145-46. This
entry actually comes from the Norway period of his exile.
Apparently Lenin had a long-standing concern with the world
of medicine.
Several times he advised Gorky on his health,
but recommended German doctors, not the Russian variety,
See Nathan
those "'asses,'" eager to try out experiments.
The Case of
Leites and Elsa Bernaut, Ri tual of Liquidation
The Free Press, 1954T,
the Moscow Trials (Glencoe, Illinois:
p. 493n.
,

,

:

A

Q

Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 pp. 43, 47. On September 11, 1935, he wrote Natalya about his disappointment
"'. . . Already the recent past seems better
with France:
than it was.
Yet we looked forward with so much hope to our
Is this definitely old age already? Or is
stay in France.
,

,

i

607

tem rar Y' though all too sharp a
decline, from
k-°k IX shall P°
which
rally? We shall see. . .
In the same
month he wrote her that at night he awoke,
and felt like
an abandoned child,'" calling for her
and added:
-did
not Goethe say that old age catches us by
surprise and finds
us children?- See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
pp. 265, 284,
on this "crisis of middle age."
1

\

,

49

Trotsky, Diary in Exile, 1935 p. 106. Some commentators, notably Bernard Wolfe, have commented on
a
quality in this diary. But Erich Fromm, in a review ofpathetic
the
book demurred:
»'»... in the midst of insecure exile, illness, cruel Stalinist persecution of his family, there
is
never a note of self-pity or even despair. There is objectivity and courage and humility. This is a modest man; proud
of his cause, proud of the truth he discovers, but not vain
or self-centered.'" Quoted in Joseph Hansen, "Trotsky
•Psychoanalyzed,'" a review of Bernard Wolfe's The Great
Prince Died_, in Leon Trotsky
The Man and His Work p. 84,
reprinted from International Socialist Review Summer, 1959.
,

:

,

,

°Trotsky, Diary in Exile
51

53

Ibid .

,

pp.

Ibid .

,

pp. 68-69.

Ibid .

,

p.

,

1935

,

p.

119.

63-64.

129.

Ft

54

Ibid .
This oft-quoted passage also appears
p. 135.
in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
pp. 288-89.
,

,

55

Leon Trotsky, "The Case of Zinoviev, Kamenev and
Others" (January 16-18, 1935), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1934-35 ed. by George Breitman and Bev Scott New York:
Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1971), p. 145. This is reprinted
from Bui letin of the Opposi tion Number 42, February, 1935,
and includes quotes from Bui letin of the Opposi tion Number
1-2, July, 1929, p. 2.
,

(

,

,

,

56

Trotsky

,

This series of articles appears in Wri tings of Leon
1934-35 pp. 112-65, reprinted from various sources.
,

57

These comments appear in The Case of Leon Trotsky
Report of Hearings on the Charges made against h m in the
Moscow Trials The Preliminary Commission of Inquiry, John
with an introduction by George Novack (New
Dewey, et a]_.
York:
Merit Publishers, 1937/68), pp. 280, 495. Hereafter
Also see Leon Trotsky, Their
cited as Case of Leon Trotsky
Morals and Ours," in Their Morals and Ours: Marxist Versus
Liberal Views on Morali by (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969),
p. 38, and Leon Trotsky, "Romain Rolland Executes an Assignment" (October 31, 1935), "In Socialist Norway" (December,
:

.i

,

,

fr

.

f

f

608

1936), and "Interview in Dagebladet " (August
20, 1936), in
Of Leon
"1935-36 ed. b? George Breitman and
Bev^Scott (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp.

Tro^,

,

lis",

58

Trotsky, "The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the
Kirov
lna
DeCember 28 1934) in Writings of Leon
^ro^v
o?^ ,c
35
ThlS 13 sprinted fro~ t
P ' 112
am,
nhl
phlet, The Kirov Assassination (New York:
Pioneer' Publishers,
ilSnerS
February, 1935).
It also appeared in Bulletin of the
Opposition Number 41, January, 1935.

—

_

,

:

'

l

>

>

*

'

,

59 TK

.

l£id .

115-16.
During the Mexican hearings
Trotsky told of his first reaction to the assassination:
"My first hypothesis was that it was individual revenge.
Maybe^ certain conflicts about a woman, concerning a woman
question, and so on a situation which could compromise Kirov
if it would be published.
It was for me the only one explanation for this secrecy." See Case of Leon Trotsky
pp. 26061 •
,

pp.

—

,

60
61

Ibid .

,

p.

123.

Ibid.

,

p.

121.

62

Leon Trotsky, "Some Results of the Stalin Amalgam"
(January 12, 1935), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1934-35
This article is reprinted from New Militant (Februp. 142.
ary 9, 1935), under the title, "Late Episodes in Kirov
Assassination Analyzed by Trotsky." On the same page Trotsky
wrote that a possible aim of executing the "YCLers" (or
Komsomol tsi was to show any independent youth that "the
slightest doubt about the divine blessings that flow from
Stalin or about the immaculate conception of Kaganovich
would meet, hereafter, with the same penalty as terrorist
acts."
,

,

)

63

Trotsky, M The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Kirov
Assassination," in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1934-35 pp.
116-17:
,

,

64

Leon Trotsky, "Where is the Stalin Bureaucracy
Leading the USSR?" (January 30, 1935), in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1934-35 p. 162. This article is reprinted from
The New International (March, 1935), unsigned.
,

,

65

Trotsky, "The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Kirov
Assassination," in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky 1934-35 p. 130.
,

66

67

Ibid .

,

pp.

118-19.

Ibid.

,

pp.

124-25.

,

"

609

68 TW
Ibid., pp.
69
.

70

120-21.

Ibid .

,

p.

122.

Ibid .

,

p.

124.

.

71

Ibid., pp. 130-31.
Trotsky added that the only way
out of the impasse was for the world proletarian vanguard
to
rally around the banner of the Leninist party:
"The defense
of the Soviet Union is inconceivable without the
struqqle for
the Fourth International .
"

2

Ibid.

,

p.-

130.

•

73

Ibid .
Trotsky also noted that the Soviet
p. 122.
press claimed criticism by the fathers had nurtured the blind
hatred of their "children," but these were but "plagiarisms"
from the Tsarist times, when similar comments were common.
Yet Trotsky was willing to admit that the grumbling of the
fathers at home could undermine respect for the regime among
their sons.
,

74

Ibid .
Trotsky conceded that Zinoviev & Co.
p. 123.
might have complained about Stalin in a closed circle, nothing
very serious:
"But they in themselves represented this danger
that they could become the axis for the lower and middle
bureaucracy, which is discontented with Stalin. Now, in this
sphere, the chief does not joke." See "The Case of Zinoviev,
Kamenev and Others" (January 16-18, 1935), in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1934-35 p. 147, reprinted from Bulletin of the
Opposition No. 42, February, 1935.
,

—

,

,

,

75

76
77

Ibid.

,

p.

122.

Ibid.

,

p.

114.

Ibid .

,

pp.

114-15.

78

In another place Trotsky wrote
Ibid ,
pp. 114-15.
that it was "unthinkable" to ascribe to Zinoviev and Kamenev
participation in a crime "which is without any political
meaning and which at the same time conflicts with the views,
and aims, and the entire political past of Zinoviev and
Kamenev. " See "Romain Rol land Executes an Assignment"
(October 31, 1935), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36
p. 118, reprinted from New International (December, 1935).
,

,

,

Ibid .

,

p.

116.

on

Leon Trotsky, "Everything Gradually Falls Into
Place" (January 26, 1935), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1934-35, p. 155, reprinted from Bulletin of the Opposition
No. 521 February, 1935.
,

,

610
81_.

.

Ibid., p. 154.

82 T
L eon Trotsky, "The Indictment"
•
...
(December 30, 1934),
Tr
in Writings of Leon Trotsky , 1934-35
p. 134, reprinted from
Neg MilitantTJanuary 19,. 1935)7^d also
in the'pamphlet
TM. Klrov Assassination.
Trotsky repeated this theme at
1 63
n the COmlng yearS
For ^stance, he claimed
'
fh^^n^
?
i
, not wish
that,
'Stalin did
to kill Kirov; Kirov himself did
not wish to be killed; but Nikolaiev, although
surrounded on
all_ sides by agents provocateurs, himself took
his role too
seriously. . . ." See "Shame!" (December
18, 1936), in
HEitino^ of Leon Trotskv_, 1935-36 p. 149, reprinted from
QuatnSme Internationale (March-April, 1937). And before
the Dewey sub-commission, he explained:
"It is plain that:
the G.P.U., through its provocateurs, played with
Kirov's
head in order to involve the Opposition in the affair and
then expose the conspiracy.
Nikolayev, however, fired his
shot without waiting for Medved s permission, and thereby
cruelly compromised the amalgam. Stalin used Medved as a
scapegoat." See Case of Leon Trotsky p. 497.
,

,

'

,

83

Trotsky, "Everything Gradually Falls Into Place,"
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1934-35 pp. 152-53.
,

84

Trotsky

,

,

Trotsky, "The Indictment," in Writings of Leon
1934-35 p. 134.
,

QC

Ibid .

,

pp.

132-33.

86

Trotsky, "Everything Gradually Falls Into Place,"
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1934-35 p. 156.
,

,

87

Trotsky, "The Indictment," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1934-35 p. 135. For more on Bissineks, also spelled
"Bissenieks " see Case of Leon Trotsky p. 497, and "A reply
to Ambassador Bilmanis" (March 17, 1938), in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1937 -38 ed. by George Breitman and Evelyn Reed
(New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 147-48, reprinted
from the New York Times March 21, 1938.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

88

Trotsky, "The Indictment," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1934-35 p. 136. On the same page Trotsky noted
that the Soviet press made "very circumspect use" of the
Trotsky link to the amalgam, but 1 Humani te was much more
blatant in its use partly because the "idiocy" of the charge
was more obvious in Moscow, and partly because this part of
the amalgam was designed for foreign consumption, especially
in France.
,

,

j

,

89

Trotsky, "The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Kirov
Assassination," in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1934-35 p. 124.
,

90

^Ibid.

,

p.

129.

,

.

.

611

9lTr0t kY " The CaSS f zin °viev,
°
Kamenev and Others,"
S
in Writing of
Leon Trotsky, 1934-35 p. 151.

m ^^

'

'

,

92

Trot k y» "Everything Gradually Falls Into
w
W£^1H£S ofJ Leon Trotsky, 1934-35 p. 156. ThesePlace,"
remarks
are also quoted in Deutscher, Proph et
Outcast p. 281, and
Case of Leon Trotsky p. 498.
t*.

^

,

,

,

93

Trotsky, Diary in Exile, 1935 p; 132. This
actually comes from an open letter, written by Natalya passage
Sedova
on the arrest of her son, Sergei, but shows
signs of Trotsky's
imprint.
She suggested that Romain Rolland, Charles [sic]
Gide, and Bernard Shaw might be likely members of
the proposed
commission.
,

94

Ibid.
Trotsky also wondered about a
pp. 52-53.
Prav( a article, in which anti-Party elements were linked
to
^
foreign agents:
"To whom do the words 'foreign intelligence
services' refer? To the princes or to Trotskyists?" In
another entry he compared the hounding of the "Trotskyists"
to a cholera epidemic, when ignorant peasants killed their
doctors:
"Distractedly the masses watch the brutal beating
of the doctors [Trotskyists], the only people who know both
the disease and its cure." See loc . cit .
pp. 60-62, 20.
95
Ibid .
pp. 26-27.
,

,

,

96

Ibid , pp. 107-08.
pp. 289-92.

Also see Deutscher, Prophet

a

Outcast

,

97

Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 p. 139.
,

,

p.

290.

See

,

98

Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 291.
,

,

p.

140.

,

p.

142.

Also see

,

99

Trotsky, Diary in Exile

,

1935

"''^Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

p.

293.

101

Trotsky, "A Report in Arbeiderbladet " (July 26, 1935
1935-36 p. 6, reprinted from
in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky
Arbeiderbladet (July 26, 1935). Obviously the interview was
held some days prior to the twenty- sixth of July 1935
,

,

,

i

n?

Leon Trotsky, "On the Atlantic" (December 28, 1936),
1937-38 p. 9, reprinted from
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
Fourth International June, 1941, under the title, "Pages from
Trotsky s Journal u
,

,

,

1

]

no

Deutscher, Prophet Outca st, pp. 294-95. There is
In
some doubt about the correct spelling of the village.
various places it is written "Weksal" or "Veksal."

),

"

612

~

Victor S.erge, Vie et Mort de Trotskv (P*ri^- tm< nJ.,
Dumont 1951), p. 239.
i~stud7
cooperation with Natalya Sedova, and features in close
manyY long9
quotations attributed to her.
105 xw
Ibid., p.
06

^flf^n

.

242.

Trotsky, "in 'Socialist' Norway" (December,
1936),
^2^36. P- 123, reprinted frL

^

^Flif#Jgy^'

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
108

Trotsky, Diary in Exile

,

,

p.

1935

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

,

p.

295.
p.

145.

296.

110

Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writing s of Leon
Trotsky, 1935-36 p. 124. The French Communist paper,
1 'Humanity, had the cheek
to suggest that this "'interview'"
was proof of Trotsky's ties to the fascists, a charge Trotsky
found "incredible"
unqlaublicken " . See Trotsky Archives
T3956 (August 21, 1936). For more on this affair with the
fascists see the New York Times
"Norway Will Allow Trotsky
To Remain," August 9, 1936, p. 9; "'Plot' By Trotsky Surprises
Norway," August 15, 1936, p. 2; and "Trotsky Urges Inquiries,"
August 16, 1936, p. 10.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
1935-36
Also see Deutscher, Prophe t
pp. 124-25.
331-32.
pp.
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Trotsky Archives
T3954, "Statement by Leon Trotsky
in Reply to the Charges made Against Him by the Tass Bureau"
(August 15, 1936).
This article also is printed in Writings
of Leon Trotsky
1935-36 p. 129, under the title, "Let Us
Know The Facts," reprinted from Socialist Appeal September,
:

,

,

,

1936, p. 10.
113

Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1935-36 p. 125. A dispatch from Oslo reported that
many demonstrators invaded Trotsky's holiday retreat at the
time.
Voices were heard shouting, '"murderer, damned bloodhound.'" See the New York Times August 18, 1936, p. 5.
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People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report o_f_ Court Proceedings in the case of the Trotsky i te Zinovievite Terrorist sntreT Moscow: People's Commissariat
of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1936), pp. 120-21, 127.
Hereafter
cited as Trot sky i te-Zinovievi te Centre.
Harold Denny reported that
when Vyshinsky asked Reingold about Trotsky's role, the latter
Ibid .
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pp.

127,

118,
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re not quite sure what we
SSiiw'.^S
Trotsky after we got! power. »" At this point, wouid d ° ^th
according to an
AP dispatch, the courtroom "rocked in laughter."
See the New
Yc^k Times:
Denny, "16 in Soviet Admit 2 Plots To
Kill StaTTn
and Others," and "Vied to-be Named as Killers,"
August 20,
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132.

117

Ibid., pp. 25, 130-31.
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cit .
pp. 165, 168, 171-72, 172.
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RobertL C. Tucker, "Introduction," to Robert C. Tucker
and Stephen F. Cohen, eds., The Great Purge Trial The Universal Library (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1965),
Both Trotsky and his son "'knew that the verdict of
p. xi.
the Moscow court was not platonic in character and that it
would be carried out in one way or another,'" Natalya Sedova
contended. Quoted in Isaac Don Levine, The Mind of an Assassin
(New York:
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959), p. 42.
,

121

See the New York Times
Harold Denny, "Trotsky Is
Called Real Conspirator in Anti-Soviet Plot," August 21, 1936,
p. 1, and Denny, "Trials Dramatize Soviet Struggles," August
23, 1936, IV, p. 5.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
1935-36 p. 125.
Ibid .
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127-28.
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Leon Trotsky, "Behind the Moscow Trials" (March,
1938), in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky 193 7-38 p. 126, reprinted
from Sunday Express TLondon
March 6, 1938.
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See Leon Trotsky, Li terature and Revolution Ann
Arbor Paperbacks (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan
Press, 1960), p. 104, and Leon Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, with
Pioneer
an introductory note by Max Shachtman (New York:
Publishers, 1937), p. 18.
,
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Leon Trotsky, "Preface, Les Crimes de Staline ," in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 (July 5, 1937), p. 61,
reprinted from the book of the same name.
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Case of Leon Trotsky p. 55. Trotsky rarely had
See Trotsky, Literature and
good word for Dostoevsky.
Revolution p. 114.
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See The Trotsky Archives
T4028, "The convevor of
frame-ups at work" (January 28, 1937),
and
Antisemitizma" (January 30, 1937). Joseph T405i™Iemy
Nedava, Trotsky
:
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70-83, is devoted to a discussion of Trotsky's
reaction to the famous frame-up.
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'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
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1935-36, p. 125.
,

,

131

Trotsky
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writi ngs of Leon
*
1935-36 p. 125.
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Leon Trotsky, "Interview in Dagebladet " (August 20,
1936), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 pp. 130-31,
reprinted from Socialist Appeal (Chicago: October 1, 1936),
under the^ title, "An interview with Leon Trotsky on the Recent
Moscow Trial." Although this interview is missing in the
Trotsky Archives it bears a striking resemblance to one he
gave Arbeiderbladet on the 20th of August.
See Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast 336.
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Trotsky Archives
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T3957, "An Hour with Trotsky"

(August 23, 1936).
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Trotsky Archives
T3958, "Erkl'arung Leo Trotzkis
zum Moskauer Prozess" (August 23, 1936).
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Trotsky Archives

T3959,

"Zum Selbstmord Tomskis"
(August 23, 1936).
He also discussed the suicides of Tomsky
and Sokolnikov (false report) in T3960 (August 24, 1936),
basically the same as "Interview in News Chronicle " (August
1935-36 pp. 132-33,
26, 1936), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
reprinted from August 27, 1936, edition of the London paper.
136
The Times (London), August 26, 1936, p. 12.
"If
Trotzky wants his day in court, let him go to Moscow," was
also the suggestion of William Z. Foster, "Should Leon Trotzky
Have an 'Impartial' International Hearing?,". Daily Worker
February 15, 1937, p. 2.
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Trotsky Archives
T3960.1, "Andwort an Herrn Johann
Scharf f enberg" (August 24, 1936).
Part of this reply appears
in Trotsky, "Ready to Face Norwegian Court" (August 24, 1936),
1935-36 p. 132, from a dispatch
in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky
in New York Times August 25, 1936, p. 3, "Trotsky Issues
Statement
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Trotsky Archives
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T3961,

"Die Todesurtei le"
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(August 24, 1936). An abbreviated version
appears as, "The Death Sentences" (August of this article
24, 1936), in
£f Leon Trotsky, 1935-36 p. 132, reprinted
from
the New York Times August 25, 1936,
p. 3.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writinqs
of
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Leon Trotsky 1935-36, p. 125.
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Trotsky Archives: T3962, "Ich Fordere ein
Gerichtsverfahren uber mich!" (August 25, 1936). This
basically the same as "Regular Trial Demanded," article is
in Writinqs
9
of Leon Trotsky,, 1935-36 p. 132, from an
article i n the
New York Times August 26, 1936, p. 4.
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Trotsky Archives
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T3963 (August 27, 1936).

Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
1935-36 p. 129.
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Leon Trotsky, "In Closed Court" (December, 1936), in
Writinqs of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 145, reprinted from
Les Crimes de Staline
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
p. 326, and Case of Leon Trotsky
pp. 33, 38.
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Quoted in Trotsky, "In Closed Court," in Writinqs of
Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 144. Also see Friedrich Adler,
The Witchcraft Trial in Moscow with a Preface by Norman
Thomas (New York:
Pioneer Publishers, 1937), p. 27.
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Claire Price, "On a Planet Without
Times Magazine November 15, 1936, VIII, p.
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Harold Denny, "Soviet Protest Forseen," New York
Times August 29, 1936, p. 3. This quote, in all likelihood,
appeared in Izvestia August 28, 1936.
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Quoted in Harold Denny, "Moscow Asks Oslo to Expel
Trotsky As A Conspirator," New York Times August 30, 1936,
It also appears in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 337.
p. 1.
Ambassador Yakubovich was eventually a victim of the voracious
appetite of the purge. The demand for deportation, not
extradition, was "a testimonium paupertati " according to
Pioneer
Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York:
Publishers, 1936), 134.
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Quoted in "Norway Not Likely to Expel Trotsky,"
New York Times August 31, 1936, p. 3.
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Quoted in "King Acts to Keep Trotsky Guarded,"
New York Times September 1, 1936, p. 15.
,

15 0

See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

p.

338.

,

616
1 5]

"

See Trotsk Y> "In 'Socialist' Norway," and
"In Closed
Court," in WrJ _tijnaLs _of_ Lecm Trotsky, 1935-36
pp. 126? 145
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
337-38.
pp.
Before the
Dewey sub-commission Trotsky contended that,
although the
Norwegian Government was socialist, "we have a
genuine dictatorship of the shipowners. The state is governed
exclusively
by the shipowners.
The Socialist Government is a decorative
ornament in this instance." See Case of Leon Trotsky
p. 358.
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Quoted in "Norway Tells Soviet Trotsky Will Remain,"
New York Times, September 4, 1936, p. 5. In a second
diplomatic
note, the Soviet government contended that with a
policy of
internment, the Norwegian government had taken full responconsequences of Trotsky's continued residence
in Norway:
"'The Soviet finds it impossible to recognize the
decision of the Norwegian Government as satisfactory and in
conformity with the friendly relations of Norway and the
Soviet.'" See "Soviet Criticizes Norway for Harboring Trotsky,"
_New York Times
September 12, 1936, p. 8. Also see Shachtman,
Behind the Moscow Trial, pp. 135-36. This threat was redeemed
in the second trial, when Trotsky was accused of using Norway
as his conspiratorial base.
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See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
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336-38.
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See Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of
Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 126, and Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
In a letter to Trygve Lie, dated August 26, 1936,
pp. 336-37.
Trotsky explained his reasons for refusing to sign the document.
Reminding Lie that the only interview he had given in
Norway was in the presence of the Minister, Trotsky demanded
the opportunity to answer his accusers in the press:
"To
refrain from bringing me to trial before a Norwegian court
and at the same time to rob me of the possibility of appeal
to public opinion on a question that concerns myself, my son,
my whole political past, and my political honor, would mean
to transform the right of asylum into a trap and to allow
free passage to the executioners and slanderers of the GPU."
Leon Trotsky, "A Letter to Trygve Lie" (August 26, 1936) in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 pp. 134-35, reprinted from
the Nation
October 10, 1936, p. 431. In response, Lie
telephoned Trotsky that there was merit in the letter, but
asked him not to release it to the press, pending a meeting'
The next day the police arrested
of the Council of Ministers.
Trotsky, and confiscated five copies of the letter, but one
copy had already been sent abroad and eventually appeared in
the Nation .
See Trotsky, "In Closed Court," in Writings of
Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 145.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky, 1935-36 p. 126. Norwegian authorities decided that
Trotsky had violated the terms of his asylum by writing an
article, "Revolutionary Interlude in France," critical of
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Trotsky,
1935-36 p. 126. The Norwegian Premier, Johann
Nygaandsvold, was quoted as saying a "'Norwegian Siberia'"
must be found for Trotsky, perhaps a North Atlantic Island.
See "World's Loneliest Man 'Protected' by Oslo's Police,"
News-Week September 5, 1936, p. 16.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky, 1935-36 pp. 126-27. Also see Deutscher, Proohe~t
Outcast p. 342.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
1935-36 p. 128. Also see Deutscher, Prophet
,
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Case of Leon Trotsky p. 38. Also see Trotsky, "In
•Socialist' Norway," in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36
One report had Trotsky playing golf while in internp. 126.
ment:
"In the Trotsky game, fellow players had to wear
shabby flannel trousers he frowns on bourgeois plus-fours."
See "Trotsky Haven:
Mexico offers Revolutionary only Available
Refuge in a Hounding World," in The Literary Digest Vol. 123
(January 9, 1937), 12-13.
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pp.

,

Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writings of Leon
1935-36 p. 128. Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
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1
29,
1936).
Also see T4065.1, "Why did the GPU choose Norway?"
t January
31, 1937), for quotes from a confiscated letter
to
his Norwegian lawyer, M. Puntervold, in which
he warned that
the GPU might attempt to obtain an incriminating
letter from
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This article also appears in Writing s of Leon
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist* Norway," in Writing s of Leon
Trotsky, 1935-36 p. 128. Also see Deutscher, Prophet
Outcast, pp. 343-44. For more on the abortive libel suit
see the New York Times
"Trotsky Sues to Expose 'Reckless
Soviet Policy'," October 25, 1936, p. 2; "Permits Trotsky's
Libel Suit," October 27, 1936, p. 3; "Trotsky Suit Is Barred,"
October 30, 1936, p. 4; and "Trotsky Drops Libel Suit Against
Paper in Norway," March 16, 1937, p. 18.
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Trotsky, "In 'Socialist' Norway," in Writin gs of Leon
1935-36 p. 129.
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Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1937-38 p. 7. For Trotsky's youthful views of
Ibsen, see Deutscher, Prophet Armed pp. 50-51. Also see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 292, for more comments on
"Enemy of the People," where Dr. Stockmann was banished by
his brother, the Burgomaster, after concluding that the
town's prosperity was based upon infected mineral baths.
Trotsky liked the line from the play, "'Now we shall see,'
exclaims the doctor, 'whether baseness and cowardice can
stop the mouth of a free and honest man.'"
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Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1937-38 p. 8. A slightly different version appears
in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 351-52.
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See "Hear Trotsky Seeks Refuge," New York Tim es,
September 15, 1936, p. 23, and "Trotsky Se^ki" R^fUge," New
York Times November 25, 1936, p. 9. Trotsky wanted to~^Tsit
Spain to engage in some "practical work," to help the workers
of Spain "vanquish and destroy fascism."
But it was his
Misfortune" to be reduced to writing articles and giving
advice by mail.
See Trotsky, "In Closed Court," in Writings
of Leon Trotsky
1935-36 p. 136.
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George Novack, private interview in New York City,
9,

1971.
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Ibid
More details on obtaining the Mexican visa
will be presented in the next chapter.
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Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1937-38 p. 8. Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
p. 350, and "Trotsky Presses to Leave Norway," New York
Times December 8, 1936, p. 7.
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Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Wri tings of Leon
1937-38 p. 8.
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Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
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352-53.

Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1937-38 p. 8. The Norwegian government feared that
the GPU would place "an infernal machine on the ship, " wrote
Trotsky
"My wife and I could by no means consider the
latter fear as unfounded. Our own security coincided in this
instance wi th the security of a Norwegian vessel and its
crew." See loc. cit.
p. 9.
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Leon Trotsky, "Statements in Tampico" (January
.....
9,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 23, reprinted
from the New York Times January 10, 1937,
p. 9, under the
title, "Trotsky in Mexico Asks Trial in Plot by
Impartial
Body." Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
p. 354.
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Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 354. Also see Serge,
Vie et Mort de Trotsky p. 256, and Leon Trotsky, "Why They
Confessed Crimes They Had Not Committed" (January 1, 1937),
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 13, reprinted from
Les Crimes de Staline . On board the "Ruth," Trotsky also
wrote, "The year that is now ending will go down in history
as the year of Cain."
See Leon Trotsky, "Zinoviev And
Kamenev" (December 31, 1936), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 11, reprinted from Fourth International, August,
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Trotsky, "On the Atlantic," in Writings of Leon
1937-38 p. 7.
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Leon Trotsky, "In Mexico" (January 9, 1937), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 21, reprinted from
Fourth International June, 1941, under the title, "Pages
from Trotsky's Journal." After the fourth paragraph, this
article must have been written several weeks after its date.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, p. 356. But in a personal interview (New York CiTfyl TTovember 9, 1971), George
Novack denied that he had been on the cutter, only meeting
Trotsky later that day.
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Serge, Vie e t Mort de Trotsky
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Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
193 7-38
But not all was peaches and cream that first
p. 21.
day in Mexico. Trotsky and his wife were locked in a stifling
hotel room for three hours, while Shachtman went to get some
fresh fruit for Natalya, but when he returned, admitted with
Trotsky did not credit Shachtman
a laugh, "'I forgot it.'"
with bad intentions, but observed, "'It's just that he does
nothing seriously. But I could not forget his leaving us
like that, especially leaving Natalia after she had been
,
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George Novack, "Trotsky's Views on Dialectical
Materialism," in Leon Trotsky
The Man and His Work, p. 94,
reprinted from International Socialist Review FaTTT 1960.
Also see Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky p. 256, and Leon
Trotsky, I_n Defense if Marxism (New York: Merit Publishers,
:
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1965), p. 114.
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"Trotsky Is At Villa of Rivera in Mexico," New York
January 12, 1937, p. 9.
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Quoted in Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky p. 257. A
slightly different translation of this passage appears in
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 356, but Deutscher says the
comment was made on the train trip.
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Quoted in Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky p. 257.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 356, and Trotsky,
"In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 21.
,

,

,

,
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These details are taken from Betty Kirk, "Mexico's
Fiery Cellini," New York Times Magazine April 25, 1937, VIII,
p. 29, and Joseph Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," introduction to Leon Trotsky, My_ Life : An Attempt at an Auto biography A Merit Book (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970,)
,

,

pp. x-xi.

202

1937-38

,

Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky
p.

,

21.

203

See Bertram D. Wolfe, The Fabulous Life of Diego
This
Rivera (New York:
Stein and Day, 1963), pp. 44, 244.
Earlier he had
was Wolfe's second effort at a biography.
Alfred
His Life and Times (New York:
written Diego Rivera
A. Knopf, 1943).
:
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,

.
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Wolfe, Fabulous Life, pp. 150-51,
216-23.

Quoted in Ibid.,
206 T
Ibid .
,

386.

p.

.

20 7„

pp.

,

„

Sen
'

Life, p. xx"

233, 431-32.

.

h

Tr ° tsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky,

My.

208,

Wol f e Fabulous Life, pp. 336-40.
During the great
Ha
battle
over Rivera's mural in Rockefeller Center
eventually demolished on orders of the youthful (1933)
Rockefeller, many Americans sprang to Rivera's Nelson
including Carleton Beals, Freda Kirchwey, and defense,
Suzanne La
Follette, future members of the Trotsky Defense
Committee
or Dewey Commission.
'

4-4-1

'

Ibid .
210

My Life

,

p.

,

234.

Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotskv,
1
p.

xx.

2H«See

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 359, and Wolfe,
Fabulous Life p. 70. At one point Trotsky wrote that the
October revolution had found her greatest interpreter in
Mexico.
Rivera's "magnificent frescoes" were inspired by
"the mighty blast of the proletarian revolution." Without
October, Rivera's penetration into the epic of work and
insurrection would never have "attained such breadth and
profundity." Even the gashes made in the murals by Catholics
and Stalinists had their uses.
"These cuts and gashes give
even greater life to the frescoes. You have before you, not
simply a 'painting,' an object of passive esthetic contemplation, but a living part of the class struggle. And it is
at the same time a masterpiece." See Trotsky, "Art and
Politics" (June 18, 1938) in Partisan Review V (AugustSeptember, 1938), pp. 3-10.
,

,

,

212

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

p.

359.

213

Wolfe, Fabulous Life pp. 240-48, 395-98.
Besides
Wolfe's detailed portrait of Frida Kahlo, also see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast p. 359.
,

,

214

Joseph Hansen, Trotsky's secretary at the time,
contended that the two families frequently visited each
But Wolfe
other, and made excursions into the countryside.
was close to the Riveras in the late 1930s and wrote that
they saw Trotsky and his wife less often than generally believed:
"They dine together occasionally, confer lengthily
by telephone, have taken several vacation trips together
through the countryside." See Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky, My Life p. xx, and Wolfe, Diego Rivera
,

,

p.

262.
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Quoted
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
p. a 44
WolfplQ first biography
Wolfe's
(Dieqo Rivera ~77^ TZo an\ Z'
that there was noVSth
fSndamenta 'oolitic^
disagreement between the two men:
"Trotsky his Sur'Sft no?
8
*>r pol i ticaHfanLsy
? 2?'
however
warmth
warm their
discussions on secondary matters may yet
be, the
er ha
lwa V s defe ed to Unprofessional
politician
\?
in basic
h'
matters
in the iatter's field."
But
in
his 19sS
biography (Fabulous Life, p. 238), Wolfe
shaded this view"Being men of self-confidence and
intense personal pride
SO ° n clashed Trotsky
Diego's fabulous fantasy, but for a time could not^tand
the painter
Politician in the Iatter's field." Wolfe also deferred
contended that Rivera's outrageous invention of
'"facts'" in noli
tical matters drove Trotsky into such a towering
rage that
he and Natalya packed their bags, and left
them on the sidewalk, until they could find other housing.
See Fabulous
Lif

m

,

to^orT^

U

;

^

D^n^T^f^^f

/

,

7.

p.

My Life

See Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky,
*
pp. xx-xxi .

1

,
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See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 384-86, for an
exchange of letters between Trotskv and his wife over this
rather pathetic "flirtation," which strained their relationship.
,

218 0
See Hansen, With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky,
My Life p. xxi and Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 444-45.
Newsweek "Trotsky Tiff" (April 24, 1939, p. 24), reported
that after the split, Trotsky insulted Rivera by sending him
a check for 200 pesos, about $40.00, as rent for the Blue
House.
Rivera sent the check to a Marxist magazine and
resigned from the Fourth International.
,

,

,

,
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Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 445. Hansen wrote
that after the split, "I don't think that Trotsky's personal
regard for Diego was changed in the least. His admiration
and appreciation remained and he still talked about him as
if their friendship had not been affected.
Trotsky didn't
really consider Diego to be wholly responsible in politics;
his imagination tended to run away with him." See Hansen,
"With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky, My Life p. xxi.
And in early 1939, defending Rivera against certain personal attacks, Trotsky wrote:
"Rivera represents an exceptional
case because he maintains complete moral independence towards
the bourgeoisie.
Precisely for this reason, he has the right
to be respected by every socialist worker and sincere democrat." See Leon Trotsky, "Ignorance Is Not a Revolutionary
Instrument" (January 30, 1939), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1938-39 ed. by George Breitman and Evelyn Reed (New York:
Merit Publishers, 1969), p. 96, reprinted from New Interna tional, March, 1939, under the title, "Clarity or Confusion?"
,

,

,
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Quoted in Ibid., "Haven for Trnf^v,,
Trotsk y ln„ M
Mexico
Certain," December TTT19.36,
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& Woe," Time,

January 11, 1937,
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Quoted in "Trotsky & Woe," Time January
11, 1937,
Also see A. Montes, "Mexican~"unTons
Assail Trotzky
as an Enemy," Daily Worker December
17, 1936, p. 3.
*
p.

oo
22.

,
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,
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100 '" ln Writinqs
7 ^'' 1
°I h£2H Trotsky
1937 38 PP * 21 " 22 A1 so see "Mexican Labor Warns"
People on
Trotzky's Presence in Country," Daily Worker
January* 11,
1937, pp. 1, 4.
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Charles Cornell, "With Trotsky in Mexico," in Leon
Trotsky: Ihe Man and His Work p. 66, reprinted from
FourTh
International August, 1944.
,
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Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

p.

Editorial in the New York Times

357.

January 15, 1937,

,

20.

229
23

"Trotsky & Woe," Time

,

January 11, 1937, p. 22.

°See "Rivera Beaten in Mexico," New York Times,

December 24, 1936,

p.

9.
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See "Peril for Trotsky Seen," New York Times
December 30, 1936, p. 11, and "Trotsky & Woe," Time
January 11, 1937, p. 22.

,

,

232

January

"Trotsky Expected at Tampico Today," New York Times

9,

1937, p.

,

2.

233

Quoted in Joseph Hansen, "The Attempted Assassination
of Leon Trotsky," in Leon Trotsky
The Man and His Work
August, 1940.
p. 7, reprinted from Fourth International
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 357.
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1937-38
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Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
p.

21.
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"Aux Represen tan ts de la

l
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Presse Mexicaine" (January 12,
1937)
SomP
these comments
™ of fh.o
are also printed in "Trotskv Ltl
Spain,"
New York Times January n^lfa?"
p. 9.
,
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See Trotsky Archives
T4054, (January
oanucl ^y ju,
30
19^71
lyj/j,
and T4116.1 uiarcn
qo
^
3
(Mar^h J,
7
^
1937).
Also
see Case of Leon T^otsky_,
p. 5.
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Mexico '" in Writings of Leon
Trotskv
Trotsky, f!?7
?2 p. 21, " and DeutscherT
1937-38,
u tcTs>
358.
Also see Trotsky Archives
T4970.
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239

Trotsky Archives

T3970.

Frar k Kluckhohn, "Trotsky Has Difficult
Role," New
January 17, 1937, IV, p. 5.

Ynr
York Times
,

:
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1937-38, p °22
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MeXiC °'" in Writings of Leon Trotsky,

'

241 c

Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky, p. 258. A different
translation of this passage appears in Deutscher, Prophet

Outcast
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193 7-38
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L

361.

p.
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Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
"

p.

22.

A.

Vyshmsky made

,

this charge in People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., Report of Court Proceedings
in the case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre Moscow:
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1937), p.
467.
Hereafter cited as Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre
244
See Ibid .
pp. 568, 577.
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Ibid.

pp.

559 -60.

Ibid .
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Ibid.
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Ibid .
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36.
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pp.

61,
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Ibid.

pp.

124- -25.
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63.

Ibid.
The charge of desiring a restoration
p. 489.
of capi tali sm had no t appeared in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial
August 1936 but had figured in the accusations made against
the ex-Bol sheviks in the aftermath of the Kirov affair.
,
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Ibid .

p.

60.
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Ibid .

p.

489.
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Ibid .

pp.

359,

pp.

496-97.
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Ibid
thesis.
257

Ibid .

Also see p.

9 on

the "Clemenceau"

56.

p.

Ibid.

.10.

Also see pp. 113-14, 483, 491, and
tor additional testimony on "concessions."
Herr Hess
appears on pp. 64 and 106. Vyshinsky argued that
the "agreement" with the fascists was really just an
"embroidered
capitulation, the Trotskyite surrender to the mercy of
conquerors, that this was bondage, that to accept such the
an
agreement meant crawling into the wolfs mouth while
oneself with the idea that the wolf is not wicked and consoling
will
not gobble one up." The situation also reminded the
Prosecutor
of the fable, "The Lion Goes Hunting," by Ivan A. Krylov,
one of
Stalin's favorite authors. See loc . cit . p. 483.
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Thi s logic f ol lows the Bol shevik theory that "the
smal 1 acts have
In other words
end is in the beginning.
enormous consequences, and political positions must be
considered in terms of their consequences posledstviya
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Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre
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550.
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539.
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265.

Ibid ., p. 541.
Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky

78

Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 360.
Trotsky even believed that his new refuge in Mexico might
have ended any hesitation that Stalin had about staging the
new trial:
"It now became necessary, at any cost, and as
soon as possible, to drown the forthcoming revelations by
the sensation of new accusations." At the last minute fresh
elements had to be sketched into the geographical framework
of the trial:
"Only because it lacked sufficient time, did
the GPU find it impossible to arrange for me a meeting with
Japanese agents in the Mexican park of Chapul tepee " See
Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38
,

.

,

p.

,

22.
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Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

361.

p.

280

Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky p. 258. This passage
is also translated in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 361.
,

,
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1937-38

,

Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
p.

,

22.

282

Leon Trotsky, A New Moscow Amalgam" (January 22,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 26, reprinted
from The Truth About the Moscow Trial
a single-issue
tabloid paper published by Pioneer Publishers in April 193 7
under the original title, "The Meaning of the Moscow Trials."
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Trotsky Archives

:

T3978 (January 20, 1937).

284

In the Trotsky Archives are a multitude of articles
dealing with the Pyatakov-Radek trial, from T3978 to T4076.

285

Trotsky Archives

:

T3983 (January 22, 1937).

Trotsky, "A New Moscow Amalgam," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky, 1937-38, p. 30.
i

s
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Tr otsky Archives

T4041 (January 29, 1937).

:

288

Trotsky Archives
T3995 (January
For
Trotsky's view of Pyatakov also see "A New 24, 1937)
Moscow AmalgamT"
9
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 27.
:

'

,

289

,

Trotsky Archives:

T4006, "V dni moskovskoqo
(Ja ™ary 25, 1937).
For more on Radek also see
KS«R f(January
T
T3988
23, 1937), and "A New Moscow Amalgam," in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 27.
290
Trotsky Archives
T3986 (January
1937).
For
more on Muralov also see T4016, "Mouralov" 23,
(January 26, 1937).
291
Trotsky Archives: T4004, "Rakovskii" (January
25,
ig
e S

,

,

:

292

See Trotsky Archives
T4002, "Mdivani" (January
25, 1937), and T4028, "The conveyor of frame-ups at work"
(January 28, 1937).
:

,

293

Trotsky Archives
T4010, "The 'voluntary' confessions of the accused" (January 26, 1937). Also see Leon
Trotsky, "The Last Words of the Accused" (January 30, 1937),
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 37, reprinted from
Bulletin of the Opposition No. 54-5.
This article is
listed in the Trotsky Archives under the number T4050
(January 30, 1937).
:

,

,

,
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Trotsky Archives

:

T4006.
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Trotsky Archives
T4006.
Also see T3988 (January
23, 1937) for additional comments on V. Romm.
Trotsky also
wrote about the Tass correspondent in "On Romm" (January 24,
1937), and "Romm Frequented Dark Paris Alleys" (February 15,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 32, 40-41.
The first article is reprinted from the New York Times
January 25, 1937, p. 3 under the title, "Trotsky Renews
Denial." The second one appeared in Truth April, 1937.
:

,

,

,

,
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Trotsky Archives
T4018, "An Important Declaration
of Mr. Trotsky" (January 27, 1937); T4020, "Moe konkretnoe
predlozhenie Moskovskomu sudu" (January 27, 1937); T4047,
"The construction of the trial" (January 30, 1937). For
additional comments on the "flight," see Trotsky, "Pyatakov'
Phantom Flight to Oslo" (January 27, 1937), and "Story Vague
on Time, Place" (February, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 pp. 33-34, 38. The first article appeared in Truth
April, 1937; the second one also is reprinted from this
:

,

,

,

source.
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Trotsky Archives
T4076, "Finale?" (February 1,
This article also appears under the title, "The End?,"
:

1937).
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in Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-3
8, pp. 38-39
rpnrinf.n
from Bulletin of
For furtner
analysis of the trial see Trotsky, "A 54-L
New
Moscow Amaxqam »
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 , p. 30. Also see in
Archives T3978
20TT937)?
"How and
why did Soviet citizens accuse themselvesand
of crimes tney
thev
didnOt commit" (January 29, 1937).
298
Trotsky Archives
T4041.
299
Le ° n r °^ SkY " Stalin in Partial Retreat"
(January
29 , iy j /;
w
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-3 8, p 36
reprinted from the New York Times January
30, 1937, p
2
artlCle iS listed in the Archives as T4044 (January
29,
1937)
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Trotsky Archives:

T4068,

193?

»'

Saved •" (January 31,

301

Ibid., T4071, "Thirteen are to die" (January
31,
Also see Trotsky, "Stalin in Partial Retreat," in
Writings of, Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 36.
ta4 _.
1937).

,

302

Trotsky Archives

,

:

T4071.

303

Trotsky Archives
T3983 (January 22, 1937).
Similar
sentiments appear in Leon Trotsky, "Whose Conspiracy" (January
23, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 32.
This
dispatch to the Manchester Guardian was reproduced from Labor
Action (San Francisco), February 6, 1937.
:

,

304

Trotsky Archives

,

T3990 (January 23, 1937). This
article is the same as Leon Trotsky, "Why This Trial Seemed
Necessary** (January 23, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 31, reprinted from the New York Times January 24,
1937, p. 28, under the title, "Trotsky Derides Charges at
Trial.
:

,

,
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,

Trotsky Archives

:

T4054 (January 30, 1937).

Ibid .
T4076, "Finale?" Shortly after Trotsky
arrived in Mexico, he sent a telegram to Norman Thomas, John
Dewey, and the Defense Committee:
"UPON SETTING FOOT NEW
WORLD SOIL I HASTEN TO GREET COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK INITIATIVE
IN FIGHT FOR FULL IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION TRIAL SIXTEEN STOP
PLACE MYSELF ENTIRELY AT DISPOSAL COMMITTEE AND PREPARED TO
PROVIDE IT ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION FURNISH DOCUMENTS ANSWER
ANY QUESTION THAT MAY INTEREST COMMITTEE STOP NEEDLESS TO SAY
IS NOT MERELY QUESTION CONCERNING ME AND SON AGAINST WHOM
MOST IGNOMINIOUS ACCUSATION IN ALL POLITICAL HISTORY HAS BEEN
LAUNCHED NOR FATE OF DOZENS AND HUNDREDS ACCUSED BUT QUESTION
INVOLVING FATE OF SOVIET UNION AND EVEN WORLD LABOR MOVEMENT
FOR YEARS TO COME STOP CONCEALMENT OF FACTS SILENCE DOWNRIGHT
,
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PROTECTION OF FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY
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See
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Telegram
to New York"
:,.
(January 11, 1937),
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Tr t SkY " stalin in Partial Retreat,"
in Writings
?
qs
t
^
of Leon
Trotsky
1937-38 p. 36.
308
At he Mexican hearings Carleton Beals
m„
pressed
Trotsky on this issue, implying that the
extradition challenge
was something of a sham, since Mexico and the
Soviet Union
lacked formal diplomatic relations.
Somewhat stung, Trotsky
replied:
"The absence of relations between these two
countries is not imputed to me even by Vyshinsky."
Fmerty interjected that extradition was possibleCounsel
if
nations recognized the necessity of such a step. And both
Albert
Goldman, Trotsky's lawyer, later added that the Kremlin
could ask for extradition through a "mutually friendly
power-"
Trotsky was prepared to journey to any country that had an
extradition treaty with the Soviet Union, if the Kremlin
accepted his "challenge." But Trotsky appeared to have lost
some points on this exchange.
See Case of Leon Trotsky pp.
3, 66-67, 69-70, 110-11.
On another matter, Trotsky prepared
a formal request to the President of the Council of Ministers
of France, demanding a formal investigation of the charges
that he passed on information to Vladimir Romm on French
soil.
But apparently the letter was never sent.
See Trotsky
Archives
T4338.1, "A Monsieur le President du Conseil des
Ministres de France" (February 26, 1937).
309
"Britain and France Move for Balkan Compromise As
Anger Rises at Geneva," New York Times December 9, 1934,
This proposed agreement was mentioned in the
pp. 1, 8.
Moscow demarche to Oslo. See Harold Denny, "Moscow Asks
Oslo to Expel Trotsky As A Conspirator," New York Times
August 30, 1936, p. 1.
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^"^Leon Trotsky, "On Sending Terrorists to the USSR"
(January 6, 1937), in Wri tings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38
In an earlier
p. 19, reprinted from Les Crimes de Staline .
article, Trotsky discussed the Litvinov proposal on terrorism.
Even though Marxists reject individual terrorism, he
wrote, "this has never prevented us from always siding with
William Tell and not with the Austrian despot Gessler. The
Soviet diplomacy, on the other hand, is now discussing
jointly with the Gesslers how best to exterminate the Tells.
By his participation in the international stalking of terrorists, Stalin supplements in the best manner possible his own
."
See Trotsky,
terroristic stalking of the Bolsheviks.
"Stalin's Revolutionary Prisoners" (January 15, 1936), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 106, reprinted from the
New Militant, February 1, 1936, under the title, "Tell the
,

.

,

,

.

,
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° f Revolutionists

Trotsky Archives; T4041 (January
Deutscher cites this article on p. 362 of 29, 1937)
Prophet Outcast-,
but gives the incorrect date. However,
i nHInf^xI^of^e
preceding page he provides the correct one.
312

Trotsky Archives: T4388.1, "To the
Juridical
Cr
ri
th
Lea ^ ue of National [sic]" (March
?
iQ^of
If
?^
,f also
1
1938 ]This ?letter
appears as, "A Letter to the
'
f
League of Nations," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky, 1937-38
2
re P rinted fror" the Socialist Appeal, April
2 3,
?S;
Q
I
but, is incorrectly dated March 21, 1938.
1938,
In this
letter he cited the mysterious deaths of Ignace
Reiss, his
son, Lyova, and various collaborators, as
evidence of the
need for an international inquiry.
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Trotsky,

I

Stake My Life

!,

24.

p.

Trotsky, "Stalin's Revolutionary Prisoners," in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 p. 106.
,

315

Trotsky Archives

,

:

T4076, "Finale?"

Ibid .
317

Leon Trotsky, "An Interview for Americans" (January
16, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 p. 25,
reprinted from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch January 17, 1937,
under the title, "Leon Trotsky tells his Story." The interviewer was Julius Klyman.
,

,

,
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See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 30, and 264, for
mention of their 1930-31 correspondence and the 1933 visit.
Also see Andre Malraux, "Leon Trotsky," in Writings of Leon
Trotsky 1933-34 ed. by George Breitman and Bev Scott (New
York:
Pathfinder Press, 1972), pp. 331-38. This article,
reprinted from The Modern Monthly March, 1935, attempts to
describe his August, 1933, discussions with Trotsky in St.
Palais. At one point Malraux wrote of Trotsky:
"You belong
to those proscribed persons of whom they cannot make an
emigre.
In spite of all . . . the heroism that shook the
Winter Palace now feels itself humiliated by your solitude."
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Leon Trotsky, "Some Concrete Questions for Mr
Malraux" (March 13, 1937), in Writings of Leon Tr^^W.
1937-38, pp. 74-75, supplied by George Novack. Apparently
this was a reply to Malraux's letter, yet it was written
before the Malraux piece appeared in print. Trotsky never
made amends with the French writer.
in December, 1938,
Trotsky remembered his great hopes for Malraux's literary
career, but charged that the writer had become "a reporter
for the GPU, a purveyor of bureaucratic heroism in prudently
proportioned slices, just so long and so wide. . . . The
fate of Malraux is symbolic for a whole stratum of writers,
almost for a whole generation. It is the generation of
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revolution." See "Leon Trotsky to Andre" Breton," in
Partisan Review VI (Winter, 1939), 126-27; the letter is
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Bernard Wolfe, "Press Release" (June 20, 1937),
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partially appears in "Trotsky Ends Vacation," New York Times
July 29, 1937, p. 5, and Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 369.
On July 21, 1937, Shaw wrote, "'The strength of Trotsky's
case was the incredibility of the accusations against him. .
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T4057, "Kaganowitch predicts my end" (January 31,
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Jewish issue
into the present controversy, and to
use it in order t0
to
mend his political fences.'"
(April
(.April,
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Mauritz A. Hallgren, Why_ I Resigned From the
Trotskv
Defe^e Committee (New York: l7TteFn^tTo^p—
shiFsT^oTf,
riginal letter ° f resignation was dated January
27,
Tq^7 %K
° lnt WaS ecnoed b Y Corliss Lament in
P
"An Open
r
t!.'
I
0 AmSriCan Liber als,» Soviet Russia Today.
VI (March,

1937Yl4

86

"Trotskyists Organize Anti-Soviet Campaign," Soviet
Russia Today Vol. 5 (January, 1937), 7.
,

87

Appeal

,

"Communist Party and Political Asylum," Socialist
III (January, 1937), p. l.

According to George Novack (private interview in
New York City, November 9, 1971), James T. Farrell buttonholed acguaintances at a cocktail party for Art Young in the
fall of 1936, and urged them to sign a petition on behalf of
Trotsky.
Mary McCarthy signed, Max Lerner turned away. For
another version of this party see Mary McCarthy, "My Confession," in On the Contrary (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Cudahy, 1951), pp. 94-95.
89

The experiences of Louis Adamic, as well as that of
Lewis Gannett, will be related later in this chapter.
90

The final Report (March 21, 1938) of the American
Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky claimed that some
150 men and women had joined the Committee.
(See p. 1).
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A
different
S
Z
a
ea
a Committee letter (Anrii iq
PP red on
ioiii
i! 1
Tamiment Library?
in
"Of The American Committee ^iiersltv
for thl Defense nf eon Tr
°tsky."
The 82 members listed inclnri«|.
,5
tJ,?
included:
Louis
Adamic,
„
Devere Allen
Eli^ahoi-h
«
.^-land
Bates,
Franz Boas^
A^tf Brenner Paul
LeWiS
Br ° Wne
Burnham, Witter Banner V* F r*?^'

Ti^rl

'

.

N^ork

r

'

S^SM;

-en?^t^1?' D o^,

am
Abra^Harrxr'r

;i
Sidney

S
Y

0
*

" 6 "? 1 ""
Hamson

M -tha ^ruening
Louis
r
Sidney Hook, Roy Temple House
H ° USe

S
Howard,
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Dorothy Kenyon, William Kilpatrick*
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Joseph Wood Krutch, Suzanne^
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Layle (?) Lane, William E. Leonard,
Ludwig Lore, Ferdinand
?^les M alamutn> Dwight MacDonald,
Margaret
Marshal?' Ernest L. Meyer, Dwight
Marshall,
Morrow, Felix Morrow
Max Nomad, GeoVgHovack
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Winifred Raushenbush, James
Rortv E A Ross, Dagabert
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f'
Rorty,
(?) Runes, Gaetano Salvemini,
Meyer Schapiro, Vida D. Scudder, Evelyn
Scott, Margaret De
Silver, John Sloan, Clara Gruening Stillman,
Ben Stolberq,
Norman Thomas, Tom Tibbett, Frank Traeger
Carlo Tresca^
Lionel Trilling, August Tyler, B. Charney
Vladeck, Charles
6r J ° hn
°° ks Wheelwright, B. J. Widick, Edmund Wilson,
J n Woodward, W. E. Woodward, "and
Helen
others ; "
91.
Jonn Dewey's views of communism will be examined at
the beginning of the next chapter.
92
John Dewey, "Why I Am Not A Communist,'* Modern
Quarterly, VIII (April, 1934), 135-37. Also see Warren
L iberals and Communism
pp. 13-14, and 67 for a discussion
of Dewey and other "critical liberals."
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For more on Kallen see Aaron, Writers on the Left
pp. 172, 457n; Warren, Liberals and Communism pp. 13-14, 67;
and Who's Who in America 1972-73 I (Chicago:
Marquis's
Who's Who, 1973?), p. 1648. Also see R. Alan Lawson, The
Failure of Independent Liberalism 1930-1941 (New York!
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), pp. 149-51.
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For more on Allen see Who Was Who in America
1951-60 III (Chicago:
Marquis's Who's Who, 1960), p. 21;
Shannon, Socialist Party of America p. 191; Seidler, Norman
Thomas pp. 132-34; and Johnpoll, Pacifist's progress pp.
122-24.
Allen's obituary appeared in the New York Times
August 28, 1955, p. 84.
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Milton
Howard,
"Norman
Thorn*** 2«
f Defense for Trotzky Does
Not
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.°??.° of Friendship
With His, Protestations
for the ^Soviet
ovl et Union,"
Union »
Daily Worker February 17, 1937,
p. 2.
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fro ^i^ern Temper (1929) in Joseph
Wood
Mn.o^
Krufrh More Lives Than One (New
Krutch,
York:
William
Sloane
Associates, 1962), pp. 216^17.
1

^

,

m

Quoted
Ibid., pp. 239-40, from the May
3, 1933,
issue of the Nation.
in this autobiography KrutcA devoted
not a single word to his membership on the
Defense Committee.
™° re or K ^tch see Aaron, Writers on the
Left, pp. 165,
l°l
^/b-77; and Contemporary Authors. Vols. 1~(
DeTFoi
Gale
Research Company, 1967), pp. 555-56. Also see an t
obituary
and an eulogy in New York Times May 23,
1970, p.
23, and
P
May 26, 1970, p. 407
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Krutch, More Lives

,

pp.

299,

253,

255.

100,

Warren, Liberals and Communism p. 183. Also see
loc. cit.
pp. 69-70, 16, 114, 147, 149, 225.
For more on
Kirchwey see Who s Who in America 1972-73 I (ChicagoMarquis's Who's Who, 1973?), p. 1727, and Current Bi ography
1942 (New York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1942), pp. 460-62.
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,

Waldo Frank, "The Moscow Trials," communication in
New Republic May 12, 1937, pp. 19-20. Frank lost his post
as President of the Writers Congress and engaged in an acrimonious debate with the Party. See Earl Browder, "Waldo
Frank and the Moscow Trials," New Republic May 26, 1937,
p. 76 (also in Daily Worker
May 22, 1937, p. 9); Reinhold
Niebuhr, "Against Earl Browder," New Republic June 9, 1937,
p. 132; and "Waldo Frank in Rebuttal," New Republic
July
14, 1937, p. 232.
Frank and the editors of the New Masses
also debated the issue in the editions of May 18, 1937, pp.
10-11, and May 25, 1937, p. 20.
For more on the Writers
,
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Congress see Aaron, Writers on
the Left, no
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-Novack, "Radical Intellectuals in
the 1930s,"
international SocialLat ^Review, Vol. 29
(March-April
1968),
26-27
this group which gravitated toward
the
Communist
r y
early 1930s Novack named Clifton
H
"J
Sidney Hook, Lionel and Diana Trilling,
Meyer Schaoiro
S
a
Elli0t C0
Herbert S^iow/and Felix^orrow.
S
Most
of
th^'
,
Ut
° M
° f Columbi ^ University and contributed
f
°
h
to the
Menorah Journal
the predecessor of Commentary
in
an obituary, "Max Shachtman:
A Political P ortrait," International Socialist Review. Vol. 34 (February,
1973), 27
Novack provided another list of writers and
were attracted to the ideas of Trotskyism at journalists who
about the same
time:
Solow, John MacDonald, Morrow, Cohen, Harold
Earle Birney, Hook, Bernard Wolfe, Dwight MacDonald, Isaacs,
Lionel
Abel, Fred Dupee, and Arthur Mizener.
By 1946 every one of
these "Trotskyite intellectuals'" had turned away
from the
revolutionary struggle, with the exception of Novack, and
begun to "find a niche somewhere in the establishment."
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This membership list of the Executive Committee was
provided by James T. Farrell, in a private interview in New
York City, March 2, 1972.
105

Letter from Felix Morrow, December 16, P972. Harold
Isaacs wrote The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolutio n (1938), to
which Trotsky contributed a preface; he is currently a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. His wife Viola Robinson Isaacs was active in
Committee activities. Cohen (1899-1959) was a managing
editor of the Menorah Journal in the 1920s, and a founder of
Commentary
In May 1959 he was found dead in his New York
apartment with a plastic bag over his head, an apparent
suicide.
Pearl Kluger was the mainstay of the secretarial
force during the entire existence of the Defense Committee,
and accompanied the Preliminary Commission to Mexico.
On
Isaacs see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 295, 297, and
Contemporary Authors Vols. 1-4, ed. by James M. Ethridge
and Barbara Kopala (Detroit:
Gale Research, 1962/1967),
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107 T

Letter from Felix Morrow, December ifi iQ7o
c
and Cohen were especially
"resentful" of the Trotskyi^e
insistence on wiping out this organization^
Mor?ow extends
108
lbid.
i

^

109^
C nnon
History of American Trotskyism
_
tq*i
f
pp . 154-55 '
In 1933 Solow
joined the Com^uTTTsTTe aque alon q with
Morrowand Novack. See Novack, "Max Shacntman: 9
A Political
International Socialist Review, Vol. 34
(Februa^,
1973)? 27.
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110 c
See Aaron, Writers on the Left

,

p.

Letter from Felix Morrow, December

457 n .
1972.

16,

For more on Solow see his obituary in the New
York
Times, November 27, 1964, p. 35. Also see
"Herbert"
Fortune LXXI (January, 1965), 118.

lc^

,

113«
Cannon, History of American Trotskyism pp. 178-79
According to Cannon, Burnham wanted unification with
the
Trotskyites because he was getting "a little bit more
radical;
he wanted to put his toe a little deeper into the
icy water
of proletarian politics while bracing himself,
with his other
foot, on the bourgeois shore."
114
For more on this split see Ibid . pp. 254-55, and
Joseph Hansen, "Trotsky's Last Battle Against The. Revisionists," in Leon Trotsky
The Man and His Work (New York:
Merit Publishers, 1969), pp. 26-34, reprinted from Fourth
International November, 1940. Most of Trotsky's In Defense
of Marxism (New York:
Merit Publishers, 1965), was devoted
to this controversy.
,

,

:

,

115

For more on Burnham see Current Biography 1941 ed
by Maxine Block (New York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1941),
121-23,
and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Middle-Aged Man
pp.
with a Horn," review of Containment or Liberation by James
Burnham, in the New Republic March 16, 1953, pp. 16-17.
Burnham also wrote, among other books, The Machiavellians
( 1943 )
Web of Subversion 1954
and The Coming Defeat of
Communism (1950).
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Heqel to Marx ( QTfil
Se Aaron
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" 44,
^-Jz^T
dd
rI a S
discussion of Hook's pole^s^
^°
ithH^w
Eastman on the nature of Marxism.
117
See Hook, "Why I Am a Communist:
Communism without
Dogmas,"
Modern Monthly VIII (April,
1934)? 143-65.
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er lain ^oted in Aaron,
Writers
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rker
appraisal of~
~^

"
SSe ?k
the edlto ^ial, "Trotzkyites Hide
Tha^r p
Their
Faces,"n d^u'
February 19, 1937, p. 6.

S e Gannon, History of American
Trotskyism p. 226.
arrn
According tto Cannon, Hook wante d fusion in
order to qe the
American Workers Party off his hands "and end
venture in party politics. He wanted to retirehis brief ad!
to the side
ne
° nlY place wnere he nas ever f elt at
home, and
t
t\he ought never to have left."
which
See pp. 178-79.
120„
See Hook, "The Prophetic Trotsky," review of
The
Third International After Lenin
by Leon Trotsky, in the"
Saturday Review of Literature XIV (July 11,
1936), 10.
,

,

,

121

See "Retiring Prof. Hook Gives Class His Views,"
New York Times, December 21, 1972, p. 37. Hook declared
that he wanted to write his autobiography:
"'I'm going to
call it "Out of Step," . ... I've always been out of step.
A premature Marxist. A premature anti-Communist.'"
122
See Lyons, Red Decade p. 343.
Among the "prime
movers" of the undertaking were John Dewey, Benjamin Stolberg,
Horace M. Kallen, and Suzanne La Follette.
123
For more on Hook see Current Biography 1952, ed.
by Anna Rothe and Evelyn Lohr (New York:
H. W. Wilson
Company, 1952), pp. 269-71, and Contemporary Authors Vols.
11-12, ed. by James M. Ethridge and Barbara Kopala (Detroit:
v
Gale Research Company, 1965), p. 182.
124
For a particularly controversial article see Hook,
"Communism and the Intellectuals," American Mercury LXVIII
(February, 1949), 133-44.
,

,

,

,

125

James T. Farrell, a private interview in New York
City, March 2, 1972. Also see Selden Rodman, "Trotsky in
the Kremlin:
An Interview," Common Sense VI (December,
1937), 19, and Editorial, "The Trotsky Commission," Nation
May 1, 1937, pp. 496-97.
,

126

See editorial, "Trotsky Investigates Himself,"
New Masses April 20, 1937, p. 28, and Marion Hammett and
William Smith, "Inside the Trotsky 'Trial,'" New Masses,
,

i
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April 27, 1937, p. 6; also see the editorial, "Mr.
Disposes," New Masses May 18, 1937, p. n. Many Stolberay
of the
same criticisms of Stolberq and La Follette were
made in
"Mexico Expedition Loaded With Trotzkyi tes " Daily
Worker,
April 10, 1937, p. 2.
Both publications took part i cular
exception to Ms. La Follette' s reviews of two books on
the
Popular Front in France ( Nation September 26, 1936,
pp.
371-73). At that time she contended that the Front tactic
had failed, and that "fascism is to be defeated only by
the
arming of the working class against a fascist coup, by revolutionary changes in the military personnel, by reorganization
of the police, by a desperate fight against finance capital."
,

,

,

127

See Stolberg's comments in "Violence, For and
Against; A Symposium on Marx, Stalin, and Trotsky," in
Common Sense VII (January, 1938), 21.
,

128 A
Aaron, Writers on the Left p. 457n.
129
"The New Freeman," Time October 16, 1950, pp. 46-48.
130
Adamic, My_ America p. 73.
Stolberg admitted that
he admired Trotsky, but was no partisan of his views.
See
"Violence, For and Against," Common Sense VII (January,
1938), 21.
"I think very highly of Trotsky as a historian,
writer and man of action. ... I certainly do not follow
his revolutionary leadership." After a review of The Revo lution Betrayed in the Nation Trotsky said of Stolberg,
"'I see that you are not a Marxist.'" For the review see the
Nation April 10, 1937, pp. 401-04. Also see Trotsky, In
Defense of Marxi sm p. 92. For an obituary of Stolberg see
the New York Times January 22, 1951, p. 17.
,
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Adamic, My_ America pp. 83-84.
In 1938 Malcom
Crowley accused My_ America of "'smelling of Stolberg and red
herring.'" Quoted in Warren, Liberals and Communism p. 121.
,

,

132

Quoted in Lyons, Red Decade p. 330. In a review
of the "Red Terror," Granville Hicks asserted that he knew
of only one effort by the Party to suppress a book Stolberg's
See "How Red Was the Red Decade?,"
Story of the C.I.Q
Harper's Magazine Vol. 207 (July, 1953), 56. When Stolberg's
book was serialized in newspapers of the Scripps-Howard chain,
the Party was beside itself and spared no adjectives in describing the betrayal of this "renegade ," 'gangster of the pen,"
"putty-faced underground Trotzkyite," who was "infected with
the leprous taint of Trotskyism." For a representative
Adam Lapin, 'CIO
selection of articles see the Daily Worker
Organ Hits Poison Pen Red-Baiters Who Knife Labor," January
15, 1938, p. 1; "Brophy's Attack On Stolberg Wins Labor's
Approval," January 24, 1938, p. 1; January 25, 1938, p. 6;
January 26, 1938, p. 1; editorial, "The CIO Smites A Coughlin
Bed-Fellow," January 26, 1938, p. 6; January 27, 1938, p. 1;
January 28, 1938, p. 3; February 1, 1938, p. 1; February 2,
,
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1938, p. 6; Mike Gold, "Thousands of Readers Have Marched
Away from the Scripps Papers," February 2, 1938,
7p
February 5, 1938, pp. 5-6; February 8, 1938,
p. 6;*Harrison
George, "Life in a Leper Colony With Stolberg," February
10,
1938, p. 7; February 11, 1938, p. 5; February 15, 1938,
7.
p.
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134

Aaron, Writers on the Lef
Ibid_.

,

120.

p.

Also see pp. 172, 457n for
more on the NDCPP. Novack claims that Rorty helped write
the Manifesto supporting Foster and Ford in 1932.
See Novack,
"Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s," International Social ist
Review Vol. 29 (March-April, 1968), 27~.
,

pp.

213,

437.

,

135

Aaron, Writers on the Left pp. 261-62. Hook, Eliot
Cohen, and Solow were also involved in this proposed study.
136
Novack, 'Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s," inter national Socialist Review Vol. 29 (March-April, 1968) 27.
Also see Lyons, Red Decade p. 145, and Aaron, Writers on
the Left pp. 172, 4577^
,

,

,

,

137
138

Socialist Call

,

June

5,

1937.

Editorial, "From Rorty to Hearst," New Masses

,

June 22, 1937, pp. 14-15.
139

Rorty, "Mobilizing the Innocents:
Communism Behind
the Scenes," Forum and Century XCIV (January, 1938), 43-47.
Also see Warren, Liberal s and Communi sm p. 161.
,

,

140

Lyons, Red Decade

,

p.

345.

141

In 1955 Rorty denounced censorship of libraries.
See "The Libraries In A Time of Tension," Commentary Vol.
Born in 1890, he wrote several
19 (January, 1955), 30-37.
books of verse, Our Master's Voice (1934) on advertising,
and with Moshe Decter, McCarthy and the Communists (1954),
the last sponsored by the American Committee for Cultural
,

Freedom.
142

Another
See Richard Schickel, "James T. Farrell:
Time, Another Place," Esquire LVIII (December, 1962), 157,
et seq . Also see C. Hartley Grattan, "James T. Farrell:
Moralist," Harper's Magazine Vol. 209 (October, 1954), 93,
et seq .
,

,

143

Quoted in Aaron, Writers on the Left pp. 316-19,
Also see Farrell, "A Note on Literary Criticism,"
449-50.
Nation March 4 and 11, 1936, pp. 276-77, 314-15. For a
vigorous counter-attack see New Masses June 23, 1936, pp.
23-24; August 18, 1936, p. 23; September 22, 1936, p. 36;
and December 1, 1936, pp. 23-24.
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144

Aaron, Writers on the Left

,

pp.

318-19.

145

Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey a
Symposium edited by Sidney Hook, pp. 363^647 Also see
1 '? eulo<3y of Trotsky, "Leon Trotsky," Partisan
Review
f^/i
VII (September-October, 1940), 388-90.
146
See Letter, "That Man Again," New Republic January
12, 1938, p. 287.
Dwight MacDonald protested this "literary
lynching," and contended that although Farrell had his
"faults" as a novelist, this did not justify such "a childish
and malicious outburst" as represented by the letter from
East St. Louis, Illinois.
See "Farrell Finale," New Republic
February 16, 1938, p. 48. For more on the "elaborate pattern of calumny" against Farrell see Lyons, Red Decade
pp.
335-36.
Also see Schickel, "James T. Farrell: Another Time,
Another Place," Esquire LVIII (December, 1962), 274. in a
private interview (New York City, March 2, 1972), Farrell
implicated Malcolm Cowley as the leader of this organized
campaign.
,

,

,

,

,

147

The novelist quoted these remarks in "James T.
Farrell on James T. Farrell" (a reply to Edmund Wilson's
appreciation of Fathers and Sons ), New Republic October 28,
,

1940, p. 595.

148

Aaron, Writers on the Left p. 393. When Granville
Hicks, after breaking with the Party in late-1939, published
a mimeographed bulletin for other refugees, Farrell dubbed
it a "'Stalinist Lonely Hearts Club.'" See Lyons, Red
Decade p. 363. Farrell also took the Nation to task for
its analysis of the Moscow Trials.
See "Challenge from Mr.
Farrell," the Nation September 30, 1939, p. 359, and Warren,
Liberal s and Communi sm pp. 213-14.
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/

For more on Hook see Current Biography 1952 (New
York:
H. W. Wilson Company, 1952), p. 271, and 200 Contemporary Authors ed. by Barbara Harte and Carolyn Riley
Gale Research Company, 1969), pp. 109-11.
(Detroit:
,

,

150

Hicks, "How Red Was the Red Decade?," Harper
Magazine Vol. 207 (July, 1953), 54. A list of these "premature anti-Communists" appears in Lyons, Red Decade p.
326.
It includes Dewey, Eastman, Stolberg, Dos Passos,
Edmund Wilson, Rorty, Hook, Farrell, La Follette, Charles
Rumford Walker, Charles Yale Harrison, V. F. Calverton,
Evelyn Scott, and Ludwig Lore, among others. All of those
named participated, to some degree, in the activities of
the Trotsky Defense Committee.
'
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,

151

Novack, "Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s,"
International Socialist Review Vol. 29 (March-April, 1968),
27-28.
,
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152
fM
v
(New
York:

McCarth y' " M Y Confession," in On the Contrary
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1951 )TppT~8 2^881

153

Ibid., pp. 94-95.
probably James T. Farrell.

154
155

Ibid.

,

Ibid_.

,

pp.

The "novelist friend" was

95-96.

In her story "Portrait of the
pp. 97-98.
Intellectual as a Yale Man," The Company She Keeps (New YorkHarper, Brace and Company, 1942), Mary McCarthy devoted considerable attention to the Trotsky affair in the mid-1930s.
Her hero, Jim Barnett (a fictionalized portrait of John
Chamberlain), attended Defense Committee meetings, where the
members "wore an expression of injury, of self -justification
a funny, feminine, 'put-upon' look, just as if they were all,
individually, on trial." He used to wish, after listening to
letters from the "Old Man," that Trotsky could be held incommunicado until the investigation was over:
"The Old Man
did not understand Americans." But he also noticed that his
magazine, " The Liberal ," no longer invited Trotskyites to
review books, as if it were trying to make itself "as neutralcolored as possible and fade discreetly into the sourrounding
landscape." As for Dewey, Jim Barnett was bothered by this
apotheosis of the cracker-barrel spirit deep in conversation
with a Shachtman or Stolberg; it was "like finding your father
in bed with a woman."
But Dewey took to it "like a duck to
water." Whenever Jim heard that "dry voice" swell out in a
mass meeting in anger or eloquence, "he squirmed in his seat,
not knowing whether to feel embarrassed for Dewey or for
himself." Jim began to believe the stories of persecution.
See loc . cit
pp. 218-19, 220-29.
.

156

,

McCarthy, "My Confession," in On the Contrary

pp.

,

98-100,
1

57

Also see McCarthy, "Portrait of
Ibid
pp. 100-02.
the Intellectual as a Yale Man," The Company She Keeps
.

,

,

p.

216.
1

v

CO

See Pravda "In the
Adamic, My America pp. 80-81.
Last Hour," February 7, 1937, p. 1, for the assertion that
Adamic had "broken with the committee." In 1951 Adamic was
either a suicide or murder victim. See Lawson, Failure of
Independent Liberal! sm pp. 150-57.
,
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,

159

16Q

Adamic,

My_

America

,

p.

82.

Kenneth Durant was the first
84-85.
Tass correspondent in the United States, and press secretary
to Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, the unrecognized Soviet envoy
His father
in this country after the Bolshevik Revolution.
helped build the Moscow-St. Petersburg railroad. Durant
Ibid .

,

pp.

"
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(1889-1972) was married at one time to Genevieve
Taqqard,
F
hiS obituar Y see
New York Times December
i
§70
±y
/ Z
1
p. 42.
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Lyons, Red Decade

,

pp.

252,

324-25.

162

Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey a
Symposium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 356-57*; For other overt
efforts to discourage Committee partisans see "Boudin Calls
Trotzky 'Appeal' An Attack," Daily Worker February 13,
1937, p. 6, and Milton Howard, "A Letter to Ernest L. Meyer
on His Membership in Trotzkyist 'Defense'," Daily Worker
February 15, 1937, p. 6. Meyer was also attacked by Morris
U. Schappes in an "Open Letter," New Masses
March 2, 1937,
This
pressure eventually forced an open protest
p. 21.
from Dewey, Kallen, and other Committee members, who complained about the visits, telephone calls, and letters.
See "Trotsky Inquiry Under Fire Here," New York Times
February 17, 1937, p. 4.
,

,

,

,

,
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Lyons, Red Decade p. 252. Also see "Aid and Comfort for the Fascists," Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6 (March,
1937)
7, and The American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), p. 7. Frederick L.
Schuman claimed that he had joined the Defense Committee in
the autumn of 1936, but had resigned on February 10, 1937,
when the Committee began to organize "an 'investigation'
whose chief function would necessarily be that of publicizing
Trotsky's attacks on Stalin." This writer, however, has been
unable to find Schuman s name on any of the membership lists.
See "Leon Trotsky:
Martyr or Renegade?," Southern Review
Vol. 3 (Summer, 1937), 70n.
,

,

,

'
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164

Hallgren, Why I_ Resigned From the Trotsky Defense
Commi ttee pp. 1-6. A letter from Hallgren on his resignaFebruary 5, 1937, p.
tion appeared in the New York Times
New York Times
20, followed by replies from George Novack
February 6, 1937, p. 5), and from Suzanne La Follette New
York Times February 8, 1937, p. 16). Also see American
Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, Report (March 21,
1938)
p. 7.
,
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16 5

Resigned From the Trotsky Defense
Committee pp. 7-14. Parts of this letter appeared in New
Masses February 9, 1937, pp. 19-20, and the Daily Worker
February 4, 1937, pp. 21-22. In the same issue, p. 2, the
Worker published a special editorial on his resignation-"Hallgren's Letter Sharp Challenge to Those Defending
Trotzky.
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See "Readers' Forum," New Masses February 16, 1937
A slightly different version appeared in Pravda
,

21.

,

s
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"In the Last Hour," February 7, 1937, p. 1.
a private interview (New York City, March 2, 1972), Farrell stated
that
Gannett had believed the Committee had been misrepresented
to him by Farrell.
167
"Readers' Forum," New Masses February 16, 1937,
p.
The same quote appeared in Pravda, "in the Last Hour,"
21.
February 7, 1937, p. 1.

—

,

168

See "Readers' Forum," New Masses February 16, 1937,
Both Jaffe and Bowman reacted adversely to a story
p. 21.
in the New York Times ("Trotsky Backers Act To Clear Him,"
February 1, 1937, p. 12), which they interpreted as a commitment by the Committee to clear Trotsky, even before the
testimony was heard. Vera Boudin and Dorothy Brophy, an old
Socialist, also attacked the Committee.
See "Readers' Forum,"
New Masses April 6, 1937, p. 21. The Daily Worker published
a number of stories on the resignations:
"Gannett and Jaffe
Resign from Trotzkyist 'Defense' Committee," February 6, 1937,
p. 1; "Nine Resign From Trotzky 'Defense'," February 12, 1937,
p. 2; "Poet Quits Committee for Trotzky," February 17, 1937,
The Worker
honor list of nine included: Sara Bard
p. 2.
Field, Manuel Komroff, Freda Kirchwey, Mauritz Hallgren, Lewis
Gannett, LeRoy Bowman, Jacob Billikopf, Sam Jaffe, and Evelyn
Preston, chairman of the League of Women Shoppers.
,

,

'

169
1

70

171
1

Lyons, Red Decade
Ibid
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,

pp.

Ibid.

,

p.
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,

p.

252

253.

^

257.

7?

"Corliss Lamont, Now 70, Is Still Active," New York
Times April 2, 1972, p. 22. For twenty years Lamont was a
director of the American Civil Liberties Union, before becoming chairman of the more militant National Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee.
,

173

Corliss Lamont, "An Open Letter to American Liberals,"
Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 14-15. Parts of
this "Open Letter" also appeared in the New Republ ic February
It also was printed in the Daily Worker
24, 1937, pp. 75-76.
February 9, 1937, p. 2, and quoted from in M. Olgin, "Responses to the Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center,"
Pravda February 10, 1937, p. 5.
,

,

,

,

174

For information on Robins and Trotsky see George
Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (New York: Atheneum, 1956/
1967), pp. 99-100, 113-16, 193, 397-401, 496-500, 505-06,
514-17.
See the New York Times January 21, 1937, p. 9, and
February 6, 1937, p. 5. The pages of the Daily Worker were
,

.
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With attacks on Trotsky.
See, for instance, editorial,
Common Enemy of Humanity," February 1, 1937,
6
and
p
"18,000 In Garden Vow To Drive Trotzkyism Out Of The
Labor
Movement," February 6, 1937, p. 1, The issue for February
8, 1937, p. 4, was filled with news of anti-Trotsky meetings
"Chicago CP. Leader To Talk on Trotzky," "Amter to Expose
Trotzkyism in Rally at Boston on February 14," "Hathaway To
Talk on Trotzkyism," "Amter To Talk On Trotzkyism In Harlem."
A favorite ploy at these meetings was to compare Trotsky to
Aaron Burr. An elaborate version of this analogy appears in
Earl Browder, "Lessons of the Moscow Trials," Communist,
XVII (April, 1938), 306-21.
1S

f,ii
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1

76

"Urges Soviet Admit Observers at Trial," New York
TJjnes, January 10, 1937, II, p. 3.
Responding to an erroneous report that the Bukharin-Rykov trial was soon in the
offing, the Defense Committee in March 1937 made the same
demands of Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, and described its
members as "'staunch friends of the Soviet Union,'" something
of a jest under the circumstances.
See Socialist Call,
March 13, 1937, p. 5.
177

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 5-6. Among other publications,
the Committee published six issues of a printed bulletin,
not located by this writer.
1

78

Max Shachtman, "Radicalism in the Thirties: The
Trotskyist View," in Simon, ed., As We Saw The Thirties
pp. 40-41.
,

1

79

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 4-5.
180

This information comes from a poster in the folder
marked, "Of The American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky," Tamiment Library, New York University.
181

I

Max Shachtman, "Introduction," to Leon Trotsky,
Pioneer Publishers, 1937),
(New York:
Stake My Life
1

^

8^

Ibid .

,

,

p.

p.

2.

2

183

"Wire Break Balks Trotsky As 6,500 Await Speech
Here," New York Times February 10, 1937, p. 1.
,

184

The
Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, p. 5, and passim
abbreviated Russian" version ol this speech, "Russkaia rech
na mi tinge v zale ippodroma v Niu-Iorke" (February 9, 1937),
is listed as T4090 in the Trotsky Archives Harvard UniverFor an accounting of the money spent on this meeting
sity.
see American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 10-11. A few days later Trotsky
.

,
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issued essentially the same challenge to a meeting in
Chicaqo
See Trotsky, "A Telegram to Chicago" (February 14, 1937)
in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 ed by George Breitman and
Evelyn Reed (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 39-40,
reprinted from Labor Action (February 27, 1937), under the
title, "Trotsky Telegram Repeats Challenge."
185„
See American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 5-6. Also see "Wire
Break Balks Trotsky As 6,500 Await Speech Here," New York
Times February 10, 1937, p. 1.
,

.

,

,

186

See "2 Inquiries Start On Trotsky Fiasco,"
York Times February 11, 1937, p. 8.

New

,

187

See "Trotsky Back In Home," New York Times February
10, 1937, p. 4, and Trotsky Archives
T4092, "Regarding the
Causes of the non- transmission of Mr. Trotsky's Speech""
(February 10, 1937), signed by Bernard Wolfe.
,

:

1

88

"Trotsky in Seclusion," New York Times

,

February 11,

1937, p. 8.
189

Quoted in Editorial, "More on the Moscow Trial,"
Soviet Russia Today Vol. 5 (November, 1936), 8.
,

190

"A Lawyer Views the Radek Trial," and Leon [ sic ]
Feuchtwanger on the Trial," in Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6
For another view see "Feuchtwanger Sees
(March, 1937), 12.
Trial as Check To War," Daily Worker February 1, 1937, p. 2.
,

,

1

91

"Newton D. Baker Reviews the Treason Trial Record,"
Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6 (April, 1937), 8.
,

19 2

Quoted in Editorial, "Aid and Comfort for the
Fascists," Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 7.
,

193

"The New Treason Trial," Soviet Russia
Edi torial
*
Vol. 5 (February, 1937), 7.
,

Today

,

194

See Editorial, "Shape of Things," Nation January
30, 1937, p. 114, and Editorial, "Behind the Soviet Trials,"
Nation February 6, 1937, pp. 143-45.
,

,

195

February

"Another Russian Trial," New Republic
1937, pp. 399-400.

Editorial
3,

196 Editorial

Republic

,

,

"Russian Politics in America," New
February 17, 1937, pp. 33-34.
,

197

Suzanne La Follette, Letter, "October Is Safe"
(February 5, 1937), Nation February 13, 1937, p. 196.
,

i

,
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198

Franz Hoellering, Letter, "Evidence Is Essential"
(February 8, 1937), Nation February 20, 1937, p. 224.
,

199

James Rorty, Letter, "Harsh Words from a Friend"
(February 16, 1937), Nation February 27, 1937, p. 252.
200
W^ldon Burke, Letter, "The Russian Trial," New
Republic February 17, 1937, pp. 50-51.
in a reply to"
Burke the editors of New Republic denied that they took
their opinions "ready-made" from Walter Duranty, even though
"on the whole" they agreed with him.
They also claimed that
there were two broad aspects of democracy, "political .and
economic," with Soviet Russia having only the second kind:
"It nevertheless is a part, and an important part, of the
anti-fascist front." See loc ci . p. 51.
,

,

.

,

201

Letters, "Trotsky:
Friends and Enemies," New
Republic February 24, 1937, p. 75. Also Drinted in Socialist
Call February 13, 1937, p. 4.
,

,

202

Martha Gruening, Letter, "Trotsky and Civil Liberties," New Republic March 3, 1937, p. 113.
,

203

Letter, "Trotsky and the Russian Trials," New,
Republic March 17, 1937, p. 169. The signers of this letter
were:
John Chamberlain, Eleanor Clark, James T. Farrell,
Martha Gruening, Louis Hacker, Suzanne La Follette, Ludwig
Lore, James Rorty, Clara G. Stillman, and Lionel Trilling.
In a reply the editors of New Republ ic doubted that a countertrial could establish either Trotsky's guilt or innocence;
"it would simply intensify the confusion." With only one
side represented, the inquiry "would serve chiefly as a sounding board for propaganda." Trotsky, instead, should publish
any evidence bearing on the trials, which "would serve much
the same purpose as if it were delivered verbally before a
court of inquiry." Meanwhile, there were other questions of
more importance than Trotsky's guilt, e.g., Spain and Ameri"And there is the question whether American
can labor.
liberals and progressives are going to work toward the ends
they have in common, or whether they are going to dissipate
their influence by quarrels among themselves over questions
pp. 169that concern them at second hand." See loc ci t
,
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.

,
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204

Farrell, "On 'The Nation'," Socialist Call
timidity,
In this attack on the Nation
5.
July 17, 1937,
Farrell suggested that if it waited until January 2037 to
assemble all the facts, then it could write an editorial
almost as bold as those of Oswald Garrison Villard in 1937.
Villard, of course, had been the editor and elder statesman
In 1937 he was prepared to
of the Nation for many years.
condemn the Moscow trials, unlike Freda Kirchwey.
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p.
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Lyons, Red Decade p. 243.
"But the years of equivocation, apology and complacent suspension of judgment had
helped the incredible revolution absorb the purges, to
emerge stronger after the invigorating draught of blood,"
commented Lyons on the posture of the^liberal journals toward
the purge.
In general, he wrote, there were "no intellectual
acrobatics which the f el low- travelers would not undertake to
save their lovely faith in Russia.
They had developed
a set of card-indexed formulas of rationalization for washing
out such minor blemishes on the beloved dictatorship of the
proletariat." See loc. cit
Philip Rahv sumpp. 244-45.
marized the attitude of the liberal journals in the following
formula:
"'Some people will believe the trials are frame-ups;
some people will believe the trials are not frame-ups.
However, both sides are partisan. As for ourselves, we
prefer to view them sub specie aeterni tati . Perhaps in a
hundred years we shall know the truth."" See Rahv, "Trials
of the Mind," Partisan Review IV (April, 1938), 5.
Also
see Max Eastman, Stalin s Russia and the Crisis In Socialism
(New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1940), pp. 267-78.
,
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Warren, Liberal s and Communism

,

pp.

177-79,

172-73.

207

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
"Introductory Note," World Voices on the Moscow Trial s p. 6.
,

208

Adamic, My America pp. 85-86. At a general meeting,
attended by about one-eighth of the Defense Committee's total
membership, Adamic found that "most of this one-eighth was
obviously more ignorant about the facts and issues involved
than was I, who had just been kicked out of a foreign country
on account of them." There was "no clarity, no solid understanding," added Adamic, who believed that many had joined
See loc cit ., p. 85.
at the urging of a friend.
,

.

209,,

1937),
Prof essor John Dewey's Speech" (March 1
Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), in the Trotsky
,

Archives
v

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
It seems likely that Dewey
Report (March 21, 1938), p. 1.
presented these "principles" at the March 1937 membership^
meeting, but the final report does not expressly state this
as fact.
211

"Roundabout Roads to Trotskyism," New
Editorial
February 23, 1937, p. 19.
,

Masses

,

212

See American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), p. 6, and Heisler, First
Why? pp. 168-70.
Two Moscow Trial
:

213

,

Trotsky Archives

:

T4128.1, "To the President of the
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Commission of the Socialist Lawyers' Front" (March 15?
1937)
For more on the Lawyers' Front see Editorial,
"Trotsky'
Investigates Himself," and Marion Hammett and William
Smith,
Inside the Trotsky 'Trial'," in New Masse s, April
20, 1937,
p. 28, and April 27, 1937, p. 10.
According to the editorial
three Mexican judges had been appointed to study the
evidence
but "Trotsky haughtily rejected this offer," apparently
because he believed some Front members were communists.

-

214

George Novack, interview in New York City, November
9, 1971, and Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November
Trotsky had written to Ms. La Follette urging the
26, 1971.
importance of immediate action in a letter probably dated
March 16, 1937.

—

215„
Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November 26,
1971.
216

This "confidential letter" (March 17, 1937) from
Trotsky to his New York followers was provided through the
courtesy of George Novack. The "internal crisis" to which
Trotsky referred may have been the resignations from the
Defense Committee or friction between the liberal and
Trotskyite factions within the organization.
217

Ibid .

,

1-2.

pp.

218

Ibid
In this letter Trotsky reminded the
p. 2.
New York "comrades" of the elementary rules of coalition:
retain group identity; view the ally as a possible adversary;
preserve full rights of criticism; supplement the bloc with
independent action use favorable circumstances to take the
initiative when allies are hesitating. The failure to act
on these f ormul as
he added in a harsh judgmen t belonged
"in principle to the same category as the f ailure of the
Chinese Communists after their entrance into the Kuomintang."
See loc . cit
p. 3.
.

,

;

,

.

,

219-.. A
Ibid .
220

,

,

p.

o
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.

Guilty Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Charges made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials
Harper & Brothers, iy38} p. 3.
John Dewey et al. (New York:
Hereafter cited as Not Guil ty
Not_

,

,

,

.

221

In separate interviews, both George Novack and James
T. Farrell agreed that Margaret de Silver donated $5000 to
But Suzanne La Follette put the figure closer
the Committee.
The Novack interview was held on November 9,
to $2000-3000.
1971, the La Follette interview on March 7, 1972, and the
Farrell interview on March 2, 1972— all in New York City.
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American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
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Re P ort (March 21, 1938), p. 3.
Also see "Dewey Heads Commission To Try Trotsky In Mexico," Social ist Call, April 10,
H
1937, p. 5.
'

223

Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November 26,
A logical candidate for the sub-commission was Norman
1971.
Thomas, but considering the bitter fight then raging with
the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party, it would have been
"inappropriate" for him to join, contends James T. Farrell
(interview, New York City, March 2, 1972). Also Thomas was
planning a trip to Europe and the Soviet Union in March 1937,
but because "I had been on the John Dewey Committee for
Justice to Trotsky," he later explained, the Soviet authorities held up the visa. He wrote to Sir Stafford Cripps for
help, and finally obtained the necessary visa.
See Norman
Thomas, "The Thirties in America as a Socialist Recalls Them,"
in Simon, ed.
As We Saw the Thirties pp. 116-17.
Also see
Johnpoll, Pacifist's progress p. 184, and Seidler, Norman
Thomas p. 181.
,
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,

,

224

Harold Kirker and Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, "Beard,
Becker and the Trotsky Inquiry," American Quarterly XIII
(Winter, 1961), 519.
Beard's letter to Novack was dated
March 19, 1937.
Earlier Beard had written Novack declining
an invitation to join the Defense Committee (September 26,
1936):
"In sheer self-defense
to get a little time for
study I am compelled to adhere to a simple rule: Don't
underwrite committees (for they may do anything) and stick
See
to matters of which I have some personal knowledge."
,

—

—

loc . ci

.

,

p.

518.
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Beard's letter to Norman Thomas was
Ibid .
p. 520.
dated March 27, 1937. On behalf of Novack, Felix Morrow
wrote to Beard on April 6, and expressed regrets at this
"Literally every comrefusal to join the sub-commission:
mittee member consulted on personnel for the commission
suggested your name." In addition Morrow declared that the
impossibility of proving a negative was well taken as a
fundamental rule, and "has served to clarify a number of us
on the objective limitations to proving a negative by positive
evidence." But he added that Trotsky had been under guard
When
See loc . cit .
pp. 520-21.
during much of his exile.
the final verdict was announced, Dewey remarked that "a
distinguished colleague of mine" had declined to share_"our
labors," pleading the impossibility of proving a negative,
but it was possible to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, "the
existence of a frame-up, and I submit that the Commission
has done just that." See "Speech of Dr. John Dewey, Chairman" (December 12, 1937), Dewey Commission Exhibit D438
In the Case of Leon
(second folder), in Trotsky Archives .
Trotsky pp. 464-67, Trotsky discussed in some detail Beard s
letter of March 19, 1937. He argued that this "exceptionally
,

,

,

t
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conscientious investigator" should have entered the Commission
in order to test his conclusions.
Trotsky also felt that he
could prove a "negative fact," i.e., that he had not been
with the conspirators at specified times, and a "positive
fact," that Stalin organized "the greatest frame-up in human
history." Obviously he regretted the non-participation of
the "celebrated" historian.
226

Kirker and Wilkins, "Beard, Becker and the Trotsky
Inquiry," American Quarterly XIII (Winter, 1961), 522.
Becker's letter to Novack was dated March 25, 1937.
,

227

Ibid., pp. 522-23.
This letter from Becker to Felix
Morrow was dated April 16, 1937. Earlier Morrow had written
Becker (April 12, 1937) that they regretted his inability to
serve, because "we felt that an able historian was the ideal
commissioner, for it is not so much legal training, as the
combination of the historical approach and the capacity to
give the right weight to documents, which are required for
this task." See loc . ci .
p. 522.
,

228

Communi sm
229

Ibid .
p.

,

,

p.

523.

Also see Warren, Liberals and

182.

.

Kirker and Wilkins, "Beard, Becker and the Trotsky
Inquiry," American Quarterly XIII (Winter, 1961), 525.
,

230

Dewey's motivation for joining the Commission will
be discussed in the next chapter.
231

At the last moment Tresca was unable to make the
trip to Mexico City.
232

For more on Tresca (1879-1943) see the New York
In subsequent weeks the Times
Times, January 12, 1943, p. 1.
devoted many articles to this mysterious assassination.
Carlos Contreras, an enemy of Tresca, was mentioned in some
accounts as the likely assassin. Contreras, also known as
Enea Sormenti or Vittorio Vidali, was a veteran N^KVD agent
who may have participated in an abortive attempt on Trotsky's
After World War II he emerged as "Moscow's
life in May, 1940.
Gauleiter in the critical zone of Trieste." See Isaac Don
Farrar, Straus
Levine, The Mind of an Assassin (New York:
Also see Current Biography
and Cudahy, 1959), pp. 70-71.
H. W. Wilson Company,
1943 ed. by Maxine Block (New York:
1943), p. 774, and "Political Murder," Time January 25,
1943, pp. 21-22.
,

,

,

233

For Ruehle's obituary see the New York Times June
Also see Case of Leon Trotsky pp. x, 55,
27, 1943, p. 15.
the
57, 312, 431, 433, for more on Trotsky, Ruehle, and
Miss La Follette wrote on Ruehle in a
German Revolution.
notarized statement (August 8, 1940), Dewey Commission
Exhibit D438 (second folder), Trotsky Archives
,

,
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234

tscher
°^
Foiled however,
Follette,

Prophet Outcast, pp 449-50. Suzanne
La
contended that Ruehle had not met Trotsky
"
r
See not ^ized statement (August 8
194oT° n
Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder),
1940),
Trotsky
Archives.
Ruehle was identified by foes of the Commis
sion as
the father-in-law of Fritz Bach, "a notorious
Trotskyite,"
expelled from the Mexican Communist Party with Rivera"Ruehle gets his line from Bach and is as impartial on
the
Moscow trials as Rivera." See Editorial, "Trotsky Investigates Himself," New Masses April 20, 1937, p. 28, and
"Mexico Expedition Loaded With Trotzkyi tes " Dailv Worker,
L
April 10, 1937, p. 2.
'
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,

,
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Adamic, My America pp. 88-89. The Beals' Case
will be discussed at greater length in Chapter VI. Although
he later became the darling of the Commission's foes, he was
not a favorite of the Communists before the hearings commenced.
He was described as "a free-lance journalist who has been
hostile to the Soviet Union for the past seven years," and
who pursued Ma career of facile political adventuring, changing
his colors with ease as the occasion requires." See Editorial,
"Trotsky Investigates Himself, " New Masses April 20, 1937,
p. 28, and "Mexico Expedition Loaded with Trotzkyi tes
Daily Worker April 10, 1937, p. 2.
,

,

,

,
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For Finerty' s obituary see the New York Times June
According to James T. Farrel 1 interview,
6, 1967, p. 47.
New York City, March 2, 1972), 'during the Mexican hearings
Trotsky made an approving remark about the Irish; from then
on Finerty thought Trotsky a "great man," another Eamon de
Valera.
The only references to the Irish in the hearings
appears on pp. 45, 368 of Case of Leon Trotsky
According
to George Novack (interview, New York City, November 9, 1971),
Arthur Garfield Hays was the first choice to be counsel.
,

(

.
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Finerty s "hostile" cross-examination will be discussed in the next chapter.
1

238

Born Alfred Griot, he took his name frorn^ Ibsen's
"Rosmersholm, " a free thinker. See his obituary in the New
York Times May 7, 1964, p. 37.
,

239

Alfred Rosmer, "Trotsky in Paris During World
The Man and His
War I" (July 11, 1950), in Leon Trotsky
Work pp. 103-11, reprinted from New International SeptemberRosmer also wrote Movement ouvrier pendant
October, 1950.
la guerre (2 vols. ) and Moscou sous Lenine
S eG
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240

See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 6, 58-59, 449-51,
484-85, 495, and Not Guilty p. v. Also see Gustave Stern,
A Journal of Soviet
"In Memoriam Alfred Rosmer," Survey
,

—

,

:
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and East European Studies, October,
1964, pp. 98-106.
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Not Guilty

,

p.

o^
'

v.

243

Ibid., p. v.
Ross died in 1951 at the age of 84.
For his obituary see the New York Times July
23, 1951,
17.
Among other works he wrote Russia in Upheaval The p
Russian Bolshevik Revolution and The Russian Soviet~publ
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Adamic, My America p. 85.
Also see Not Guilty
p. v, and Whp_^s Wh_q in America
1972-73 I (Chicago:
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George Novack, private interview, New York City,
November 9, 1971.
In a symposium on the trials Chamberlain
remarked, "As an American who prizes the privileges of shooting off his mouth when he doesn't like things, I naturally
resent any government that bottles up the function of criticism
and compels dissenters to work underground." See "Is Leon
Trotsky Guilty? A Symposium," Modern Monthly,
X (March,
L
1937), 6.
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George Novack, private interview, New York City,
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1971.
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As noted before, the Communist Party played a major
role in organizing the CIO. Trade-union officials were
loathe to antagonize their allies.
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Not Guilty p. 4. Also see George Novack,
"Introduction," Case of Leon Trotsky p. xi for a similar
opinion.
Dewey defended the impartiality of the panel in
"Violence, For and Against: A Symposium on Marx, Stalin,
and
and Trotsky," Common Sense VII (January, 1938), 20-21,
also in "Speech of Dr. John Dewey, Chairman" (December 12,
1937), Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), Trotsky
Archives .
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Editorial, "The Trotsky Commission," Nation
1937, pp. 446-47.
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James Cannon was sure that the Trotskyites had
played a leading role in organizing the Defense Committee.
See Hi story of American Trotskyism p. 241.
,

1,

REFERENCE NOTES

CHAPTER IV:

DEWEY AND TROTSKY IN MEXICO (I)

Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952,"
Commentary, Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 251. Hook contended
that his "presumed influence" had been limited to soliciting
"his [Dewey's] signature for the organization of the committee
to discover the truth about the Moscow Trials."
2

In both a letter to this writer (dated November 26,
1971) and a personal interview (New York City, March 7, 1972),
Suzanne La Follette credited Hook with convincing Dewey to
assume the chairmanship of the Commission.
In her opinion
Dewey was the perfect chairman, and was simply "wonderful"

during the Commission's labors.
3

George Novack, private interview, November 9, 1971.
Herbert Solow, according to Novack, was also involved in convincing Dewey to accept the post.
In 1944 Joseph Hansen guoted
James Cannon on the circumstances of the decisions.
"'I
wouldn't let him go,'" said Cannon, "'until he agreed to do
something for justice. That was how he [Dewey] came to serve
on the Commission.'"
Supposedly Dewey admitted that Cannon
had appealed to his '"better nature.'" It was Cannon, then,
"whosternly shepherded Dewey into the paths of righteousness,"
commented Dwight MacDonald on this contention. For a scathing
attack on the Trotskyites see MacDonald, Memoirs of a Revolu tionist
Essays in Pol i tical Cri tici sm (New York: Farrar,
In another commentary
Straus and Cudahy, 1957), pp. 272-83.
Hook declared that the "histrionic appeal" by a Trotskyite
leader, who later "viciously attacked" Dewey for criticizing
Trotskyism and Stalinism, did not influence his decision. See
Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952," Commentary
Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 250.
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Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952,"
Commentary Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 250.
,

5
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1952," Commentary Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 250.
:

,

,

,

James
March

2,

1972.

Farrell, private interview, New York City,
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 392.
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Although Dewey still contributed articles to the New
after the May 12, 1937 issue his name was no long— Republic,
llsted"^
a "contributing editor."
7

Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952 "
Commentary, Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 251. Also see Editorial,
"Trotsky Investigates Himself," New Masses April 20, 1937,
According to Hook, the Communist Party's hegemony over
p. 28.
large sections of liberal opinion was "incomplete or threatened" as long as Dewey remained outside the fold. See loc.
cit .
p. 251.
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Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952,"
Commentary Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 251. VOKS was the AllUnion Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries,
which spread abroad an official version of Soviet life. Louis
Adamic contended that "an insolent Soviet agent" visited Dewey,
while James T. Farrell asserted that Dewey was offered a second
trip to the USSR.
See Adamic, My_ America 1928-38 (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 83, and Farrell, "Dewey
in Mexico," in John Dewey
Philosopher of Science and Freedom
a Symposium edited by Sidney Hook (New York:
Dial Press, 1950),
p. 357.
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Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey a Symposium
ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 357.
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Vanguard Press, 1954?) pp. 97-123.
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For "Jim Barnett's" reaction to Dewey's apparent ease
in talking with a Ben Stolberg or Max Shachtman see Mary
McCarthy, "Portrait of the Intellectual as a Yale Man," in
The Company She Keeps (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1942), pp. 220-21.
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Quoted in William W. Brickman, "John Dewey and Overseas Education," in John Dewey s Impressions of Soviet Russia
Mexico-China-Turkey 1929 (New
and the revolutionary world
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964), p. 19.
York:
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see Ibid ., pp. 19,

The first impressions of the trip
were originally published in the New Republic November 14December 19, 1928. Also see Robert H. McNeal Bride of
the
Revolution:
Krupskaya and Lenin (Ann Arbor, Michigan"7 - University of Michigan Press, 1972), pp. 277-78, 289, for
more
on Dewey and Krupskaya.
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John Dewey, "Soviet Russia, 1928," in Brickman John
Dewey' s Impressions of Soviet Russia and the revolutionary
world pp. 55-57.
Dewey scoffed at the notion that the Soviets
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in particular, John Dewey, Letter, "Pravda on
Trotsky," New Republic March 24, 1937, pp. 212-13. When the
Manchester Guardian printed a letter from Leon Sedov, Pravda
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liberal organ into a fascist-speaking trumpet.'" Dewey asserted that "tactics similar in kind, although milder in tone,
have been resorted to in this country to try to discredit
those who in the interest of ordinary human liberties, justice
and ultimately the progress of socialism, have devoted themselves to securing a fair trial for Trotsky."
,

33

The Case of Leon Trotsky
Report of Hearings on the
Charges Against Him in the Moscow Trial
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with an Introduction by
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Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey a Symposium
edited by Sidney Hook, p. 357. Farrell made this trip "because
Originally Farrell
I was interested, and had no official task."
was the "most prominent member" of the Commission, to use his
own words, but Ben Stolberg "maneuvered" him off the panel,
not wanting a "playboy" involved with such serious work. This
was all right with Farrell; it would have been "too much work."
These comments were offered in a private interview, New York
In keeping with its "reactionary purCity, March 2, 1972.
poses, the expedition was organized secretly," claimed the
,
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Daily Worker, in an article entitled, "Whitewash Expedition
Leaves U.S. to Visit Trotzky in Mexico" (April 3, 1937,
p. i).
40

Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey A Symposium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 359-60.
For more on Dewey's
"tremendous humility" and "real fiber" see loc . cit
p. 358.
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Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey a Symposium ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 361.
44
The Commission was absolutely a "separate body" from
the Committee, claimed Suzanne La Follette (private interview,
New York City, March 7, 1972). But George Novack asserted
that the Committee was well-informed on all the Commission's
activities (private interview, November 9, 1971, New York City).
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George Novack, private interview, New York City,
November 9, 1971. Suzanne La Follette could not remember this
episode, although James T. Farrell recalled the bomb threat.
These comments were made in private interviews in New York
City, March 7 and March 2, 1972, respectively.
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This was the recollection of George Novack (private
But Farrell coninterview, New York City, November 9, 1972).
tended that Novack was replaced with Herbert Solow as director
of Commission operations once the group reached Mexico
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As an example of this tension, Stolberg attempted to
obtain Farrell' s proxy vote while the train was in St. Louis,
in order to allow James Rorty to wrest control of the Executive
Committee from the Trotskyites. Farrell refused (private interMiss La Follette, however,
view, New York City, March 2, 1972).
She did recall that Stolberg
had no memory of this incident.
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forth a dollar bill; they had made a bet on who could first
(private interview, New York City, March 7,
give up smoking
1972).
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"The Trial of Leon Trotsky Will Be Public," Excelsior
Suzanne La Follette
(Mexico City), April 7, 1937, pp. 1, 3.
recalled that Beals met the train at El Paso; he was "cold,
stiff, standoffish." Farrell also remembered Beals as being
"strange" when he got on the train. However, Beals did not
attend the first press conference or participate in preparing
Apparently he
the opening statement for the Sub-Commission.
reached Mexico sometime later than the other members. See
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New York City.
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Editorial, "Trotsky Investigates Himself," New Masses
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1973?), p. 3293, and Contemporary Authors Vols. 17-18,
ed.
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Pathfinder Press,
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See Hammett and Smith, "Inside the Trotsky 'Trial',"
New Masses April 27, 1937, p. 6, and Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday Evening Post, June 12, 1937,
p.
A hostile article, "Trial of Trotsky To Be All Trotsky,"
74.
unsigned, but apparently by Kluckhohn, had appeared in the Now
York Times April 5, 1937, p. 11, in which it was charged that
the trial was "likely to be a publicity campaign with only one
outcome--the 'whitewashing' of Mr. Trotsky." The Daily Worker
quickly picked up the charge:
"'Times' Sees Trotsky 'Trial' a
Whitewash," April 6, 1937, p. 2. In response Trotsky included
Kluckhohn among the "'friends' of the GPU." See "The Preliminary Inquiry at Coyoacan," Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38
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Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, p. 74. Three times during the
hearings Suzanne La Follette told Beals to throw away his gum,
much to his amazement.
Later he learned that Trotsky had once
condemned the pernicious American habit of chewing gum. See
Case of Leon Trotsky p. 369, and "Trotsky, Stalin & Cardenas,"
Time January 25, 1937, p. 16.
In March 1917, according to
Time Trotsky wrote an article for the New York Russian-Jewish
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It has therefore adopted measures
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35-37, 64-65, 109-10, 227-28, and Appendix III,
594-603
Several parties, such as the Patrolman Sailors
Union of'the
C
L ° S An(9 eles ) ^d Roy Burt (Socialist
Party), comi i
mended
the Commission for its enterprise (loc.
cit.
pp. 110,
But there were many detractors.
418).
See~Jose7h Brodsky's
refusal to participate in the hearings, "Whitewash
Expedition
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to Visit Trotzky in Mexico," Daily Worker
April
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3, 1937, p. 1.
Also see New Masses April 13, 1937,
p . io,
and Daily Worker
"Troyanovsky Hits Trotzky Defense Trip,"
April 3, 1937, p. 2, and "Mexico Expedition Loaded With
Trotzkyites," April 10, 1937, p. 2. At the same time Earl
Browder wrote an article for Pravda in which he claimed that
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members "paralyzed, and the committee [had] ceased to function." Reprinted as "Trotzkyite Reserves in U.S.," Daily
Worker April 9, 1937, p. 2.
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Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, p. 74. Beals regretted that the
proceedings were not translated into Spanish, "an elementary
courtesy," in his opinion. But at various stages of the
hearings Beals, his wife, and others translated some portions
of the testimony into Spanish.
See Case of Leon Trotsky
pp. 50, 227, 249, 457, and "Trotsky Succeeds In Shattering
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the Charges made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials
John Dewey, et al., (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938)
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Ibid., pp. 2-4.
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Better," Saturday Evening Post, June 12, 1937, pp. 74, 77.
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Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post, June 12, 1937, p. 76. For Finerty's comment
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rule and the certification of documents.
,

,

,

673

105^
Case of Leon Trotsky_, pp. 51-52. Norwegian
Nazis
made an unsuccessful attempt to steal Trotsky's
August 1936; the GPU in Paris was more successfuldocuments in
on November
However, Beals later wrote that Trotsky "hems
7, 1936.
and
haws' on the question of the archives 's location and
documents in Mexico were "merely uncertified copies." the onlv
Trotsky
found this allegation "absolutely false." See "The Fewer
Outsiders The Better," Saturday Evening Pos^, June 12, 1937,
p. 76, and Trotsky, "Mr. Beals as a Witness" (May 18, 1937),
in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38 pp. 66-67, supplied by
George Novack.
,

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

,

pp.

63,

249-50.

Ibid., p. xxv. At the May 1937 Mecca meeting Dewey
announced that Otto Ruehle would examine the archives in
Mexico, and the European sub-commission would examine the
European documents with Trotsky's assent.
In Not Guilty
p. 13, it was claimed that the Commission had had "unhampered
access" to the archives.

—

,

108

Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, p. 76. According to Beals,
Stolberg believed the Times man would snap up the comment about
"'only copies'" in Trotsky's testimony. Actually Frank
Kluckhohn had already stressed this aspect of the trial in
"Trial of Trotsky To Be All Trotsky," and "Trotsky Ready For
'Trial'," New York Times April 5, 1937, p. 11, and April 11,
1937, IV, p. 5.
,

,

109

.

Editorial, "The Trotsky Commission," Nation

May

,

1,

1937, p. 497.
^

"^Trotsky "Mr. Beals as a Witness," in Writings of
Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 66. Trotsky commented, "I have
never heard of anyone certifying the copies of his own letters."
,

,

,

"Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey
sium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 361, 363-64.
v
"*"Farrell,

,

Sympo-

a

11?

Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, pp. 23, 74.
,

113

"Stripped of the
Deutscher Prophet Outcast p. 381.
splendours of his mighty eloquence, denying himself the advantages which even the humdrum speaker finds in the use of his
native language, he answered impromptu the most varied, complex,
and unexpected questions." This was Deutscher's rather flattering view of Trotsky's performance.
,

,

114

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 348-49. Trotsky also
stated, "Yes, a revolutionary must know English and with the
help of patience I will learn English." See loc cit . p. 278.
,

.

,

,
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117
P«

118

Ihid.

P.

278.

119 T
~ 42 Ibid.
41At one Point Goldman asked Trotsky
PP
PP.* 41
if he had been accused of crucifying Jesus
Christ.
"T have
not at this moment," was the reply.
See loc. cit
.

120 T ..
Ibid .

,

p.

340.

,

121

122
123

124

79.

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp.

466, 481.

Ibid .

,

pp.

481-82.

Ibid .

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp.

5

482.
466, 487.

125

Trotsky, "The Preliminary Inquiry at Coyoacan,"
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 64. After the hearings
were completed Dewey stated, "The only three matters of fact
upon which there was a show of independent objective evidence
have been subject to grave doubt as Mr. Finerty has just
clearly proved." See " Truth is on the March ," p. 10.
126
Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York:
Pioneer Publishers, 1936), pp. 81-82.
127
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report of Court Proceedings in The Case of the Trotsky i teZinovievite Terrorist Centre (Moscow: People's Commissariat
of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1936), pp. 100-01.
Hereafter
cited as Tro t skyi te-Zinovievi te Centre
,

,

.

W

128
129

130
131

Ibid.

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp. 94-95.

Ibid .

,

pp.

Ibid.

,

pp. 96,

*

87.

112-13.
114.

132

Alexander Orlov [pseud.], The Secret History of
Random House, 1953), p. 55. Also
Stalin's Crimes (New York:
see Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial
p. 82, and Case of
Leon Trotsky pp. 146, 167, 520.
,

,

TOO

There was a rumor
Orlov, Secret History pp. 57-58.
that the NKVD deliberately introduced the slip on the Bristol
,

t

675

hotel in order to sabotage the trial.
See Nathan Leites and
Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation
The Case of the
Trials (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19547, ~~pT Moscow
:

424~T

134

Quoted in Abraham Unger, "More Light on the Moscow
Trial," Soviet Russia Today Vol. 5 (February, 1937), 31.
,

135

"The 'Hotel Bristol' in Copenhagen," Soviet Russ ia
Today_, Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 7, and "The Farce in Mexico,"
Soviet Russia Today Vol. 6 (May, 1937), 8.
,

136

"Readers' Forum," New Masses March 9, 1937, p. 21.
Also see Case of Leon Trotsky p. 168. The Daily Worker also
used Martin Nielsen as an authority on the Bristol Hotel in
an article entitled, "'Bristol' Is Shown as Notorious Trotzkyist Copenhagen Hangout," February 11, 1937, p. 2.
In an
editorial the same paper contended that it was natural to
mistake the cafe and hotel:
"The cry 'Hotel Bristol' will
not save the Trotzkyist scum from the condemnation of honest
workers." See "A Shyster 'Defense' Col 1 apses ," February 12,
1937, p. 6.
,

,

137

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 135, 152-53. Also see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 182-83, and Dewey Commission
Exhibit D68 (deposition of B. F. and Esther Field, dated
April 9, 1937), Trotsk y Archives
,

,

.

138

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 154, 172. Also see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 184, and Dewey Commission
Exhibit D48, "In re Copenhagen Visit" (a precis of all the
material dealing with Copenhagen, n.d.), Trotsky Archives .
,

,

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 30, 156-57, 163-64, 167,
Apparently Trotsky feared detection and spent at
170-71.
least one night in a small pension, but there is some disap.
greement about the length of the stay. See loc ci
pp. 184-85, and Dewey Com164, Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
mission Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archives
,

.

.

,

,

.

140

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 186-87. The names
of the many visitors to the villa may be found on pp. 137-40
The resolutions emanating from the
of Case of Leon Trotsky .
meetings are included in Dewey Commission Exhibits D48, D15054, Trotsky Archives
,

.

141

Deutscher Prophet Outcast p. 184.
Commission Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archives
,

,

Also see Dewey

.

142

Dewey Commission Exhibit D48, Trotsky Archives drawn
The Soviet embassy in Copenhagen made
from exhibits D146-48.
threatening noises about economic sanctions if Trotsky were
allowed to stay in Denmark.
,

676
143,,

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 188, 190.
Trotsky
wanted to visit Sweden or the United States.
144
Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 520-21. Many of these
comments were drawn from Trotsky Archive s: T4128, "Otel
Bristol" (March 13, 1937).
,

,

'

145

Case of Leon Trotsky p. 521. Also see loc . cit.,
pp. 146-47, 168-70, 171-72, for a discussion of the "splotch"
in the radiophoto of the Bristol Cafe reproduced in Soviet
Russia Today (March, 1937, p. 7).
in their deposition the
Fields contended that there was something "queer" about the
brightness of several signs in the photo, and that the "big
black splotch" was really the location of the cafe, not the
candy store.
" The Konditori Bristol is not next door but
actually several doors away at quite a_ distance from the hotel
and was not a_ part of i t in any way and there was no door
connecting the Konditori candy store i t would be called here
and the Grand Hotel i" For some unknown reason this deposition
was "rejected" by the Commission. See Dewey Commission
Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archive s. The question of the Bristol
was a nagging one for Soviet defenders. Margaret I. Lamont,
the wife of Corliss, wrote an article on the physical location
of the hotel, after a 1938 visit to Copenhagen.
She felt that
it was "humanly understandable" that the cafe had been confused with the hotel.
See "A Visit. To The Bristol," Soviet
Russia Today Vol. 7 (August-September, 1938), 16.
,

,

(

)

,

146

147

"^^

Case of Leon Trotsky
Ibid .

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp.

,

p.

522.

167.

160-61.

149

Trotsky later
Ibid.
pp. 140-41, 149, 161-62.
corrected himself, and wrote Miss La Follette that he met
See loc cit .
pp. 592-93.
his son on the 6th of December.
,

.

,

150

Trotsky was unable t© produce
Ibid .
pp. 158-59.
the records of his phone calls to Berlin; it was a "delicate
matter," involving the Danish government. See loc . cit . p.
141, and 142-45 for a summary of the many depositions entered
They are summarized in Dewey Commission
on Trotsky's behalf.
Exhibit D48, Trotsky Archives .
,

,

151

Dewey Commission
Case of Leon Trotsky, pp. 145, 590.
Exhibits D103 and D104 contain reproductions of Sedov's stamped
school books Trotsky Archives ).
(

152

Case of Leon Trotsky

May 29, 1937.

,

Appendix

I,

pp.

589-90, dated

s

677
153,,

See Dewey Commission Exhibit D106, Trotsky
Archives
or
e
er da d A ugus;t 17, 1937, which TroTsl^enTT:
cn^rss
La P
toilette on the earlier correspondence.

"

M

^

154

Ibid.
A search of the Paris archives had belatedly
discovered the letters between Sedov and his mother. They are
contained in Dewey Commission Exhibits D107-118, Trotsky
Archives.
Some of the letters are quoted in Not Guil ty, pp.
84-85, and Orlov, Secret History 56-57.
155
Case of Leon Trotsky p. 516.
,

,

)

V.

156

Ibid .

,

p.

94.

157

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 91, 516, 592. Trotsky
thought it noteworthy that Holtzman gave no details in his
testimony, and was not asked about lodgings or his passport.
His story "crumbles into dust."
,

158

Ibid .

94-97,

172-73.
The Pf emf ert-Tro tsky and
Olberg-Trotsky correspondence may be found in Dewey Commission
Exhibits D9-16, D24-27, D31, Trotsky Archives along with
other material on Olberg. Also see Not Guilty pp. 107-08.
,

pp.

,

,

159

Case of Leon Trotsky p. 517. For more of Trotsky's
views of Olberg see Trotsky Archives
T3995, "Who is V.
Olberg the most important witness in the Moscow Trial?"
(August 20, 1936).
,

:

—
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Also see Deutscher, Prophet
Ibid .
pp. 138-39, 165.
pp. 25-26, 59n, 187, 194, for more on the Sobolevi tzius
,

Outcast
brothers.
,

161

T4112.1, "Declaration regarding
Trotsky Archives
In this
the case of Senin and Well" (February 27, 1937).
statement Trotsky reviewed their visit to Turkey, the trip to
Copenhagen, and the "crafty little coup d'etat" in the German
organization "in connection with the G.P.U."
:

1

For more on Soble-Senin-Sobolevi tzius see Hearings
before the Sub-committee to Investigate the Administration of.
the Internal Security Act November 21, 1957, Part 87 (WashHis brother, Dr.
U.S. Senate, 1958), pp. 4875-76.
ington:
Robert Soblen (Roman Well), received a life sentence on August
com7, 1961, but escaped to Israel the next year, and later
See David Dallin, From Purge to
mitted suicide in London.
& Khrushchev s Russia
Essays on Stalin
Coexistence
Henry Regnery Company, 1961), p. 72. For material
(Chicago:
on Zborowski see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 347-49, 366,
390-96, 405-10, 422, and Henry Kasson [nom de plume of David
Dallin], "The Zborowski Case," New Leader November 21, 1955,
March
and Dallin, "Mark Zborowski, Soviet Agent," New Leader
19 & 26, 1956.
:

'

'

,

,

,

t

678
163 c

.

Senin's role is open to question.
,

Deutscher

h*=;

trial
But Robert Conquest, Isaac Don Levine,
and Victor
Serge have tended to find him responsible
for at least some
of Trotsky's troubles.
See Prophet Outcast, pp 25^26 ?87Conquest, The Great Terror ~sT^TT^_s~^Tir^e of
the T_hfr^tie^'
(New York:
Macmillan Company, 1968), pTlTl—
neT^rhe^
Mind of an Assassin (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Cud^hV,
1959), pp. 24-27, 225-26; and Victor Serge, Vie et
Mort de
Trotsky (Paris: Amiot *Dumon t 1951), pp. 20T=02~
:

L~

,

164.,

„
Not Guilty
One Alfred Kruse stated in a
p. 91.
deposition that the hotel had been turned into offices, not
pulled down.
See Dewey Commission Exhibit D125, Trotsky
Archives . Kruse volunteered another deposition (Dewey Commission Exhibit D76) in which he testified to the great
difficulty in contacting Trotsky during the latter' s 1932
visit to Denmark.
In this deposition Kruse claimed that in
1915-16 he had been a courier for the Bolsheviks:
"By the
knowledge of the bolshewic representatives I also had commissions to fullfill in handing over some material for the
socialdemocratic Douma-f rac tion Tscheidze and Trotskyitecircles," tasks that "lighting the activity" of the Bolsheviks.
The spelling is accurately rendered from the original statement.
Trotsky apparently had no time to discuss with Kruse
old conspiratorial activities, much to Kruse' s astonishment.
The Dewey Commission also gave him short rift.
.

.

„

,

,

165

Not Guilty pp. 91-92.
In two statements A. Vikelsoe
Jensen, of the Danish Students' Social Democratic organization,
gave contradictory information on the 1932 location of the
hotel and cafe/confectionary.
The question was whether the
cafe was contiguous to the hotel or separated by several small
shops.
Also see Dewey Commission Exhibits D124, 127, 128,
129, 130, 131, Trotsky Archives
,

.

166
16 7

Not Guilty

,

pp. 94-95.

95-96.
The evidence on this question was
See loc . ci .
"very voluminous," some 67 documents.
p. 83.

Ibid .

,

pp.

,

168
1

Ibid.

,

pp. 92-93.

69

Leon Sedov also testified on his
Ibid .
pp. 109-15.
relations with Olberg. See loc . cit . p. 100.
,

,

170

Ibid.

,

pp.

120-26.

171

The Origins and
Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge
Consequences of Stalinism trans, by Colleen Taylor, ed by
Random House,
David Joravsky and Georges Haupt (New York:
1971), p. 250.
:

,

.

t
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172
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1
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Case of Leon Trotsky
Ibid .

,

pp.

,

p.

534.

202-03.

74

Walter Duranty, "Radek Wins Tilt of Wits at
TrialConfession Amazes Spectators," New York Times,
January 25,"
1937, p. 3.
William Allen White wrote that Romm was "a qood,
convinced Communist," an "amiable, kindly, rather
intelligent, soft-voiced and even-tempered man." exceptionally
When
knew him he was "neither the fool which his testimony White
would
suggest, nor a ruthless perjurer who would send men to
exile
and death." In addition, Paul Ward also wrote kindly
of the
ex-Washington correspondent and vouched for his pro-Moscow
sentiments.
See White, "Moscow and Emporia," New Repu blic,
September 21
1938, p. 179, and Ward, "Vladimir^onmV
Nation February 6, 1937, p. 147.
7

,

,

1

75

People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the Anti-Soviet
Trotskyite Centre (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice
of the U.S.S.R., 1937), pp. 93, 136.
Hereafter cited as
Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre .
1
1
1

Ibid.

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp.

136-43.

Ibid ,

,

pp.

141-42.

142.

no

179

Ibid .
Radek disagreed on
pp. 143-44.
with Romm's testimony.
See loc . ci .
p. 145.
,

a

few points

,

180

Joseph E. Davies, Mi ssion to Moscow, Pocketbook
revised edition (New York:
Blakiston Company, 1941/1943,

p.

41

181

'"American Writers Attempt to Save Romm; Soviet Assured
Journalist Held Was Loyal," New York Times January 24, 1937,
A group of Washington journalists also called on
p. 28.
Ambassador Troyanovsky to express their "*shock and dismay "
at Romm s arrest, and assured the Soviet official that Romm
had defended Soviet policies "'without qualification and with
every indication that he believed in them wholeheartedly. 1,1
The Ambassador replied that he had known Romm for many years
and felt keenly his arrest, but had also known he was a TrotSee "Friends Again Act In Romm's Behalf," New York
skyite.
Times January 27, 1937, p. 10.
,

1

1

,

182

Davies, Mission to Moscow
was dated January 26 1937.

,

pp.

43-44.

The letter

,

183

The Soviet official was
44-45n, 78.
Romm may have been sent to the interior,
Ambassador Oumansky.
Ibid.

,

pp.

i
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but he was never heard from again.
Coexistence P. 98.

——

—

See Dallin, From Purge
"
to

,

Case of Leon Trotsky_, pp. 549, 177. The
depositions
on the case were listed in loc. cit.,
pp. 185-86.
The material
on the visa is contained in Dewey Commission
Exhibits D166176, Trots ky Archives .
Also see Not Guilty pp. 214-15.
185^
Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 549, 30, 174.
in the party
on the boat were Sarah Weber, Max Shachtman, Jean Van Heijenoort, and "Adolphe," a German emigre.
The party sailed as
"'Max Shachtman and suite,"' See Not Guilty pp. 211-13, for
the testimony of Shachtman and Weber before the New York subcommission.
,

,

,

186^
Case of Leon Trotsky

pp.

,

262,

182,

201,

551.

187

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 260-61. Max Shachtman testified that Sarah Weber had " a mechanical device on
the principle of an electric pad, with chemicals and a rubber
bag,"' which she applied to Trotsky's back. See Not Guilty,
pp. 211-12.
,

1

188
189

Case of Leon Trotsky
Ibid .

pp.

?

174,

550.

The test of the decree is in loc cit
Trotsky arrived on the 24th of July and later commenp. 186.
fff
ted
It is a long time . . . since I acknowledged the
receipt of any official document with so much pleasure. '"
See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast p. 262.
,

p. 175.

.

.

,

:

.

,

190

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 175-76, 550-51. Trotsky's
case was somewhat weakened by the fact that the party had not
signed the hotel register.
See loc . cit
pp. 186, 196-07.
This discrepancy was picked up by Soviet Russia Today in an
article entitled, "The Farce In Mexico," Vol. 6 (May, 1937),
9.
On another point, Trotsky commended the "accuracy" of a
Times correspondent, who reported that Trotsky had been
variously described as on his way to Corsica, Roy^t, or Vichy
after leaving the vessel. See Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 175,
February 16, 1937, p. 16 on
203, 550, and New York Times
"Romm's Testimony at Trial." Apparently the Times was in
Trotsky's camp. After the Russian exile had given some of
his evidence to the paper ("Trotsky Gives His Proof Of Moscow
Trial Falsity," February 16, 1937, p. 1), an editorial appeared
which stated, "Where three vital pieces of evidence can be
manufactured by a secret police an entire body of evidence can
be manufactured." The burden of proof was on Stalin, not
"Three confessed acts
Trotsky, contended the editorial:
have been shown to be impossible. The taint extends to the
whole trial." See "Trotsky's Defense," February 17, 1937,
,

.

,

,

,

,

681

Various depositions on the trip to St. Palais
are
also listed as Dewey Commission Exhibits
D186, D188-90, D19295, Trotsky Archives .
p.

20.

'

Van Heijenoort, Weber, and "Adolphe" headed in
direction of Paris to throw off any would-be followers the
Shachtman spent several days in Marseilles, arranging
for
the safekeeping of the luggage, including Trotsky's
"library
The boxes were stamped "M.S.," which led Trotsky to
remark,
"The box can testify in our favor.
(Laughter)" Shachtman
then went to Paris and the United States, without seeing
Trotsky again in France. Beals, however, was unconvinced
that any GPU agents would actually follow the Trotsky party.
For material on the ruse see Case of Leon Trotsky, pp. 176,
~
194-95, 197-99, 201
551
5 5 3T~^d ~N oT Gu'i 1 ty
p. 212.
192
Case o f Leon T rotsky p. 194. Also see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast p. 262.
,

,

»

,

,

,

193

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

176.

p.

194

Ibid
Also see Deutscher,
pp. 176-79, 187, 552.
Prophet Outcast p. 263 and Not Guilty pp. 217-26. The
depositions on the fire are listed as Dewey Commission
Exhibits D197-205, Trotsky Archives .
.

,

,

,

195

Case of Leon Trotsky 178-79, 188-89, 191, 552.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 263-65, on Trotsky's
ennui at the time.
For various depositions on the period at
"Les Embruns" see Dewey Commission Exhibits D207-218, Trotsky
Archives .
,

,

196

For more on Trotsky's many visitors at the time see
Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 202-03, 552-53; Deutscher, Prophet
Outcast pp. 263-64; Not Guilty pp. 212-13. Some twenty-four
depositions were collected from visitors, listed in Dewey
Also see Trotsky,
Commission Exhibit D161, Trotsky Archives
"Romm Frequented Dark Paris Alleys" (February 15, 1937), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 40-41, reprinted from
Truth April, 1937.
,

,

,

.

,

,

,

197

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 30, 180-81, 265-66, 553.
Unfortunately for his case, the French police were unwilling
to document his trips around France, apparently for political
178-79, 190, 552, and Deutscher,
See loc. cit
reasons.
Prophet Outcast pp. 265-66. Also see Trotsky Archives
T4111.5 (February 26, 1937), "A Monsieur le President du
Conseil des Ministres de France." This letter calling for an
official French investigation of the alleged meeting with
Romm was apparently never sent.
,

.

,

;

,

198

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 183-85. Trotsky's admission that he did not know Romm, or even read Izvestia drew
,

,

.

682

^

some sharp comments.
"Extraordinary, if true t-h»f ™~ k
professes to be an authoritative critic
of
Sovet" Government should never read its official organ!"
This editorial
went on to note that Trotsky's latest book
was filled with
at thS Same Ume Romm was Siting
for ft
T S FarCS ln Mexico '" Soviet Russia
Today, Vol.
I (May,
(m
1927), S8.
6
Trotsky's statem 5 nT~Tha-t he hae rHi^r heard
Of Romra, a "stellar correspondent" for Tass
and
simply incredible," and went far toward "discre Izvestia, was
diting" him
This was the judgment of Mauritz A. Hallgren, Why
I
From the Trotsky Defense Committee (New York: "inter Resiqned
national
Publishers, 1937?), pp. 8-9.
.

,

199

200
201
I

i

202
203

Case of Leon Trotsky
Ibid.

,

pp.

Ibid .

,

p.

540,

Ibid .

,

p.

542.

536,

,

p.

534.

538.

There had been no mention of the
.
pp. 541-42.
"parallel centre" in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, hence the
need for some timely help from Radek.
Trotsky believed that
this 1932 schema had been constructed "retroactively" and
"very poorly."
I_bid

,

204

Ibid .
Romm had testified that Radek put
pp. 539-40.
the letter in his pocket, after glancing at it.
In the opinion
of Trotsky, "All the confessions abound in such 'concrete'
platitudes, of which the most incompetent writer of detective
stories would be ashamed."
,

205-,.
Ibid .

,

pp.

Ibid .

,

p.

544.

Ibid.

,

p.

545.

Ibid .

,

p

548.

Ibid .

,

pp.

Ibid

,

p.

.

211

.

543,

544.

552-53.
553.

The Dewey Commission

ally Dewey Commission Exhibits D160, "Memorandum on the
Deposition of the Witness Vladimir Romm," and D161, "Against
Romm," Trotsky Archives for full particulars of the evidence
,

212

A New York sub-commission took testimony from

i

t

683
e ^° n
Sara Weber amon others, on
£?
3
Jn?v
oh
July 26-27 1937. The Commission Rogatoir
e heard Sedov and
others
Pans, May 12-June 22, 1937T~MoTe details on
these two sub-commissions will be given in
Chapter VI
See
Not Gui 1 ty p. 7.
'

'

m

,

213

214
215

Ibid .

,

p.

Ibid .

,

pp.

227-28.

Ibid .

,

pp.

227-28.

Ibid .

,

pp.

228-29.

206.

217

Leon Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, prepared address for
a meeting in the Hippodrome Theatre, New York City, February
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p.
25, reprinted from the St. Louis Post Dispatch
January 17,'
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Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 299, 308-09. Trotsky contended that in case of war "civilization will find its new
Europe will become a backward
fatherland in the New World.
province for a long period."
,

128

Ibid.

,

pp.

514-15, 476, 282-85,-286-87.

Trotsky

i

t

.

698
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the workers' state to a diseased liver:
nA
liver poisoned by
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1938 and the New York Times March 3, 1938, p. 15.
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JHdcje, p. 148, and W. G. Krivitsky, In Staling
Secre~t~S ervice
tNew York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1939 ), pp. 9-TT.
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See in particular
pp. 49-50, 51-53, 58, 61-67, 68-71, 85-89, 90-92, 93-96.
Material was also drawn from the lectures of Professor Paul
Hollander, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
186
In all fairness to Trotsky, at times he did mention
that the defendants had drawn back from full confessions, but
he never appeared to understand the degree of resistance or
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"In Closed Court" (December 1936) and "Shame i," in Writings of
Leon Trotsk y, 1935-36 pp. 142, 144, and 149. Also see "Why
They Confessed Crimes They Had Not Committed," in Writings of
Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 15, and Trotsky Archives
T3964,
On Trotsky and the
"Guepgou et Gestapo" (August 27, 1936
distorted "Truth" see Leites and Bernaut, Ri tual of Liquidation
pp. 421, 464.
v
.

,

:

,

,

)

.

,

1

on

in Writings of Leon Trotsky
See Trotsky, "Shame!,
1935-36 pp. 146, and "A New Moscow Amalgam," in Writings of
1937-38 p. 29.
Leon Trotsky
11

,

,

,

]

,

88

For Trotsky's comments on the possible trial of the
Tsar see Trotsky, Diary in Exile 1935 trans, from the Russian
For
Atheneum, 1965), p. 80.
by Elena Zarudnaya (New York:
material on the S-R trial see Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 374-75,
pp.
449, Ulam, Bolsheviks
pp. 550-53, and Trotsky, My Life
473-75.
For his comments on the Menshevik trial see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast p. 163, and Trotsky, "Why They Confessed
,

,

,

,

,

,

i

y
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=? mmUted '" ln H£itino£ of Loon Trotsky,
He also ex Pressed his regre~f^rTh'
•
is "erro r"
before the Dewey Commission. 9 Se e
Case of Laon

l^l-ts^
n
3
{TAfl P I r
oyudgment
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t

189^
Case of Leon Trotsky_, pp. 581, 571 . At
various times
Trotsky asserted he would cooperate with
Stalin if the latter 's
political policy were changed. See loc. cit.,
This was not a personal struggle but a politicalpp. 170-71
one, in his
opinion; he harbored no hatred for his rival.
For more on
aSSGr t i0 See Trotsk Y' "'Thirst for Power(January 3,
?.
1937), in Writings
of Leon Trotsky, 1937-38 p. 18, reprinted
from Les Crjjruvs de SI a] inc .

^^^

,

;

,

190
191

Case of Leon Trotsky

Ibl£ .

581-82,

pp.

,

373-74.

For more on Trotsky's evaluation
pp. 582-83.
of the Bui lot n see loc. cit . , p. 273
and "In Closed Court,"
in Wri
ngs oi i,,-,. M Trnl
0 i'.-36
Trotsky also
p. 139.
had a tendency to .uropt: at
are value Stalinist claims that
so many thousands of "Trotskyi tes" had been purged, and then
use these figures as evidence of his movement's strength
within the USSR.
See, in particular, Trotsky, "On the Soviet
Section of the Fourth International" (January 11, 1936), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky 1935-36 pp. 102-04, reprinted from
Now Militant February 15, 1936, under the title, "20,000 Oppositionists Expelled from the Communist Party of the Soviet
i
i

I

,

i

;

l<

,

1

,

i

,

,

,

Union in Recent 'Cleansing'."
192

Case of Leon Trotsky p. 583. He fully expected that
the Kremlin would accuse the Trotskyi tes of preparing the
obstruction of the Panama Canal, or the restoration of Porfirio
Diaz, though the Mexican leader was already dead:
"The Moscow
creators of amalgams do not stop before such trifles." See
loc
cit ., p. 584.
,

.

1

93

Trotsky Arch vos
T3983 (January 22, 1937).
He also
stated that the first trial was "directed only against Trotsky"
1935-36 p« 147.
in "Shame!," Writings of Leon Trotsky
:

i

,

,

194

This discussion is based on a variety of sources. .See
Trotsky, "Why This Trial Seemed Necessary," p. 32, "The Beginning of the End," p. 54, "The Decapitation of the Red Army,"
p. 55, and "Preface, Les Crimes de Stalinc ," p. 61, all in
/- ,M
Also see Trotsky, "The
Writings of Loon Trotsky
ngs
Spiciest Dishes Are Still to Come" (May, 1936 ), in Wri
)3'»- U>
mm I'.n <! in <>t \v< Upper, of Loon Trotsky
p. 10'),
(August
T396
ti on
No. 50, May, 1936, and Trotsky Arch ves
27, 1936).
J

,

1

'

.

1

(

,

I

1

,

I

1

i

195

Trotsky, "The Beginning of the End,"
Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 51-54.
,

i

1

,

,

i

;

>>

in Wri ti ngs of
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196

lom
1937),

Tr ,° tS

in
-

" The ^capitation
^'
Writings of

of the Red Army-' (June 17
Leon Trotsky, 1937-38 nn SQ in

r

'

IOhO«ll^l:

pr nted fro. Bulletin
IV-7 fju y-August
937 - * ls ° seG Trotsky Archives
T4076 "Finale^" (Februarv
j
Y
1937), for a description of Stalin's terror
1,
io
bureaucracy:
"The bureaucracy fears its isolation
?rom tn"e
e ef ° re SUStainS Stalin
Stalin f
his isola*
tion froft
from the h
bureaucracy and tries to flirt with the
people."
197_
tor more on this question see Robert Tucker,
"Introduction," to Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, eds.
The Great
Pur^e Trial The Universal Library (New York:
Gr^seT-sTDunlap
Publishers, 1965), p. xxvi . Also see Conquest, Great
Terror,
p. 479, and Beck and Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction
of
Confession p. 215.
:

,

—

,

,

,

For a discussion of these and other theories see Beck
and Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession
In the "Retribution" theory, for instance,
pp. 227, 240-42.
it was claimed that every prisoner was atoning for some
personal
sin; his arrest was a reminder of depravity.
Also see Weissberg, Accused
pp. 513-14, for the "Memory Hole" theory, or the
notion that Stalin desired to blot out all memories of the past,
in order to have greater freedom of maneuverability.
Robert
H. McNeal has suggested that the absurd charges in the trials
and purges had an "educational" function, a "matchless exercise in the art of believing (or pretending to believe) the
incredible." As electrified fences are used to condition cows,
the terror was used to condition the inmates in the totalitarian prison to a desired pattern of behavior.
For more on this
theory see his Bolshevik Tradition pp. 105, 114, 119-20.
,

,

,

199

Isaac Deutscher, Stalin
A Poli tical Biography
Vintage Books (New York:
Random House, 1960), pp. 375-77.
:

^^George Kennan, Russia
Stalin Mentor Book (New York:
pp. 287-88.
,

,

and The West

Under Lenin and
New American Library, 1962),
:

%

201

Tucker, "Introduction," to Tucker and Cohen, eds.,
Great Purge Trial
In one of his novels
pp. xxxiii-xi.
Solzhenitsyn has Stalin say to a police chief in the late
1940s, "'You will have a great deal of work soon, Abakumov.
BeWe are going to carry out the same measures as in 1937.
See Aleksandr I.
fore a big war a big purge is necessary."
Bantom Books,
Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle (New York:
1969), p. 129.
,

202

Beck and Godin, Russian Purge and the Extraction of
Confession pp. 244-49. The authors of this work also discuss
the "Asiatic," "Snowball," "Plan and Counter-plan," "Social
,
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Prophylaxis," and "Whipping-Boy" theories
an
certain merits. See loc cit
?c
Jl
n
?7o
272 ~

——

225-26, 235.

203^

'

PP#

75

'

i

•

° f Whlch have
,

237-39, 243-44,

.

Tucker "Introduction," to Tucker
and Cohen, edsS "
u n
Cr
Great Purge Trial pp. xxviii, xxxii.
'

'

,

204_
Beck and Godm,
Confession, pp. 249-57,

Russian Purge and the Extraction
° n of
257-67.

—

205-..

Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge:
Politics
in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge Mass.:
Harvard
.

e

.

sity Press,

Univerumver

,

1956), pp. 36-37,

33

,

35,

19.

206 T

Leon Trotsky, "Bertram Wolfe on the Moscow
Trials"
(November 25, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937-38
p. 79, reprinted from Socialist Appeal
December 4, 1937
,

'

,

I

"

REFERENCE NOTES

CHAPTER VI:

FINALE

!

The Case of Leon Trotsky
Report of Hear ings
Char qes A q ainst Him iH the Moscow Trials Preliminary on the
Co^m~
sion of Inquiry, John Dewey, et al.
with an Introduction by
George Novack (New York: Merit Publishers, 1937/1958),
pp.
584-85.
Hereafter cited as Case of Leon Trotsky
2 James T. Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dpwey
Philosopher of Science and Freedom a Symposium ed7~by Sidney
Hook (New York:
Dial Press, 1950), pp. 368-69.
;

,

,

.

:

,

3

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

p.

585.

4

Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey
sium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 368-69.

,

a

Sympo-

For a general description of the trial see Lorine
Pruette, "Trotsky 'Trial' Has Academic Air," New York Times
April 18, 1937, IV, p. 10.
Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey
sium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 366, 369, 374.

,

a

,

Sympo-

7

Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast Trotskv 19 291940 Vintage Books (New York:
Random House, 1963/1965), pp.
381-82.
,

:

,

Q

Ibid .
Also see Farrell, "Dewey in
pp. 371-72.
Mexico," in John Dewey a Symposium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp.
365-66.
,

,

9

"The Final Act of the Trial Concerning Trotsky Ends
in Blows," Excel sior (Mexico City), April 18, 1937, pp. 1,
Albert Glotzer may have been on the receiving end of
12.
Goldman s "blows.
'

"^Letter from Suzanne La Follette, dated November 26,
In a personal interview (March 7, 1972,
1971, New York City.
New York City), Miss La Follette expressed some indignation
that Beals never repaid the $250, even though he must have
received at least $2,000 for his article in the Saturday Even
inq Post
Beals's stay on the Commission was no sacrifice;
Both Farrell and
in fact he "prospered" from the incident.
.
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Louis Adamic also testified that Stolberg
nsioie for
tor
Beals s invitation to join the Commission. was responsible
1

1

!-?" m ° re on deals' s biography and his impressive
11 •* of literary
list
credits see Contemporary Authors Vols.
1-4,
1
ed. by James M. Ethridge and Barbara
t
Kopala~TDetroi
Gal e
1962 / 1967 >> PP. 58-59; Who^ Who in Amer^
Y
America
555^55 1 (Chlca g°: Marquis's Who's Who,
Inc .7T973?7T~d"
Vki Current
191;
Biography 1941 (New York: H. W. Wilson 'company,
1941;, pp. 49-51; and the New York Times April
18, 1937,
,

^™

'

•

'

,

,

,

12

Worker

"Mexico Expedition Loaded With Trotzkyi tes
April 10, 1937, p. 2.

,

,

"

DailyL

13

Louis Adamic, My America 1928-1938 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), pp. 88-89.
Beals once wrote
that "'being an independent writer, doubly so now, is a thorny
path.
Sooner or later, one steps on everybody's toes. Being
an independent writer means having no fixed address; people
pin labels on you and, when the labels don't fit, they hate
you. . . .»" See Contemporary Authors Vols. 1-4, p. 59.
,

,

14

On Calverton see Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left
(New York:
Avon Books, 1961), pp. 335-36, e_h seg_.
and
Adamic, My_ America p. 87. The symposium appeared in Modern
Monthly in the March 1937 issue. For more on Calverton »s
view of the Moscow trials see Editorial, "Stalin On Trial,"
Modern Monthly X (October, 1936), 3-4.
,

,

,

15

Quoted in Trotsky Archives
T4153, "Mr. Beals(
inexplicable change of mind" (May 28, 1937). Signed by
Bernard Wolfe, the statement added:
"Mr. Beals starts with
an unconcealed cynicism about the trials
he ends with provocations and a demonstrative resignation, accomplished with
a fanfare of publicity, from the only body capable of impartially uncovering the whole truth about these trials. A
startling change of mind!" Apparently Beals' s statement was
sent to Calverton, but this writer cannot find it in the pages
However, on April 8, 1937, Beals wrote to
of Modern Monthly .
Calverton that he had "unexpectedly" become a member of the
Dewey Commission:
"As a result it is very essential in order
not to prejudice me and the work of the commission that my
remarks about the Moscow Trials be withheld for the present."
See Beals' s letter to Calverton, dated April 8, 1937, Mexico
City, in the V. F. Calverton Papers New York Public Library,
Box 3, Folder 14.
:

'

—

,

1

6

Case of Leon Trotsky p. xxvi. For Beals's comments
see "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday Evening Post
June 12, 1937, p. 76. He was described by various sources as
,

,

8

t

;
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seeing in Mexico City— Frank Kluckhohn,
Harry Block Vi nr.nf
Lombardo Toledano, and Alex Gumberg s
'o
were friendly with the Trotskyite al roth
h,
I
Justification for calling Beafsl "sSini
t-'a
letter of Suzanne La Follette, November
26, 1971? nL ^ork
JamSS T FarreU Dece - b
1971? New
YorkVrtvY
P rivate interview with Farrell,
? 9 17
m
March 2d, 1972,
New YorkI City.

1

•

^^1?'

*

-

'

f

^

17

"Trotsky Desires that the U.S.S.R. Ask For
his
Judicial Extradition,'* Excelsior April 13,
1937, p
2.
,

.

1

Case of Leon Trotsky, pp. 67-69. Beals created
"considerable excitement" with his remarks on extradition,
according to an article by Frank L. Kluckhohn,
"'Plotters'
Meeting Denied By Trotsky," in the New York Times, April
1937,
For more on Beals' s view of this opening statement 13,
p. 3.
see "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturd ay Eveninq
* Post,
June 12, 1937, pp. 74, 77.
19

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

pp.

110.

70,

20

Ibid., pp. 32-34, 194-95, 196-97, 199, 201.
According to Beals, his only intention was to keep the testimony on
the basis of "proof rather than opinion," but later felt
compelled to add:
"I have a hearty contempt for all secret
services of all nations; but it was merely a question of
evidence." In reply Trotsky declared that his own remarks
were directed at the GPU, not at Beals.
21

For material on Beals and the archives see Case of
Leon Trotsky pp. 51-53.
In loc
ci
also see pp. 379-80
for testimony on Trotsky and Hearst; pp. 164-65, 193, for
Beals's interrogation of Frankel pp. 269-70, 273-74, 26265, 128-29, for evidence on Trotsky's contacts with the
Soviet Union; pp. 53-55 for the questions on Brest-Li tovsk
p. 165 for Beals's question on Sedov's passport; p. 317 for
his questions on Poland; and p. 375 for his query on individual
terrori sm.
.

,

.

,

;

22

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 294-99. In a private interview (November 9, 1971, New York City), George Novack
asserted that Spanish refugees in Mexico had convinced Beals
the Trotskyites in Spain were a "Fifth Column " in the Loyalist
Beals, quite involved in the Spanish struggle, was
side.
"upset" to learn that the Trotskyites were actually aiding
From Mexico City "P" [Pearl Kluger?] wrote "Harold"
Franco.
[Harold Isaacs?] concerning Beals, this "stupid and confused
person, despite his literary reputation. He acts too foolishly
and too publicly to be an undercover man." According to "P,"
Seals had been seen in the company of "Guzman, Azana's Mexican
,

I

710

representative, since his arrival."
ApDarenHv r*.i. w S ~lieved, with the Stalinists, that
Trotskv
Y tit Tnn ?lea 9 ue with
Franco.
For this letter
1*2
i2
Co mmitt ee for'She Defense of Leon^s.y"
SKy
la^e^'f
Tamiment T.^"""
Library,,
New York University.

%

'

23

Tr ° tS Y
,The Prelimin
^Y Inquiry at Coyoacan"
',^Spring,
(Sprina 1937),
19^^
w
Writings of Leon Trof^y, 1937-38,
nn
pp "
64-65, reprinted from Le_s CrTme^s~d^
sTaTTnel
24
Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better,"
^aturoay
Saturdav
Evening Post, June 12, 1937, pp. 76-77.

m

^2ase of Leon Trotsky, pp. 411-13. According
to
Bm1 ,
Ying t0 lay thS basis for questions on
TrnlllJt
Trotsky's secret contacts with the Fourth
International. As
a result, he asked about earlier secret
contacts with foreign
parties:
"The result was a violent explosion.
Trotsky
called my informants liars, and completely lost his
My informant, among others, I advised Trotsky, was temper.
Borodin
himself." See Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better,"
Saturday Evening Pos_t, June 12, 1937, p. 78. For more on the"
mysterious Borodin see Beals, Glass Houses
Ten Years of
Free-Lancing (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, T938),
Supposedly Borodin had tried to smuggle Tsarist
pp. 45-51.
jewels into Mexico in the false bottoms of suitcases; they
were to pay for communist propaganda. Borodin also wanted
to provoke the United States into a "war of conquest" in
Mexico; such an adventure would keep the United States from
helping Great Britain against the fledgling Soviet government.
"It was an evil thing Borodin and Trotsky wanted to promote,"
wrote Beals. Theodore Draper, in his The Roots of American
Communism (New York: The Viking Press, 1957-1966), pp. 23641, also discusses Borodin and the missing jewels.
When Beals
asked Trotsky about Borodin, "'"myblood ran cold ," " commented
a refugee from Germany, possibly Ruehle:
"'"Only an exile
could feel what Trotsky must have felt. Here was an attempt
to take the ground out from under him and leave him without
any asylum in the world." " Quoted in "Meeting Will Hear
Dewey on Trotsky Story," Socialist Call May 8, 1937, p. 2,
from an article in the "News Bulletin" of the Trotsky Defense
Committee.

^

^

;

,

»

1

,

26

Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, p. 78. Beals later contended
that his questions on Borodin were "pulled cut of all context
and given unfortunate dramatic prominence because Dewey
lifted the session on me." A year later Beals chided Calverton for not publishing his "piece" on Borodin, one which
Calverton never saw.
See Beals' s letters to Calverton, May
22, 1937, and April 11, 1938, and Calverton's reply, April 24,
,
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Cas e of Leon Trotsky

,

xxvi-vi.

28

Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The
Better," Saturri™
5at urday
Evening Post, June 12, 1937, p. 78.
'

29

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

xxvi.

p.

30,,

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

373-75.

pp.

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 415-16. For more on
this
statement see "Beals Quits Group Hearing Trotsky,"
New York
limes, April 18, 1937, p. 1, and "The Final Act of
Concerning Trotsky Ends in Blows," Excelsior April the" Trffl
18, 1937,
At another point Trotsky contended that the
12.
pp. I
sending of agents to other countries was entirely in
the hands of
the Comintern:
"There can be no talk of the possibility that
I sent agents anywhere to carry out my
personal line." He
also stated that the controversy over "'socialism in one
country'" did not arise until 1924, which Borodin could not
have anticipated in 1919:
"Consequen tly Borodin could not
have told Mr. Beals what the witness Beals communicated Tn~~
the hearing of the Commission." See Trotsky, "Mr. Beals is
a Witness" (May 18, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
1937 .3-8
p% 67, supplied by George Novack.
,

,

»

,

,

)

32

Case of Leon Trotsky pp. 416-17. Also see loc . cit
pp. 417, 451-52, for Goldman's comments on Beals.
,

.

,

33

Letter, Beals to Calverton, dated May 22, 1937, in
Calverton Papers New York Public Library, Box 3,
X*
Folder 14.
Beals wrote that during the hearings Dewey's
"judgment was flagrantly bad." He only issued additional
statements after Dewey had given releases to the press.
,

34

"Mr. Beals Resigns from Trotsky Commission," Soviet
.Russia Today
Vol. 6 (May, 1937), 38.
This statement was
probably written on April 18. Additional articles on this
declaration may be found in Frank L. Kluckhohn, "'Trial' of
Trotsky A Joke, Says Beals," New York Times April 19, 1937,
p. 6; "Beals Brands 'Trial' of Trotzky Ridiculous," Dai ly
Worker April 20, 1937, p. 4; and "The Investigation of the
Hearing of Trotsky was a Ridiculous Farce," Excel sior April
19, 1937, p. 1.
,

,

,

,

35

Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post June 12, 1937, pp. 23, 74, 76-78. This is
probably the same article that appeared in Futuro (Mexico City).
,

36

See Case of Leon Trotsky

,

pp.

xxv-vi

,

for details.
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ttn « I« the Mecca

tskY " The Preliminary Inquiry
!V°
"Comment to Journalists on Dewey Verdict"
'

in Writings of Leon

Jj^t^,

2937-38,

at Coyoacan
(December"
pp. 64-65, 69.

n

,

«

and
19?7)

38

Trotsky, "Mr. Beals as a Witness," in Writinqs
of
Leon Trotskv, 1937-38, pp. 66-68. Point by poi nt
TroTs kf
refuted many of the "errors" in Beals's Futur o
article,
such as his "sister" committed suicide in "Paris"
(his daughter
committed suicide in Berlin), and that the Norwegian
Fascists
stole his archives (one letter).
39

Ernest Sutherland Bates, "An Open Letter to Carleton
Beals," Modern Monthly, X (May, 1937), 9-10. Bates, a
member
of the Trotsky Defense Committee, was particularly
incensed
that Beals should question the integrity of John Dewey:
"if
there is one man in America whose personal integrity is above
reproach that man is John Dewey." Beals made a short reply
in the same issue of Modern Monthly
and also wrote to Calverton on the attack, in letters dated May 19, and May
22, 1937,
V. F_. Calverton Papers
New York Public Library, Box 3,
Folder 14.
,

,

40

Letter, Calverton to Trotsky, dated October 8, 1937,
in the V_. F_. Calverton Papers New York Public Library, Package No. 67 M 27.
Trotsky's reply, "To the Editor of Modern
Monthly " (October 13, 1937), appears in The Writinqs of Loon
Trotsky 1937-38 p. 78, supposedly reprinted from Social ist
Appeal September 18, 1937. Not only cannot this writer find
it in Socialist Appeal
but the date of publication precedes
the date of writing.
,

,

,

,

,

41

Letter, Rivera to Calverton, dated November 3, 1937,
in the V. F_. Calverton Papers New York Public Library,
Package No. 67 M 27. Copies of this letter went to Trotsky,
Eastman, Rorty, Brenner, Charles L. Walker, Solow, Stolberg,
and Hook.
,

42

Letter, Calverton to Trotsky, dated December 6, 1937,
in Ibid .
In a subsequent letter to Calverton, dated January
18, 1938, Rivera resigned from the editorial board of Modern
Monthly since Beals had not been driven from "the ranks."
On January 31, 1938, Calverton acknowledged Rivera's letter
of resignation, but in the meanwhile it had appeared in Social The editor of Modern Monthly
ist Appeal (January 29, 1938).
later complained, in a letter to the Appeal editors, dated
February 4, 1938, that Rivera's letter was "irrelevant," un"To use
less he wanted to imply Beals was a foreign agent.
the method he does of attempting to create this impression
without the presentation of the necessary evidence is, we feel,
not in accordance with that revolutionary integrity he proposes
,

I

e
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" er

Calverton to Beals, undated, in Ibid.
The
on the basis of intrinsic evidence,
must Have been
written between December 6, 1937, and April
11, 1938?
,

n
letter,

'

i

44

Ibid.

Letter, Beals to Calverton, dated April
11, 1938, in

45 n

.

Adamic,
,

America

My_

,

p.

89.

46„
See '"Trial by Jury,'" News-Week May 1, 1937,
17"Trotsky's Trial," Time May 17, 1937, p. 20; Editorial, p '"'The'
Trotsky Commission," Nation May 1, 1937, p. 497; "The Week "
New Republic April 28, 1937, p. 343; Bertram D. Wolfe,
"Trotsky's Defense," a review of The Case of Leon Trotsky in
New Republic November 24, 1937, p. 79; and SeTde"n Rodman,
"Trotsky in the Kremlin: An Interview," Common Sense VI
(December, 1937), 19.
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

47

See, for instance, "The Farce in Mexico," and Corliss
Lamont, "The Moscow Trials" (a radio broadcast over CBS), in
Soviet Russia Today VI (May, 1937, and January, 1938), 8,
,

14,

respectively.
48

Case of Leon Trotsky

,

p.

584.

49

Trotsky, "The Preliminary Inquiry at Coyoacan"
(Spring, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 6263, reprinted from Les Crimes de S t a 1 i n
,

,

.

"^

Ibid .

^ Ibid

.

,

pp.

64-65.

,

pp.

64-66.

52

See "The Farce in Mexico," Soviet Russia Today VI
(May, 1937), 8-9.
In the same editorial Henry L. Mencken was
quoted as saying the transcript of the Pyatakov-Radek trial
demonstrated "'the reasonable honesty and fairness of the
trials; that it establishes the guilt of all the accused beyond the slightest shade of doubt, and that it proves up to
the hilt that the Hon. Trotsky knew a great deal more about
their principal operations than he has ever admitted.'" The
editors added that "in view of the gravity of Trotsky's crimes
it is serious that anyone bearing the name of liberal should
be a party to this farce." Also see "Covering the News," in
In the same journal apNew Masses April 13, 1937, p. 10.
peared an editorial, "Trotsky Investigates Himself" (April 20,
1937, p. 28), and Robert Forsythe, "Not from the GPU," (May 4,
1937, p. 26).
,

,
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"USSR for World Peace Troyanovsky
Assails Trotzkyites," Daily Worker April Tells PressMore on this speech appears TrTThe Worker, 24, 1937 n 2
April 23, 1937 d
1, and the New York Times, April 2377937
p? 6
For an
earlier Troyanovsky attack also see the
X±sL, April 4? 1937,
I, p. 3.
At various times Trotsky took to task
Menshevik." After the verdict was rendered, he this "exsuggested
that Troyanovsky »s main task in America was
to compel a belief in Stalin's justice, but he failed:
"Stalin, as always,
needs a scapegoat.
One should not be surprised if Troyanovsky
were invited to Moscow for 'explanations.'" See
Trotsky
"Answers to Questions on Verdict" (December 13, 1937)
i
Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-38 p. 71, reprinted from n
Socialist Appeal December 25, 1937.
,

.

,

,

54

Editorial, "The Trotzky Whitewashing Expedition on
the Rocks," Daily Worker April 19, 1937, p. 6.
In the same
newspaper Mike Gold wrote that the "fools" [Dewey commissioners] did not know that "even in a fake wrestling match, there
must be some mauling, grunting and burping," yet there was a
shadow of tragedy in the hearings:
"Trotsky's mind was once
a brilliant, flaring phenomenon that for a moment contributed
to the historic scene.
Now it seems like the mind of a
criminal, low, desperate and cunning enough to drag others
down with it, as it did Radek and Piatakov." See "The Mexican 'Serio-Comedy, " May 21, 1937, p. 6.
For an attack on
Dewey, the "fifth wheel to the Trotsky wagon," see A. B.
[Alex Bittelman], "Review of the Month," Communist May, 19
,

'

,

p.

397.
55

Presenting the One-Man Show

— Written,

Directed, Acted
by Trotzky," Daily Worker April 16, 1937, p. 6. The Worker
also reprinted an April 12 editorial from the Rockford Illinois
Register-Republic rather scornful of the Mexican hearings.
,

,

56

"'Trial by Jury,'" News-Week

,

May

1,

1937, p.

17.

57

"Trotsky's Trial," Time May 17, 1937, p. 20. This
article, basically a review of Dewey's Mecca speech, also
quoted "Augur" in the New York Times who contended that the
powerful Trotskyite sect had managed to spirit Spanish gold
out of Madrid.
,

,

co

"The Stalin-Trotsky Feud" [in "News Behind the News"],
Common Sense VI (April, 1937), 7. According to the editors,
Trotsky and the "distinguished American committee of liberals
and radicals" had thrown enough doubt on Stalin's case "to
discredit it in public opinion to a damaging extent."
,

Editorial, "The Trotsky Commission," Nation May
Also see "The Shape of Things," Nation
1937, pp. 497-97.

1,

,

,

1
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May 22, 1937, p. 578, for more on the
"'cleanings.'"
60" A nos
a1
ticism in the Moscow Trials," New
g
w,i
fi
d~
2
Republic May 19,
.

.

—

,

'

1937, pp. 33-34.

,

6

'

Ibid-

Also see Malcolm Cowley, "The Record
P- 34.
Tr al,
3
ViSW ° f the transc ^Pt in the PyatakoSek
I
i
o
^lal. New
Republic April 7, 1937, pp. 267-70. This
was by
all odds the "most exciting book I have read
this year,"
Cowley informed his readers. Also see Walter Duranty,
"The
Riddle of Russia," New Republic July 14, 1937,
pp. 270-72
for an analysis of the Trotsky-Hitler "synthesis."
i

.

a

f

^

.

1

,

,

62

Frank A. Warren, III, Liberals and Communism
The
"Red Decade" Revisited Blooming ton
Indiana!
Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 178-79.
:

(

,

63

This title is from a poster in the folder, "Of
American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky," Tamiment
Library New York University. On the eve of the Mecca meeting
Dewey gave an interview that appeared in the New York Times
May 8, 1937, p. 7. The meeting took in $1,177.15, against
expenses of $1,030.47, according to the American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 5,
10, 11, Tamiment Library
New York University. The Trotsky
Defense Committee was concerned that "the capitalist press
refused to open its columns to the Mexican hearings," and that
the news it printed was "under-played and cut, individual
remarks were torn out of context," and the volumes of factual
and documentary material presented by Trotsky while on the
witness stand were passed over "in almost complete silence."
It was also asserted that Kluckhohn's reporting in the Times
"reached a new low in vicious editorializing," according to
an article, "John Dewey to Report on Trotsky," in Socialist
Call April 24, 1937, p. 7.
,

,

,

,

64

John Dewey, " Truth is on the March " Reports and
Remarks on the Trotsky Hearings in Mexico, Mecca Temple, New
York City, May 9, 1937 (New York: American Committee for
This interim
the Defense of Leon Trotsky, 1937), pp. 5-9.
report also appears in Case of Leon Trotsky pp. xxiii-xxvii.
,

,

65

For reports on the meeting see
Ibid .
pp. 10-11.
"Trotsky Probe Must Go on, Says Dewey," Socialist Call May
15, 1937, p. 5; "Meddling Charged in Trotsky Inquiry," New
York Times May 10, 1937, p. 2; and "Trotsky's Trial," Time
May 17, 1937, p. 20.
,

,

,

66
fi

7

Dewey,

" Truth

is on the March ," pp.

14-15.

Letters, from George Novack to Defense Committee
members, dated March 16, April 28, and June 21, 1937,

,

,
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Tamiment Library

,

New York University.

68

Not Guilty Report of the Commission
t££ Charges made against Leon Trotsky in fh. of inquiry into
John Dewey et al_.
(New York:
Harperl ir^tT^rTTli^TT
9j ~ 96 -. For Trotsky's comments on
the members of the
French ^
Commission see "The Preliminary Inquiry at
Coyoacan,"
Y
in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38,
p. 63.

M^f^f^

,

,

•J

'

,

69

Not Guilty

pp.

,

7,

395-96.

70

This material is based on an interview with Suzanne
La Follette (New York City, March 7, 1972), and Not Guilty
Her various memoranda on the cases of HoTtzman
p. vn.
Romm, and Pyatakov may be found in the Dewey Commission
Exhibits, Trotsky Archives (Houghton Library, Harvard University)
,

71_

For more on the purge of the Red Army see Chapter

I.

72

Editorial, "Soviet Chills and Fever," New Republic
June 23, 1937, p. 175-75. Also see a letter from Max Eastman
in the same journal, July 7, 1937, p. 253, and an article by
H. N. Brailsford on the purge, "What Has Happened in the
USSR?," July 28, 1937, pp. 323-25.
,

73

"The Shape of Things," Nation June 19, 1937, p.
For a much more critical view of the purge in the same
691.
magazine see Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men,"
July 10, 1937, p. 46.
,

74

See "Smashing Spy Ring Shows USSR Power, Says Soviet
Paper," Daily Worker June 12, 1937, p. 2. The Worker also
ran stories on the purge in subsequent issues:
June 15, p.
2; June 16, p. 2; June 17, p. 2; June 22, p. 2; June 25, p.
Also see the July
6; July 5, p. 4, and so on, all in 1937.
1937 issue of Soviet Russia Today p. 5, for more on the
victorious purge of the Red Army.
,

,

75

Leon Trotsky, "The Decapitation of the Red Army"
(June 17, 1937) in Writings cf Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 55No. 56-7,
60, reprinted from Bulletin of the Qpposi tion
July-August, 1937.
,

,

,

76

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast

,

pp.

436-38.

77

Suzanne La Follette, Notarized Statement, Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), dated August 8, 1940,
in the Trotsky Archives .
78

(July 6,

Leon Trotsky, "The Questions of Wendelin Thomas"
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 19 3 7-38 pp.
,

,

1

1

,
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159-60, reprinted from Socialist Appeal^
August 21, 1937
79-

in Particular, Trotsky, -Hue and
Crv Ovpr
Kronstadt" (January 15, 1938), and "More
on the Suppression
tM
f
r
S
U
6
938)
in
19^7-38
19 37 ?8
^0
,'J
160-64,
pp.
164, reprinted from New InTer^aironai
April and August, 1938. Trotsky argued,
TTTe ssence, that
" armSd
W S
reaction " of P et ty bourgeoisie;
RoT°i
?
the Bolsheviki
had to "extinguish the fire" as soon as
it
started
order to reduce the number of victims. His
critics
were merely "parlor pinks" who did not understand
the necessity of iron discipline in a revolutionary situation.
Trotsky
also contended that he had not "personally" directed
the
suppression of the insurrection, but assumed complete
responsibility for the action. For the review of a fictionalized
account of Trotsky and his "guilt" over Kronstadt, see
Joseph
Hansen, "Trotsky 'Psychoanalyzed,'" review of Bernard Wolfe,
The Great Prince Died in Leon Trotsky
The Man and His Work
(New York:
Merit Publishers, 1969), pp. ~8~re"pTin~te"d
from International Socialist Review Summer, 1959. For
another view see Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed Trotsky
1879-1921 Vintage Books (New York:
Random House, 1954/1965 ),
,

^

^

'

M^^onS

^

m

,

;

,

:

,

,

pp.

510-14.
80

Quoted in "Trotsky Probe Must Go On, Says Dewey,"
Socialist Call May 15, 1937, p. 5.
,

8

For a typical attack see A. B. Magil, "Poisonous
Trotzkyism Is Spread into Socialist Party s Decisions,"
Daily Worker June 3, 1937, p. 6. For other stories on the
Socialist Party and its Trotskyite infection see the Daily
Worker
August 12, p. 1; August 13, p. 1; August 14, p. 6;
August 26, p. 2; August 28, p. 1; and September 7, 1937, p.
These stories focussed, in particular, on the expulsion
1.
of various Trotskyites.
Also see M. Olgin, "The Unmasking
of the Trotskyists in the USA" [" Rozoblachenic Trotskistov
v SShA"], Pravda, March 21, 1937, p # 5.
Olgin cited a statement of thirty-six Wisconsin Socialists, who advocated the
expulsion of the Trotskyites, and the resignation of all
Socialists from the Trotsky Defense Committee.
1

,

:

82

See articles in the Sociali st Cal
September 11,
Also see
1937, pp. 4, 6-7, and September 25, 1937, p. 7.
"Socialists Expel Trotsky Disciples," New York Times September 6, 1937, p. 8.
,

,

Q

O

See "V. D. Scudder Quits Trotzky Committee," Daily
Worker, June 3, 1937, p. 2.
She was a professor emeritus of
English at Wellesley College.
84

Trotsky charged that Jacob Walcher, a former leader
of the German Communist Party, and one of his visitors at

1
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Palais in 1933, refused to give testimony
before the Dewev
Commission on "an obviously false pretext."
See Trotskv
"Their Morals and Ours" (February 16,
1958), in Their
Ours:
Marxist Versus Liberal Views on MoralT^ Morals
wffP^
Introduction by George Novack (New^oTk :~
MeTiFTwishers?
and Deutscher, Prophet Outcast,
P- 2
ing to David Dallm, Max Lieber, at one time p. 263. AccordTrotsky's
literary agent in New York, was actually an
undercover Soviet
agent.
In February 1937 Trotsky charged that Lieber
practically sabotaged his literary work in America, and
dropped
him.
Then in April the Defense Committee requested permission
to examine the correspondence between author and agent"Lieber informed the committee that he had destroyed the
correspondence. Today we know that he had turned it over to
the Soviet intelligence services." See Dallin, Soviet Espion a
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955 ), pp. 419-20V
qf
Whitaker Chamber also identified Lieber as "Paul" in an underground communist cell. See his Witness (New York: Random
House, 1952), pp. 44-46, 355-94.
But Suzanne La Follette did
not remember anything about this episode in an interview
(New York City, March 7, 1972).
St.

m

^

'

•

85„

,

.

Corliss Lamont, "Faith In the Soviet Union," Soviet
RussjLa Today, VI (August, 1937), 6.
This article also appeared
in the Daily Worker August 24, 1937, p. 7.
,

86„
Case of Leon Trotsky

,

p.

444.

87

This statement is based on an interview with Suzanne
La Follette, March 7, 1972, New York City.
88

Ibid .
This assertion is unverified, except for
Miss La Follette' s statement.
89

Letter, George Novack to "Friends" of the Trotsky
Defense Committee (June 21, 1937), Tamiment Library New York
University. Also see articles in Socialist Appeal August
28 and September 25, 1937, p. 7.
,

,

90

See Socialist Appeal

,

September 25, 1937,

p.

7.

9

James T. Farrell, "Cause Ce'lebre," review of The
Case of Leon Trotsky in the Saturday Review of Literature
October 16, 1937, p. 22.
,

,

"The Charges Against Trotsky," review of The Case of
Leon Trotsky in the Times Literary Supplement November 13,
1937, p. 860.
,

,

93

Kingsley Martin, "The Soviet System," review of The
Case of Leon Trotsky and other works, New Statesman and Nation
November 16, 1937, pp. 758, 760.

,
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94

.

Michael Ross, untitled review of The
Case of Leon

December 11, 193 7, pp. 648-55T

'

96

Bertram D. Wolfe, "Trotsky's Defense," a review
of
The Case of Leon Trotsky in New Republic November
24, 1937
A typographic correction on the passage about
p. 79.
Beals
in this review appeared in the same journal,
December
1937,
Trotsky was somewhat stung by Wolfe's review, 8,and
p. 154.
devoted a long article to a counterattack. Wolfe, in his
view, should not have been surprised by the trials, since
they
were prepared over a period of thirteen years, and represented
a basic struggle between two historic tendencies:
bureaucratic and proletarian. Trotsky was particularly upset that
Wolfe viewed him merely as a "'devil'" figure through which
to strike internal foes.
He admitted, however, the "dialectic" of the frame-up, i.e., that Stalin sacrificed dozens of
former comrades to create the "fantastic figure of the counterrevolutionary arch-conspirator Trotsky," and then used this
figure to destroy his adversaries. But never did Trotsky deny
that an internal opposition could arise within the Party:
the
"
trials and executions represented a form of preventive civil
war" which the bureaucracy led against the masses and which
the more consistent Bonapartist wing of the bureaucracy led
against the less reliable elements. Wolfe saw "a little piece
of truth," admitted Trotsky, but he should restudy Marxism
and the Soviet Revolution:
"Otherwise, Wolfe will, with a
delay of some years, have to make new discoveries." See
Trotsky, "Bertram Wolfe on the Moscow Trials" (November 25,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 pp. 78-80, reprinted from Socialist Appeal December 4, 1937.
„

,

,

'

,

,

,

97

American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), p. 3. This report mentioned reviews
not found
in the Manchester Guardian and Chal lenge of Youth
Sidney Hook, apparently, contributed a reby this writer.
view to Books (October 10, 1937, p. 8), and another one
appeared in the Boston Transcript (October 9, 1937, p. 3).
,

QO

10-11.
From tickets sold to the meeting the Committee grossed $370.68, against expenses of $379.87
Also see Letter, Novack to Committee "Friends," dated November
New York University. For
27, 1937, in the Tamiment Library
other reports on the meeting see "Trotsky Cleared By Dewey_
Inquiry," New York Times December 13, 1937, pp. 1, 16, which
included a long summary of Dewey's final speech and the abstract of the findings. Also see "Stalin Methods Danger to

Ibid .

,

pp.

5,

,

,

.
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World Justice, Says Trotsky Commission,"
Socialist Call
December 18, 1937, p. 8.
99

Stanley Randolphe, "Mr. Dewey Stakes His
Reputation,"
December 28, 1937, p. 9. This writer scoffed
at
the length of the speeches and lack of substance
in the proceedings.
He concluded his article asking:
nine months of
work, many meetings, much expense for what? "To
'reveal'
what any schoolboy could have found by buying the official
proceedings for one dollar, plus a discovery that Soviet
procedure in treason cases differs from Soviet procedure in
regular statutory cases."
M
Nej, M
Masses,

—

100

"Speech of Dr. John Dewey, Chairman" (December 12,
1937), pp. 1-3, in Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second
folder), Trotsky Archives .
101

102

Ibid.

,

pp.

4-10.

Ibid .

,

pp.

10-11

103

Not Guil ty pp. xiii-xv. For a twenty-three page
"abstract" of the findings, distributed to the press, see
Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), Trotsky
Archives .
,

104

Farrell contended that Dewey was quite fatigued, in
"Dewey in Mexico," John Dewey a Symposium ed. by Sidney Hook,
For Dewey's address see "Speech of Dr. John Dewey
p. 376.
Made December 13, 1937, over Columbia Broadcasting Network,"
Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), Trotsky
Archives . This debate was also covered in "Dr. Dewey Warns
on Soviet Tactics," and "Topics of The Times," New York Times
December 14 and 15, 1937, pp. 10 and 24, respectively.
,

,

105

Corliss Lamont, "The Moscow Trials," Soviet Russia
Today VI (January 1938), 14, 26. This address also appears
as "Corliss Lamont Assails Dewey's 'Defense' of Trotzky in
Broadcast, Cites Record of Moscow Trials Proving Trotzky 's
Fascist Links," in Daily Worker December 14, 1937, p. 4.
In a biting article on Lamont, Sidney Hook asserted that if
the Soviet regime and its achievement were indivisible, then
Lamont was " committed in advance to apologizing for every
future frameup that Stalin, the G.P.U. and the indivisible
regime may concoct ." For more on Lamont see Hook, "Corliss
'Friend of the G.P.U.,' " in Modern Monthly X (March,
Lamont:
Also see Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade (New
1938), 5-8.
Arlington House, 1941/1970), pp. 257-62.
Rochelle, N. Y.
,

,

,

:

106

Quoted in "Dr. Dewey and Dr. Copeland," Soviet Russia
Today VI (January, 1938), 3. Troyanovsky s statement was
probably made on December 15.
•

,
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107 n

Dewey also challenged Troyanovsky and
the Soviet
government to provide new evidence on
theTrotsky controversy
S
w
wlll n t0 re °P en the hearings a?
tiL
time.
Z1
J ?
See the statement
in Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (no
date), second folder, Trotsky Archives
It also appeared
in
part, in a New York TimlTstSry Decem
ber 17, ?93?fp! lo'
The new "frame-up" which Dewey alluded
to probably involved
the mysterious "Robinson-Rubens" case.
Donald L. Robinson
and his wife disappeared in the Soviet
Union in
When the State Department inquired about their late 1937
whereabouts,
it was discovered that they had traveled on
false American
passports.
The communist press immediately charged that
thev
were secret "Trotskyite" agents on a secret mission.
The
Trotskyites, and others, charged that the Robinsons were
actually GPU agents, possibly potential witnesses in a new
"amalgam" that would involve Trotsky and the Dewey Commission.
According to Hook, "There is some evidence that another Moscow trial was being planned in which Robinson, a minor agent
in the GPU, and Rubens, his American wife, would try to
implicate Dewey in order to discredit his Commission's report."
See Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, 1859-1952,"
Commentary Vol. 14 (September, 1952), 251. For more on the
case see "Dr. Dewey and Dr. Copeland," Soviet Russia Today
VI (January, 1938), 3; Chambers, Witness pp. 398-400; Lyons,
Red Decade
264-65; and an article by Herbert Solow in American
Mercury July, 1939. In January 1938 the New York Times
Daily Worker and other papers ran frequent articles on the
developing story.

T

"

"

.

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,
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Trotsky, "A Telegram to the Dewey Commission" (December 13, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38 p. 72,
reprinted from Socialist Appeal December 25, 1937. With
slight variations, this is the same as T4247.1 in the Trotsky
Archives but dated December 9, 1937. It was read by Dewey
in his CBS debate with Lamont.
,

,

,

,

109

Trotsky, "Comment to Journalists on Dewey Verdict"
(December 13, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky 1937-38
January 15,
pp. 68-69, reprinted from the [Scottish] Forward
T4252.1,
1938.
This is the same as the Trotsky Archives
"Brief Commentary Upon the Verdict of the International Commission on the Moscow Trials" (December 13, 1937). But it
contained additional comments, including the contention that
the twenty-three points of the verdict resounded "like blows
It is the political and human
of a hammer nailing a coffin.
honor of the chiefs of the G.P.U., commencing with Stalin,
that lies in the coffin." The final judgment vindicated the
honor of the accused in the trials, the honor of the workers'
movement, and also had "enormous moral value" for Trotsky
and his family.
,

,

,

:

110

Trotsky, "Answers to Questions on Verdict" (December
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1937) in Writings of Leon Trnl±j. 1937-38
pp. 69-71
reprinted from Socialist Appeal December 25, 1937
This
article appears in the Trotsky Archives
T4254, "Answers to
questions of journalists in regard to the verdict
of the
International Commission" (December 13, 1937). Trotsky
also
contended that it "would not be an exaggeration to
say that
the decision of the Commission will enter history
as the most
important of all verdicts ever pronounced by any court "
See
Trotsky Archives
T4244.1, "... A great verdict!" (December 13, 1937).
For more on the interview with the press see
"Bayonets Guard Trotsky," New York Times, December 14, 19^7,
13,

,

,

:

;

p.

10.

1:L1

Interview with George Novack, New York City, November
Cannon's comments are quoted from Dwight MacDonald,
9, 1971.
Memoirs of a_ Revolutionist
Essays in Political Criticism
(New York:
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 274.
This
writer cannot find any direct attack on socialism in Dewey's
December 12 speech at the Hotel Center. However, in a subsequent interview he did take issue with the basic premises
of Russian Marxism in no uncertain terms.
See Agnes E. Meyer,
"Significance of the Trotsky Trial:
Interview with John
Dewey," International Conciliation February, 1938, pp. 53-60,
reprinted from The Washington Post December 19, 1937.
;

,

,

112

Editorial, "The Soviet Election," New York Times

,

December 14, 1937, p. 24.
113

Norman Thomas, "At The Front," Socialist Call

cember 18, 1937,
114

p.

,

De-

4.

See an article on the verdict in Socialist Appeal

December 18, 1937, p.

,

1.

115

"Dr. Dewey and Dr. Copeland," Soviet Russia Today VI
For another attack on Dewey and Stolberg
(January, 1938), 3.
in the same magazine see the February 1938 issue, p. 8.
,

116

"Aiding the Agents of the Gestapo,"
Editorial
Daily Worker December 14, 1937, p. 6.
,

,

117

"American Labor Has A New Enemy," Daily
Editorial
December 22, 1937, p. 6.
,

Worker

,

118

Communist
119

A.
,

[Alex Bittelman], "Review of the Month,"
XVII (January, 1938), 14-15.
B.

Robert Forsythe, "Is John Dewey Honest?," New Masses
January 4, 1938, p. 16. Lyons contended that Forsythe was
compensating for his weekly chunk of "creampuf f ery" in
Colliers written under the name Kyle Crichton: he was
probably avenging the fate that forced him to compose "drooling
,

,

,

»

"
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sweet articles about glamour girls."
p.

See Lyons, Red Decade,

328.

120

Lyons, Red Decade, pp. 327-29.
For Heywood Broun's
attack on Dewey for comments on communist
penetration of the
CIO, see the New Republic January 12,
1938,
280-81
Sidney Hook answered the attack for Dewey in pp.
the same magazine,
y
February 16, 1938, p. 48.
,

'

121

For a Soviet appreciation of Dewey's philosophy see
"The U.S.S.R. Views American Philosophy," trans, by Mirra
Ginsburg, with a Foreword by Sidney Hook, in Moder n Review, I
(November, 1947), 649-60. Also see William W. BrickfmaT^
"John Dewey and Overseas Education," Introduction to John
Dewey' s Impressions of Soviet Russia and the revolutionary
world:
Mexico-China-Turkey 1929 (New York: Teachers College,
Columbia University, 1964), pp. 20-21.
,

122

"D'yui (Dewey), Dzhon," Bol shaya Sovetskaya
Entsiklopediya [ Large Soviet Encyclopedia ], Vol. 15, second
edition (Moscow:
Gosudars tvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel s tvo
September, 1952),. pp. 343-44. Dewey's "instrumentalism,
according to this article, served the "rapacious imperialistic
state" by advocating that workers avoid strikes and be submissive to capitalism.
'

"

123
p.

"The Shape of Things," Nation

,

December 25, 1937,

703.

124

"Trotsky," New Republic December 22, 1937, pp. 181Also see Warren, Liberals and Communism p. 169.
,

82.

,

125

Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 382, 393. According
to Deutscher, Dewey was relatively unknown in Europe, and few
reports of the Mexican hearings were reprinted in European
But the final verdict was rendered in December, not
papers.
"September," as he states. Also see Victor Serge, Vie et
Mort de Trotsky (Paris: Amiot*Dumont 1951), pp. 275-76.
,

,

1

Trotsky "hoarded the smallest particles of time," and
ri gidly organized his life, omitting all unnecessary tasks:
•Eating, dressing, all these miserable little things that have
to be repeated every day,'" interfered with more important tasks.
On one trip Trotsky was out of the car time after time "splattered from head to foot with mud, red brick mud even in his white
bushy hair, pushing the automobile, losing his white cap, organizing campesinos, ropes, drivers, when we were completely
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The Man and
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35, 64-66, reprinted from Fourth International
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At
An
Autobiography
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The Man and
His Work, p. 11.
For more on the death of Leon Sedov see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast pp. 392-97, and Trotsky, Leon
Sedof
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,

,

Mimeographed copy of Corliss Lamont telegram to
John Dewey, dated March 5, 1938, in Dewey Commission Exhibit
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Dewey tartly declared:
not prevent use of intelligence and"Experimental
knowledge previously obtained. . . . Material authentic
given out by
Committee of Inquiry has had my prior authorization.
Taccept
full responsibility.
No cause for worry." Slightly different
versions of these telegrams appear in Sidney Hook,
"Corliss
6 ° f thS G - P - U -''"
Modern Monthly X (March,
VS?S?
'/^T
1938
For more on Lamonfs attack on the Committee
7-8.
and
Boas's repudiation of the statement see the New York
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March 6, 1938, p. 27, and March 5, 1938, p.
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